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							 “it	is	hardly	possible	to	overrate	the	value	.	.	.	of	placing	human	beings	in	contact	with	persons	dissimilar	to	themselves,	and	with	modes	of	thought	and	action	unlike	those	with	which	they	are	familiar.	Such	communication	has	always	been,	and	is	peculiarly	in	the	present	age,	one	of	the	primary	sources	of	progress.”		
- John	Stuart	Mills,	1848													
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ABSTRACT		This	thesis	combines	a	literature	review	and	a	case	study	in	order	to	examine	startup	accelerators	as	social	networks.	The	literature	review	looks	at	two	distinct	bodies	of	research;	the	first	on	Social	Network	Theory,	in	order	to	create	a	framework	within	which	to	describe	an	accelerator	as	a	social	network,	the	second	on	startup	accelerators	in	order	to	understand	their	structure	and	evolution	as	business	support	programs.	The	case	study	uses	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	founded	by	this	researcher,	to	test	some	of	the	ideas	formulated	from	the	literature.			The	literature	demonstrates	that	accelerators	are	social	networks,	and	the	dynamics	between	the	different	actors	in	those	networks	can	be	explained	and	defined	using	the	vocabulary	and	concepts	of	Social	Network	Theory.	This	describes	the	structure	of	the	accelerator	network,	and	how	such	a	network	is	able	to	reward	people	with	Social	Capital,	which	is	observed	in	this	thesis	to	be	the	currency	of	accelerators.			Consequently,	the	unique	nature	of	the	research	in	this	thesis	is	to	describe	accelerators	using		the	language	and	concepts	of	Social	Network	Theory,	providing	new	insights	into	how	and	why	accelerators	work.					This	understanding	identifies	that	value	in	accelerators	lies	in	their	ability	to	facilitate	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information,	and	to	provide	early	access	to	this	information.	Creating	this	value	also	enables	accelerators	to	withdraw	access	to	that	value	as	a	threat	of	sanction	against	bad	actors.			Other	aspects	of	the	social	network	structure	and	behaviour	of	accelerators	are	examined,	including	the	tendency	of	weak	ties	and	non-redundancy	of	information	to	decay	over	time,	suggesting	that	this	may	explain	the	typical	fixed	term	of	most	accelerators.		Combined,	this	theory	leads	to	an	accelerator	being	described	as	a	dynamic	social	network	with	a	high	level	of	closure	at	the	core,	set	within	a	weak	network	architecture,	with	many	weak	ties,	and	consequently	many	bridging	ties.	It	is	policed	using	link	reciprocity,	and	its	currency	is	Social	Capital.	The	skill	used	to	operate	in	this	network	involves	having	complex	role	and	status	sets.			
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GLOSSARY	OF	TERMS			
Accelerator	A	fixed	term	program	that	delivers	support	to	a	cohort	of	startups			
Accelerator	Manager	The	person	or	team	that	run	an	accelerator		
Actor	In	the	context	of	Social	Network	Theory	an	actor	is	an	individual	or	entity	within	a	social	network	fitting	the	position	of	a	node,	where	nodes	are	connected	by	ties	to	form	networks		
Angel	Investor	An	individual	who	makes	investments	into	startups		
Angelist.co	A	website	listing	jobs	and	investment	opportunities	relating	to	startups		
Aravind		A	world	leading	eye-care	hospital	and	research	facility	in	India		
Crunchbase.com	An	online	database	of	people	and	companies	in	the	startup	sector		
Demo	day		An	event	at	the	end	of	an	accelerator	program	during	which	the	cohort	pitch	their	startups	to	an	audience,	usually	of	investors	and	mentors		
F6S.com	A	website	that	lists	accelerators	and	manages	their	online	application	processes	
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Founder	Someone	who	has	established	a	startup		
Incubation	The	process	of	supporting	early	stage	businesses		
Incubator	A	building	that	rents	out	desks	and	office	space	along	with	some	business	support	activities		
Institut	de	la	Vision	A	leading	French	institute	promoting	eye-care	research	and	innovation,	based	in	Paris		
Lean	Startup		An	innovation	approach	based	on	the	writing	of	Eric	Ries,	which	sees	rapid	iterations	defined	by	testing	and	refining	a	product		
Linkedin.com	A	professional	online	networking	website		
Link	Reciprocity		The	process	of	rewarding	co-operators	by	giving	them	more	ties	into	a	network,	and	sanctioning	bad	actors	by	cutting	their	ties	into	a	network		
Mentor	Within	an	accelerator,	a	mentor	is	someone	who	offers	their	time	for	free	to	support	startups	with	advice,	knowledge,	and	contacts		
Moorfields	Eye	Hospital	A	leading	ophthalmology	hospital	in	London,	UK		
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NDA	Non-disclosure	agreement;	a	type	of	legal	contract		
NESTA	National	Endowment	for	Science,	Technology,	and	the	Arts;	a	British	organisation	that	has	carried	out	extensive	research	into	accelerators	
Node	A	point	in	a	network,	connected	by	ties		
Norms	The	rules	and	customs	developed	by	a	social	network			
Ophthalmology	Today	A	leading	publication	about	Ophthalmology		
Rainmaking	Loft	A	co-working	space	in	Berlin	in	which	startups	and	freelancers	rent	desks	and	small	offices		
RNIB	The	Royal	National	Institute	for	Blind	People;	the	UK’s	leading	charity	for	blind	and	visually	impaired	people		
Seed-db.com	An	online	list	of	accelerators		
Seedranking.com		A	website	ranking	accelerators	on	an	annual	basis		
SME		Small	and	medium	enterprise		
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Social	Capital	The	currency	of	social	networks;	the	social	equivalent	to	economic	or	human	capital		
Social	Enterprise	A	company	that	is	established	to	realise	social	outcomes	rather	than	just	to	make	money		
Social	Network	A	network	of	people	connected	through	varying	types	of	social	ties		
Startup		An	early	stage	company	that	aims	to	be	disruptive	and	grow	quickly		
Startup	Bootcamp		One	of	Europe’s	leading	accelerator	companies		
Strong	Tie	A	close	friend	or	contact	with	whom	there	are	multiple	mutual	connections		
Tech	A	shorthand	for	a	sector	or	business	type	that	uses	technology	in	an	innovative	way		
TechCrunch	A	web	blog	that	is	the	leading	source	of	news	and	information	about	startups	and	the	tech	sector		
Venture	Capital	Investor	(VC)	A	fund	that	makes	investments	into	startups		
	
VOIP	Voice	over	IP;	a	form	of	internet	based	calling,	such	as	Skype	or	Google	Hangout			
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Wayra	An	accelerator	run	by	communications	company,	Telefonica		
Weak	Network	Architecture	A	network	in	which	there	are	many	people	who	are	not	highly	connected		
Weak	Tie	An	acquaintance	with	whom	there	are	few	or	no	mutual	connections			
Y	Combinator	The	first	accelerator,	launched	by	Paul	Graham	in	2005				 							
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				CHAPTER	1.	INTRODUCTION		
	
This	chapter	introduces	the	concepts	of	a	startup	accelerator	and	Social	Network	Theory.	
The	chapter	also	introduces	other	core	themes,	and	explains	the	aims,	outcomes,	approach,	
and	structure	of	the	thesis.		
											
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 18 
1.1	A	STARTUP	ACCELERATOR	IS	A	SOCIAL	NETWORK		This	thesis	examines	startup	accelerators	through	the	lens	of	Social	Network	Theory.	The	researcher	set	up	and	ran	an	accelerator,	EyeFocus,	and	prior	to	that	was	involved	in	mentoring	at	numerous	other	accelerators	in	Europe.	The	thesis	seeks	to	understand	a	number	of	peculiar	characteristics	of	accelerators	the	researcher	experienced	whilst	working	with	accelerators.	This	included	why	mentors	volunteer	their	time	for	free,	helping	the	startups	develop	their	business,	and	helping	the	accelerator	make	more	successful	investments,	and	why	the	startups	trust	the	mentors	and	explain	in	detail	what	they	are	doing,	without	asking	them	to	sign	an	NDA.	These	aspects	of	accelerators	are	unusual	compared	to	other	areas	of	business	activity,	where	people	charge	money	for	providing	their	expertise,	and	require	contracts	before	sharing	sensitive	business	details.			This	research	applies	Social	Network	Theory	to	understanding	these	questions	in	order	to	examine	and	describe	the	specific	type	of	social	network	that	makes	up	an	accelerator.	It	was	observed	in	practice	by	the	researcher	that	the	startup	sector	is	highly	networked,	and	that	accelerators	appear	to	play	an	important	part	in	connecting	people	within	the	wider	tech	ecosystem.	The	role	of	‘weak	ties’	in	supporting	innovation	suggested	that	answers	to	these	questions	lay	in	the	network	structure	of	accelerators,	which	led	the	researcher	to	turn	to	Social	Network	Theory	to	understand	better	why	accelerators	function	as	they	do,	and	have	these	peculiar	characteristics.				
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This	thesis	will	therefore	use	the	language	and	concepts	of	Social	Network	Theory	to	examine	startup	accelerators.	The	premise	of	the	exercise	is	that	a	startup	accelerator	is	a	social	network,	being	a	group	of	people.	Whilst	accelerators	are	seen	primarily	as	business	incubation	programs,	the	reasons	they	are	able	to	achieve	these	outcomes	can	be	examined	by	understanding	the	underlying	structure	of	the	social	network	peculiar	to	an	accelerator.		To	approach	this	hypothesis,	the	thesis	will	first	carry	out	reviews	of	the	literature	relating	to	Social	Network	Theory	and	to	startup	accelerators.	The	former	will	provide	an	overview	of	the	key	concepts	and	vocabulary	that	will	be	used	to	describe	and	examine	an	accelerator.	The	latter	will	review	the	inception,	evolution,	and	growing	diversity	of	accelerators,	and	to	what	extent	they	have	been	the	subject	of	academic	research.			The	following	chapters	will	examine	findings	and	interpretations	from	examining	accelerators	through	the	lens	of	Social	Network	Theory,	and	then	use	insights	from	this	exercise	to	inform	the	design	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	which	will	act	as	a	case	study	for	this	thesis.			The	insights	from	the	case	study,	combined	with	findings	from	the	theoretical	research,	will	lead	to	findings	and	conclusions	about	how	accelerators	should	be	understood,	designed,	and	evaluated	in	the	future.		
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The	intention	is	that	this	will	allow	a	better	understanding	of	what	roles	the	different	stakeholders	in	an	accelerator	play	in	relation	to	each	other,	and	to	the	social	network	that	underlies	an	accelerator.				1.1.1	What	is	a	startup	accelerator?		In	2005	Paul	Graham,	an	American	entrepreneur	and	investor,	established	the	first	accelerator	program,	Y	Combinator	(see	2.3.1.1).	He	decided	to	invest	small	sums	of	money	in	a	cohort	of	tech	entrepreneurs	and	support	them	as	a	group	to	develop	their	concepts.	His	intention	was	to	create	an	efficiency	by	investing	on	the	same	terms	into	a	cohort,	and	to	be	able	to	offer	them	the	same	support	at	one	time.	This	was	instead	of	acting	like	an	angel	investor	and	investing	individually	in	each	company,	with	separate	terms	and	negotiations,	and	then	supporting	each	company	on	an	individual	basis.			Since	then,	the	concept	of	startup	accelerators	has	spread	from	the	US	to	Europe,	and	become	a	global	phenomenon	(see	2.3.1.1).	Within	academia,	the	study	of	accelerators	is	relatively	new,	and	therefore	lacks	large	data	sets	or	longitudinal	studies	(see	2.3.1.2).	This	makes	it	difficult	to	evaluate	definitively	whether	they	work	or	not,	and	to	reach	a	single	definition	of	an	accelerator.	As	will	be	examined	in	the	literature	review,	academics	have	continued	to	struggle	with	this	lack	of	data,	or	clarity	about	what	an	accelerator	is.			
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Within	this	thesis,	defining	an	accelerator	forms	a	core	part	of	the	literature	review	(see	2.5)	in	order	to	provide	a	working	definition	for	the	following	chapters.	It	also	forms	part	of	the	conclusion,	at	which	point	a	new	definition	is	proposed	based	on	the	findings	of	this	thesis.	The	literature	review	traces	the	evolution	of	accelerators	from	Y	Combinator	through	to	the	three	typologies	of	program	(see	2.3.3.5)	established	by	Pauwels	et	al	(2015),	which	demonstrate	how	the	first	accelerator	model	developed	into	a	range	of	program	types	with	different	aims	and	approaches	but	similar	underlying	characteristics.			However,	what	remains	a	constant	throughout	the	discussion	of	accelerators	is	that	they	are	programs	intended	to	accelerate	the	development	of	early	stage	companies.	As	will	be	examined,	an	accelerator	is	a	fixed	term	program	that	usually	lasts	three	months,	though	can	run	for	up	to	12	months	(see	2.3.2.4).	An	accelerator	provides	a	combination	of	education,	mentoring,	and	networking	(see	2.3.2.4).	It	does	so	in	a	way	that	creates	efficiencies	for	those	delivering	and	receiving	the	value	it	creates	by	forming	a	cohort	of	participants	(Tarani	2010;	see	2.3.2.4).	This	cohort	functions	like	a	class	in	a	university,	allowing	one	lesson	to	be	delivered	to	a	group	of	startups	at	once,	rather	than	individually	multiple	times.	It	also	creates	a	focus	of	attention	for	the	other	stakeholders	that	form	an	ecosystem	around	the	accelerator,	offering	them	the	opportunity	to	meet	a	validated	group	of	startups	at	once,	rather	than	having	to	find	and	meet	them	all	individually	(see	2.3.2.4).			In	this	respect,	the	accelerator	performs	a	function	for	the	wider	ecosystem	in	which	it	exists	by	selecting	the	best	startups	from	a	larger	group	of	applicants,	and	convening	
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them	in	one	space	so	that	investors,	corporates,	and	others	can	meet	them.	It	also	selects	and	convenes	a	group	of	mentors,	who	provide	advice,	knowledge,	and	new	contacts	to	the	startups	to	help	them	develop	(see	2.3.3.3).		A	defining	feature	of	accelerators	is	this	use	of	mentors	to	support	the	cohort	(see	2.3.3.1).	Mentors	are	typically	not	paid	(Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	2013),	and	represent	a	diverse	network,	with	a	broad	range	of	knowledge	and	experience.			Accelerators	are	typically	funded	by	investors,	corporations,	or	government	agencies,	in	order	to	support	innovation,	source	investments,	or	identify	new	innovations.	They	create	returns	in	the	form	of	economic	development,	investment	returns,	or	disruptive	innovation	and	new	technologies	(see	2.3.3.6).			Despite	the	considerable	increase	in	types	of	accelerators,	and	other	organisations	that	incorrectly	identify	themselves	as	accelerators	(see	1.1.1),	a	generic	answer	to	the	question	of	what	an	accelerator	is	would	be	that	an	accelerator	is	typically	a	3	month	program	with	a	cohort	of	8-10	startups,	supported	by	investors	or	corporates,	and	with	a	large,	diverse	group	of	mentors	(see	2.4.1).								
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 23 
1.1.2	Defining	a	startup			A	discussion	about	accelerators	also	involves	discussing	startups;	the	cohorts	in	accelerators	are	usually	made	up	of	startups,	and	accelerators	are	also	referred	to	as	‘startup	accelerators.’			Therefore,	in	order	to	discuss	accelerators,	the	definition	of	a	startup	is	examined	in	2.3.2.1.	The	term	is	widely	used	in	the	technology	and	innovation	sector	to	refer	to	early	stage	companies.	While	SMEs	are	defined	primarily	by	size,	startups	are	defined	also	by	aspiration	and	approach.			The	European	Commission	(2018)	definition	of	an	SME	is	based	on	headcount	and	balance	sheet,	with	a	Small	Enterprise	being	a	company	with	fewer	than	50	employees,	and	a	turnover	of	less	than	10m	Euros,	and	a	Medium	Sized	enterprise	being	a	company	with	fewer	that	250	employees,	and	a	turnover	of	less	than	50m	Euros.	They	observe	that	SMEs	represent	99%	of	companies	in	the	European	Union.		Forbes	Magazine	(Robehmed,	2013)	addressed	the	question	of	what	a	startup	is,	reflecting	that	it	is	partly	a	state	of	mind.	They	suggest	it	is	not	about	the	specific	age	of	the	company,	and	could	be	5	years	old	but	probably	not	10	years	old,	according	to	Paul	Graham,	founder	of	Y	Combinator.	It	is	not	about	the	size	either,	because	startups	can	be	worth	hundreds	of	millions	of	dollars.	It	is	about	the	expectation	when	the	startup	is	founded	that	it	will	do	something	different,	be	disruptive,	and	grow	large.	This	is	the	main	differentiator	from	an	SME.		
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In	the	context	of	this	thesis	and	this	discussion	about	accelerators,	‘startup’	will	be	used	as	a	shorthand	for	any	company	or	entity	in	the	cohort	of	an	accelerator	program.	As	accelerators	have	developed	and	evolved,	not	all	the	companies	or	individuals	in	an	accelerator	program	will	in	fact	be	a	startup	as	defined	above	(see	2.3.2.4).	Some	may	be	individuals	with	early	stage	ideas,	others	may	be	academics,	or	more	developed	companies.	What	they	are	likely	to	have	in	common	still	is	an	aspiration	to	grow	quickly	and	to	be	accelerated,	rather	than	to	develop	organically	over	a	longer	period	of	time.		The	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	examine	accelerators,	not	startups.	To	try	to	define	accurately	in	each	context	precisely	every	type	of	participant	in	an	accelerator,	including	individuals,	social	enterprises,	later	stage	companies,	etc.	would	distract	from	the	core	purpose	of	this	thesis,	so	the	term	‘startup’	will	be	used	to	mean	any	participant	in	an	accelerator.	This	will	facilitate	a	more	efficient	discussion	of	accelerators.	Therefore,	within	this	thesis,	whilst	the	definition	of	a	startup	will	be	examined	in	the	literature	review	(see	2.3.1.1),	the	term	‘startup’	will	thereafter	be	used	as	a	shorthand	term	to	describe	a	participant	in	an	accelerator	program.										
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1.1.3	Incubation	and	Incubators		The	casual	and	inaccurate	use	of	the	terms	incubator,	incubation,	and	accelerator,	can	cause	confusion	when	discussing	accelerators,	as	they	are	often	used	interchangeably	by	those	who	do	not	understand	the	distinction	between	them.	To	create	clarity	within	this	thesis,	this	point	forms	a	section	of	the	literature	review	(see	2.3.2).	Incubation	is	the	process	of	supporting	an	early	stage	company	to	improve	its	chances	of	surviving	into	a	more	developed	business	(see	2.3.2.3).			An	Incubator	is	a	building	that	rents	space	to	companies	along	with	some	degree	of	support,	often	consisting	of	subsidised	rent	or	business	advice	(see	2.3.2.2).	An	accelerator	is	a	specific	approach	to	providing	incubation	as	a	process,	and	can	be	run	within	an	incubator.	However,	an	accelerator	is	not	an	incubator.	This	is	explained	in	the	literature	review,	which	demonstrates	that	an	accelerator	is	a	program,	and	an	incubator	is	a	building.	An	accelerator	can	therefore	run	within	an	incubator,	but	not	vice	versa	(see	2.3.2).				1.1.4.	EyeFocus	Accelerator		EyeFocus	Accelerator	will	be	examined	in	this	thesis	as	a	case	study	in	which	some	of	the	findings	of	the	literature	review	were	examined	and	tested.	EyeFocus	is	a	business	that	was	established	by	this	researcher	in	2015,	and	was	based	in	Berlin.	It	applied	the	accelerator	concept	to	the	ophthalmology	sector,	and	was	the	first	accelerator	to	focus	
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just	on	eye-care.	It	was	sponsored	by	pharmaceutical	company	Bayer	Healthcare,	optics	company	Zeiss,	a	niche	venture	capital	firm,	Peppermint	Venture	Partners,	and	Bosch	India.	EyeFocus	ran	two	accelerator	programs,	the	first	of	which	forms	the	case	study	for	this	thesis.			As	will	be	observed	throughout	the	thesis	(see	4.4.3),	EyeFocus	was	designed	to	be	a	mainstream	startup	accelerator	firmly	rooted	in	the	European	startup	ecosystem	(see	4.6),	but	one	which	was	unique	in	offering	a	very	narrow	sectoral	focus.	It	also	consciously	set	out	to	build	and	support	an	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem,	and	therefore	is	a	case	study	of	how	accelerators	can	support	the	building	of	innovation	ecosystems	(see	3.2.10).				
1.2	THE	ROLE	OF	SOCIAL	NETWORK	THEORY	IN	
EXAMINING	ACCELERATORS		The	hypothesis	of	this	thesis	is	that	an	accelerator	is	a	social	network	because	they	consist	of	actors	linked	by	ties,	as	described	by	Social	Network	Theory	(see	3.2.1).		In	the	language	of	accelerators,	those	actors	can	be	categorised	using	terms	such	as	
mentors	and	startups.	In	the	language	of	Social	Network	Theory,	they	are	strong,	weak,	and	bridging	ties,	and	the	ways	in	which	they	interact	can	be	described	in	terms	of	Social	Capital,	norms,	and	link	reciprocity	(see	3.2).		
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The	thesis	will	bring	together	these	concepts	to	formulate	a	description	of	an	accelerator	in	social	network	terms	that	provides	a	description	of	the	underlying	social	dynamics	that	make	up	the	network	which	is	an	accelerator.	As	such,	it	should	provide	greater	insight	into	how	an	accelerator	functions,	and	why	the	specific	structure	of	the	social	network	that	underpins	accelerators	is	able	to	deliver	the	support	and	benefits	expected	(see	3.2).			Based	on	this	analysis,	this	thesis	will	argue	that	accelerators	accumulate	value	in	the	form	of	Social	Capital	as	a	consequence	of	being	connectors	within	social	networks,	and	then	confer	their	Social	Capital	on	the	startups	in	their	cohorts	to	support	and	protect	them	(see	3.2.6).	These	startups	might	otherwise	have	very	little	Social	Capital	of	their	own	because	they	are	invariably	new	and	young.	Without	something	to	give	back,	they	are	in	a	weak	position	to	ask	for	favours	from	those	around	them.	By	conferring	its	accumulated	Social	Capital	on	its	cohort,	the	accelerator	gives	the	startups	a	higher	status	within	the	network,	and	something	with	which	to	return	favours.	They	are	then	equipped	to	ask	for	support	from	mentors	and	the	other	stakeholders	in	an	accelerator	(see	3.2).			The	Social	Capital	identified	here	consists	of	the	accelerator’s	ability	to	source	and	share	novel	and	non-redundant	information,	and	give	those	who	co-operate	with	it	early	access	to	this	novel	information.	(see	Lin	(1999);	2.2.3.3)	That	is	shown	in	Social	Network	Theory	to	give	an	advantage	to	people,	and	therefore	forms	the	value	offering	of	the	accelerator.	Having	value	embedded	in	its	social	network,	in	the	form	of	privileged	access	to	information,	affords	the	accelerator	the	ability	to	reward	people	
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who	co-operate	with	access	to	that	resource,	but	also	to	remove	access	from	bad	actors,	as	a	means	of	sanction.			In	a	weak	network	architecture	with	dense	ties	a	lot	of	people	are	variously	connected	to	each	other	multiple	times.	This	makes	it	easy	for	an	accelerator	to	communicate	reputation	widely,	which	again	is	a	tool	in	rewarding	and	sanctioning	people	in	that	network.	This	is	described	in	Social	Network	Theory	as	link	reciprocity,	and	the	rules	of	the	accelerator	are	its	norms.	This	structure	allows	the	accelerator	to	threaten	sanction	and	to	reward	co-operators	by	giving	or	retracting	ties	into	its	network,	which	enables	it	to	support	and	protect	its	startups	(see	2.2.3.4).		Consequently,	Social	Network	Theory	will	describe	how	accelerators	create	value	and	support	startups,	using	the	behaviours	within	a	specific	social	network	structure.				
1.3	RESEARCH	APPROACH			In	order	to	explain	the	behaviours	of	an	accelerator	using	Social	Network	Theory,	it	is	necessary	to	understand	what	an	accelerator	is	and	to	be	equipped	with	the	core	concepts	and	vocabulary	from	Social	Network	Theory	in	order	to	examine	an	accelerator	within	this	framework.			The	approach	of	this	research	is	therefore	to	carry	out	a	review	of	key	literature	relating	to	Social	Network	Theory	and	to	accelerators	(see	Chapter	2).	In	both	instances,	it	is	
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necessary	to	remain	focussed	on	the	core	thesis,	and	not	become	distracted	by	the	much	broader	topics	of	Social	Network	Theory	and	of	accelerators	and	innovation	programming	in	general.		The	literature	will	produce	theories	that	can	be	used	to	inform	the	design	of	accelerators	and	where	possible	and	relevant,	these	will	inform	the	design	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator	(see	Chapter	4).	How	theory	translates	into	practice	will	be	examined	within	EyeFocus	as	a	case	study,	as	well	as	examining	some	of	the	concepts	introduced	by	this	thesis	in	more	depth	within	a	live	accelerator	program	(see	Chapter	5).			It	is	relevant	to	acknowledge	that	EyeFocus	was	primarily	a	business,	not	a	research	project,	so	the	research	had	to	be	fitted	around	the	primary	concerns	of	the	business.	However,	because	this	researcher	was	also	the	owner	of	EyeFocus,	it	was	possible	to	gain	access	to	a	greater	degree	of	information	about	the	program,	and	to	allow	the	theory	from	this	thesis	to	inform	emergent	strategies	within	the	program	as	it	was	running.			The	thesis	therefore	mixes	desk	research	with	practical	experimentation	and	qualitative	research,	as	will	be	discussed	further	in	the	section	on	methodology	(see	1.9).							
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1.4	APPROACH	TO	THE	LITERATURE	REVIEW		The	review	of	Social	Network	Theory	literature	was	at	risk	of	becoming	complicated	because	the	topic	is	well	established	and	has	been	the	subject	of	extensive	research.	This	thesis	is	not	about	Social	Network	Theory,	but	applies	it	to	the	subject	of	accelerators,	therefore	the	review	had	to	be	kept	within	the	confines	of	the	thesis	and	is	purposefully	not	a	review	of	the	entire	Social	Network	Theory	discipline.			The	review	is	therefore	focussed	on	providing	the	necessary	vocabulary	with	which	to	describe	an	accelerator,	to	provide	an	understanding	of	the	key	concepts	in	Social	Network	Theory,	and	to	outline	some	of	the	most	relevant	theoreticians	in	that	discipline	in	order	to	lay	a	broad	enough	foundation	of	knowledge	within	which	to	contextualise	this	specific	study	of	accelerators.		It	is	arranged	by	subject,	with	the	intention	of	introducing	each	topic	separately,	gradually	bringing	in	more	facets	until	the	full	set	of	concepts	and	vocabulary	has	been	presented	in	order	to	be	used	later	to	explore	and	explain	accelerators.	The	review	identifies	seminal	works	and	key	figures	in	this	discipline,	in	particular	Mark	Granovetter,	Ronald	Burt,	and	Rose	Coser,	who	have	created	the	core	concepts	around	which	much	of	the	other	work	has	developed	and	will	be	referenced	throughout	the	literature.		The	review	of	literature	on	accelerators	examines	the	core	texts	on	this	subject,	and		introduces	the	key	researchers	in	the	discipline	who	have	shaped	the	concepts	and	vocabulary	to	date.	The	vocabulary	is	important	in	order	to	be	able	to	describe	an	accelerator.	Whilst	the	discipline	is	still	relatively	new,	and	has	not	been	the	subject	of	
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as	much	research	as	other	more	established	disciplines	(see	2.3.1.2),	it	is	necessary	to	have	a	vocabulary	that	is	universally	understood	in	order	to	describe	concepts	consistently	and	comparatively.	The	review	traces	the	evolution	of	this	vocabulary	and	provides	an	accepted	definition	of	an	accelerator	for	the	purposes	of	this	research.		Part	of	the	literature	review	on	accelerators	is	presented	chronologically	(see	2.3.2.3)	in	order	to	show	how	both	accelerators	and	the	study	of	accelerators	has	evolved	over	a	relatively	short	period	of	time.	The	chronological	approach	shows	how	ideas	have	developed,	and	also	shows	how	the	academic	discipline	has	evolved.	The	chronological	approach	also	shows	how	some	ideas	have	remained	constant	over	time,	tracing	a	consistent	thread	through	the	literature,	whilst	other	ideas	have	evolved	or	been	added	to	the	understanding	of	accelerators	as	they	developed.			Certain	works	have	been	seminal	in	understanding	accelerators,	and	the	chronological	approach	shows	how	these	works,	in	particular	Christiansen	(2009)	and	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	have	influenced	thought	about	accelerators	as	it	has	developed,	whilst	Pauwels	et	al	(2015)	helped	move	the	single	definition	on	into	a	series	of	typologies	which	better	describe	the	different	roles	an	accelerator	can	play	(see	2.3.3.5).		Because	the	review	examines	two	different	disciplines,	it	is	necessarily	divided	into	two	parts	and	is	longer	than	might	be	expected	in	a	thesis	of	this	type.						
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1.5	SCOPE	OF	THE	RESEARCH			Eisenhardt	(1989)	observed	that	it	is	important	to	stay	within	the	scope	of	a	research	project	in	order	to	avoid	becoming	overwhelmed	by	the	available	insights	and	outputs,	especially	when	the	data	does	not	yet	form	a	mature	and	organised	data	set.	Both	aspects	of	this	research	were	at	risk	of	unnecessary	and	unintentional	complexity	(Lehmann	2013).	With	Social	Network	Theory	the	risk	was	that	the	discipline	is	mature,	complex,	and	the	subject	of	wide	range	of	research	and	literature.	It	was	therefore	necessary	to	avoid	being	drawn	into	lengthy	debates	about	very	specific	aspects	of	the	theory,	and	instead	attempt	to	identify	broadly	accepted	definitions	and	concepts	that	are	relevant	to	task	required	of	them	in	this	thesis.			With	accelerators,	the	opposite	situation	created	a	similar	risk,	in	that	accelerators	are	a	rapidly	developing,	global	business	sector	in	which	definitions	and	concepts	are	relatively	fluid	and	changing	constantly,	so	it	was	necessary	to	commit	to	some	core	concepts	and	definitions,	and	to	avoid	being	drawn	into	lengthy	comparisons	with	other	accelerators,	or	with	incubators.	This	research	is	focussed	on	a	single	case	study,	so	the	broad	context	was	identified	in	the	literature	review,	and	then	the	research	itself	remained	focussed	just	on	EyeFocus	Accelerator.		Consequently,	this	thesis	does	not	examine	other	accelerators	in	detail,	and	does	not	duplicate	existing	work	in	defining	new	typologies,	(e.g.	Pauwels,	Clarysse,	Wright,	&	Van	Hove	2015)	creating	lists	of	accelerators	(e.g.	Cohen	2013,	Lehman	2013,	Miller	&	Bound	2011),	or	making	comparisons	between	accelerators.	This	has	been	addressed	
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by	others,	as	outlined	in	the	literature	review	(see	2.3.1.1),	and	is	also	notoriously	difficult	both	because	the	number	of	accelerators	is	constantly	changing,	and	because	more	and	more	organisations	are	describing	themselves	as	‘accelerators’	whilst	not	meeting	the	criteria	generally	accepted	by	experts	in	this	field	(Feder	&	Hochberg	2014).		Attempting	to	rank	accelerators,	either	as	a	‘complete	list’	or	just	the	top	10,	20,	etc.	in	a	region	or	sector	is	also	difficult	because	so	many	variables	could	be	judged	and	because	so	little	information	is	available.	The	value	of	such	rankings	remains	questionable	(Miller	&	Bound	2011).	The	fact	that	most	accelerators	have	no	obligation	to	publish	results,	and	do	not	have	the	resources	to	produce	extensive	analyses	of	their	activities	combines	with	the	speed	at	which	accelerators	are	moving	to	make	it	hard	to	tie	down	any	definitive	lists	or	meaningful	rankings	(Fehder	&	Hochberg	2014;	Hochberg	2015;	Bone,	Allen,	&	Haley	2017;	and	see	2.3.1.1).			Therefore,	this	thesis	will	not	attempt	to	produce	any	lists,	rankings,	or	judgement	on	existing	and	past	programs.	Such	work	has	been	carried	out	as	the	core	focus	of	other	academic	work	and	to	attempt	it	as	a	small	part	of	a	broader	thesis	would	not	produce	any	valuable	or	novel	findings.	However,	examining	such	work	in	the	literature	review	is	important	to	create	a	context	within	which	this	thesis	will	explore	more	specific	questions,	and	just	one	accelerator.					
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1.6	FINDINGS	AND	CONCLUSIONS		The	findings	of	the	literature	review	and	observations	the	EyeFocus	case	study	are	brought	together	to	form	conclusions	which	inform	accelerator	design.			The	findings	explain	the	role	Social	Capital	has	in	forming	accelerator	networks	(see	6.2.1),	and	in	policing	their	norms	(see	6.2.3).	They	also	explain	how	accelerators	can	build	and	maintain	ecosystems	(see	6.2.5),	and	challenge	whether	accelerators	should	invest	in	startups	as	a	matter	of	course	(see	6.2.6;	7.2.5).	They	also	examine	where	value	resides	within	the	accelerator	network	and	how	that	value	is	transferred	to	the	various	stakeholders	(see	6.2.11;	7.2.10).	The	role	of	decay	in	networks,	which	describes	how	ties	dissolve	over	time,	weak	ties	become	strong	ties,	and	consequently	non-redundancy	of	information	decays	as	well	is	also	examined.	It	is	proposed	as	a	possible	reason	for	the	timeframe	of	programs,	suggesting	that	after	3	months	it	becomes	hard	to	source	new	information	and	ties	from	the	network	built	around	the	accelerator,	as	weak	ties	and	non-redundancy	decay	(see	7.2.9).			Innovations	by	EyeFocus,	in	particular	the	creation	of	Associates	as	a	secondary	way	of	joining	the	cohort,	are	examined	and	evaluated,	suggesting	that	accelerators	can	benefit	by	creating	larger	and	more	varied	cohorts,	without	necessarily	using	investment	potential	as	the	primary	filter	in	the	selection	process	(see	6.2.8;	7.2.5).			
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The	role	of	Social	Capital	in	accelerators	is	woven	into	this	discussion,	in	particular	examining	how	mentors	are	rewarded,	and	how	this	enables	link	reciprocity	to	police	the	norms	of	the	accelerator	instead	of	contracts	and	NDAs	(see	6.2.3;	7.2.2;	7.2.7).		These	conclusions	lead	to	a	number	of	recommendations	for	future	research	(see	7.3).			
1.7	ORGANISATION	OF	THE	THESIS		Following	this	Introduction,	Chapter	2	presents	a	review	of	literature	from	two	separate	disciplines.	Part	one	examines	Social	Network	Theory,	and	part	two	examines	Accelerators.		Chapter	3	presents	interpretations	and	findings	from	the	literature	review,	which	bring	together	the	observations	from	the	two	disciplines	into	theory	that	is	then	applied	to	the	understanding	and	design	of	accelerators.			Chapter	4	explores	further	how	this	can	be	applied	in	practical	terms	to	accelerator	design,	and	in	particular	to	the	design	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	which	acts	as	a	case	study	for	this	thesis.		Chapter	5	presents	observations	from	having	applied	the	theory	in	practice,	examining	where	it	translated	well	and	where	the	reality	of	the	business	did	not	correspond	with	the	theory.		
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Chapter	6	examines	the	outcomes	of	this	process,	combining	the	theory	from	Chapter	4	and	the	practical	observations	from	Chapter	5	into	a	series	of	findings	relating	to	the	design	of	accelerators.			Chapter	7	draws	conclusions	from	these	findings,	which	inform	how	the	theory	produced	in	this	exercise	can	inform	the	understanding	and	design	of	accelerators.		This	exercise	also	led	to	recommendations	for	future	research,	which	have	arisen	from	this	research,	and	some	of	which	fell	outside	the	scope	or	expertise	of	this	thesis.			The	Appendix	presents	a	detailed	overview	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	which	can	be	used	to	add	context	to	the	research.				
1.8	AIMS	&	OBJECTIVES		The	aims	of	this	thesis	fall	into	two	areas.	The	first,	theoretical	part	of	the	thesis	aims	to	use	the	concepts	of	Social	Network	Theory	to	describe	and	understand	accelerators,	and	develop	findings	that	can	inform	the	way	an	accelerator	is	designed	and	implemented.	The	second,	practical	part	of	the	thesis	is	to	explore	these	ideas	within	the	context	of	a	real	accelerator,	EyeFocus,	offering	a	live	case	study	in	which	to	examine	theory	in	practice,	and	from	which	to	gather	new	findings	and	conclusions	that	can	be	used	in	this	and	future	research,	and	in	the	design	of	accelerators.		
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The	aims	and	objectives	of	this	research	are:	1.8.1	Aims		 1. To	use	a	literature	review	to	identify	the	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	that	can	be	used	to	describe	a	startup	accelerator.	2. To	provide	a	summary	of	the	main	academic	literature	about	accelerators.	3. To	apply	this	theory	to	the	design	of	EyeFocus	accelerator	in	order	to	examine	it	in	situ.	4. To	use	this	exercise	to	reach	conclusions	on	how	accelerators	should	be	designed	and	run	in	the	future.		5. To	create	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	based	on	Social	Network	Theory	which	can	inform	the	design	and	execution	of	future	accelerators.		1.8.2	Objectives			To	review	the	literature	about	Social	Network	Theory	in	order	to:	a. better	understand	the	wider	context	of	Social	Network	Theory	in	which	this	thesis	sits	b. define	the	vocabulary	with	which	to	describe	the	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	relevant	to	accelerators		c. understand	the	wider	discipline	of	Social	Network	Theory	and	its	relationship	to	innovation	and	entrepreneurship			To	review	the	literature	about	accelerators	in	order	to:	a. understand	the	evolution	of	startup	accelerators		
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b. create	an	historical	context	in	which	to	position	the	thesis,	and	EyeFocus	Accelerator	c. define	the	core	aspects	of	an	accelerator	and	the	accepted	terminology	used	to	describe	them	d. identify	existing	practice	in	running	accelerators	e. define	an	accelerator	for	the	purposes	of	this	thesis		To	use	the	findings	of	the	literature	review	to	inform	the	design	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	in	order	to:		a. provide	a	case	study	for	this	thesis	in	which	hypotheses	can	be	tested	and	examined	in	situ		b. lead	to	conclusions	that	contribute	to	the	knowledge	about	how	better	to	describe	and	understand	accelerators,	and	therefore	how	better	to	design	and	implement	them		Based	on	the	outcomes	of	this	exercise,	to:	a. make	recommendations	about	how	Social	Network	Theory	should	inform	the	design	of	accelerators	b. to	provide	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	based	on	this	research		to	inform	the	design	and	execution	of	future	accelerators	c. make	recommendations	for	future	research	on	this	topic			
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1.9	METHODOLOGY			This	thesis	combines	desk	research	and	case	study	research,	in	the	form	of	the	literature	review	and	the	case	study.	The	literature	review	examines	two	different	disciplines,	which	are	brought	together	to	reach	new	understandings	about	the	social	network	structure	of	startup	accelerators.	The	case	study	examines	some	of	these	ideas	in	situ,	and	tests	some	of	the	theory	in	practice.	To	achieve	this,	the	thesis	first	explores	the	literature	relating	to	Social	Network	Theory,	and	then	the	literature	explaining	and	describing	accelerators.	The	literature	review	is	followed	by	a	chapter	which	combines	the	concepts	and	theories	from	both	disciplines	to	apply	them	specifically	to	the	design	of	startup	accelerators,	and	to	EyeFocus	in	particular.		This	offers	an	opportunity	to	examine	both	how	the	theory	translates	into	a	real-life	case	study,	and	to	test	some	of	the	ideas.			This	exercise	leads	to	a	final	summary	of	concepts	that	have	emerged	from	the	research,	and	from	these	recommendations	for	future	accelerator	design.				1.9.1	Investigator’s	Role		The	role	of	the	author	is	important	in	understanding	the	context	of	research.	In	this	case,	the	author	is	both	an	academic	and	entrepreneur,	and	both	the	examiner	of	and	the	lead	actor	in	the	case	study.	As	founder	of	EyeFocus,	the	researcher	was	embedded	within	the	activity	being	researched,	and	was	both	making	observations	from	that	
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vantage	point,	and	was	influenced	immediately	by	such	observations.	In	that	respect,	the	research	impacted	on	the	subject	in	real	time,	which	is	unusual,	but	also	aims	to	counter	the	observation	by	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	that	most	academic	research	in	this	field	has	a	‘limited	shelf	life’	due	to	the	speed	at	which	the	sector	is	developing.	The	approach	is	inevitably	phenomenological,	and	emergent,	being	based	in	the	real-life	activity	of	the	researcher	as	an	entrepreneur,	and	led	in	many	cases	by	the	events	being	studied.		This	leads	to	a	greater	emphasis	on	qualitative	research	within	this	study	because	the	research	was	constantly	influenced	by	the	activities	of	the	business	and	making	changes	accordingly	during	the	research	period,	rather	than	making	a	statistical	analysis	of	data	accumulated	and	then	studied	after	the	fact.				Because	the	subject	of	this	research	is	a	business,	which	itself	supported	other	businesses,	it	is	also	the	case	that	some	of	the	data	and	observations	cannot	be	discussed	openly	or	in	full	detail	because	they	are	commercially	sensitive.	This	particularly	includes	precise	financial	agreements	between	parties,	costs,	and	email	exchanges	between	parties.				1.9.2	Case	Study	Methodology		The	primary	source	of	novel	data	and	live	observations	for	this	research	is	the	qualitative	and	quantitative	outputs	from	the	business	activities	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator.	EyeFocus	therefore	provided	a	case	study	for	this	research.		
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Eisenhardt	(1989)	observed	that	case	study	research	focusses	on	understanding	phenomena	within	a	specific	setting,	and	can	involve	multiple,	or	in	this	instance	a	single	case.	They	usually	combine	data	collection	methods	that	include	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	inputs,	including	observations.			In	keeping	with	her	theory,	the	selection	of	the	case	study	was	clearly	defined	by	the	nature	of	the	research,	being	about	the	single	specific	case	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	so	no	methodology	was	required	in	the	selection	of	the	case	for	the	study.	She	further	argues	that	case	study	research	can	be	used	to	provide	description,	test	theory,	or	generate	theory.	In	this	context	the	thesis	addresses	all	three,	first	describing	accelerators	and	Social	Network	Theory,	then	testing	theories	in	practice,	and	finally	generating	theory	in	the	form	of	wider	proposals	for	future	accelerators.			This	approach	to	research	mirrors	the	‘exploratory	case	study’	approach	used	by	Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	in	addressing	the	inability	to	carry	out	extensive	quantitative	research	due	to	the	lack	of	large	data	sets,	both	for	accelerators	in	general,	and	specifically	for	EyeFocus.	Tarani	(2010)	also	argues	in	favour	of	case	study	approach	due	to	the	limited	literature	in	this	field.	The	research	therefore	relies	more	on	qualitative	than	quantitative	data.		The	case	study	was	developed	in	phases.	Firstly,	the	literature	review	established	the	context,	and	identified	broadly	accepted	definitions	and	descriptors	of	key	phenomena	and	concepts.	Having	established	the	vocabulary	with	which	to	discuss	the	two	concepts	
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of	Social	Network	Theory	and	accelerators,	the	second	phase	was	to	establish	the	theories	to	be	examined	in	the	practice	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator.			The	execution	of	the	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	which	forms	the	core	of	the	business	activity	and	the	case	study	research,	provided	opportunities	for	qualitative	and	quantitative	data	collection,	and	to	test	some	core	theories.	After	the	program,	data	was	gathered,	analysed,	and	ultimately	conclusions	were	drawn.	These	conclusions	occurred	concurrently	within	the	context	of	the	academic	research,	and	of	the	business	itself.				1.9.3	Data	Collection		As	with	similar	work	by	Cohen	(2013),	data	was	collected	from	a	variety	of	sources	including	emails,	informal	conversations,	field	observations,	and	the	day	to	day	activity	of	the	accelerator,	including	management	meetings,	mentoring	sessions,	and	informal	discussion	with	the	key	stakeholders	involved	(mentors,	staff,	and	startup	teams).	Data	and	evidence,	in	this	thesis,	is	the	outputs	of	the	EyeFocus	Accelerator	business,	including	internal	working	documents	and	other	evidence.	Due	to	the	confidential	nature	of	aspects	of	the	business,	not	all	of	this	could	be	disclosed	in	this	research.	Due	to	the	breadth	of	activity	of	the	business,	and	the	narrow	focus	of	the	research,	not	all	of	it	was	relevant	to	this	thesis.			Also	reflecting	the	research	carried	out	by	Cohen	(2013),	given	the	nature	of	the	discussions	and	their	context	in	non-academic,	social,	or	business	situations,	not	all	of	
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the	interactions	that	informed	both	this	thesis	and	the	business	were	recorded	or	transcribed,	and	some	were	semi-structured	or	thematic,	rather	than	formal,	and	therefore	form	part	of	the	empirical	research	that	informs	this	thesis.		The	semi-structured	interviews	form	qualitative	insights	into	the	opinions	and	attitudes	of	those	involved	with	the	accelerator,	and	inform	the	other	quantitative	data	taken	from	questionnaires	and	accelerator	outputs.			The	qualitative	data	comes	from	a	number	of	sources.	Exploratory	interviews	with	various	stakeholders	involved	in	the	startup	and	accelerator	sector	took	place	in	the	lead	up	to	this	research,	and	during	the	research	period.	These	included	the	author’s	experience	as	a	mentor	at	other	accelerators	in	Europe,	an	advisor	to	startups,	and	informal	discussions	with	other	people	running	accelerators.			Multiple	data	collection	methods	were	employed,	in	keeping	with	theory	on	case	study	research	(Eisenhardt	1989).	Empirical	observations	are	used	throughout,	being	an	inevitable	outcome	of	such	an	immersive	process	as	running	a	business	whilst	researching	it.	Quantitative	data	is	used	to	find	patterns	not	immediately	clear	from	the	qualitative	inputs,	and	to	support	qualitative	and	empirical	observations	(Eisenhardt	1989).		The	research	adopted	a	flexible	and	opportunistic	approach	to	data	collection.	There	were	defined	periods	of	data	collection,	for	example	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	the	
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 44 
EyeFocus	program	when	the	business	used	questionnaires	to	gather	information,	and	there	was	ongoing	data	collection	throughout	the	lifetime	of	the	business.		In	this	instance,	data	collection	and	theory-testing	happened	organically	as	it	was	the	result	of	a	live	case	study	(an	ongoing	business).	The	data	collection	and	analysis	were	taking	place	for	two	concurrent	purposes,	the	first	being	the	business	which	is	the	subject	of	this	research,	and	the	second	being	the	research	itself.	Consequently,	some	of	this	analysis	happened	quickly	and	within	a	business	environment,	and	was	formalised	into	research	at	a	later	date.			In	keeping	with	Eisenhardt’s	(1989)	theory	on	case	study	research,	this	thesis	consequently	resulted	from	a	multi-faceted	and	iterative	process	combining	overlapping	phases	of	research,	activity,	and	experimentation,	and	using	empirical	evidence,	qualitative,	and	quantitative	data.	There	has	been	the	constant	threat	of	being	swamped	by	data	and	losing	a	sense	of	focus	from	the	richness	of	outputs	that	the	case	study	created.	This	richness	in	qualitative	evidence	is	in	some	cases	matched	by	a	relative	sparseness	in	quantitative	data.				1.9.4	Research	Limitations		
Action research around a case study had benefits, for example allowing the research to be 
reflected in the activity of the case study, and that activity then to inform the research back 
again.  
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However, it creates limitations as well.  The most notable limitation with this research was 
the challenge of being both the researcher of a business, and the person running that business 
at the same time. Because the business had the funding, and was supporting the research, the 
business had to take priority over the research, both relating to decisions about the direction 
of either, and because time had to be prioritised for the business over the research. If the 
business had failed it would have undermined the research, but without the research the 
business could still succeed.  
 
Being a case study involving live businesses, namely the startups on the program, restricted 
how some of the data gathered could be used in the research. Discussions of the startups in 
the research could not be allowed to damage the businesses in anyway, which remain 
ongoing after the episode of activity being studied. This relates to commercially sensitive 
data, but also to reflections that might in some way damage the businesses reputationally in 
their future.  
 
Furthermore, working with a large pharmaceutical company, in particular, raised issues 
because such companies are very tightly regulated, which impacts on how information about 
their involvement with EyeFocus could be discussed openly in this thesis.  
 
Related to these three points, some of the data collected during the program was either 
incomplete because it had been gathered quickly during fast moving periods of business 
activity, or became less valuable once it had been anonymised.  
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Many of these limitations echo observations by researchers whose work on accelerators is 
examined in the literature review, who found that accelerators rarely have the resource to 
gather large data sets from the programs they are running. This proved to be the case with 
EyeFocus. As outlined in the section on future research (see 7.3), it would be valuable in the 
future to see full time researchers embedded in accelerators to gather data and carry out 
research in order to overcome these limitations.  	 										
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					CHAPTER	2.	LITERATURE	REVIEW		
	
The	literature	review	is	broken	into	two	sections.	The	first	looks	at	the	extensive	literature	
on	Social	Network	Theory,	focussing	the	review	on	topics	and	theory	that	will	provide	a	
framework	with	which	to	examine	startup	accelerators	as	social	networks.	The	second	
section	reviews	the	research	into	accelerators,	plotting	its	development	since	2009,	and	
using	this	to	create	a	working	definition	of	an	accelerator	for	the	purposes	of	this	research.										
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2.1	INTRODUCTION			The	first	part	of	this	chapter	will	examine	the	literature	on	Social	Network	Theory	to	define	the	vocabulary	with	which	to	describe	and	analyse	accelerators	as	social	networks.	The	second	part	of	the	chapter	will	examine	the	literature	on	accelerators.	These	are	described	variously	as	business	incubation	programs,	businesses	in	their	own	right,	and	occasionally	in	terms	of	their	social	network.	The	approach	of	most	of	the	literature	is	to	see	accelerators	in	terms	of	what	they	do	and	how	they	do	it.	This	thesis	will	take	that	approach	further,	combining	it	with	Social	Network	Theory	to	examine	
why	they	function	as	they	do,	and	which	aspects	of	their	being	social	networks	supports	that.			Whilst	the	literature	review	will	examine	broadly	the	available	research	into	startup	accelerators,	it	will	also	restrict	itself	to	remain	within	the	bounds	of	this	thesis.	The	thesis	requires	the	literature	review	to	explain	what	accelerators	are,	and	in	particular	to	provide	a	definition	that	can	be	used	for	the	purposes	of	this	research.	Understanding	the	history	and	development	of	accelerators	is	relevant,	and	it	is	also	important	to	see	how	academic	research,	and	other	writing,	on	this	topic	has	evolved	to	date.	However,	this	thesis	does	not	seek	to	evaluate	specific	accelerators	or	provide	any	lists	of	accelerators,	as	that	is	addressed	in	literature	referenced	in	the	review,	and	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research.				
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2.2	SOCIAL	NETWORK	THEORY	LITERATURE	REVIEW			
2.2.1	SOCIAL	NETWORKS		It	is	necessary	to	establish	the	core	theories	of	Social	Network	Theory,	and	to	establish	a	vocabulary	from	the	discipline	with	which	then	to	describe	an	accelerator.	By	referencing	some	of	the	definitive	papers	on	the	topic,	this	part	of	the	literature	review	aims	to	ensure	that	the	core	principles	are	well	covered,	providing	a	foundation	for	the	following	chapters	of	the	thesis.	Social	Network	Theory	is	a	large	and	mature	topic	which	cannot	be	covered	fully	in	this	thesis,	not	being	the	core	topic	of	the	research.	In	particular,	the	works	of	Granovetter,	Burt,	and	Coleman,	which	are	discussed	below,	form	large	bodies	of	work	on	their	own,	and	have	generated	an	even	larger	volume	of	secondary	research	and	analysis.	This	part	of	the	literature	review	will	remain	limited	to	introducing	their	core	theories,	and	addressing	some	of	the	secondary	research	in	order	to	give	the	reader	enough	understanding	of	Social	Network	Theory	for	the	purposes	of	examining	accelerators.				2.2.1.1	What	is	a	Social	Network?			Borgatti	&	Halgin	(2011)	observed	that	the	term	‘social	network’	has	developed	to	mean	anything	from	a	private	club	to	a	website	and	can	therefore	lead	to	some	confusion.	
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They	describe	a	network	as	“a	set	of	actors	or	nodes	along	with	a	set	of	ties	of	a	specified	type…that	link	them.”	These	ties	connect	via	shared	points	to	link	nodes	that	are	not	directly	linked	themselves,	the	nodes	being	individuals,	or	actors	in	the	network.	Unlike	groups,	networks	do	not	have	natural	boundaries,	and	they	do	not	need	to	be	connected	internally.	These	disconnected	parts	of	the	network	can	become	connected	over	time,	meaning	networks	are	fluid	and	ever	changing.				2.2.1.2	Six	Degrees,	or	Small	World	Theory		An	early	examination	of	social	networks	by	Travers	and	Milgram	(1969)	looked	at	the	lengths	of	the	paths	between	individuals,	and	the	question	of	the	probability	of	any	two	randomly	selected	individuals	knowing	each	other,	or	how	many	acquaintances	might	connect	them	in	a	chain	of	people.	They	went	on	to	examine	more	specifically	the	cluster	consisting	of	people	in	the	USA,	with	around	200	million	nodes,	interconnected	by	a	complex	web	of	connections.	They	hypothesised	that	individuals	should	all	be	connected	to	each	other	by	at	least	one	chain	of	various	lengths	or	pathways.			They	set	out	to	explore	this	hypothesis,	seeking	to	understand	the	probable	mean	and	median	number	of	intermediaries	between	any	two	given	people.	This	became	the	well-known	‘Six	Degrees’	experiment.	They	challenged	people	to	pass	a	document	addressed	to	an	individual	to	someone	they	thought	might	be	closer	to	that	named	individual,	and	then	counted	the	number	of	steps	the	document	took	to	reach	the	person.	In	this	first	
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experiment	to	evaluate	chain	length	29%	(64	of	the	296	initial	documents)	reached	the	intended	person.	The	mean	number	of	steps	the	document	took	was	5.4.			Six	Degrees	of	Separation	also	became	known	as	the	Small	World	phenomena,	which	describes	the	idea	that	everyone	is	connected	to	everyone	else	through	six	degrees	of	separation	or	fewer.	The	body	of	work	on	the	topic	is	examined	by	Sebastian	Schnettler	(2009),	where	he	traces	writing	from	initial	research	in	1958	through	to	2009.	He	identifies	three	dimensions	of	small-world	theory;	structural	dimensions,	process	dimensions,	and	psychological	dimensions.			Schnettler	explains	that	the	structural	aspect	looks	at	how	many	pairs	of	people	are	connected	by	a	third	person	and	how	many	by	a	chain	of	2,	3,	4	or	more	people.	Process	looks	at	what	kind	of	actions	can	be	set	in	motion	by	these	connections	in	a	social	network,	and	what	forms	of	information	passed	along	chains;	and	the	efficacy	over	different	lengths	of	chain.	This	looks	at	the	role	networks	have	in	communicating	ideas,	innovation,	information	and	the	effect	of	different	types	and	distances	of	relationship	in	achieving	this.	The	work	in	this	area	explores	what	people	understand	of	their	own	networks	and	wider	social	structures,	and	how	they	go	about	manoeuvring	through	them.			Schnettler	observes	that	very	little	is	required	to	render	small	worlds	from	large	social	clusters;	just	a	few	highly-connected	individuals	who	create	short-cuts	across	the	network.	These	people	are	referred	to	as	bridging	weak	ties,	and	they	link	sub	clusters	in	a	wider	ecosystem.	
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2.2.1.3	The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties		Taking	the	Small	World	Theory	further,	the	type	of	connections	within	a	network,	and	in	particular	those	used	to	travel	across	networks,	were	described	as	Weak	and	Strong	ties	by	Mark	Granovetter,	in	The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties	(1973).	He	defined	weak	ties	as	contacts	that	are	less	likely	to	be	‘socially	involved’	with	each	other	than	strong	tie	contacts,	or	close	friends.	Consequently,	he	observed	that	a	network	of	acquaintances,	or	weak	ties,	will	be	a	low-density	network	where	many	of	the	potential	relationships	have	yet	to	be	made.	However,	a	strong	tie	network	of	close	friends	is	likely	to	be	highly	connected,	where	most	people	know	each	other.	The	early	research	by	Granovetter	(1973)	demonstrated	that	people	were	more	likely	to	hear	about	new	job	opportunities	though	acquaintances	(weak	ties)	than	through	close	friends	(strong	ties)	because	acquaintances	are	more	likely	to	be	privy	to	information	that	is	not	known	already	by	an	actor	or	their	close	friends.			The	theory	of	weak	ties	was	developed	in	relation	to	finding	jobs	but	in	the	wider	social	network	theory	it	also	describes	the	spread	of	diseases,	proliferation	of	ideas,	and	evolution	of	species,	thus	it	is	ubiquitous	across	organic	structures	(Borgatti	&	Halgin	2011).		The	real-world	equivalent	that	Granovetter	explores	is	the	concept	of	a	person,	A,	who	has	a	very	strong	network	of	close	friends,	most	of	whom	know	each	other	as	well	as	A.	At	the	same	time,	B	has	an	equivalent	strong	network	of	close	friends.	Within	these	two	networks	there	is	a	lot	of	duplication,	and	very	little	novelty.	What	A	knows	and	shares	
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with	a	few	friends	rapidly	spreads	around	her	network	because	everyone	knows	everyone.	Information	spreads	exponentially	because	what	A	tells	to	3	people	gets	told	by	them	to	3	people	each,	and	from	there	to	3	more	people.	As	most	of	these	people	are	connected,	the	information	rapidly	becomes	redundant,	in	that	everyone	has	already	heard	it.	The	same	applies	to	B’s	network.			When	A	and	B	meet	each	other,	they	are	not	only	creating	the	value	of	sharing	what	each	of	them	individually	knows,	be	it	knowledge,	skills,	or	access,	but	they	are	also	creating	a	bridge	between	their	two	much	larger,	but	closed	networks.	A	and	B	are	weak	ties;	acquaintances	with	very	little	duplication	between	their	networks	and	knowledge	(Granovetter	2012)	and	they	have	the	potential	to	bring	new	ideas,	information,	and	people	to	their	own	network.	By	doing	this	they	have	a	value	to	the	others,	and	by	connecting	these	two	networks	they	create	value	(Borgatti	&	Halgin	2011).		Granovetter	(1973,	1983,	2012)	argues	that	people	are	socially	disadvantaged	if	they	do	not	have	weak	tie	networks,	and	bridges	out	of	their	own	strong	tie	network	of	close	friends	and	family.	Such	people	do	not	have	access	to	information	and	knowledge	that	exists	outside	their	immediate	network,	and	this	may	affect	their	ability	to	hear	about	job	opportunities	(Granovetter,	1973).	When	applied	to	innovation,	it	means	they	are	isolated	from	information	about	problems	that	need	solutions,	solutions	to	problems,	and	opportunities	(Granovetter	2012).					
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2.2.1.4	Structural	Holes		Burt	(1992)	developed	Granovetter’s	original	theory	(1973,	1983)	on	the	‘strength	of	weak	ties’	by	arguing	that	the	real	value	in	weak	ties	lies	in	when	they	bridge	between	networks,	and	therefore	become	the	conduits	of	knowledge,	information,	and	value	between	those	networks.	Individuals	who	bridge	what	Burt	calls	‘structural	holes’	between	networks	act	socially	in	the	same	way	as	a	single	bridge	across	a	river	between	two	trading	communities,	and	therefore	create	value	both	for	the	communities	and	consequently	for	themselves.			Burt	(2004)	sets	out	to	explore	how	‘brokerage	provides	Social	Capital.’	Summing	up	the	theory	that	has	underpinned	much	of	the	thinking	within	this	thesis,	he	writes:		 “Opinion	and	behaviour	are	more	homogeneous	within	than	between	groups,	so	people	connected	across	groups	are	more	familiar	with	alternative	ways	of	thinking	and	behaving.	Brokerage	across	the	structural	holes	between	groups	provides	a	vision	of	options	otherwise	unseen,	which	is	the	mechanism	by	which	brokerage	becomes	Social	Capital.”			His	research	examined	the	social	networks	of	managers	within	a	large	American	electronics	company	and	concluded	that	those	who	bridge	‘structural	holes’	within	the	company’s	networks	are	more	likely	to	succeed,	both	in	terms	of	promotion	and	reward,	and	in	terms	of	having	ideas	accepted	rather	than	dismissed.	His	hypothesis	is	that	people	who	stand	near	and	bridge	structural	holes	in	a	social	network	are	more	
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likely	to	have	good	ideas	and	to	benefit	from	these,	because	they	are	exposed	to	different	ways	of	thinking,	and	consequently	have	greater	influence.			Reflecting	Granovetter	(1973),	Burt	(2004)	argued	that	ideas	are	more	homogenous	within	strong	tie	networks,	so	people	who	have	weak	ties	and	bridge	into	other	networks	will	have	access	to	more	variable	options	(different	ideas	and	behaviours)	from	which	to	synthesise	new	ideas.			Granovetter	(2012)	further	explained	that	the	stronger	the	tie	between	two	people,	the	more	overlap	there	will	be	in	their	social	networks.	Examining	this	theory,	Friedkin	(1980)	concluded	that	local	bridges	between	networks	tend	to	be	via	people	who	are	weak	ties,	because	strong	ties	‘encourage	triadic	closure,’	meaning	that	two	people	who	are	strongly	connected	are	more	likely	already	to	know	their	mutual	contacts	–	if	A	knows	C,	and	B	knows	C,	it	is	more	likely	that	A	and	B	will	also	know	each	other	via	C.			Granovetter	(2012)	concludes	from	this	that	his	argument	about	the	importance	of	weak	ties	does	not	mean	that	all	weak	ties	are	valuable,	only	those	that	serve	as	bridges	between	strong	tie	networks	are	of	special	value.	It	is	possible	that	many	weak	ties	do	not	become	bridges,	and	are	therefore	not	valuable	within	this	context,	however	he	asserts	that	strong	ties	are	unlikely	to	bridge,	and	most	bridges	will	be	weak	ties.			Borgatti	&	Halgin	(2011)	conclude	that	this	concept	supposes	that	if	bridges	are	the	source	of	novel	information,	and	only	weak	ties	bridge,	then	weak	ties	are	the	best	route	to	novel	information.		
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Borgatti	&	Halgin	(2011)	go	on	to	explore	Burt’s	theory	of	structural	holes	alongside	Granovetter’s	Strength	of	Weak	Ties	theory.	In	Structural	Hole	theory,	they	observe	that	the	focus	is	on	individuals	and	how	they	connect	to	the	others	in	their	network.	If	an	individual	is	connected	to	others	who	are	themselves	all	inter-connected,	it	is	unlikely	that	any	of	these	individual	will	be	party	to	any	novel	information	not	also	shared	already	with	the	others	in	the	network.	However,	if	an	individual	is	connected	to	distinct	and	separated	clusters	within	a	network,	then	that	individual	will	be	exposed	to	non-redundant	information	not	available	to	the	others	in	the	network.		They	conclude	from	this	that	access	to	new,	non-redundant	information	positions	an	individual	to	be	more	valuable	in	the	wider	network,	and	more	likely	to	come	up	with	good	ideas	based	on	the	fusion	and	novel	use	of	this	non-redundant	information.	Burt	(2004)	refers	to	a	person	with	multiple	structural	holes	in	their	network	as	having	non-redundant	ties,	whereas	Granovetter	(2012)	describes	this	as	someone	having	more	bridges,	and	argues	they	will	by	definition	be	weak	ties.	Burt	sees	the	strength	of	a	tie	as	reflecting	the	extent	of	non-redundancy,	in	that	over	time,	and	once	a	bridge	is	established,	the	non-redundancy	‘decays’	as	information	flows	through	it,	and	the	tie	becomes	stronger,	and	with	more	redundancy	(Borgatti	&	Halgin	2011).		Borgatti	&	Halgin	(2011)	call	this	set	of	theories	‘flow	theory’	because	they	rely	on	an	underlying	function	of	the	network	described	as	being	a	conduit	of	information	and	value	which	‘flows’	through	the	links	and	bridges	between	the	nodes.	The	flow	of	information	to	and	between	individuals	is	affected	by	their	distance	from	each	other,	position	in	the	network,	and	embeddedness	–	how	many	mutual	contacts	they	have	
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with	other	nodes.	This	will	affect	how	rapidly	they	receive	novel	information,	and	how	many	times	they	receive	it	(redundancy).		Within	networks,	Borgatti	&	Halgin	(2011)	refer	to	the	difference	between	state-type	and	event-type	social	ties.	The	former	are	non-transitory	types	of	relationship	(familial,	workplace)	which	may	change,	or	end,	over	time	but	have	a	continuous	state	within	that	timeframe.	Event-type	ties	are	transactional	and	transient,	being	the	way	two	ties	engage	(a	conversation,	business	transaction).	These	can	be	measured	in	terms	of	frequency	over	time,	quality,	and	outcome.	Both	of	these	ties	facilitate	‘flow’	between	nodes,	which	is	the	transmittance	of	things	like	ideas,	knowledge,	goods.			Rost	(2010)	challenges	the	focus	above	on	weak	ties	as	key	in	innovation,	arguing	that	weak	ties	have	no	value	without	strong	ties,	but	strong	ties	have	some	value	without	weak	ties	because	strong	ties	support	each	other,	and	can	help	realise	the	value	of	weak	ties,	whereas	weak	ties	together	lack	the	social	cohesion	and	trust	to	realise	the	value	of	the	non-redundant	information	they	enjoy.	Therefore,	Rost	argues,	a	network	which	combines	strong	ties	with	a	high	level	of	closure	in	the	core	cluster	and	a	large	number	of	weak	bridging	ties	to	other	clusters	are	the	most	creative.	Taking	this	further,	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	propose	that	“weak	ties	facilitate	the	cost-effective	search	for	codifiable	information	and	strong	ties	facilitate	transfer	of	complex	information	and	tacit	knowledge.”					
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2.2.1.5	The	role	of	role-sets			Within	this	exploration	of	weak	and	strong	ties	and	the	position	people	have	in	networks,	it	is	valuable	to	understand	the	way	they	interact,	and	the	social	skills	they	both	require	and	develop	to	function	effectively	in	this	context.	Rose	Coser	(1975)	explores	the	concept	of	role-sets	and	their	place	in	the	development	of	individualism	in	modern	society,	which	explains	how	individuals	need	to	segment	their	behaviour	to	suit	different	social	situations.	This	variety	of	social	interactions	form	a	core	part	of	an	accelerator,	as	will	be	demonstrated	in	the	second	part	of	this	literature	review.				Role-set	theory	explores	the	complexity	of	social	interactions,	depending	on	the	time	and	place,	the	person,	and	the	circumstances	of	the	engagement.		The	interaction	of	status	and	complex	‘role-sets’	are	explained	by	Coser	using	the	analogy	of	a	medical	student.	‘Medical	Student’	is	a	single	status,	but	one	which	has	many	roles	in	relation	to	others;	that	of	student	to	teacher,	doctor	to	nurse,	student	to	other	student,	doctor	to	patient,	and	an	array	of	other	role-sets	within	the	wider	medical	ecosystem.			As	well	as	‘role-sets,’	there	also	exist	‘status-sets,’	in	which	the	individual	is	engaging	with	people	of	differing	status,	and	‘status-sequence’	in	which	the	status	position	changes	over	time.	These	concepts	apply	well	to	startups,	and	to	the	tech	sector	more	generally,	for	example	to	the	social	journey	an	individual	makes	as	they	travel	from	startup	founder	with	no	money,	to	founder	of	a	funded	startup,	a	startup	that	has	been	sold,	and	potentially	into	being	an	investor.	This	journey	can	happen	quickly,	and	accordingly	role-set	and	status-set	change	rapidly	(status-sequence).		
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In	summing	up	a	broad	body	of	work	in	sociology	from	Marx	to	Merton,	and	referencing	this	to	Granovetter’s	work	on	weak	and	strong	ties,	Coser	refers	to	his	phrase	‘the	weakness	of	strong	ties.’	She	argues	that	people	in	closed	communities,	rich	in	strong	ties	and	lacking	weak	ties,	are	not	exposed	to	many	people	different	to	themselves	socially	or	in	status.	These	are	networks	of	‘simple’	role-sets	and	status-sets,	where	there	is	little	variety.	This	lack	of	variety	does	not	create	situations	that	are	socially	challenging,	and	in	which	an	individual	can	learn	the	social	skills	to	negotiate	these	social	challenges.	These	lessons	are	crucial	in	manoeuvring	through	complex	social	networks,	and	in	particular	for	bridging	up	(status)	and	out	(role).			Coser	(1975)	observes	that	when	the	word	‘parochial’	is	used	to	describe	someone’s	limited	thinking	or	understanding	of	ideas,	it	is	a	geographical	or	social	classification,	being	of	someone	from	a	simple	or	rural	social	context.	A	connection	is	being	made	between	intellectual	limitations	and	the	lack	of	a	person’s	wider	social	networks,	and	consequently	their	limited	exposure	to	people	of	differing	and	challenging	world	views.	She	argues	that	having	generic,	simple	social	interactions	with	similar	people	requires	less	intellectual	effort	than	having	to	adapt	one’s	ideas	and	responses	to	a	diverse	set	of	people	with	differing,	challenging,	and	conflicting	viewpoints.			A	particular	part	of	Coser’s	text	warrants	quotation	here.	Despite	being	written	in	1975,	and	therefore	pre-dating	startup	accelerators	it	describes	what	is	happening	in	a	startup	accelerator	with	remarkable	accuracy,	thus	suggesting	that	the	theory	of	role-sets	is	important	in	this	study:			
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“in	a	complex	role-set,	individuals	are	more	likely	to	be	confronted	with	incompatible	expectations.	Where	this	is	the	case,	they	are	required	to	reflect	upon	an	appropriate	course	of	action	in	relation	to	their	status	position.	They	must	decide	whether	to	abide	strictly	by	the	rules	or	to	reinterpret	or	even	defy	them,	and	weigh	each	decision	in	relation	to	their	own	purposes	of	action	and	the	purposes	of	others.	This	calls	for	innovation,	sometimes	in	the	form	of	violation	of	custom	and	hierarchical	modes…	it	also	forces	a	certain	measure	of	flexibility,	as	differences	are	“ironed	out,”	through	negotiation	and	compromise,	through	a	social	process	that	forces	each	participant	to	take	into	account	the	vantage	point	of	the	other	person.”	(Coser	1975,)			Coser	goes	on	to	suggest	that	in	social	networks,	subordinates,	or	people	of	low	social	status,	are	expected	to	conform	to	behavioural	and	social	norms.	A	social	structure	that	allows	for	flexibility	over	conformity	is	more	complex,	requiring	individuals	to	account	for	more	variables	in	expectation	and	reaction	from	different	role-sets	and	status-sets.			Coser	explains	how	this	spreads	into	language	use,	because	an	understanding	of	the	differentiation	of	the	self	from	others	leads	to	a	realisation	that	more	complex	language	is	needed	to	explain	ideas.	She	argues	that	when	we	realise	people	are	different	to	ourselves,	we	have	to	use	language	more	carefully	to	express	ourselves	accurately,	and	when	this	applies	to	a	diverse	group	of	people,	all	different,	then	there	is	further	pressure	to	make	language	even	clearer.			
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 61 
She	shows	that	this	‘Cognitive	Flexibility’	is	the	ability	to	see	things	from	the	perspective	of	other	people,	based	on	having	had	exposure	to	a	wide	diversity	of	people	over	time.	Being	trapped	inside	a	dense,	strong	tie	network	inhibits	the	development	of	cognitive	flexibility.			This	leads	to	Coser	observing	that	complex	socialisation	in	diverse	societies	requires,	and	develops,	the	ability	to	imagine	the	perspective	of	other	people	in	order	to	adapt	ways	to	engage	appropriately,	and	to	deal	with	the	potential	conflicts	these	differing	approaches	and	ideas	create,	yet	also	retaining	a	clear	notion	of	oneself.	This	is	the	necessary	skill	set	to	build,	manage,	and	benefit	from	a	complex	social	network,	and	therefore	is	an	important	factor	for	accelerators.				
2.2.2	SOCIAL	CAPITAL		This	section	will	examine	what	Social	Capital	is	and	how	it	manifests	within	social	networks,	in	particular	how	it	leads	to	higher	levels	of	trust,	and	how	it	affects	the	value	of	particular	social	network	structures,	and	their	behaviour.	Lin	(1999)	suggests	that	Social	Capital	refers	to	gains	made	by	an	individual	or	group	as	a	result	of	the	interaction	between	actors	in	a	social	network.	This	capital	is	not	economic	or	human	capital	and	being	part	of	a	social	network	is	therefore	described	as	Social	Capital.						
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2.2.2.1	Definition	of	Social	Capital		The	meaning	and	effects	of	‘Social	Capital’	are	not	clearly	defined	(Portes	2000).	Consequently,	there	exist	a	broad	range	of	definitions,	or	attempts	to	define	Social	Capital,	but	there	is	no	clear	consensus	for	the	conceptualisation	of	Social	Capital	(Bjørnskov	&	Sønderskov	2012).		Coleman	(1988)	describes	three	forms	of	capital	in	relation	to	each	other.	Physical	capital	is	created	by	adapting	materials	to	form	tools	that	can	be	used	to	produce	things,	and	thereby	create	value.	Human	capital	is	created	by	adapting	a	person,	through	education	and	training,	to	give	them	skills	and	capabilities	that	enable	them	to	act	in	new	ways,	and	thereby	create	value.		Consequently,	Social	Capital,	as	an	extension	of	this	logic,	is	where	changes	in	relations	between	people	enable	them	to	act	in	new	ways	and	create	value.	It	is	less	tangible	than	either	physical	or	human	capital	because	the	value	resides	in	the	relations	between	people.	Social	Capital	facilitates	the	creation	of	value,	just	as	physical	and	human	capital	do,	because	a	network	within	which	there	is	greater	trust	is	able	to	achieve	more.			The	concept	of	Social	Capital	has	many	different	and	related	definitions	and	aspects,	some	of	these	are	outlined	below	to	illustrate	the	variety	of	thought	on	the	subject:		
• Lin	(1999)	suggests	that	“Social	Capital	is	captured	from	embedded	resources	in	social	networks,”	and	that	Social	Capital	is	the	“investment	in	social	relations	with	expected	returns.”	He	further	(2001)	defines	‘capital’	as	“an	investment	of	
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resources	with	expected	returns	in	the	marketplace.”	This	theory	is	expanded	in	the	context	of	Social	Capital	by	describing	that	“capital	is	captured	in	social	relations.”			
• Coleman	(1988)	suggests	that	a	unique	feature	of	Social	Capital	is	that	those	who	generate	it	usually	only	capture	a	small	part	of	its	benefit,	which	leads	to	underinvestment	in	Social	Capital	because	the	returns	are	apparently	low.			
• Bjørnskov	&	Sønderskov	(2012)	suggest	that	Social	Capital	has	potential	value	because	it	provides	individuals	the	chance	to	access	information	and	resources	in	their	social	network.			
• Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	suggest	that	Social	Capital	is	the	resource	available	to	actors	as	result	of	their	place	within	their	social	network.	This	can	include	market	relations,	hierarchical	relations,	social	relations.	They	further	discuss	whether	Social	Capital	is	in	fact	a	form	of	capital,	arguing	that	it	is	a	“long-lived	asset”	which	can	be	developed	with	an	expectation	of	future	benefit.	Therefore,	it	has	and	holds	value	that	can	be	expended.	By	investing	in	building	links	to	other	networks,	individuals	and	groups	can	increase	their	access	to	knowledge,	ideas,	power,	resources,	and	other	advantages.	By	investing	in	developing	stronger	internal	relations,	groups	can	increase	their	ability	to	operate	together	to	build	value.			
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• Audretsch,	Aldridge,	&	Sanders	(2011)	define	Social	Capital	as	the	goodwill	“available	to	individuals	or	groups”	which	emerges	from	the	“influence	and	solidarity”	it	affords	actors.		To	them,	Social	Capital	resides	in	social	structures,	and	is	a	long-term	asset	one	can	invest	in.	It	requires	management	and	maintenance	and	can	be	used	in	the	place	of	other	forms	of	capital.			
• Orlowski	&	Wicker	(2015)	identify	that	Social	Capital	improves	the	return	on	investment	in	physical	and	human	capital	and	is	a	multifaceted	concept.	It	includes	the	connectedness	of	people	(their	networks)	and	trust	as	core	elements.	This	trust	at	the	core	of	Social	Capital	can	be	broken	down	into	inter-personal	trust,	institutional	trust,	and	trustworthiness.	Social	Capital	“refers	to	features	of	social	organization,	such	as	trust,	norms,	and	networks	that	can	improve	the	efficiency	of	society	by	facilitating	coordinated	actions.”			
• Davidsson	&	Benson	(2003)	observe	how	human	capital	theory	suggests	that	knowledge	allows	people	to	be	better	at	identifying	and	exploiting	new	opportunities,	but	they	challenge	this,	arguing	that	greater	accumulation	of	human	capital,	in	the	form	of	formal	education,	may	make	someone	more	risk	averse.	They	suggest	that	a	reason	that	immigrants	often	engage	more	in	entrepreneurial	activity	is	that	their	human	capital	–	formal	education	–	is	not	equally	recognised	in	their	new	environment,	so	they	are	encouraged	to	take	more	risk.	They	suggest	that	Social	Capital	provides	nascent	entrepreneurs	with	a	“wider	frame	of	reference”	from	which	to	develop	new	ideas,	and	a	greater	ability	to	extract	benefits	from	their	social	networks.		
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These	definitions	can	be	interpreted	as	suggesting	that	Social	Capital	resides	in	networks	and	is	the	outcome	of	interactions	between	actors	within	and	between	networks.	It	is	heavily	tied	to	trust	and	can	be	reflected	in	influence	and	power.	Social	Capital	forms	the	return	on	investments	made	in	networks,	or	the	realisation	of	resources	embedded	in	networks.	Social	Capital	is	the	currency	used	in	networks,	and	the	bond	that	holds	networks	together	and	allows	them	to	function	effectively.				2.2.2.2	Trust	and	Social	Capital			Trust	is	an	important	factor	in	internal	Social	Capital	within	an	organisation,	leading	to	greater	support	and	cooperation	between	individuals	(Yeng,	Tseng,	&	Wang	2015).		Coleman	(1988)	explores	how	different	types	of	social	structure	facilitate	trust	in	the	form	of	Social	Capital.	The	concept	of	‘closure’	within	networks	defines	where	the	actors	are	all	interconnected.	If	A	is	connected	with	B,	and	separately	with	C,	A	can	defy	a	norm	in	relation	to	B	without	C	finding	out.	If	B	and	C	are	also	connected,	A	is	now	subject	to	sanction	from	B	and	C	for	harming	either	of	them,	and	is	therefore	more	likely	to	abide	by	a	norm	adopted	by	all	three	of	them.	This	closure	in	a	network	is	called	triadic	closure.		In	this	respect,	Coleman	identified	three	forms	of	Social	Capital.	Obligations	and	expectations	depend	on	trustworthiness	within	the	social	network;	the	ability	of	the	
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social	network	to	facilitate	information-flow;	and	the	presence	of	both	norms	and	sanctions	for	breaching	those	norms.			He	discusses	this	in	the	context	of	rotating	credit	associations	in	emerging	economies,	where	a	high	degree	of	‘trustworthiness’	between	the	members	of	the	group	allows	them	to	group	funds,	and	lend	them	to	individuals	in	the	group.	The	close	social	structure,	or	triadic	closure,	make	it	difficult	to	abscond	with	the	money;	norms	of	behaviour	and	effective	sanctions,	and	visibility	across	the	network	of	anyone	who	violates	those	norms,	means	that	the	system	works	well,	and	therefore	has	strong	Social	Capital.			Coleman	(1988,	1990)	further	argues	that	Social	Capital	is	strengthened	in	closed	networks	where	norms	are	understood,	and	social	mechanisms	for	reward	and	punishment	are	in	place.	This	leads	to	greater	trust.	Social	Capital,	in	this	context,	is	therefore	weaker	in	less	consolidated	networks	because	violations	of	norms	are	more	likely	to	go	un-noticed,	or	un-punished.	Coleman’s	approach	sees	Social	Capital	as	the	relationships	between	people	that	accrue	‘credit	slips’	for	actions	carried	out	for	other	people.	In	effect,	this	is	‘doing	favours,’	and	expecting	favours	back	in	return.	Trust	is	required	for	an	individual	to	be	confident	that	someone	will	return	such	a	favour	(Rost	2010).		Coleman	(1988)	interprets	Granovetter’s	(1985)	view	on	embeddedness	as	giving	a	social	aspect	to	a	utilitarian	view	of	the	economist,	arguing	that	the	social	structures	are	not	just	formed	for	a	single	economic	function,	but	also	take	into	consideration	past	and	
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future	interactions,	leading	to	trust,	closeness,	and	other	returns	on	an	engagement	which	in	turn	may	affect	the	purely	economic	functions	of	a	social	network.	He	therefore	defines	Social	Capital	as	consisting	of	some	aspect	of	a	social	structure,	facilitating	actions	of	actors	(whether	individuals	or	corporate)	within	that	social	structure.	Social	Capital	is	unique	as	a	form	of	capital	in	that	it	exists	entirely	within	the	social	structures,	between	and	amongst	actors	in	the	network.				2.2.2.3	Bridging	and	Bonding	Social	Capital			In	this	context,	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	argue	that	‘bridging’	forms	of	Social	Capital	refer	to	the	relations	outside	the	actor’s	core	network,	or	their	external	relations,	whereas	‘bonding’	forms	of	Social	Capital	refer	to	the	internal	ties	within	a	group.	Therefore	‘Social	Capital’	can	refer	to	the	value	in	an	actor’s	bridging	links	to	other	actors	or	networks.	It	can	equally	refer	to	the	trust	that	holds	together	a	community,	society,	network,	or	group.			This	difference	between	the	approaches	of	Burt,	who	defines	Social	Capital	as	residing	in	the	bridging	of	structural	holes,	and	Coleman	who	identifies	Social	Capital	as	residing	in	network	closure,	are	discussed	by	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002),	who	conclude	that	both	network	closure	and	structural	holes	can	create	value	depending	on	the	context,	specifically	what	the	actor	is	looking	to	achieve.			
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Rost	(2010)	concludes	that	Burt	and	Coleman’s	alternative	views	of	Social	Capital	complement	each	other,	suggesting	that	individuals	who	combine	strong	network	ties	with	weak	network	architectures	produce	the	most	innovative	solutions.	She	goes	on	to	argue	that	the	difference	between	Coleman	and	Burt’s	view	on	networks,	and	in	particular	on	Social	Capital,	is	that	one	looks	at	the	relationship	of	individuals	across	the	network,	and	the	other	looks	at	the	position	of	the	individual	and	the	structure	of	the	network.			Within	this	understanding,	Rost	argues	that	strong	ties	lead	to	innovation	because	they	become	social	mechanisms	for	knowledge	recognition	and	realisation	of	innovative	ideas.	When	these	strong	ties	are	combined	with	weak	network	architecture,	which	has	access	to	some	structural	holes,	and	enough	peripheral	network	positions	and	therefore	access	to	bridging	weak	ties,	it	adds	the	benefits	of	information	flow,	and	access	to	knowledge	and	ideas.	She	concludes	that	people	with	strong	ties	who	are	embedded	in	weak	network	architecture	are	most	likely	both	to	have	innovative	ideas	and	be	able	to	realise	them.			Granovetter	(2005)	confirms	this	by	explaining	that	social	networks	lead	to	economic	outcomes	for	three	main	reasons.	Firstly,	he	argues	that	social	networks	affect	both	the	flow	of	information	and	also	that	trust	within	the	network	allows	people	to	verify	or	qualify	the	information.	Secondly,	he	points	to	the	role	social	networks	have	in	amplifying	the	reward	or	punishment	for	interactions	and	behaviour	within	a	network.	Thirdly,	he	argues	that	trust	emerges	from	within	networks,	and	defines	‘trust’	as	being	
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a	belief	that	others	will	behave	in	a	way	that	may	be	contrary	to	their	immediate	best	interest,	but	in	the	interest	of	other	actors	in	the	network.				2.2.2.4	The	value	of	Social	Capital			Orlowski	&	Wicker	(2015)	observe	that	defining	the	monetary	value	of	Social	Capital	is	made	difficult	because	it	has	no	accepted	exchange	value	with	money	and	is	generally	intangible.	Audretsch	et	al.	(2011)	also	argue	that	Social	Capital	cannot	be	measured	or	quantified	in	the	same	way	as	other	forms	of	capital,	and	that	because	it	resides	in	relationships	it	cannot	be	owned	by	a	single	actor.			Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	argue	that	a	key	benefit	of	Social	Capital	is	information,	and	the	quality,	relevance,	and	freshness	of	that	information.	Other	benefits	include	influence,	control,	and	power.	This	second	set	of	benefits	can	express	itself	both	in	people	to	whom	multiple	favours	are	owed,	and	who	can	therefore	influence	those	around	them	for	their	own	benefit	or	that	of	someone	they	choose	to	support.	Another	benefit	of	Social	Capital	can	be	seen	in	someone	who	bridges	structural	holes,	and	in	doing	so	exerts	power	because	they	can	choose	who	benefits	from	the	bridges	they	build.	These	forms	of	power	can	benefit	groups	that	distil	them	collectively,	allowing	them	to	‘get	things	done’	more	effectively,	thus	creating	value	for	the	group.			Adler	&	Kwon	agree	that	Social	Capital	can	be	converted	into	other	forms	of	capital,	for	example	using	one’s	position	in	a	social	network	to	gain	economic	capital.	They	observe	
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that	economic	capital	is	most	liquid,	and	therefore	easiest	to	convert	into	human	or	Social	Capital	(e.g.	paying	for	an	education,	or	buying	someone	lunch),	whereas	Social	Capital	is	the	least	liquid	and	hardest	to	convert.	There	is	no	simple	mechanism	whereby	Social	Capital	can	be	converted	into	other	forms	of	capital	in	the	same	way	that	financial	capital	can	be	used	to	pay	for	something.			They	affirm,	however,	that	Social	Capital	can	be	used	as	a	substitute	or	complement	to	other	forms	of	capital.	For	example,	strong	networks	can	be	used	to	reach	people	faster,	saving	time	and	money,	and	can	be	used	to	raise	financial	capital,	or	to	take	a	product	to	market.	Social	Capital,	in	the	form	of	trust,	also	affects	the	cost	of	things	impacted	by	risk,	such	as	lending,	because	that	risk	can	be	assessed	more	easily	using	Social	Capital,	which	provides	the	ability	to	access	deeper	and	broader	knowledge	about	an	individual	or	opportunity	from	which	to	evaluate	its	risk.			Granovetter	(2005)	refers	to	Lin	(2001)	in	defining	Social	Capital	as,	for	example,	where	a	prospective	employer	and	employee	prefer	to	find	out	about	each	other	via	a	trusted	actor	in	a	network.	In	this	context,	social	networks	and	Social	Capital	are	more	efficient	than	a	recruitment	agency	because	they	exist	already	as	part	of	a	person’s	wider	activities	and	interactions,	whereas	a	recruitment	agency	will	spend	time	and	money	to	build	such	a	network.		Therefore,	whilst	Social	Capital	cannot	be	quantified	in	direct	relation	to	other	forms	of	capital	it	can	be	converted	into	economic	and	human	capital.	It	can	also	be	accrued	and	‘spent’	to	create	other	forms	of	capital.	However,	Social	Capital	resides	and	is	created	
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from	the	links	between	actors	in	a	network,	and	therefore	cannot	exist	without	the	context	of	multiple	actors	in	a	network	environment.				2.2.2.5	The	risks	associated	with	Social	Capital			Whilst	Social	Capital	has	so	far	been	explored	in	the	context	of	its	benefits,	and	as	a	positive	outcome	of	social	networks,	it	can	also	have	risks	and	the	potential	for	negative	outcomes.			These	risks	are	explored	by	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	who	argue	that	they	primarily	relate	to	the	cost	of	building	and	maintaining	Social	Capital	within	networks,	when	realising	and	converting	that	Social	Capital	is	difficult.		A	simple	risk	is	not	getting	an	adequate	return	on	the	investment,	but	also	that	the	work	involved	distracts	from	other	important	activities,	for	example	earning	economic	capital.			A	related	argument	put	forward	by	Granovetter	(2005)	is	that	building	and	maintaining	close	network	ties	(strong	ties)	is	expensive,	whereas	maintaining	weak	ties	is	easier	and	more	efficient.	As	strong	ties	bring	redundant	information,	and	weak	ties	bring	non-redundant	information,	the	risk	of	building	and	maintaining	a	broad,	strong	tie	network	is	that	it	is	costly	and	high	in	redundancy.			Adler	&	Kwon	also	describe	the	risks	posed	by	Social	Capital	of	becoming	too	embedded	in	a	network,	leading	to	a	lack	of	non-redundant	information	flows,	and	at	a	group	level	
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a	lack	of	new	ideas	resulting	in	parochialism	and	inertia.	Too	much	Social	Capital,	represented	by	overly	strong	network	ties,	can	also	lead	to	a	sense	of	over-obligation	within	the	group,	and	friendships	that	are	too	close	to	allow	more	opportunistic	interactions.	This	can	ultimately	lead	to	corruption,	conspiracy	theories,	and	other	negative	behaviour	by	a	group,	where	excessive	Social	Capital	results	in	loyalty	to	strong	ties	taking	precedence	over	beneficial	behaviour,	and	overriding	adherence	to	the	norms	of	the	wider	weak	tie	community.	They	conclude	that	too	much	Social	Capital	is	seen	to	lead	to	too	much	network	closure,	so	Social	Capital	has	a	risk	when	it	becomes	too	strong.			Taken	further,	Adler	&	Kwon	explain	that	groups	which	have	low	internal	bonding	ties,	and	low	external	bridging	ties	will	suffer	from	low	Social	Capital,	whereas	those	with	high	levels	of	internal	and	external	ties	will	enjoy	strong	Social	Capital	and	the	associated	advantages.	This	approach	suggests	Social	Capital	risks	exist	in	networks	with	high	internal	links	and	low	external	ties,	or	high	external	with	low	internal	ties.			They	suggest	that	networks	with	high	internal	links	and	low	external	links	risk	isolation	and	a	tendency	towards	not	receiving	conflicting	sources	of	information,	combined	with	norms	that	encourage	people	to	‘toe	the	line’	rather	than	challenge	negative	behaviours.	This	creates	a	tendency	towards	information	bubbles,	conspiracies,	and	corruption.	Networks	with	high	external	and	low	internal	ties	risk	developing	strong	access	to	new	and	conflicting	ideas,	and	therefore	a	potential	for	innovation,	but	no	internal	Social	Capital	to	provide	the	trust	and	cooperation	needed	to	act	on	it.			
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Adler	&	Kwon	conclude	that	this	analysis	also	depends	on	the	content	of	the	ties	in	these	networks,	whereby	the	two	tendencies	described	can	result	in	a	force	for	good	or	bad	outcomes	depending	on	what	information	is	travelling	across	the	internal	or	external	ties,	and	on	the	underlying	culture.	Isolated	networks	can	create	a	downward	force,	where	false	information	and	ideas	go	unchallenged,	creating	a	negative	spiral,	or	they	can	end	up	creating	the	stable	social	platform	from	which	members	of	the	group	can	reach	out	to	other	networks.				
2.2.3	THE	BEHAVIOUR	OF	SOCIAL	NETWORKS		The	description	of	social	network	structures	combined	with	an	understanding	of	Social	Capital	enables	an	examination	of	behaviour	within	social	networks,	including	social	norms,	and	how	these	are	policed.			
	
	2.2.3.1	Norms			Societies	all	have	norms.	They	are	the	accepted	social	rules	that	a	connected	group	of	people	agree	upon.	They	may	be	codified,	in	the	form	of	laws,	or	a	constitution,	but	originate	as	and	can	remain	as	unwritten,	even	unspoken	rules.		Norms	are	an	important	part	of	behaviour	within	social	networks,	accounting	for	how	they	self-regulate,	and	defining	the	levels	of	trust	and	co-operation,	or	Social	Capital	within	the	network.	Norms	are	clearer	and	easier	to	enforce	in	a	dense	network,	which	is	one	in	
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which	there	are	multiple	possible	connections	between	nodes	and	triadic	closure,	as	outlined	above	(see	2.2.1.4).	Information	travels	more	quickly	through	such	networks,	and	consequently	reward	and	sanction,	especially	in	terms	of	reputation,	spread	rapidly	and	widely.	Norms	are	policed.	Individuals	who	conform	to	norms	are	rewarded	by	the	network,	and	those	who	break	with	them	are	sanctioned.	The	precise	form	of	reward	and	sanction	varies	according	to	the	society	or	network	(Granovetter	2005).					2.2.3.2	Cooperation	and	reciprocity		Fowler	&	Christakis	(2008)	research	the	spread	of	ideas	and	emotions	through	social	networks.	They	used	data	from	the	Framingham	Heart	Study,	a	20-year	longitudinal	social	study,	to	explore	how	happiness	spreads	across	social	networks.	They	concluded	that	happiness	spreads	across	networks	through	a	variety	of	ties,	and	that	it	clusters	in	groups,	and	can	extend	by	up	to	three	degrees	through	the	network.	They	went	on	to	show	how	other	concepts,	like	depression	and	loneliness,	also	spread	by	up	to	three	degrees	through	social	networks,	using	social	ties.	This	sets	the	context	for	understanding	how	concepts	like	co-operation	also	spread	through	networks.		Harrison,	Sciberras	&	James	(2011)	specifically	explored	cooperation	in	social	networks.	Their	experiment	with	human	networks	demonstrated	that	cooperation	is	most	productive	when	individuals	can	expect	direct	or	indirect	reciprocity	in	the	future	or	are	aware	of	sanctions	imposed	on	non-co-operators.	Reputation	in	the	network	increases	the	chances	of	cooperation	again	because	it	increases	the	likelihood	of	either	
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reward	or	sanction	in	the	future.	Social	connectivity,	or	the	place	in	the	network	structure	of	a	particular	actor,	also	affects	the	probability	and	frequency	of	interaction,	and	the	exchange	of	information.	They	identify	that	if	an	actor	is	highly	connected	within	the	network,	then	cooperating	with	them	is	more	likely	to	result	in	reward,	or	not	doing	so	in	sanction.			In	their	experiment,	they	sought	to	test	the	investment	in	cooperation	in	a	human	social	network	by	getting	individuals	to	carry	out	tasks	that	had	a	clear	physical	cost	to	the	actor,	but	a	benefit	to	another	actor	in	the	network.	They	identified	that	social	proximity	within	the	network	increased	cooperative	investment,	and	that	some	individuals	were	willing	to	expend	more	effort	for	the	benefit	of	their	close	social	ties	than	on	themselves	or	their	close	genetic	ties.	They	concluded	this	is	because	strong	social	ties	are	different	to	strong	genetic	ties,	whereas	an	individual	would	expect	a	relative	to	act	to	support	them,	with	non-genetic	ties	there	may	be	a	desire	to	increase	the	chance	of	reciprocity	by	over-compensating	their	support	as	it	cannot	be	taken	for	granted.		Through	their	experiment,	Harrison	et	al.	(2011)	showed	that	social	proximity	in	a	human	social	network	acts	in	the	same	way	as	biological	relatedness	in	a	simpler	animal	social	network,	and	that	people	who	are	more	cooperative	are	more	likely	to	cluster	in	networks.						
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2.2.3.3.	Embeddedness	and	tie	decay			Granovetter	(1985)	proposes	that	co-operation	and	reciprocity	are	behavioural	norms	that	are	embedded	in	social	networks,	and	that	the	behaviour	and	institutions	examined	in	neoclassical	utilitarian	economics	are	far	from	being	self-interested	and	isolated	from	social	influence,	as	suggested	by	economists,	and	instead	are	highly	affected	by	ongoing	social	relations	and	therefore	not	operating	independently	of	them.			He	thus	combines	economics	and	sociology	and	suggests	that	most	behaviour	is	embedded	in	networks,	and	therefore	influenced	by	social	outcomes	and	inter-relationships.	In	particular,	he	suggests	that	behaviour	such	as	expending	effort	to	benefit	others,	that	is	apparently	non-rational	as	viewed	from	an	economics	perspective,	becomes	rational	when	viewed	sociologically	as	a	function	of	embeddedness,	and	therefore	complying	with	social	norms,	and	responsive	to	social	outcomes	like	status,	approval,	or	sanction.		Burt	(1999)	argues	that	embeddedness	is	also	a	factor	in	the	decay	of	networks,	which	describes	the	tendency	of	relationships	to	weaken	and	dissolve	over	time.	He	further	observes	(2001)	that	the	rate	of	decay	is	affected	by	multiple	factors,	and	is	slowed	in	part	by	people	being	connected	indirectly	through	many	third	parties,	or	being	highly	embedded.	He	posits	that	building	such	attachment	should	happen	as	early	as	possible	and	should	be	embedded	in	other	types	of	social	relations,	for	example	involving	spouses,	friends,	and	relatives,	not	just	the	individual,	and	should	stray	into	social	
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engagement,	not	just	topic	or	work	related.	A	higher	level	of	embeddedness	will	lead	to	a	slower	rate	of	decay.			Lin	(1999)	offers	three	further	reasons	why	embedded	resources	in	a	social	network	will	produce	value.	Firstly,	they	give	access	to	the	flow	of	information.	In	an	imperfect	market,	an	individual’s	position	in	the	network	can	increase	their	access	to	information	not	readily,	or	quickly,	available	to	others,	thus	giving	them	an	advantage.	Secondly,	position	in	the	social	network	can	afford	an	individual	some	degree	of	power	or	influence.	This	can	relate	to	the	decision-making	of	others,	or	any	other	outcomes	over	which	this	influence	creates	greater	value	for	the	actor	or	its	associates.	Thirdly,	Lin	points	to	how	the	position	of	an	actor	in	the	network,	and	their	relationship	to	others	can	afford	them	social	credentials	in	the	eyes	of	others.	This	value	derives	from	the	interaction	between	actors	in	social	networks	and	is	therefore	their	Social	Capital.				2.2.3.4	Link	Reciprocity			The	literature	has	thus	far	examined	the	interrelationship	between	Social	Capital	and	co-operation,	showing	that	reciprocity	is	a	key	factor	in	social	networks	and	Social	Capital	(see	2.2.3.2).	Rand,	Arbesman,	&	Christakis	(2011)	argue	that	in	evolutionary	game	theory	reciprocity	is	generally	examined	in	the	context	of	occurring	between	two	actors.	In	this	context	an	actor	can	reciprocate	the	action	of	another	actor,	either	by	cooperating	or	not	based	on	their	previous	action.	They	suggest	that	this	notion	is	harder	to	explore	in	groups,	but	they	argue	that	“strategic	tie	formation	and	dissolution”	
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in	a	dynamic	social	network	allows	actors	not	only	to	respond	to	cooperation	or	lack	thereof	in	others	by	equivalent	actions,	but	also	to	respond	through	the	formation	or	dissolution	of	ties	between	that	actor	and	their	network.			Consequently,	if	an	actor	in	the	network	does	not	cooperate,	that	tie	with	them	is	dissolved,	excluding	them	from	the	group.	If	an	actor	does	cooperate,	their	behaviour	can	be	rewarded	both	with	reciprocal	cooperation,	but	also	with	formation	of	social	ties	into	the	network.	The	result	is	a	network	which	can	refresh	rapidly,	can	constantly	bring	in	co-operators,	and	exclude	non-co-operators	(Rand	et	al.	2011).	Harrison	et	al	(2011)	suggest	this	explains	that	co-operators	tend	to	cluster	as	a	result	of	link	reciprocity.		Rand,	et	al.	describe	how	dynamic	networks,	where	ties	are	created	and	dissolved	in	response	to	behaviours,	can	amplify	clustering	of	certain	behaviours	or	attitudes,	creating	an	advantage	within	the	network	for	constructive	behaviour.	Ties	in	social	networks	are	dynamic,	in	that	they	are	created	and	terminated	in	response	to	people’s	actions	and	behaviours,	becoming	an	effective	means	by	which	behaviour	is	sanctioned	or	rewarded.	Link	reciprocity	therefore	means	that	the	networks	of	co-operators	grow	rapidly,	and	those	of	non-co-operators	shrink	accordingly.		Link	reciprocity	is	therefore	the	means	by	which	norms	are	policed	in	dynamic	social	networks.				
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2.2.4	SUMMARY:	SOCIAL	NETWORK	THEORY				This	first	part	of	the	literature	review	has	explored	the	fundamental	concepts	in	Social	Network	Theory,	and	shown	how	value	resides	in	networks	in	the	form	of	Social	Capital.	The	behaviour	of	social	networks	is	influenced	by	these	structures	and	rewarded	through	Social	Capital.	In	particular,	co-operators	cluster	in	networks,	supported	by	link	reciprocity,	which	rewards	them	with	further	ties,	and	at	the	same	time	expels	those	who	do	not	co-operate,	or	who	are	bad	actors.			The	extent	to	which	an	actor	is	embedded	within	a	network	affects	their	access	to	information,	and	consequently	their	power	and	influence.	All	of	this	is	the	Social	Capital	they	derive	from	their	position	and	behaviour	in	the	network,	but	can	be	converted	to	economic	or	human	capital	when	those	benefits	are	reflected	in	their	commercial	activities.			Therefore,	Social	Capital	can	be	a	substitute	for	other	forms	of	capital	because	it	can	be	converted	as	a	result	of	the	benefit	it	brings	within	a	social	network.	It	can	consequently	be	used	to	reward	people,	and	threat	of	withdrawal	can	be	used	to	sanction	them.			Within	the	structure	of	a	social	network,	bridging	ties	give	access	to	new	information	and	ways	of	thinking,	and	bridging	ties	are	usually	weak	ties.	However,	strong	ties	allow	people	to	get	things	done	effectively,	and	enjoy	greater	trust	because	they	are	more	likely	to	return	favours	over	time.	Therefore,	a	mixture	of	strong	ties	and	weak	ties	creates	the	ideal	social	structure	by	which	to	access	new	ideas	and	act	on	them	to	create	
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benefit.	In	order	to	manoeuvre	through	this	rich	social	landscape,	individuals	require	complex	role	and	status	sets	in	order	to	relate	to	people	unlike	them,	and	to	express	their	ideas	to	a	variety	of	other	actors.			This	describes	the	social	network	structures	that	are	the	foundation	of	accelerators,	which	are	not	only	business	support	programs,	but	also	networks	of	actors	connected	by	ties,	engaging	in	complex	social	interactions.																		
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2.3	ACCELERATOR	LITERATURE	REVIEW			
2.3.1	WHAT	AN	ACCELERATOR	IS		Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	suggest	that	a	valuable	approach	to	understanding	the	value	of	accelerators	is	to	explore	the	alternatives	available	to	startups,	and	by	doing	so	begin	with	understanding	what	accelerators	are	not.	They	argue	that	bank	loans,	government	grants,	and	paying	for	space	in	an	incubator	are	all	less	attractive	than	an	accelerator	package,	in	particular	being	slow,	making	it	harder	to	scale,	and	being	more	expensive.			As	examined	in	more	depth	below	(see	2.3.2.2)	they	point	out	that	accelerators	are	not	incubators,	which	are	buildings	that	rent	out	desks,	but	are	a	form	of	incubation,	which	is	a	form	of	support	for	an	early	stage	company.	It	could	be	argued	that	many	early	stage	companies	that	get	accepted	into	accelerators	could	not	join	an	incubator	because	they	do	not	have	the	funding	to	pay	for	rent	or	other	services.				Hallen,	Bingham,	&	Cohen	(2016)	explain	that	accelerators	help	startups	overcome	the	‘liabilities	of	newness,’	which	Frimodig	(2012)	describes	as	their	competence	and	equity	gap.	To	achieve	this	they	offer	strategic	support,	helping	startups	grow	faster,	and	raise	money	more	effectively.	They	are	also	intended	to	provide	private	equity	and	venture	capital	investors	a	source	of	higher	quality	startups	that	have	a	lower	mortality	rate	(Sharma,	Joshi,	&	Shukla	2014).		
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Accelerators	were	born	into	the	unique	business	environment	of	the	tech	sector,	which	is	unusually	open	and	collaborative.	Mentors	offer	advice	for	free,	startups	share	office	spaces	and	talk	openly	about	their	businesses.	In	most	circumstances	NDAs	are	frowned	upon	or	considered	unnecessary,	certainly	with	startups.	They	have	developed	out	of	this	sector	to	encompass	many	sectors,	but	the	traditions	and	core	concepts	have	remained	(Miller	&	Bound	2011).		This	is	the	framework	and	context	within	which	accelerators	exist.	The	literature	review	now	traces	their	development	and	evolution,	exploring	these	and	other	themes	in	more	detail.			2.3.1.1	Emergence	and	growth	of	accelerators		Almost	all	accelerators	are	derivations	of	Y	Combinator,	which	established	the	concept	in	2005	(Christiansen	2009).	The	founder	of	Y	Combinator,	Paul	Graham,	first	invested	a	small	amount	of	money	in	eight	startups	after	giving	a	talk	to	the	Harvard	Computer	Society	in	which	he	advised	the	budding	entrepreneurs	to	seek	angel	investment	from	wealthy,	successful	entrepreneurs	who	had	founded	tech	companies	themselves	(Lee,	2006;	Cohen	2013).		He	found	that	by	having	invested	into	a	group	of	founders,	all	of	whom	were	inexperienced,	the	advice	and	education	they	needed	could	be	delivered	to	the	whole	group	at	once,	which	was	more	efficient	(Cohen	2013).	This	group	of	startups	grew	into	
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some	successful	companies,	including	Loopt,	which	was	acquired	for	about	$43M	by	Green	Dot	(Cohen	2013).	These	successful	sales,	or	exits,	created	a	return	on	the	investment	made	by	Graham,	suggesting	that	this	model	of	investing	in	batches	had	merit.			Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	explain	how	the	concept	then	developed,	and	in	particular	took	off	after	2008,	when	the	recession	diminished	the	amount	of	funding	previously	available	to	startups,	especially	angel	investing	and	bank	loans.	They	suggest	the	growth	of	accelerators	was	in	part	due	to	this	decline	in	alternative	funding,	making	accelerators	more	attractive	to	startups.	Hathaway	(2016)	estimates	a	50%	annual	increase	in	their	numbers	from	2008	to	2014.		Cohen	(2013)	observed	that	there	is	no	official	list	of	accelerators,	and	as	new	ones	are	launching	so	often	any	such	list	would	soon	become	out	of	date.	When	she	compiled	her	own	database,	she	identified	(in	2013)	up	to	300	programs	in	five	continents,	which	had	supported	2500	startups,	and	helped	them	raise	around	$1.8bn.			She	observed	that	it	is	difficult	to	count	accelerators	or	chart	their	growth	definitively.	Other	sources	that	have	tried	to	do	this	produce	a	confused	picture.	A	year	after	Cohen	created	her	list,	Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	estimated	there	were	anything	from	300	to	over	2000	programs	in	six	continents.	Miller	&	Stacey	(2014)	referenced	the	main	online	database	of	accelerators,	Seed–db.com,	as	listing	136	programs	worldwide	which	had	supported	2,038	companies	and	helped	them	raise	$1.5	billion.	Shane	(2015)	refers	to	the	website,	Angelist.com,	as	listing	467	accelerators.	Hallen	et	al	(2016)	suggested	
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 84 
that	since	2005,	over	6000	startups	had	participated	in	one	of	650	programs,	and	raised	around	$13bn,	taking	their	information	again	from	Seed-db.com.			Bone	et	al.	(2017)	also	referred	to	Seed-db.com,	identifying	224	accelerators	globally,	18	of	which	had	closed	or	merged.		Geographically,	139	were	in	North	America,	and	57	in	Europe,	and	the	rest	scattered	in	other	continents.	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	discuss	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	but	Seed-db.com	does	not	list	it,	which	shows	that	the	data	on	accelerators	is	not	comprehensive	or	current	at	any	given	point	or	in	any	given	source.				In	2014,	reflecting	how	the	motivation	and	funding	for	accelerators	had	evolved	from	Paul	Graham’s	investing	model	of	an	accelerator,	Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	reported	that	local	governments	and	founders	were	motivated	by	using	accelerators	to	trigger	the	local	startup	ecosystem	in	their	city	or	region.				As	well	as	the	recession	of	2008	creating	a	need	for	different	ways	to	finance	startups,	the	other	reason	for	the	growth	in	accelerators	is	linked	to	the	reduced	cost	of	setting	up	a	tech	company,	and	testing	ideas	and	products.	During	the	dot.com	boom,	technology	companies	required	very	large	sums	of	money	to	create	new	software	or	hardware,	but	the	development	of	technology,	and	better	understanding	of	processes	like	Lean	Startup	means	that	startups	could	now	make	meaningful	progress	with	relatively	small	amounts	of	money	and	time	(Fehder	&	Hochberg	2014;	Pauwels	et	al.	2015).		
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Hochberg	(2015)	showed	that	the	spread	of	accelerators	in	the	US	was	across	the	country,	rather	than	clustering	around	traditional	tech	hubs	like	Silicon	Valley.	Whereas	in	the	UK,	Fox	(2014)	reported	that	61%	of	programs	in	the	UK	were	based	in	London	and	referenced	what	were	then	early	efforts	by	the	government	to	encourage	a	wider	spread	of	programs	outside	London.			As	the	concept	of	accelerators	evolved	into	different	variants,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	reported	205	incubators,	163	accelerators,	and	11	pre-accelerators,	7	virtual	accelerators,	and	4	virtual	incubators	in	the	UK.	Several	maker	spaces,	co-working	spaces,	and	venture	capital	funds	did	not	meet	the	criteria	of	either	an	accelerator	or	incubator,	despite	describing	themselves	as	such.	This	shows	how	much	the	concept	of	an	accelerator	has	developed	since	its	inception,	and	how	it	has	triggered	other	types	of	incubation	processes	and	business	models	around	the	ecosystems	which	have	been	built.		Reflecting	the	tendency	for	accelerators	to	be	based	within	larger	ecosystems,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	also	observed	that	half	of	UK	accelerators	were	in	London,	whilst	incubators	were	evenly	distributed	across	the	UK.	This	confirms	the	idea	that	will	be	examined	in	this	thesis	that	accelerators	can	be	ecosystem	builders	but	need	a	wider	ecosystem	around	them.		Bone	et	al.	(2017)	also	reported	that	businesses	travelled	a	shorter	distance	to	participate	in	incubators	than	they	did	for	accelerators.					
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2.3.1.2	The	lack	of	research	into	accelerators		A	theme	running	through	the	literature	is	that	there	has	been	relatively	little	research	into	accelerators.	By	examining	the	literature	chronologically,	it	is	possible	to	see	how	observations	have	changed	over	time	and	how	research	into	accelerators	has	evolved	and	developed.		This	section	of	the	literature	review	will	examine	the	evolution	of	accelerator	thinking	over	time.	Christiansen	(2009)	cited	a	lack	of	‘serious	literature’	about	accelerators,	despite	there	being	plenty	written	about	them	in	the	popular	press.		In	2010,	Tarani	(2010)	suggested	that	little	research	had	been	carried	out	into	accelerators,	and	that	most	of	the	available	literature	was	from	magazines,	websites,	and	by	organisations	concerned	with	innovation	and	entrepreneurship,	such	as	NESTA	and	the	Kaufman	Foundation.	These,	he	argued,	mainly	explored	how	to	build	accelerators,	but	did	not	explore	the	underlying	processes	in	detail.			Two	years	later,	Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	observed	that	the	data	they	were	studying	was	only	two	years	old,	making	it	a	difficult	topic	to	form	the	basis	of	extensive	scientific	research.	Frimodig	(2012)	found	that	whilst	there	had	been	extensive	research	into	business	incubation,	less	attention	had	been	paid	to	accelerators.			In	2013,	Caley	(2013)	continued	this	argument,	citing	that	over	250	articles	on	incubators	had	been	published	in	peer-reviewed	journals,	whilst	nothing	similar	had	been	found	on	accelerators.	Like	Tarani	in	2010,	Caley	also	found	that	available	research	material	mainly	consisted	of	reports	by	think-tanks	and	governments,	
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dissertations,	and	media	articles.	Cohen	(2013)	concluded	that	accelerators	were	an	important	subject	for	academic	research,	but	as	yet	were	under-studied.			The	lack	of	peer-reviewed	literature	was	also	observed	by	Lehmann	(2013),	in	particular	that	no	scientific	study	had	been	made	into	corporate	accelerators.	He	primarily	referred	to	Christiansen	(2009)	and	van	Huijgevoort	(2012)	as	a	resource	for	his	own	research,	and	reached	the	conclusion	that	most	of	the	research	and	writing	on	the	topic	of	accelerators	was,	to	date,	just	descriptive	rather	than	analytical.			This	last	point	is	of	interest	and	is	developed	further	in	the	literature.	Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	specifically	point	out	that	not	enough	research	had	been	carried	out	on	the	acceleration	process.			In	2014,	Kim	&	Wagman	observed		that	despite	the	significant	role	that	accelerators	were	now	playing	in	entrepreneurial	financing,	they	had	still	received	very	little	attention	in	academic	research.	Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	added	that	accelerators	were	proliferating,	but	there	was	limited	evidence	in	research	of	the	‘efficacy	and	role’	of	the	programs.	They	suggested	this	was	partly	due	to	an	absence	of	large	scale	datasets.	In	an	observation	that	is	important	to	this	thesis	and	other	research,	they	concluded	that	researchers	do	not	have	access	to	much	information	about	accelerator	programs,	such	as	the	companies	entering	and	exiting,	and	the	startups	that	apply	but	are	rejected.	They	suggest	one	reason	is	that	accelerators	are	often	startups	themselves,	so	they	do	not	have	the	resource	or	incentive	to	track	data	in	a	way	necessary	for	thorough	academic	research.		
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Hochberg	(2015)	continued	a	year	later	to	suggest	that	with	the	increase	in	public	and	private	money	now	being	committed	to	accelerators	it	was	necessary	to	find	ways	to	evaluate	their	wider	effect	on	regional	ecosystems	and	entrepreneurial	activity	more	generally,	going	on	to	argue	that	this	had	not	been	achieved	in	the	literature	mainly	due	to	a	lack	of	available	data.			Whilst	this	was	in	part	because	the	phenomenon	was	still	considered	to	be	quite	new,	Hochberg	(2015)	again	suggested	that	accelerators	rarely	had	the	capacity	to	gather	and	track	data	to	an	extent	that	would	be	necessary	for	large-scale	studies.	He	added	that	as	the	market	had	developed,	accelerators	had	become	transient,	and	some	of	them	did	not	exist	long	enough	to	carry	out	long	term	studies	into	the	companies	they	accelerated.			Again,	in	2015	Pauwels	et	al.	argued	that	the	literature	to	date	had	been	primarily	descriptive.	And	in	2016	Hathaway	(2016)	observed	that	accelerators	have	received	a	great	deal	of	attention	but	little	scrutiny.			Eleven	years	after	Y	Combinator,	and	seven	years	after	Christiansen’s	first	paper,	Hallen	et	al.	(2016)	were	still	concluding	that	there	is	‘surprisingly’	little	research	into	the	effectiveness	of	accelerators.	This	troubled	them	because	they	found	that	accelerators	were	by	now	advertising	for	startups	with	the	promise	that	they	would	accelerate	their	businesses,	but	still	there	was	no	real	evidence	to	support	this	claim.		The	point	that	there	is	a	large	amount	of	research	into	incubators,	but	very	little	into	accelerators	was	again	made	by	Eveleens,	van	Rijnsoever,	&	Niesten	(2016),	and	
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Hathaway	(2016)	also	argued	that	there	had	been	little	systematic	research	into	the	impact	of	accelerators.	Specifically,	Barba	(2016)	pointed	out	that	what	is	missing	is	any	continuous	research,	leading	to	a	lack	of	data	on	the	performance,	methodologies,	and	strategy	of	accelerators	as	they	have	evolved.	She	suggested	this	is	partly	due	to	accelerator	founders	not	wanting	to	share	this	information.			This	argument	would	make	sense:	whilst	they	might	appear	to	be	subjects	for	study	in	the	eyes	of	academics,	most	accelerators	are	to	their	founders	competing	private	businesses,	so	they	would	be	unwilling	to	share	what	they	might	view	as	their	competitive	advantage,	or	outcomes	that	would	impact	on	their	reputation.			By	2017,	very	little	appeared	to	have	changed	since	Christiansen	and	Tarani	formed	their	opinions	in	2009	and	2010.	Gonzalez-Uribe	&	Leatherbee	(2017)	pointed	to	a	lack	of	‘rigorous	evidence’	about	the	effect	of	accelerators.	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	warned	their	readers	that	accelerators	had	evolved	‘dramatically’	over	a	decade,	and	that	by	then	new	programs	were	launching	‘almost	weekly.’	They	observed	that	this	meant	the	‘shelf-life’	of	any	study	into	the	topic	would	therefore	be	limited.			This	author	believes	that	this	last	point	perhaps	goes	some	way	to	explain	the	apparent	disconnect	between	academic	researchers	and	accelerator	founders.	In	effect,	accelerator	businesses	may	have	been	evolving	too	quickly	for	academic	literature	to	keep	up.	Consequently,	academic	research	may	have	been	perceived	to	be	of	little	value	to	those	running	accelerators,	because	it	was	out	of	date	by	the	time	it	was	published.	This	would	leave	accelerator	founders	and	managers	less	incentivised	to	work	closely	
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with	researchers.	Consequently,	the	nature	of	the	research,	in	particular	the	tone	of	work	like	that	by	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	is	clearly	aimed	at	policy	makers	rather	than	accelerator	practitioners.			In	2017,	Bone	et	al.	still	maintained	that	the	sector	was	young,	and	stated	that	“empirical	data	needed	to	thoroughly	evaluate	the	success	of	accelerator	programs	and	their	graduates	does	not	yet	exist,”	so	there	is	little	proven	research	into	best	practice.			This	thesis	comes	at	the	end	of	a	period	of	developing	academic	interest	in	accelerators,	but	one	during	which	a	relatively	small	body	of	work	has	developed	mainly	aimed	at	describing	accelerators.	There	is	some	analysis,	and	many	lists	and	rankings,	but	no	large	data	sets	or	long-term	studies	which	exist	for	their	evaluation.	This	thesis	therefore	focusses	on	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	as	a	case	study,	to	contribute	to	the	wider	body	of	research,	rather	than	seeking	to	replicate	or	add	to	the	existing	lists	and	rankings.			
2.3.2	DEFINITIONS		The	examination	thus	far	of	the	historical	evolution	of	accelerators	and	the	extent	of	research	into	this	topic	gives	a	context	in	which	to	explore	in	more	depth	the	definition	of	an	accelerator,	and	the	other	related	concepts	of	a	startup,	and	incubation.				
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2.3.2.1	Definition	of	a	Startup			This	thesis,	and	any	discussion	about	accelerators,	refers	to	‘startups.’	The	word	‘startup’	can	cause	as	much	confusion	and	disagreement	as	the	word	‘accelerator,’	perhaps	indicative	of	both	still	being	relatively	new	and	constantly	changing	concepts.		A	startup	was	shown	to	differ	from	an	SME	in	part	due	to	the	attitude	and	ambition	of	a	startup	(see	1.1.2).			Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	add	to	this	that	a	startup	is	distinct	in	operating	in	an	uncertain	and	difficult	context,	and	bringing	something	new,	and	potentially	disruptive	to	the	market.			Bone	et	al.	(2017)	suggest	that	the	young	company	will	also	have	a	specific	growth	ambition,	namely	to	grow,	or	scale,	quickly	and	rapidly,	which	is	not	exclusive	to	startups,	but	not	ubiquitous	to	all	SMEs.	Startups	typically	have	something	new	about	them,	be	it	a	technology,	business	model,	or	market.	The	support	startups	need	is	therefore	different	to	the	support	required	by	new	small	firms,	or	small	firms	in	general.			Dee,	Gill,	Weinberg,	&	Mctavish	(2015),	writing	for	NESTA,	go	further	to	make	the	sub	distinction	that	a	pre-startup	can	consist	of	entrepreneurs	with	an	un-tested	idea,	which	can	also	be	called	‘idea	stage.’	They	define	a	startup	as	a	company	that	is	in	the	process	of	being	set	up,	while	an	‘early	stage	venture’	may	be	pre-profit,	but	with	some	form	of	early	traction.		
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Another	approach	to	defining	‘startup’	is	in	exploring	what	they	do	not	have,	and	therefore	what	they	need	from	an	accelerator.	Isabelle	(2013)	observed	that	startups	generally	apply	to	accelerators	when	they	have	multiple	needs,	rather	than	just	needing	mentoring,	or	just	needing	capital.	This	is	a	reflection	of	their	lack	of	knowledge	and	experience,	so	in	turn	the	definition	could	include	a	company	with	an	incomplete	team,	or	a	team	with	incomplete	knowledge.			Given	the	very	wide,	and	subjective,	definitions	of	a	‘startup,’	many	of	which	are	created	for	specific	purposes,	for	the	purposes	of	this	research,	a	startup	will	be	taken	to	refer	to	any	company	or	entity	that	is	part	of	an	accelerator	cohort.	This	allows	for	the	fact	that	in	contemporary	accelerators,	participant	companies	may	be	social	ventures,	more	developed	businesses,	or	even	quite	developed	companies,	as	well	as	individual	founders,	new	teams,	or	more	classic	early	stage	technology	companies.				2.3.2.2	Incubators	are	not	accelerators			Much	as	it	is	necessary	to	define	‘startup’	in	order	to	discuss	accelerators,	it	is	also	necessary	to	differentiate	accelerators	from	incubators,	and	therefore	to	define	the	terms	‘incubator,’	and	‘incubation,’	so	they	can	be	distinguished	from	an	accelerator.		Hochberg	expresses	frustration,	which	is	shared	by	this	author,	at	accelerators	that	call	themselves	incubators	and	incubators	that	call	themselves	accelerators	(Fehder	&	Hochberg	2014;	Cohen	&	Hochberg	2014).	These	terms	are	casually	used	interchangeably,	which	is	both	inaccurate,	and	causes	confusion.	
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This	thesis	will	not	focus	in	depth	on	defining	incubators	or	comparing	them	to	accelerators,	as	this	has	been	well	covered	in	the	existing	literature	(Miller	&	Bound	2011;	Cohen	2013)	and	is	not	the	focus	of	this	thesis.	However,	it	is	relevant	to	clarify	the	distinction	between	them	in	order	to	carry	forward	this	particular	examination	of	accelerators.			Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	state	that	incubators	were	the	antecedents	of	accelerators,	and	accelerators	may	have	evolved	as	a	response	to	incubators.	The	first	business	incubator	was	established	in	1959	in	New	York,	by	1995	there	were	600	in	the	US	alone	(van	Huijgevoort	2012).	While	incubators	are	the	historical	predecessors	of	accelerators,	Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	conclude	that	there	is	no	evidence	that	those	creating	accelerators	studied	incubators	for	guidance.				This	author	understands	that	the	primary	distinction	between	incubators	and	accelerators	is	that	an	incubator	is	a	building,	and	an	accelerator	is	a	program,	so	an	accelerator	could	run	inside	an	incubator,	but	not	vice	versa.	However,	the	business	model	is	different	as	well.	Incubators	are	real	estate	ventures	offering	startups	office	space	at	a	reduced	rent.	They	also	lack	cohorts,	with	companies	arriving	and	leaving	on	a	continuous	basis.	Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	suggest	that	incubators	are	seen	to	shelter	early	stage	companies	from	‘the	harsh	realities	of	the	world’	while	accelerators	push	startups	out	quickly	to	find	out	if	they	will	survive	or	fail.				Another	difference	between	accelerators	and	both	incubators	and	angel	groups	is	the	cohort	formed	by	accelerators,	which	brings	benefits	by	clustering	interesting	startups	
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together	and	encouraging,	in	return,	investors	to	cluster	around	them	(Fehder	&	Hochberg	2014).		Unlike	business	incubators,	van	Huijgevoort	(2012)	observes	that	accelerators	offer	a	larger	number,	and	higher	quality	of	mentors,	and	create	a	boot-camp	environment	that	puts	startups	under	pressure.	Accelerators	also	focus	heavily	on	facilitating	access	to	future	investors,	in	a	way	not	typically	done	by	incubators,	or	at	least	not	to	such	an	extent.				Christiansen	(2009)	saw	accelerators	as	being	generally	less	reliant	on	government	funding,	and	therefore	more	flexible,	fast	moving,	and	commercially	focussed	than	incubators.	This	was	further	supported	by	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	which	found	that	all	incubators	in	the	UK	received	government	funding,	which	was	not	the	case	for	accelerators.			Another	key	distinction	is	around	investment	and	equity.	Christiansen	(2009)	observed	that	incubators	generally	do	not	take	equity	in	their	tenant	companies,	whereas	accelerators	typically	do	take	equity.	Therefore,	the	relationship	between	an	incubator	and	a	startup	is	typically	that	of	tenant	and	landlord,	whereas	with	an	accelerator	and	startup	it	is	investor	and	investee.			Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	suggested	it	is	an	interesting	distinction	that	when	accelerators	offer	office	space,	they	do	so	as	part	of	an	investment	package,	in	return	for	equity,	rather	than	in	return	for	rent.		
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All	of	this	means	that	the	alignment	of	interests	between	an	accelerator	and	startup	are	totally	different	to	those	between	an	incubator	and	tenant.	Consequently,	incubators	are	sometimes	criticised	for	offering	life-support	to	companies	(Miller	&	Bound	2011).	The	argument	being	that	incubators	risk	keeping	startups	alive	in	order	to	retain	them	as	paying	tenants,	whereas	accelerators	are	designed	to	accelerate	either	success	or	failure	because	they	are	supporting	them	financially	as	investors.	Helping	a	bad	startup	fail	quickly	is	an	important	service,	saving	the	founder	time,	money,	and	pain,	and	allowing	for	funding	to	be	reallocated	to	companies	on	a	more	likely	route	to	success.	For	this	reason,	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	argue	that	accelerators	need	to	maintain	their	tradition	of	having	a	short,	fast	program,	or	if	it	is	longer	then	still	having	a	beginning	and	end	to	that	program,	otherwise	they	too	fall	into	the	trap	of	incubating	early	stage	companies	that	would	otherwise	fail	in	the	harsh	outside	world.				2.3.2.3	Definition	of	Incubation	as	a	process		Having	seen	that	an	‘incubator’	is	a	building,	and	a	type	of	business,	‘incubation’	is	a	process,	and	one	which	can	happen	in	a	variety	of	environments;	incubators	are	physical	spaces,	incubation	is	a	wide	range	of	support	(Bone	et	al.	2017).		Incubation	is	a	process	to	help	early	stage	companies,	and	accelerators	are	an	iteration	of	the	incubation	process.	Accelerators	may	run	within	incubators,	but	incubators,	whilst	offering	incubation,	are	not	accelerators	(Pauwels	et	al.	2015).	
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Incubators	accept	companies	one	at	a	time,	rather	than	in	cohorts,	and	allow	them	to	stay	for	an	undefined	period	of	time.	Accelerators	are	different	in	that	they	generally	take	equity	in	the	startups,	accept	them	in	cohorts,	and	only	for	a	limited	period	of	time,	which	starts	and	ends	concurrently	for	the	whole	cohort.				2.3.2.4	Definition	of	an	Accelerator			This	literature	review	has	so	far	demonstrated	that	an	accelerator	is	not	an	incubator,	(see	2.3.2.2)	and	that	it	is	not	the	same	as	angel	investment,	bank	lending,	and	other	forms	of	support	for	early	stage	ventures,	(see	2.3.1)	but	is	a	form	of	incubation	(see	2.3.2.3).	This	review	now	examines	the	definition	of	an	accelerator	within	the	literature.				The	definition	of	‘accelerator’	has	changed	over	time	as	the	concept	has	evolved.	To	show	this	evolution,	the	literature	will	again	here	be	reviewed	chronologically,	charting	both	the	growing	understanding	of	what	an	accelerator	is	and	does,	but	also	showing	how	the	underlying	principle	has	not	really	changed	since	Y	Combinator.	Two	papers	have	been	instrumental	in	defining	the	accelerator,	and	these	two	definitions	lie	at	the	heart	of	the	discussion	and	description	of	accelerators	in	the	literature.	Christiansen	(2009),	and	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	laid	the	foundations	on	which	other	definitions	have	been	built.	Tracing	this	discussion	through	the	literature	chronologically	also	shows	more	generally	how	research	into	accelerators	has	developed	since	2009,	with	the	number	of	papers	and	depth	of	research	increasing	gradually	each	year.			
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 97 
In	2009	Christiansen	wrote	the	first	detailed	paper	on	accelerators,	called	‘Copying	Y	Combinator,’	when	the	accelerator	concept	was	only	4	years	old,	and	just	taking	off.	In	it	he	analysed	what	Y	Combinator	was	doing,	referring	also	to	the	other	early	US	accelerator,	TechStars,	and	tried	to	refine	this	into	a	blueprint	for	others	founding	accelerators.	The	concept	was	beginning	to	be	copied,	hence	the	name	of	his	paper.		In	his	analysis,	he	concluded	that	accelerators	are	different	from	both	seed	investing	and	business	incubators.	To	be	classified	as	an	accelerator,	the	program	should	include	funding,	a	cohort	of	small	teams	as	participants,	a	defined	period	of	support,	education,	networking,	but	the	offer	of	office	space	and	a	demo	day	,	or	closing	event	where	startups	pitch	to	investors,	were	not	fundamental	to	his	definition.		Christiansen	excluded	from	his	definition	any	programs	that	offered	seed	investment	without	a	structured	education	program,	or	an	education	program	without	seed	funding	or	financial	support.	He	also	excluded	from	his	research,	and	his	definition,	programs	founded	by	Venture	Capital	(VC)	funds	and	consortia	of	investors.	He	observed	that	Y	Combinator	and	TechStars	were	both	founded	by	angel	investors,	who	did	not	necessarily	have	the	resources	to	become	follow	on	investors	in	their	accelerated	companies.	He	suggested	that	when	a	VC	backed	accelerator	does	not	make	a	follow-on	investment	in	one	of	its	companies,	despite	having	the	financial	ability	to	do	so,	this	can	send	a	‘danger	signal’	to	other	investors,	thus	damaging	the	future	prospects	of	the	company.	This	is	not	the	case	for	angel	investors	who	do	not	have	such	resources.			A	year	later,	Tarani	(2010)	observed	that	it	was	understood	that	the	small	amount	of	financial	support,	given	as	an	equity	investment,	was	to	enable	the	team	to	pay	for	their	
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living	expenses	whilst	attending	the	program,	rather	than	being	intended	as	a	pure	equity	investment.			He	also	observed	that	the	12	week	program,	with	the	pressure	of	the	demo	day		at	the	end,	was	used	to	create	a	sense	of	urgency	and	pressure	on	the	startup	founders.	He	also	explored	the	unique	feature	of	cohorts	within	accelerators,	suggesting	these	are	‘classes	of	startups,’	which	brings	efficiencies	to	the	support	of	early	stage	businesses.	The	efficiency	of	the	cohort	approach	made	it	possible	to	deliver	intensive	education	and	support	during	this	period.		Tarani	interviewed	Jon	Bradford,	founder	of	Springboard	accelerator	in	the	UK,	and	arguably	the	person	who	introduced	accelerators	from	the	US	to	the	UK	and	Europe.	Bradford	explained	the	value	of	the	cohort	in	terms	of	the	efficiency	it	creates,	suggesting	that	people	go	to	networking	events	in	the	hope	of	meeting	relevant	people.	Experts	are	approached	individually	by	startup	founders	seeking	advice.	The	accelerator	gathers	those	founders,	who	need	contacts	and	advice,	into	a	cohort.	It	then	gathers	the	experts	and	other	contacts	into	a	group	of	mentors,	and	facilitates	them	meeting	in	an	efficient	manner.	When	done	well,	Bradford	argued,	a	cohort	of	10	or	more	founders	can	each	meet	10	mentors	in	one	day,	which	is	clearly	a	uniquely	efficient	proposition.	Bradford	refers	to	this	as	“forced	serendipity.”			In	2011,	the	definition	was	developed	and	refined	further	by	Miller	&	Bound	(2011),	who	laid	the	foundations	for	most	future	definitions	and	discussions	of	accelerators.	They	concluded	that	an	accelerator	had	the	following	five	features:	
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1.	 “Open	and	competitive	application	process	2.	 Pre-seed	investment,	usually	for	equity		3.	 Focus	on	small	teams,	not	individual	founders	4.	 A	defined	time	frame	of	education	and	intensive	mentoring	5.	 Cohorts	of	startups	rather	than	individual	companies”		Miller	&	Bound	also	observed	the	growth	of	social	venture	accelerators,	such	as	Bethnal	Green	Ventures	in	London,	addressing	the	rise	in	interest	of	impact	investing	from	the	investor	perspective,	and	a	desire	by	startup	founders	to	address	social	problems	with	a	startup	approach	rather	than	the	traditional	grant	funded	charity.	The	accelerator	model	was	therefore	adapted	to	address	this	combined	market	of	investors	and	founders,	using	the	same	principles	of	mentoring,	cohorts,	and	intensive	programs.			Continuing	the	argument	made	by	Tarani	(2010)	about	efficiencies	of	the	cohort,	Frimodig	(2012)	observed	that	accelerators	were	mainly	founded	by	entrepreneurs	and	were	seen	as	a	means	to	address	the	“competence	and	equity	gap”	of	startups.	By	acting	more	broadly	as	a	connector	in	the	entrepreneurial	ecosystem	they	were	understood	to	create	value	beyond	just	that	for	the	people	directly	involved,	such	as	investors	and	startups.			Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	defined	an	accelerator	as	being	groups	of	people	who	bring	business	experience	to	support	nascent	firms,	to	help	them	survive	the	earliest	stages	of	their	development.	This	support,	they	explained,	can	include	office	space,	mentorship,	networking,	knowledge,	and	expertise.	The	definition	taking	shape,	3	
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years	after	Christiansen’s	strict	criteria,	was	becoming	less	prescriptive,	reflecting	the	wider	variety	of	accelerators	now	in	the	market.			Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	examined	a	key	aspect	of	accelerators,	being	the	educational	component	of	their	activities.	They	explored	both	the	extent	to	which	the	education	is	part	of	what	defines	an	accelerator,	and	how	that	education	is	delivered.	Accelerators	help	build	the	team	around	the	startup,	challenge	the	idea,	and	support	with	prototyping	through	to	product	development.	The	accelerator	provides	an	intensive	program,	similar	to	a	boot-camp,	and	is	therefore	different	to	conventional	entrepreneurship	education.				This	comparison	with	conventional	entrepreneurship	education,	at	universities	for	example,	was	explored	further	by	Cohen	(2013),	who	suggested	that	accelerators	offer	entrepreneurship	education	whilst	accelerating	the	development	of	an	early	venture.	She	referred	to	them	as	‘modern	incubators’	that	offer	seed	financing,	mentorship,	and	education,	and	referred	to	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	for	her	definition	of	an	accelerator.		She	adapted	this	definition	based	on	her	own	interviews	with	industry	professionals,	reaching	a	definition	that	accelerators	provide	entrepreneurship	education	to	a	cohort	of	early	stage	ventures,	who	enter	and	leave	the	program	at	the	same	time.	These	two	factors,	the	education	combined	with	the	cohort,	she	argued,	distinguish	the	accelerator	from	incubators	and	angel	investors,	both	of	which	engage	with	startups	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	one	at	a	time.			
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Whereas	Christiansen	(2009)	was	looking	at	just	one	program,	by	the	time	Cohen	(2013)	was	examining	the	accelerator	market,	she	focused	on	9	programs.	She	identified	a	far	wider	range	of	variables	between	the	programs,	ranging	from	the	amount	they	invest,	the	size	of	cohort,	and	the	specific	areas	of	business	they	address,	though	nearly	all	the	programs	she	examined	culminated	in	demo	day	s,	which	are	events	at	which	the	startups	pitch	to	a	room	of	investors	for	further	funding.	Cohen	examined	the	role	a	demo	day		plays	along	with	the	set	timeframe	of	an	accelerator.	She	concluded	that	the	strict	timeline	and	concept	of	a	graduation	date,	when	the	startups	have	to	leave	the	accelerator,	reduces	the	risk	of	co-dependency	between	startups	and	accelerators,	and	forces	the	startups	into	the	selection	process	of	the	market.			Echoing	the	growing	focus	on	the	efficient	transfer	of	knowledge	from	mentors	to	founders,	and	the	more	structured	educational	component,	Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	concluded	that	“knowledge	is	the	most	valuable	resource	of	an	accelerator,”	along	with	the	ability	to	transfer	that	knowledge	to	the	startups.			Frimodig	and	Torkkeli	(2013)	conclude	that	a	range	of	programs	can	be	classified	as	accelerators,	including:	
• Pre-seed	accelerators	
• Seed	accelerators	(startup	accelerators)	
• Business	accelerators	
• Corporate	accelerators		
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Building	on	Miller	and	Bound’s	definition	of	2011,	Miller	and	Stacey	(2014)	explored	the	business	models	of	accelerators,	which	9	years	after	Y	Combinator	was	launched	had	evolved	into	a	variety	of	approaches.	They	concluded	that	the	business	model	can	include	programs	that	are	entirely	grant	funded,	those	set	up	along	the	same	model	as	venture	capital	funds,	with	an	investment	group	and	associated	management	and	performance	fees,	and	those	supported	by	corporate	sponsors.			Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	looked	more	at	the	efficiencies	of	accelerators,	observing	that	most	accelerators	employ	very	few	people,	and	as	with	university	degrees,	offering	a	program	to	a	cohort	creates	an	economy	of	scale,	allowing	advice	only	to	be	delivered	once.	They	also	observed	that	the	cohort	element	encourages	founders	to	support	each	other,	rather	than	just	wait	to	be	educated	passively,	both	through	peer	support,	but	also	through	peer	pressure	to	perform.			Reflecting	further	how	the	growth	in	accelerators	made	it	harder	to	create	a	single	definition,	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	looked	further	at	how	accelerators	were	defined	in	relation	to	incubators,	focussing	on	the	way	they	translated	knowledge,	or	offered	intangible	support	to	startups,	rather	than	the	tangible	support	offered	by	incubators	in	the	form	of	office	space	in	as	a	defining	characteristic.	They	added	that	the	short	time	frame	of	accelerators,	rather	than	long	and	ongoing	incubation	support,	and	equity	investment,	were	still	defining	aspects	of	an	accelerator.				They	drew	attention	to	the	mentoring	aspect	of	accelerators,	suggesting	that	a	key	difference	with	previous	incubation	models	is	carefully	facilitated	mentoring,	managed	
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by	the	accelerator	managers.	This	is	in	addition	to	a	curriculum	of	education	which	varies	from	program	to	program,	but	typically	includes	quick	insights	into	key	knowledge	areas	for	a	new	entrepreneur,	such	as	finance,	intellectual	property	(IP)	law,	and	marketing.			Exploring	the	now	diverse	types	of	accelerators,	they	observed	that	a	wider	definition	allowed	for	an	equally	wider	set	of	indicators	by	which	to	measure	and	judge	accelerator	outcomes.	Allowing	for	them	to	have	a	broader	set	of	aims	and	outcomes	means	that	they	can	be	judged	to	have	succeeded	according	to	different	measures,	such	as	local	economic	development,	introduction	of	an	entrepreneurial	mind-set	to	a	formerly	conventional	and	risk-averse	culture,	and	coordination	of	a	previously	disorganised	and	unconnected	ecosystem.	Policy	makers,	supporters	of	accelerators,	and	investors	should,	they	suggested,	understand	this	broader	nuance	between	accelerators	in	order	to	be	able	to	judge	them	appropriately	and	see	the	value	that	they	may	be	creating	which	is	not	recognised	if	they	are	all	judged	on	investment	outcomes	alone.			By	2015,	the	measure	of	success	explored	by	Christiansen,	which	was	almost	entirely	around	investment	returns,	no	longer	applied	to	the	more	complex	market,	especially	in	Europe,	where	not	all	accelerators	were	set	up	for	the	purpose	solely	of	being	deal	flow	makers.	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	suggested	that	this	specific	investment	model	accelerator	could	only	work	in	dense	ecosystems	like	Silicon	Valley.	They	criticised	policy	makers	for	wrongly	expecting	what	they	call	‘welfare	stimulators,’	or	accelerators	set	up	to	achieve	goals	more	around	economic	development	to	have	the	same	outputs	as	deal-
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flow	maker	programs,	being	those	just	designed	solely	to	create	returns	on	investment	into	startups.			Continuing	this	theme,	Hathaway	(2016)	was	able	to	reflect	that	accelerators	had	become	a	popular	part	of	the	regional	growth	infrastructure.	He	argued	that	four	aspects	of	accelerators	differentiated	them	from	other	economic	growth	activities;	a	fixed	term	program,	the	cohort,	mentors,	and	the	demo	day	.	This	is	still	essentially	the	definition	of	Christiansen	(2009)	and	Miller	&	Bound	(2011).	Despite	this,	he	found	that	fewer	than	one	third	of	the	700	organisations	he	reviewed	in	the	US	that	self-identified	as	an	accelerator	actually	fitted	his,	or	Cohen’s	(2013)	definition	of	an	accelerator,	demonstrating	that	the	proliferation	of	accelerators	had	not	helped	refine	the	wider	understanding	of	what	they	were.			Reflecting	previous	insights	into	the	efficiency	of	programs,	he	suggested	that	whilst	‘learning	by	doing’	is	inevitable,	it	is	also	slow	and	inefficient.	Accelerators	aim	to	condense	years’	worth	of	learning	into	a	few	months.	An	accelerator	focusses	a	lot	of	activity	onto	a	defined	group	of	people,	in	one	place,	in	a	condensed	time,	so	also	exposes	various	ecosystem	actors	to	each	other	in	a	dynamic	and	open	environment	(Hathaway	2016).		Brunet	et	al.	(2016)	suggested	it	is	becoming	harder,	rather	than	easier	to	define	precisely	what	an	accelerator	is,	because	the	evolution	of	new	models	of	accelerators	creates	more	breadth	in	what	accelerator	can	mean,	and	because	the	line	between	accelerators,	incubators,	and	early	stage	funds	is	becoming	more	blurred.	Of	the	193	
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accelerators	they	reviewed,	30%	described	themselves	as	combining	aspects	of	accelerator,	incubator,	venture	capital	fund,	and/or	angel	group,	therefore	having	evolved	away	from	the	clearer	and	precise	definitions	of	Christiansen	(2009)	and	Miller	&	Bound	(2011).			Concurring	with	this,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	suggest	that	the	word	still	has	a	‘broad	definition’	in	the	startup	community	and	that	as	the	model	is	still	developing	the	definition	is	hard	to	tie	down	definitively.	They	see	the	common	aspects	between	accelerators	and	incubators	as	being	training,	mentoring,	business	support,	and	selection	by	merit.			Their	research	identified	163	accelerators	active	in	the	UK,	which	they	suggest	was	more	than	estimated	or	expected.	On	average,	they	support	cohorts	of	16	companies,	over	a	time	period	of	just	over	6	months.	Mentoring	is	the	most	common	form	of	support,	offered	by	85%	of	the	programs.	Funding	is	offered	by	61%,	which	averaged	£39,000	per	startup.	46%	of	the	accelerators	took	equity	and	the	average	equity	taken	was	7%.			Based	on	this	research,	and	these	findings,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	adapted	the	definition	of	Christiansen	(2009),	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	to	define	an	accelerator	as:		
• A	program	with	a	fixed	duration	of	3-12	months	
• Taking	equity	rather	than	fees	
• Most	likely	provides	seed	funding	
• Offers	services	as	a	primary	resource,	rather	than	physical	space	
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• Accepts	startups	in	cohorts	
• Offers	mentorship	and	training	
• Focusses	on	teams	rather	than	single	founders	
• Highly	selective	program	from	an	open	application	process		Bone	et	al.	(2017)	also	defined	an	accelerator	by	saying	what	it	is	not,	which	includes	Angel	Networks,	Co-Working	Spaces,	Entrepreneurship	courses,	hackathons,	and	maker	spaces,	seed	funds,	and	other	forms	of	mentoring	schemes.			This	section	has	reviewed	how	the	literature	has	attempted	to	define	an	accelerator	between	Christiansen	in	2009	and	Bone	et	al.	in	2017.	The	review	has	shown	how	these	definitions	have	developed	over	time,	reflecting	how	accelerators	have	evolved	away	from	the	Y	Combinator	model,	through	TechStars,	to	the	proliferation	of	accelerators	reviewed	in	recent	years.			What	these	definitions	have	in	common,	and	have	maintained	throughout	this	evolution	is	that	accelerators	are	different	to	the	other	support	available	for	startups,	and	that	they	are	fixed-term	programs	consisting	of	cohorts	of	startups,	accepted	through	a	selection	process,	and	offered	mentoring,	training,	and	networks.	They	generally	do	not	charge	fees,	instead	taking	equity,	often	in	return	for	a	small	investment.						
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2.3.3	WHAT	AN	ACCELERATOR	DOES		Having	examined	what	an	accelerator	is,	this	section	goes	on	to	look	at	what	an	accelerator	does.	This	reflects	the	definitions	in	the	previous	section,	which	focus	on	mentoring,	education,	and	networking	as	core	features	of	an	accelerator.				2.3.3.1	The	Role	of	Mentors		A	key	element	and	distinguishing	characteristic	of	accelerators	is	mentoring.	Mentors	are	experts	who	provide	advice	and	guidance	to	the	startups	in	the	program.	Mentors	are	often	also	the	investors	but	are	not	uniquely	investors.	Alongside	the	startups,	the	mentors	are	another	key	stakeholder	group	(Lehmann	2013).		Frimodig	(2012),	in	defining	the	strategy	accelerators	take	to	fill	the	competence	and	equity	gap	of	startups,	concludes	that	the	people	with	knowledge	surrounding	the	accelerator	are	of	great	importance,	and	this	‘intellectual	capital’	is	embedded	in	the	“mentors’	human	capital.”		The	need	for	a	large	and	diverse	mentor	network	was	explained	in	practical	terms	by	Paul	Graham	(2011),	who	wrote:	"different	startups	need	such	different	things,	so	you	need	a	lot	of	people	to	supply	each	startup	with	what	they	need	most"		
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Hallen	et.al	(2016)	referred	to	mentoring	as	‘indirect	learning’	and	have	suggested	that	research	into	accelerators	has	not	drawn	conclusions	on	whether	it	is	beneficial.	Understanding	the	value	of	mentoring	is	complicated	due	to	the	many	other	influencing	factors	that	could	affect	the	progress	of	startups	in	an	accelerator.	They	concluded	that	mentoring	is	a	“key	mechanism”	by	which	accelerators	“casually	impact	venture	development,”	and	acknowledged	it	could	be	beneficial	to	founders	in	challenging	cognitive	biases,	and	filling	knowledge	gaps	quickly,	as	opposed	to	learning	by	experimentation.	By	contrast,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	concluded	that	mentoring,	and	the	network	provided	by	the	mentors,	is	one	of	the	most	valuable	elements	of	an	accelerator.			Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	add	that	a	feature	of	mentoring	is	that	mentors	typically	work	for	free.	Their	motivation	should	not	be	payment	for	their	time,	but	instead	access	to	deal	flow,	learning,	networking,	and	‘giving	back.’					2.3.3.2	Finding	and	managing	Mentors			The	most	comprehensive	study	of	mentoring	in	accelerators	was	carried	out	by	Cohen	(2013).	She	found	that	an	important	function	of	an	accelerator	is	to	build	a	mentor	network	and	manage	the	interaction	between	mentors	and	startups.	Typically,	it	is	not	the	job	of	startups	to	manage	their	own	engagement	with	mentors.		By	doing	this	as	part	of	the	core	activity,	the	accelerator	creates	an	efficiency	for	the	startups	if	it	plans	and	manages	the	mentor	interactions,	allowing	an	intense	period	of	rapid	mentoring	that	
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they	would	otherwise	have	to	spend	a	lot	of	time	and	resource	arranging.	It	also	creates	some	degree	of	commitment	from	startups	who	might	otherwise	elect	not	to	meet	mentors	and	to	focus	on	development	of	products,	which	may	in	fact	be	the	wrong	products.			Cohen	(2013)	found	that	when	accelerators	source	and	manage	the	mentor	interactions,	they	absorb	the	‘learning-coordination’	cost	for	the	startups,	creating	an	efficiency	by	arranging,	for	example,	one	mentor	to	meet	eight	startups,	rather	than	eight	startups	arranging	for	one	mentor	to	have	eight	meetings.	Cohen	found	that	on	average,	startups	had	55	more	mentor	meetings	when	the	meetings	were	coordinated	by	the	accelerator	than	when	they	were	organised	by	the	startups	themselves.			Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	agreed	that	the	ability	of	accelerators	to	find	and	manage	mentors,	and	thereby	deliver	knowledge	and	contacts	quickly,	is	an	important	factor	in	structuring	an	accelerator.	They	suggested	that	accelerators	act	like	gears	between	large,	slow	moving	cogs,	and	fast	spinning	cogs	in	a	machine.	Startups	need	everything	very	quickly,	where	industry	and	academia	tend	to	move	very	slowly.			Christiansen	(2009)	explained	how	accelerators	attract	mentors	by	gathering	a	critical	mass	of	startups,	which	in	turn	attracts	high	quality	mentors.	This	presents	a	paradox	at	the	outset	of	a	new	accelerator,	in	that	an	accelerator	with	good	mentors	will	attract	good	startups,	and	one	with	good	startups	will	attract	good	mentors.	Creating	the	initial	appeal	for	one	without	the	other	already	in	place	can	be	challenging.			
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Alongside	experts,	and	potentially	mentors	from	a	corporate	backer,	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	observed	that	investors	mentor	at	accelerators	in	order	to	carry	out	due	diligence	into	the	companies.	Mentoring	is	a	very	different	dynamic	to	being	pitched	for	money,	allowing	the	investors	to	see	how	the	team	works	together,	how	the	product	has	developed	over	time,	and	how	they	adapt	to	lessons	and	mistakes.			This	approach	to	“learning	from	others”	(Cohen	2013)	means	that	companies	on	accelerator	programs	can	learn	from	mentors	and	their	cohort	without	having	to	accumulate	experience	over	time,	which	is	more	efficient	and	inexpensive	compared	to	accumulating	knowledge	first-hand,	over	time.			In	particular,	the	difference	between	explicit	knowledge	and	tacit	knowledge	is	an	important	factor	in	the	benefit	of	mentoring.	Cohen	observed	that	the	accelerator	directors	and	mentors	transferred	what	they	learned	had	worked	in	the	past,	so	the	startups	could	act	on	those	lessons	without	having	to	experience	them	directly.		Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	continued	this	point,	observing	that	tacit	knowledge	is	gained	from	experience,	and	is	embedded	in	people,	whereas	explicit,	or	acquired	knowledge	is	documented	and	easier	to	source	and	transfer.	Explicit	knowledge	can	be	viewed	simply	as	information,	whereas	tacit	knowledge	can	take	the	form	of	wisdom.	It	is	this	latter	type	of	knowledge	that	accelerators	aim	to	find	and	transfer	to	new	founders	via	mentoring,	who	by	definition	lack	tacit	knowledge.			Different	approaches	are	taken	to	mentoring,	but	that	favoured	by	the	most	traditional	accelerators,	and	explored	by	Cohen	(2013)	involves	a	period	of	what	she	called	
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“mentor	overload,”	when	founders	are	exposed	to	a	large	number	of	mentors	over	a	short	time.	The	founders	receive	conflicting	feedback	on	product	and	implementation	whilst	pausing	the	implementation	due	to	the	time	pressure	of	the	mentoring.	Over	time,	Cohen	reported	that	the	conflicting	feedback	was	confusing,	but	began	to	crystallise	as	it	was	reviewed	with	further	mentors	towards	the	end	of	this	period.	Ultimately,	founders	began	to	break	down	their	preconceptions	about	their	businesses	and	strategy	and	started	to	find	common	themes	between	apparently	contradictory	mentor	feedback.			Referring	to	one	accelerator	in	her	study,	Cohen	recorded	740	meetings	with	a	total	of	140	mentors	in	19	days,	averaging	64	meetings	between	founders	and	mentors,	from	which	80%	of	the	founders	reported	receiving	conflicting	advice.			The	importance	of	this	intensive	period	of	mentoring	is	that	startups	spend	this	time	receiving	and	processing	advice	and	carrying	feedback	from	one	mentor	session	into	the	next,	to	test	and	challenge	it.	When	mentoring	was	carried	out	slowly,	over	a	longer	period	of	time,	Cohen	(2013)	found	that	startups	iterated	between	these	meetings	rather	than	holding	off	product	development	until	they	had	accumulated	a	large	volume	of	feedback.	They	had	a	higher	failure	rate,	with	60%	of	startups	failing	shortly	after	the	program,	suggesting	that	they	had	benefitted	less	from	the	learning	outcomes	of	this	different	approach	to	mentoring.		The	diverse	feedback	and	“mentor	overload”	over	a	short	time	allowed	founders	to	find	commonalities	in	the	feedback	from	amongst	the	contradictory	advice	because	it	was	
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absorbed	so	intensively	over	a	condensed	period,	whereas	founders	who	had	less	frequent	mentoring	from	fewer	mentors	were	not	able	to	identify	what	was	good	from	bad	advice.	This	caused	them	to	act	on	advice,	build	products,	iterate,	and	then	fail	continuously.	In	effect,	the	speed	of	input	experienced	during	mentor	overload	allowed	the	teams	to	process,	digest,	and	bounce	back	inputs	to	the	next	mentor,	speeding	up	the	develop-iterate-fail	loop	into	a	short	period	of	time,	emerging	with	the	final	iteration	which	they	then	developed	later.	This	made	them	more	likely	to	succeed	(Cohen	2013).		Accelerators	which	provided	“mentor	overload”	saw	the	startups	engage	in	intensive	pivoting	between	different	strategies	during	this	period,	then	a	commitment	to	one	strategy	at	the	end	of	that	phase	of	the	program.	Cohen	argues	that	this	contradicts	the	conventional	approaches	of	Lean	Startup	(Ries	2011)	which	argues	for	ongoing	pivoting	and	testing,	and	in	fact	in	the	startups	in	the	top	performing	accelerators	in	her	study	rarely	made	pivots	after	the	initial	intensive	mentoring	period.		Cohen	(2013)	further	stated	that	founders	said	they	had	trouble	explaining	what	they	do	to	mentors,	but	over	the	intense	“mentor	overload”	period	they	invariably	ended	up	explaining	their	business	multiple	times	in	one	day.	This	in	itself	was	important	training,	fine	tuning	how	the	startup	is	described,	and	in	doing	so	how	they	understood	their	business.	The	founders	she	studied	also	related	how	they	would	notice	particular	parts	of	their	pitch	catch	the	attention	of	mentors,	so	they	were	able	to	refine	the	pitch	rapidly	over	multiple	mentoring	sessions.			
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Cohen	(2013)	concluded	that	her	data	favoured	the	learning	achieved	by	founders	in	programs	that	started	with	“mentor	dating,”	and	allowed	those	interactions	to	develop	organically,	over	programs	that	assigned	mentors	from	the	outset.	One	accelerator	Cohen	studied	assigned	mentors	and	then	encouraged	those	mentors	to	have	regular	meetings	with	several	startups,	which	the	startups	had	to	organise.	Consequently,	the	startups	had	fewer	overall	mentor	meetings	during	the	three-month	program.			Mentoring	is	therefore	a	fundamental	part	of	an	accelerator.	It	can	be	concluded	from	the	literature	that	without	mentoring,	a	program	is	not	an	accelerator,	as	this	is	the	main	method	of	transferring	tacit	knowledge	to	the	startups	quickly.					2.3.3.3	The	Role	of	Cohorts		Having	a	clearly	defined	cohort	ties	into	the	role	accelerators	have	in	sourcing	and	selecting	startups.	The	cohort	is	formed	at	the	end	of	a	selection	process,	so	being	part	of	that	cohort	has	status	attached	to	it.	The	cohort	becomes	something	the	accelerator	can	advertise	to	potential	mentors	and	investors.			Cohen	(2013)	discusses	the	synchronisation	of	learning	by	virtue	of	a	coordinated	program	having	a	cohort	of	startups	working	together.	She	was	surprised	to	observe	cohorts	sharing	knowledge	rather	than	competing.	She	also	found	that	‘cohort	peers’	were	beneficial	to	the	program	because	they	raised	the	shared	aspirations	of	the	group	and	helped	each	other	to	close	performance	gaps	between	the	startups.	This	behaviour	
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is	a	reflection	of	how	the	reputation	of	the	whole	cohort	impacts	on	each	individual	company.	If	the	cohort	is	viewed	positively,	the	accelerator	will	attract	better	mentors,	more	investors,	and	media	coverage,	so	the	cohort	members	are	incentivised	to	support	each	other	to	this	end.			Cohen	(2013)	also	observed	that	as	well	as	raising	aspirations,	the	cohort	has	the	effect	of	bringing	over-confident	founders	down	to	a	more	realistic	level	by	comparison	with	the	startups	and	founders	in	the	cohort.			Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	added	that	cohorts	offer	an	efficiency	of	scale,	up	to	a	point,	which	allows	accelerators	to	carry	out	due	diligence,	invest,	and	manage	networking,	mentoring,	and	presentation	of	their	cohort	to	investors	in	a	way	not	possible	for	angels	investing	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	They	suggest	though	that	if	cohorts	grow	too	large,	this	efficiency	breaks	down.				2.3.3.4	Cohorts	and	weak	tie	networks		This	thesis	explores	how	an	important	aspect	of	the	value	mentors	bring	to	accelerators	is	sharing	their	networks.	However,	networking	is	not	restricted	to	mentors.	In	as	much	as	an	accelerator	is	an	ecosystem	builder,	it	is	a	hub	that	facilitates	networking	broadly	within	the	given	ecosystem.	Networking	is	a	core	output	and	outcome	of	the	accelerator,	and	also	features	the	extended	networks	of	the	team	running	the	accelerator,	the	cohort,	partners,	investors,	and	other	stakeholders.	
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Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	argued	that	the	most	widely	cited	advantage	of	participating	at	any	level	in	an	accelerator	is	networking.	A	key	aspect	of	the	networking	is	the	way	the	accelerator	structures	the	different	groups	of	stakeholders	into	organised	well-defined	groups	which	are	easier	to	work	with	to	effect	greater	social	network	outcomes.		Christiansen	(2009)	observed	that	at	the	outset	the	network	around	an	accelerator	reflects	the	‘quality	and	quantity’	of	the	personal	network	of	the	accelerator	founder,	but	over	time	grows	to	reflect	the	quality	of	the	startups	that	have	come	out	of	the	program.				Eveleens	et	al	(2016)	reviewed	the	literature	specifically	on	network-based	incubation,	being	where	incubators	focus	primarily	on	providing	new	networks	over	other	forms	of	support.	They	evaluated	the	impact	of	this	approach	on	startup	performance,	including	looking	at	it	through	the	lens	of	Social	Capital	theory.	Whilst	this	thesis	is	consciously	not	looking	at	incubation,	it	is	interested	in	social	networks	and	Social	Capital,	so	this	particular	research	is	relevant	and	of	interest.	Their	conclusion	about	the	findings	of	research	into	network-based	incubation	and	Social	Capital	found	that	“incubation	influences	the	structural	dimension	of	Social	Capital…	by	helping	the	startup	to	form	relationships	with	other	actors.”			They	argued	that	the	networking	element	of	a	program	brings	intangible	resources,	such	as	“knowledge	and	legitimacy,”	and	builds	on	observations	that	such	intangible	resources	are	of	value	to	startups.		
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Eveleens	et	al.	(2016)	explained	that	this	is	caused	by	putting	participants	in	close	proximity	to	each	other	–	in	this	case	in	an	incubator.	The	shared	space	and	events	form	a	dense	internal	network	with	strong	closure.	Network-based	incubation,	as	with	accelerators,	also	involves	an	external	network	with	which	the	startups	connect,	but	also	which	is	joined	by	the	startups.	They	argued	that	the	result	is	both	closure	within	the	internal	network,	and	ultimately	closure	within	the	external	network,	closure	being	the	development	of	multiple	ties	between	different	actors.				They	identify,	within	incubators	they	studied,	a	similar	dynamic	to	an	accelerator,	in	which	strong	ties	develop	quickly	between	the	startups	within	the	incubator,	and	between	the	startups	and	the	incubator	manager.	But	then	the	manager	creates	the	opportunity	for	the	startups	to	develop	weak	ties	by	organising	networking	events	and	constantly	refreshing	the	network	around	the	core.			An	interesting	observation	made	from	their	research	is	that	the	increased	Social	Capital	in	terms	of	having	a	larger	network,	and	in	terms	of	becoming	close	to	the	program		manager	are	seen	to	have	positive	outcomes	on	the	startups	performance,	whereas	the	strong	network	closure	between	startups	is	not	perceived	as	being	of	value,	because	startups	find	it	hard	to	capitalise	on	this.	They	also	argued	that	strong	homophily	between	the	startups	–	i.e.	a	cohort	of		very	similar	startups	–	is	damaging	because	they	may	feel	they	are	competing,	whilst	very	little	homophily	is	also	less	useful	because	they	do	not	have	enough	overlapping	knowledge	or	information	to	be	useful.	When	the	startups	are	‘somewhat	similar’	they	are	most	able	to	support	each	other	usefully	(Eveleens	et	al	2016).	
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2.3.3.5	Building	entrepreneurial	ecosystems		This	thesis	will	discuss	the	importance	of	ecosystems	to	accelerators.	It	is	therefore	necessary	to	examine	ecosystems	in	the	related	literature,	and	to	understand	the	way	
ecosystem	is	interpreted	in	this	context.				Spigel	(2017)	defines	an	ecosystem	as	“the	union	of	localized	cultural	outlooks,	social	networks,	investment	capital,	universities,	and	active	economic	policies	that	create	environments	supportive	of	innovation-based	ventures.”			Within	this	definition,	the	ecosystem	is	larger	than	a	social	network,	and	may	contain	multiple	smaller	social	networks.	The	ecosystem	also	differs	from	a	social	network	by	including	other	factors	such	as	policy	and	infrastructure,	which	are	not	parts	of	a	social	network.					He	goes	on	to	explain	that	ecosystems	are	a	form	of	network,	in	that	they	feature	individuals	or	corporations	linked	by	ties	of	various	form.	However,	ecosystems	go	further	and	feature	intangible,	and	non-actor	aspects	like	culture,	policy	and	education.	A	typical	ecosystem	might	be	a	city	which	includes	a	university,	co-working	spaces,	accelerators,	incubators,	investors,	and	the	influence	of	government	innovation	policy,	tax	breaks	for	investors	plus	transport	links	to	other	ecosystems.	These	are	not	a	social	network	or	group,	but	each	may	contain	one	or	more	social	networks	with	multiple	interactions	between	these	networks.		
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Spigel	explained	that	the	theories	behind	entrepreneurial	ecosystems	find	their	roots	in	the	advantages	of	business	clusters,	which	identified	the	value	to	firms	of	co-locating	or	clustering	either	around	a	region,	or	a	technology	or	industry	vertical,	to	enable	them	to	share	resources,	knowledge,	and	attract	labour.	Entrepreneurial	ecosystems	differ	from	business	clusters	because	clusters	tend	to	co-locate	firms	that	work	in	a	similar	industry	or	are	part	of	a	related	supply	chain,	so	they	can	share	resources	and	knowledge	about	that	sector.	Entrepreneurial	ecosystems,	he	suggests,	are	more	likely	to	gather	around	a	core	technology	rather	than	a	common	market	or	client.		Entrepreneurial	ecosystems	tend	to	focus	on	the	early	stage	of	businesses,	and	their	common	needs	in	terms	of	finance,	support,	and	advice,	and	resources	common	to	the	entrepreneurship	process.	Clusters	tend	to	focus	on	commonalities	relevant	to	companies	of	all	size	and	age,	but	in	a	specific	industry	sector	(Spigel	2017).	Entrepreneurial	ecosystems	have	become	recognised	as	tools	which	can	support	economic	development,	innovation,	and	social	change	(Harrington	2017).		Harrington	goes	on	to	explain	that	developing	entrepreneurs	is	the	building	block	from	which	venture	development,	and	then	economic	development	stem.	For	economic	development,	especially	in	modern-facing	sectors	such	as	technology,	it	is	important	to	have	a	ready	and	ongoing	supply	of	entrepreneurs,	who	can	find	problems,	develop	solutions,	scale	into	startups,	and	from	there	into	businesses	that	grow	into	receiving	venture	funding	and	creating	revenues.		Entrepreneurs	can	be	developed	through	a	wide	range	of	actions,	including	within	formal	education,	alongside	education,	and	within	a	business	environment.		
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Efforts	to	stimulate	and	develop	entrepreneurship	in	an	ecosystem	require	a	lighter	touch	than	other	related	aspects,	like	economic	development.	Harrington	(2017)	states	that	entrepreneurial	ecosystems	require	a	degree	of	“chaos,	serendipity,	and	fluidity.”			Stangler	&	Bell-Masterson	(2015)	argued	that	an	entrepreneurial	ecosystem	needs	to	be	measured	by	its	outputs,	not	just	its	inputs.	At	a	regional	level,	inputs	are	metrics	such	as	research	funding,	available	investment,	new	startups,	events	etc.	They	propose	four	indicators	by	which	to	measure	the	performance	of	an	ecosystem:	density,	fluidity,	connectivity,	and	diversity.			Fluidity	is	the	“population	flux,	labour	market	reallocation,	and	high-growth	firms.”	Density	is	defined	as	the	number	of	young	firms	per	1000	people,	the	share	of	employment	in	those	new	and	young	firms,	and	the	density	of	specific	sectors,	like	tech.	Diversity	includes,	‘multiple	economic	specializations’,	social	mobility,	and	immigration.	Because	ecosystems	are,	or	should	be,	constantly	evolving,	they	argued	that	these	factors	needed	to	be	tracked	continually	over	time,	not	in	a	snapshot.			This	understanding	of	ecosystems	gives	a	context	within	which	to	discuss	accelerators.	Indeed,	as	will	be	discussed	throughout	the	thesis,	one	of	the	typologies	for	accelerators	developed	by	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	was	that	of	“ecosystem	builder,”	the	full	set	of	typologies	being:	
• 	“Ecosystem	Builder:	Matching	customers	with	start-ups	and	build	corporate	ecosystem.”	
• “Deal-Flow	Maker:	Identification	of	investment	opportunities	for	investors.”	
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• “Welfare	Stimulator:	Stimulation	of	start-up	activity	and	economic	development.”		This	typology	focussed	on	the	“ecosystem	builder”	being	established	by	a	corporate,	and	aiming	to	help	startups	navigate	through	the	internal	structures	of	future	corporate	clients	or	investors.	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	observed	that	the	“ecosystem	builder”	and	“welfare	stimulator”	are	mainly	prevalent	in	Europe,	whereas	the	US	was	dominated	by	the	“deal-flow	maker.”		Christiansen	(2009)	also	referred	to	the	role	accelerators	play	in	creating	an	ecosystem,	citing	it	as	a	common	reason	for	people	founding	them.	He	cited	TechStars	in	Boulder,	Colorado,	which	was	the	subject	of	Brad	Feld’s	book,	Startup	Communities	(Feld	2012),	which	described	how	to	approach	building	an	ecosystem,	and	the	role	an	accelerator	can	play	in	this.			Whereas	the	concept	of	an	“ecosystem	builder”	accelerator	was	defined	by	Pauwels.	et	al.	(2015)	as	building	ecosystems	of	innovators	around	Corporates,	Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	had	also	coined	the	term	“welfare	stimulator”	to	describe	an	accelerator	which	receives	public	funding	and	is	focussed	primarily	on	supporting	the	growth	of	entrepreneurship	and	networks	in	a	given	context.	Practically	speaking,	both	are	building	ecosystems	of	innovators,	one	at	a	local	or	regional	level,	the	other	around	a	corporate	or	sector.	This	distinction	will	become	relevant	to	this	thesis,	as	EyeFocus	became	seen	as	an	ecosystem	builder,	catalysing	the	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem.	
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This	was	done	around	several	corporates,	as	outlined	by	Pauwels	et.al	(2015),	but	also	for	the	wider	good	of	the	sector,	in	a	way	that	reflects	the	welfare	stimulator	model.			Lehmann	(2013)	explored	the	then	relatively	new	concept	of	the	corporate	accelerator.	He	defined	this	as	a	program	that	has	received	“significant	and	public	support”	from	an	incumbent	corporation.	The	support	includes	funding,	but	also	encompasses	access	to	resources,	networks	within	and	through	the	corporate,	and	public	endorsement	by	the	corporate.				He	observed	that	in	this	model,	the	Accelerator	Manager	retained	full	control	over	the	program	content	and	delivery,	and	the	sponsors	only	had	limited	influence	over	who	was	selected	onto	the	program.	However,	the	sponsorship	helped	the	program	differentiate	itself.	Whereas	with	a	fully	corporate	run	program,	the	program	itself	is	run	by	managers	from	the	corporate	rather	than	by	entrepreneurs,	giving	it	a	very	different	character.	He	observed	that	(in	2013),	the	majority	of	accelerators	in	Germany	were	corporate	programs,	including	Deutsche	Telekom	AG,	Telefonica	A.S.	and	ProSiebenSat1	Media	AG,	and	Axel	Springer.			Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	observed	that	some	commercial	accelerators	were	seen	to	start	out	with	a	more	altruistic	approach	to	building	a	wider	ecosystem,	but	had	a	longer-term	plan	to	realise	a	return	on	that	early	work	by	becoming	embedded	at	the	heart	of	that	ecosystem.				
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Specifically,	the	ecosystem	builder	typology	defined	by	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	was	based	on	accelerators	established	by	companies	such	as	Microsoft	and	Accenture,	in	order	to	extend	their	networks.	By	connecting	together	their	company,	some	of	their	lead	customers,	and	startups,	they	aimed	to	build	an	ecosystem	of	new	activity	around	their	company,	ultimately	leading	to	new	business.	These	ecosystem	builders	actively	involved	executives	from	the	corporate	in	the	running	of	the	program,	for	example	in	selecting	participants.	This	means	that	startups	selected	are	expected	to	benefit	the	corporate.	Mentors	are	also	sourced	from	within	the	corporate,	either	exclusively	or	alongside	external	mentors.			Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	recognised	that	as	ecosystem	builders,	accelerators	can	play	an	important	role	in	a	sector	or	region	as	a	convening	power,	bringing	together	different	stakeholders	who	might	otherwise	not	meet.			Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	observed	that	as	the	role	of	accelerators	in	building	ecosystems	developed,	and	conversely	the	need	of	ecosystems	for	accelerators	to	succeed,	the	lines	between	the	ecosystem	and	the	accelerator	started	to	blur,	and	it	became	widely	understood	that	startups	need	ecosystems	to	succeed,	just	as	ecosystems	benefit	from	accelerators.	Whilst	accelerators	benefit	ecosystems	by	acting	as	a	convener,	they	need	ecosystems	in	order	to	source	the	stakeholders	who	are	the	ingredients	for	a	good	accelerator,	namely	the	corporates,	mentors,	and	investors.		Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	observed	that	a	specific	feature	of	a	strong	ecosystem	around	an	accelerator	is	that	it	enables	the	accelerator	to	protect	startups	from	the	many	threats	they	face	in	their	early	days,	from	predatory	investors	to	companies	stealing	their	IP.	By	
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belonging	to	an	accelerator,	which	is	a	well-connected	network	within	the	wider	ecosystem,	the	risk	of	sanction	to	anyone	harming	a	startup	is	far	greater	because	of	the	ability	to	cause	widespread	reputational	damage	to	that	individual	or	entity.	A	startup	alone	may	not	be	able	to	cause	reputational	damage	to	a	bad	actor,	but	an	accelerator,	with	its	large	network	of	investors,	high-status	actors,	and	mentors	can	communicate	reputation	and	therefore	confers	on	the	startup	in	its	cohort	the	benefit	of	that	ability,	and	in	doing	so,	protects	it.			Reflecting	the	role	accelerators	developed	within	their	wider	ecosystems	Brunet	et	al	(2016)	concluded	that	accelerators	have	evolved	into	“far	more	than	simple	business-service	providers	or	investment	vehicles,”	now	playing	an	important	role	in	the	private	and	public	sectors.	As	such,	they	suggested	that,	accelerators	play	a	key	role	in	the	wider	startup	ecosystem	and	deserved	proper	support	by	policymakers.			2.3.3.6	The	role	of	a	selection	process	to	form	cohorts		Hochberg	(2015)	observed	that	accelerators	are	expected	to	demonstrate	the	‘best	in	class’	of	a	larger	list	of	startups,	and	can	be	used	as	deal	flow	aggregators	for	investors.	For	corporates,	they	can	also	find	and	convene	the	best	startups	that	might	benefit	the	corporate.	Arguably,	Y	Combinator	established	this	as	a	principle	with	some	early	successes,	including	their	successful	investments	in	Reddit	(2005),	Scribd	(2006),	and	Dropbox	(2007),	all	of	which	were	sold	for	considerable	profits.	Kim	&	Wagman	(2014)	concluded	that	this	suggested	that	accelerators	are	good	at	screening	future	
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investments,	and	the	small	size	of	the	cohorts	allows	them	to	refine	a	cohort	down	to	the	best	startups	available.		However,	they	observed	that	as	Y	Combinator	grew	in	size,	and	cohorts	increased	in	number,	investors	have	suggested	that	they	are	more	hesitant	to	invest	in	companies	at	demo	day	.	By	2012,	the	cohort	consisted	of	80	startups,	which	may	have	changed	perception	of	the	efficacy	of	the	screening	process.	This	suggests	a	conflict	between	a	successful	accelerator’s	desire	to	grow,	and	the	perceived	value	in	remaining	highly	selective	(Kim	&	Wagman	2014).		Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	concur	that	identification	of	strong	startups	is	a	factor	in	the	success	of	an	accelerator.	For	a	for-profit	deal-flow	maker	accelerator,	finding	strong	teams,	with	scalable,	global	products	and	businesses	is	important.	So,	the	approach	to	sourcing	and	selecting	participants	is	important.			Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	add	to	this	that	accelerator	founders	also	focus	on	their	ability	to	make	a	difference	to	startups	in	deciding	which	to	accept	onto	the	program,	favouring	those	where	the	program	can	offer	support	that	will	lead	to	tangible	progress	by	the	end	of	the	program.	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	observed	that	an	ecosystem	builder	established	or	backed	by	a	corporate	would	typically	see	the	corporate	involved	in	this	process,	though	this	creates	a	potential	conflict	whereby	the	corporate’s	executives	select	primarily	around	what	might	benefit	the	corporate,	rather	than	would	benefit	the	accelerator,	or	wider	ecosystem.			
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They	concluded	that	accelerators	are	therefore	seen	as	providing	a	selection	and	filtering	role,	whether	that	is	for	investors,	for	the	benefit	of	a	corporate,	or	to	attract	good	talent	to	an	ecosystem.	To	achieve	this,	accelerators	develop	rigorous	selection	processes,	often	in	multiple	stages,	and	with	input	from	third	parties	through	this	process.	Their	perceived	value	is	in	attracting	a	wide	range	of	applicants,	processing	those	applications	to	select	only	the	best,	though	with	the	development	of	underlying	business	models,	‘best’	can	mean	whatever	will	benefit	the	backers	of	the	program,	and	meet	its	stated	aims.		For	many	accelerators	it	is	important	that	this	process	is	visible	to	the	ecosystem,	with	external	advisors	involved,	as	this	validates	the	claim	later	that	their	cohort	is	the	best	in	class.				2.3.3.7	Focussed	Accelerators			This	thesis	will	examine	the	development	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	which	was	an	ultra-focussed	accelerator	program.	The	intention	was	that	a	very	focussed	accelerator,	addressing	a	very	narrow	vertical,	would	offer	benefits	to	the	stakeholders.	The	benefit	of	a	very	focussed	program	developed	in	the	literature	from	the	outset.	Christiansen	(2009)	concluded	that	there	is	“a	huge	potential	in	focusing	a	startup	accelerator	programme	on	a	particular	vertical,”	predicting	the	development	of	the	market	towards	more	focussed	programs.			Six	years	later,	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	observed	that	programs	were	indeed	increasingly	focussing	on	a	specific	theme	rather	than	being	generic.	Barba	(2016)	concluded	that	
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vertical	programs	have	the	advantage	of	being	able	to	offer	specialised	and	expert	mentoring	and	support.			This	is	further	explained	by	Bone	et	al.	(2017),	who	observed	that	as	the	top	programs	grew	in	strength	and	reach,	the	competition	to	attract	the	best	founders	and	companies	became	harder	for	other	programs.	Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	concluded	that	vertical	focus	may	become	one	precondition	for	success	of	accelerators	due	to	the	increasing	number	of	programs,	and	therefore	greater	competition	across	the	sector.	They	suggested	a	very	focussed	program	may	give	the	accelerator	stronger	differentiation	in	a	more	crowded	market.			In	their	research,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	referred	to	EyeFocus	Accelerator	as	an	example	of	an	accelerator	where	the	specialism	is	not	just	‘digital’	or	‘healthcare’	but	crosses	the	technology	or	business	vertical.	They	list	EyeFocus	Accelerator	alongside	the	Female	Propeller	for	High	Fliers	in	Dublin,	which	targets	female	founders,	arguing	that	this	type	of	focus	is	not	just	about	a	type	of	business	(digital,	healthcare,	early	stage,	late	stage)	but	about	a	unifying	common	theme	that	includes	a	wide	range	of	business	types.			They	further	argued	that	the	development	of	vertical	accelerators	came	about	in	order	to	achieve	a	variety	of	objectives,	including	establishing	a	core	competence	in	order	to	attract	startups.	As	the	market	grew,	claiming	to	offer	support	to	all	types	of	startups	became	difficult	for	all	but	the	best	and	largest	programs,	so	offering	very	specific	support	and	networks	in	one	vertical	allowed	new	programs	to	compete	in	the	more	crowded	marketplace.	Vertical	programs	are	also	a	result	of	the	greater	involvement	of	
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corporates	in	accelerators,	where	the	focus	reflects	the	core	expertise	and	interest	of	the	corporate.			Brunet	et	al	(2016)	concluded	that	vertical	programs	bring	greater	value	to	their	startups	by	having	more	specifically	qualified	management	teams,	a	larger	group	of	mentors	from	that	relevant	industry	vertical,	and	closer	ties	to	corporates	that	form	the	route	to	market	for	the	startups.					
2.3.4	ACCELERATORS	AS	INVESTORS			2.3.4.1	Investment			As	exemplified	in	the	research	carried	out	by	Christiansen	(2009)	the	early,	traditional,	accelerators	invested	in	the	startups	on	their	program.	The	investment	is	relevant	in	different	ways	for	the	different	stakeholders	associated	with	the	accelerator.	For	startups,	it	provides	funding	for	the	founders	to	cover	their	living	costs	during	the	program,	and	therefore	not	be	distracted	by	earning	money	elsewhere.	For	the	accelerator	it	offers	a	way	to	realise	a	return	on	the	money	they	invest	in	running	the	program,	and	for	investors	it	allows	them	to	become	involved	in	the	board	of	a	startup	very	early	on,	with	a	view	to	making	later	rounds	of	investment.		
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The	investment	is	referred	to	as	a	‘stipend’	by	Hochberg	(2015),	and	while	it	is	in	return	for	equity,	she	argues	it	should	be	seen	as	part	of	a	package	of	value,	including	mentoring,	education,	office	space,	and	brand	association.			Christiansen	(2009)	argued	in	favour	of	accelerators	investing	in	the	startups	as	it	brings	the	accelerator’s	incentives	in	line	with	those	of	the	startups.	Both	parties	want	the	startup	to	succeed,	to	raise	more	money,	and	to	exit.	This	is	similar	to	an	angel	investor’s	incentives,	but	different	to	an	incubator,	which	is	incentivised	to	keep	the	startup	as	a	tenant.			Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	observed	that	an	aspect	of	investing	that	differentiates	accelerators	from	angel	investors	is	that	angels	tend	to	make	investments	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	carrying	out	extensive	due	diligence	and	term	sheet	negotiations	for	each	deal.	Accelerators,	however,	focus	on	an	average	of	10	deals	at	any	given	time,	standardising	the	term	sheet,	and	funnelling	the	due	diligence	into	an	application	process	for	the	program.	They	suggest	that	this	allows	accelerators	to	make	more	investments	more	quickly.		In	examining	accelerator	investments,	Hallen	et.al	(2016)	found	the	average	investment	by	accelerators	into	startups	was	$26,000	for	an	average	of	6%	equity	in	the	startup,	referencing	www.seedrankings.com,	but	acknowledging	that	the	amounts	had	risen	between	the	time	of	the	study	and	its	publication,	supporting	the	observation	by	Bone	et	al.	in	2017	that	research	had	trouble	keeping	up	with	accelerators	(see	1.9.1).	Hathaway	(2016)	found	that	between	2005-2015,	172	US	based	accelerators	invested	a	
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median	of	$100,000	in	over	5000	US	based	startups.	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	found	that	the	investment	in	UK	accelerators	ranged	from	£10,000-£50,000.			Exploring	further	the	attraction	of	this	approach	to	investing,	Shane	(2015)	pointed	to	the	problem	investors	face	when	trying	to	diversify	their	investments,	and	to	access	deals	at	an	earlier	stage.	In	particular	suggesting	that	conventional	angel	and	VC	investors	are	not	suited	to	finding,	processing,	and	investing	in	large	numbers	of	startups,	and	that	the	cost	of	sourcing	and	carrying	out	due	diligence	is	prohibitive.	He	observed	that	accelerators	resolve	this	problem	because	they	have	the	structure,	process,	and	brand	in	place	to	find	and	sort	larger	numbers	of	startups,	providing	a	benefit	to	other	investors	and	to	corporates.			Hochberg	(2015)	adds	that	accelerators	are	a	leaner	type	of	organisation,	and	their	fund	structures	are	less	complicated	than	a	conventional	VC	investor,	so	they	can	make	a	larger	number	of	smaller	investments	more	quickly	than	a	larger	fund.			This	translates	into	the	larger	investors	both	coming	into	the	initial	investment	group	formed	by	the	accelerator	and	positioning	themselves	as	follow-on	investors	into	the	startups	graduating	from	the	program	(Shane	2015).	The	investors	quite	often	either	do	not	expect	to	see	a	return	on	their	accelerator	investment	or	are	not	making	that	investment	just	for	the	return	(Hochberg	2015).	The	aim	of	investing	in	an	accelerator	is	more	usually	to	get	an	oversight	of	the	startups	and	deal	flow,	and	an	opportunity	to	carry	out	slower	and	more	in-depth	due	diligence	in	the	startups	by	mentoring	them	(Shane	2015).	
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Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	pointed	out	that	investors	can	become	involved	not	only	by	investing	into	the	accelerator	‘fund’	itself,	but	also	as	mentors.		Mentoring	allows	investors	to	get	to	know	the	startups,	and	the	demo	day		brings	investors	to	the	location	because	of	the	efficiency	of	meeting	the	clustered	startups	all	at	once.		They	observed	that	investors	also	arranged	meetings	with	other	startups	near	the	accelerator	if	they	travelled	in	for	a	demo	day	or	mentoring	sessions,	with	the	benefit	of	their	involvement	spreading	more	widely	into	the	ecosystem.			Consequently,	Hochberg	(2015)	found	that	the	arrival	of	an	accelerator	in	a	given	location	tended	to	increase	the	proportion	of	local	investment	made	into	earlier	stage	companies,	and	therefore	the	investment	aspect	of	accelerators	has	a	positive	impact	on	the	wider	ecosystem.	By	connecting	angel	investors	around	the	accelerator,	and	promoting	the	idea	of	angel	investing,	the	accelerator	improves	the	culture	of	investing,	across	the	ecosystem,	so	this	benefit	is	not	restricted	to	those	startups	in	the	program.				2.3.4.2	Does	accelerator	investing	work?		In	the	typical	investment	model	accelerator,	or	deal-flow	maker,	Hochberg	(2015)	argued	that	investors	either	do	not	expect	to	see	a	return	on	their	investment	into	the	accelerator	fund	at	all,	or	not	for	some	time.	He	found	that	a	typical	early	stage	investment	would	take	over	9	years	to	realise	a	return,	and	that	accelerators	which	cannot	invest	in	follow-on	rounds	become	too	diluted	to	make	a	viable	return	over	the	longer	term.		
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In	aiming	to	understand	how	returns	on	accelerator	investments	may	work,	Christiansen	(2009)	put	forward	a	simple	financial	model	to	explore	the	viability	of	investing	by	accelerators.	He	based	it	on	an	investment	of	$20,000	for	5%	equity	spread	over	20	companies,	so	a	total	investment	of	$400,000.	He	assumed	one	company	exits	with	a	$100m	valuation,	earning	the	accelerator	$500,000,	then	5	companies	exit	at	$10m,	5	companies	break	even,	and	10	companies	fail	and	bring	no	return.	Based	on	this	calculation,	the	accelerator	returns	$1.4m	on	its	investment	of	$400,000.	At	the	time	of	writing,	he	was	able	to	suggest	that	both	Y	Combinator	and	TechStars	were	already	starting	to	prove	this	model.			Hathaway	(2016)	found	that	the	companies	he	studied	raised	$19.5	billion	between	2005-2015,	representing	an	average	of	over	$3.7m	each,	which	he	suggested	points	to	the	investor	model	of	accelerator	succeeding,	and	having	strong	prospects	for	the	future.	However,	this	author	considers	that	averaging	money	raised	across	a	number	of	startups	produce	misleading	conclusions	as	to	the	benefit	of	accelerators	to	startups.	As	Christiansen’s	figures	suggest,	in	reality	most	startups	fail,	and	only	a	few	have	large	exits.	Averaging	money	raised	might	give	the	impression	that	most	startups	raised	a	moderate	amount	of	investment,	which	would	be	inaccurate	if	in	fact	very	few	had	raised	large	amounts,	and	most	had	raised	little	or	no	money.			Lehman	(2013)	pointed	to	anecdotal	evidence	and	data	reported	by	accelerators	and	startups,	which	therefore	may	suffer	from	a	bias	of	reporting,	which	suggests	that	60-70%	of	startups	in	accelerators	attracted	follow-on	funding.	However,	as	accelerators	are	investors	in	the	startups,	they	require	big	wins	to	offset	the	losses	of	the	under-
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performing,	or	failing	startups.	He	therefore	concludes	that	an	exit	is	the	only	real	measure	of	success,	being	when	the	accelerator	realises	a	return	on	its	investment.			Supporting	this	view,	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	concluded	that	deal-flow	makers	are	only	likely	to	succeed	with	a	pure	investment	business	model	if	they	are	located	in	very	dense	ecosystems	like	Silicon	Valley.	This	concern	was	first	predicted	by	Christiansen	(2009)	and	transpired	to	be	accurate.		In	examining	the	questions	around	accelerator	investing,	Kim	&	Wagman	(2014)	argued	that	a	potential	obstacle	in	understanding	whether	the	deal-flow	maker	model	works	is	that	traditional	deal-flow	maker	accelerators	only	make	a	profit	when	their	portfolio	firms	raise	further	investment.	This	may	incentivise	them	to	be	selective	in	the	information	they	disclose	about	their	portfolio,	with	a	bias	towards	positive	information	in	order	to	help	the	company	raise	money	and	the	accelerator	to	exit	their	investment.			Another	concern	with	deal-flow	makers	and	signalling	was	first	raised	by	Christiansen	(2009),	who	cautioned	that	when	an	accelerator	is	solely	funded	by	a	VC	firm	with	considerable	available	funds,	if	the	accelerator	does	not	make	a	follow-on	investment	into	a	startup	on	their	program	it	sends	a	danger	signal	to	other	investors.	For	this	reason,	he	suggested	startups	avoid	such	programs.	The	same	could	apply	to	accelerators	that	have	evolved	into	seed	funds,	and	many	of	the	European	accelerators	which	received	European	Investment	Fund	grants	for	follow-on	investing.	These	accelerators	consequently	have	the	resources	to	make	follow-on	investments	and	send	danger	signals	if	they	do	not	(Hochberg	2015).		
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Another	potential	problem	with	deal-flow	makers	is	that	some	startups	see	them	primarily	as	investors,	rather	than	support	programs	that	also	offer	a	stipend.	Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	cautioned	that	this	can	lead	to	them	undervaluing	the	mentoring,	networking,	and	co-location,	and	not	becoming	actively	involved	members	of	the	program.	It	is	also	a	problem	because	the	value	of	the	financial	investment	alone	is	not	then	perceived	to	justify	the	equity	stake	being	asked	by	the	program,	which	reflects	the	whole	package	of	value.	The	author	of	this	thesis	has	also	observed	that	it	is	important	for	programs	to	demonstrate	that	equity	is	in	return	for	funding,	support,	office	space,	and	a	combined	package	of	benefits	in	order	to	avoid	negotiating	with	startups	who	try	to	reduce	the	amount	of	equity	they	give	up.			The	investment	model	should	be	judged	both	by	whether	it	produces	a	return	for	the	investors,	and	whether	it	benefits	the	startups.		Gonzalez-Uribe	&	Leatherbee	(2017)	found	that	the	funding	provided	by	accelerators	is	not	on	its	own	a	factor	in	the	future	success	of	startups	on	accelerator	programs,	but	that	the	“entrepreneurial	capital,”	and	related	features	of	the	program	combined	with	funding	are	key	for	a	successful	outcome.	This	supports	the	argument	above	that	neither	party	should	focus	solely	on	the	investment	being	provided.			Cohen	(2013)	suggested	that	more	research	is	needed	to	determine	whether	accelerators	work	as	an	investment	vehicle,	and	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	argued	that	it	is	not	clear	whether	most	venture	backed	accelerators	will	ever	break	even,	and	suggest	that	most	will	not.	Furthermore,	they	suggest,	with	the	growth	in	accelerators	and	increased	competition	for	good	quality	startups,	the	venture-backed	model	will	become	more	
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difficult	as	more	accelerators	chase	a	finite	group	of	high	quality	startups	that	are	capable	of	delivering	a	return	on	investment.		Brunet	et	al	(2016)	found	that	due	to	the	difficulty	for	accelerators	to	succeed	as	a	business	from	the	return	on	investments	made	into	the	cohort	alone,	fewer	programs	are	focussing	on	investment	as	their	main	form	of	income.	They	found	that	(in	2016)	only	62%	of	accelerators	were	pursuing	the	investment	business	model,	and	this	approach	was	declining.	They	identified	just	52	reported	exits	in	their	research	of	startup	investments,	suggesting	that	this	route		is	not	bringing	in	enough	revenue	to	support	accelerators.	As	a	consequence,	they	found	that	35.8%	of	accelerators	in	Europe	received	some	form	of	public	funding.	The	main	sources	of	revenue	for	accelerators	were	corporate	sponsorship	(32%),	with	exit	of	startup	investments	representing	just	8%.	However,	the	accelerators	reviewed	predicted	the	share	of	revenue	from	exits	would	rise	to	32%	in	the	future,	presumably	reflecting	that	they	had	not	yet	seen	many	exits	but	assumed	more	as	the	startups	matured.			Golomb	(2015)	suggested	that	whilst	the	top	tier	accelerators	can	work,	lesser	accelerators	would	end	up	accepting	the	startups	which	leading	accelerators	reject.	Consequently,	they	will	struggle	to	profit	if	their	business	model	is	investment	outcomes	alone.	The	founders	on	these	programs	come	away	with	excellent	educational	benefits	and	networks	and	will	probably	succeed	in	a	future	startup,	but	the	accelerator	would	fail	to	benefit	from	this.	He	argued	that	the	rapid	growth	in	accelerators	saw	programs	established	by	people	who	did	not	have	enough	experience	as	entrepreneurs	setting	up	and	scaling	technology	companies,	or	finding	and	funding	the	best	startups	as	
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investors.	He	anticipated	that	the	rapid	explosion	of	accelerators,	most	of	which	he	thought	would	fail,	would	be	looked	back	upon	as	a	learning	phase	out	of	which	a	new	way	to	educate	entrepreneurs	would	emerge.				Clearly	investment	was	the	main	catalyst	for	the	birth	of	startup	accelerators	(Christiansen	2009,	Tarani	2010),	but	as	they	have	evolved,	and	spread	beyond	the	main	startup	clusters	that	have	enough	investors	in	the	ecosystem	to	make	that	model	work,	investment	has	become	less	important.			Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	concluded	that	accelerators	have	a	role	in	encouraging	the	emergence	of	local	angel	and	VC	communities,	which	in	turn	helps	support	the	development	of	greater	entrepreneurial	activity.	Therefore,	investment	activity	and	outcomes	should	in	fact	be	measured	across	the	whole	ecosystem,	not	just	in	relation	to	the	startups	on	the	program.			Startups	still	require	funding,	in	the	form	of	the	‘stipend’	as	it	was	originally	designed,	and	many	stakeholders	funding	accelerators	are	looking	for	a	return	on	their	investment.	However,	as	it	is	becoming	clear	that	accelerators	can	do	more	than	just	create	a	return	on	investment,	other	outcomes	are	becoming	key	performance	indicators,	such	as	economic	development	and	sourcing	innovation.	Equally,	accelerators	are	looking	to	other	forms	of	income	that	is	more	stable	and	predictable	than	investing,	such	as	sponsorship,	grants,	and	fees	from	corporates	to	run	a	program.	It	appears	from	the	literature	that	under	the	right	circumstances,	investing	into	startups	in	an	accelerator	can	still	lead	to	returns,	but	this	no	longer	applies	to	all	accelerators.	
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Therefore,	in	terms	of	defining	an	accelerator,	investing	should	no	longer	be	seen	as	a	mandatory	activity	for	a	program	to	be	considered	an	accelerator,	and	should	not	be	the	only,	or	the	main	measure	by	which	a	program	is	judged.				2.3.4.3	Evaluating	other	outcomes		This	examination	of	investment	outcomes,	and	the	suggestion	that	other	outcomes	should	also	be	valued	suggests	that	evaluating	whether	accelerators	work	poses	many	challenges.	It	is	difficult	to	make	meaningful	comparative	studies	between	startups	that	did	and	did	not	attend	programs	because	no	two	startups	are	the	same.	Various	studies	(e.g.	Hochberg	2015),	have	looked	at	the	success	of	accelerated	startups	in	raising	further	investment	compared	to	those	which	did	so	without	the	support	of	a	program.	However,	the	author	of	this	thesis	argues	that	ascribing	to	the	accelerator	whether	a	startup	raises,	for	example	$1m	or	does	not,	or	does	so	more	quickly,	seems	too	specific	a	measure	for	something	that	is	so	complex	and	nuanced	as	a	disruptive	new	business.			Bone	et	al.	(2017)	acknowledged	that	there	is	no	agreed	set	of	criteria	for	measuring	the	performance	of	accelerators,	but	posited	that	commonly	used	metrics	include:	• The	number	of	applicants	to	a	program	• The	number	of	startups	supported	by	the	program	• How	much	further	investment	the	startups	raised	• The	survival	rate	of	the	startups	• The	number	of	people	employed	by	the	startups	
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They	observed	that	as	not	all	accelerators	have	the	same	goals,	it	is	hard	to	find	a	common	set	of	metrics	to	measure	success.	They	recognised	the	value	of	measuring	impact	on	the	founder	not	just	the	venture,	and	whether	social	impact	should	be	measured	as	well	as	just	financial	outcomes.			Looking	at	the	wider	impact	of	accelerators,	Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	examined	the	effect	of	accelerators	on	their	regional	entrepreneurial	ecosystems	specifically	relating	to	the	availability	of	seed	and	early	stage	venture	capital	funding.	They	carried	out	a	comparative	analysis	of	US	Metropolitan	Statistical	Areas	(MSAs)	that	have	an	accelerator	with	similar	areas	that	do	not.	They	compared	these	MSAs	from	2005-2012	and	found	that	a	new	accelerator	was	associated	with	an	104%	increase	in	the	number	of	seed	and	early	stage	VC	investments	made	that	year,	and	a	97%	increase	in	the	number	of	investors	active	in	the	region.	They	proposed	that	this	was	not	just	due	to	direct	investment	into	accelerator	startups,	but	also	to	the	way	an	accelerator	attracts	investors	to	engage	with	the	wider	ecosystem	and	promotes	an	investment	culture.		The	research	by	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	identified	that	accelerators	in	Europe	specifically	fall	into	different	typologies,	with	different	aims	and	objectives.	They	argued	that	accelerators	should	not	be	evaluated	using	the	single	criterion	of	investment	raised,	but	instead	new	criteria	needed	to	be	developed	that	acknowledge	the	distinction	between	a	deal-flow	maker,	ecosystem	builder,	and	welfare	stimulator.	Only	the	deal-flow	maker	should	be	judged	using	the	traditional	criteria	relating	to	investment	outcomes.	The	other	types	of	accelerator	need	a	more	refined	set	of	KPIs,	including	impact	on	the	ecosystem,	on	the	corporate	and	government	funders,	and	on	the	wider	economy.		
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2.3.4.4	Obstacles	to	evaluation	of	accelerators		The	literature	has	shown	that	it	is	not	clear	how	to	evaluate	accelerators,	and	that	simply	judging	them	on	investment	returns	risks	overlooking	other	valuable	outcomes	or	judging	them	on	the	wrong	criteria.	However,	there	are	many	obstacles	to	evaluating	their	outcomes,	and	that	observation	is	woven	into	the	discussion	in	this	chapter.	One	reason	is	identified	by	Bone	et	al.	(2017),	who	found	that	as	many	accelerators	are	startups	themselves,	they	often	do	not	have	the	time	or	resources	to	engage	in	complicated	measuring	and	reporting,	so	there	is	a	dearth	of	data	on	outcomes	across	the	sector.		Kim	&	Wagman	(2014)	also	found	that	the	difficulty	in	evaluating	accelerators	is	aggravated	by	the	lack	of	available	information.	They	looked	at	the	incentives	accelerators	have	to	disclose	only	partial	information	about	their	portfolios,	and	to	supress	negative	information.	This	partial	disclosure	may	also	tie	in	with	incentives	to	exit	portfolio	investments	early.	They	cautioned	that	accelerators	can	cause	‘valuation	bubbles’	for	startups,	and	other	misleading	data	and	signalling	because	of	their	natural	internal	bias.			By	contrast	to	these	arguments,	Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	proposed	that	it	is	in	fact	simple	to	measure	the	success	of	accelerators,	because	the	only	metric	that	matters	is	follow-on	funding.	Analysing	smaller	operational	metrics	is	misguided	because	accelerators	are	not	there	to	make	marginal	changes	to	startups.	However,	their	conclusion	predated	the	research	by	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	and	with	the	benefit	of	their	more	detailed	
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categorisation	of	accelerators	should	be	seen	only	to	apply	to	deal-flow	makers	that	set	out	primarily	to	achieve	investment	outcomes.		However,	this	observation	assumes	that	the	only	stakeholders	interested	in	outcomes	are	the	startups,	investors,	and	the	accelerator	manager,	being	the	three	parties	that	would	benefit	from	follow-on	investments	or	exits.	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	examined	in	more	depth	the	motivations	of	people	founding	accelerators	and	suggested	that	the	aims	of	the	accelerator	should	define	how	outcomes	should	be	measured.	They	suggest	that,	despite	the	proliferation	of	accelerators,	by	the	time	of	their	report,	there	was	still	relatively	little	evidence	about	what	works,	and	in	particular	whether	accelerators	create	success	or	select	for	success.		The	bias	of	evidence,	as	referenced	above	by	Kim	&	Wagman	(2014),	makes	for	a	very	complicated	set	of	criteria	that	are	hard	to	measure	given	the	lack	of	available	data	sets,	and	the	potential	biases	in	that	data.			Another	problem	with	the	data	and	how	it	is	analysed	can	be	observed	in	the	report	by	Fox	(2014)	for	Telefonica,	where	data	is	broken	into	averages,	yet	startups	by	nature	are	rarely	average.	Startups	are	generally	expected	to	grow	exponentially	or	fail.	She	found,	for	example,	that	17	programs	had	supported	1655	startups	which	went	on	to	raise	£112.83m.	She	then	proposed	that	this	worked	out	as	an	average	of	£68,176.	Whilst	in	London	10	programs	had	supported	279	startups,	which	raised	£46.3m,	or	an	average	of	£165.949.	It	is	not	clear	how	useful	such	average	numbers	are	when	presumably	they	do	not	reflect	the	reality	of	the	startups.	In	reality	it	is	likely	that	a	small	number	of	the	startups	raised	a	large	proportion	of	the	money,	whilst	many	raised	small	amounts,	and	most	failed.	
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As	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	observed	in	their	research,	to	evaluate	the	effectiveness	of	accelerators	would	require	a	comparison	of	the	same	metrics	across	different	programs,	and	with	a	control	set	of	non-accelerated	startups.	Neither	exist,	because	accelerators	are	not	all	the	same,	and	therefore	do	not	have	easily	comparable	data	points.	Startups	are	also	so	different	that	trying	to	find	a	control	group	against	which	to	compare	accelerated	startups	would	run	into	the	same	problem.			Not	only	are	startups	different	to	each	other,	but	also	the	factors	that	decide	their	success	are	so	various.	Such	a	comparison	would	have	to	take	into	account	the	team’s	education	and	past	experience,	their	networks,	the	location	of	the	startup,	the	sector,	and	much	more.	Ultimately,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	conceded	that	it	is	not	possible	to	evaluate	whether	accelerators	create	success,	or	select	for	it.	Equally,	Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	pointed	out	that	measuring	the	survival	of	startups	graduating	from	accelerators	is	a	weak	metric	because	it	should	also	be	deemed	a	successful	outcome	of	an	accelerator	to	help	a	startup	fail	quickly,	freeing	up	the	founder	and	team	to	pursue	a	better	startup,	and	preventing	investors	from	losing	more	money.			They	further	add	that	there	is	another	problem	when	discussing	average	outcomes	on	startups	from	a	wide	range	of	accelerators.	This	is	due	to	the	possibility	that	any	positive	effect	of	the	top	accelerators	on	their	startups	is	diluted	by	the	negative	effect	of	the	larger	number	of	average	or	bad	accelerators	on	their	cohorts,	creating	a	flat	average	where	one	cancels	out	the	other.			
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Bone	et	al.	(2017)	went	on	to	observe	that	examining	the	state	of	the	accelerated	startups	2-3	years	after	they	graduate	is	too	soon	to	ascertain	whether	they	have	become	a	success,	and	to	calculate	the	wider	impact	on	the	ecosystem	around	them.	There	is	a	dearth	of	longitudinal	data	due	to	the	relative	newness	of	the	sector.			Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	proposed	that	the	approach	of	evaluating	accelerators	by	follow-on	funding	raised	by	their	startups	does	not	accurately	reflect	‘success’	because	startups	that	raise	money	may	fail,	and	startups	that	do	not	raise	money	may	succeed.	Therefore,	this	measure	is	possibly	more	of	a	marketing	tool,	to	attract	future	startups	into	the	program.	They	suggested	that	a	true	indicator	for	a	for-profit	accelerator	should	be	its	own	Return	on	Investment	(ROI)	after	5-10	years.	However,	this	would	restrict	any	attempt	to	measure	progress	before	then,	and	therefore	limit	how	accelerators	raise	funding	and	attract	startups	in	the	short	and	medium	term.			Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	add	to	the	doubts	over	using	follow-on	funding	as	a	metric	of	success	asking	whether	in	the	longer	term	is	it	better	for	a	startup	to	become	profitable	and	self-sustaining,	or	to	keep	raising	multiple	rounds	of	investment?	It	is	not	clear	whether	the	current	phase	of	startups,	especially	in	Silicon	Valley,	that	have	raised	very	large	rounds	of	investment	in	fact	represent	a	bubble,	so	this	question	cannot	yet	be	answered.			Concentrating	the	discussion	into	other	forms	of	funding,	such	as	government	grants,	and	how	this	can	be	justified,	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	argued	that	the	difficulty	in	evaluating	outcomes	makes	it	hard	to	assess	whether	public	funding	of	accelerators	is	an	
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appropriate	use	of	resources,	and	whether	there	is	a	long	term	economic	impact	from,	for	example,	attracting	foreign	startups	to	the	city	or	country.	This	point	relating	to	the	deployment	of	public	money	is	also	explored	by	Bliemel	et	al	(2014)	who	concluded	that	the	metric	of	job	creation,	common	in	public	sector	evaluation,	is	not	a	good	way	to	measure	the	benefit	of	accelerators	because	startups	typically	operate	on	a	lean	budget	and	automate	or	outsource	functions	rather	than	employ	people.				
2.3.4.5 Non-investment outcomes	Observations	by	Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	suggested	that	accelerators	do	bring	a	benefit	to	the	wider	ecosystem.	They	found	that	the	increase	in	investment	amounts,	numbers	of	investors	and	investee	companies	in	an	ecosystem	with	an	accelerator	that	they	identified	in	their	research,	showed	that	the	presence	of	an	accelerator	increases	interest	in	the	ecosystem	from	nearby	investor	groups,	rather	than	from	new	outside	investors	entering	the	market.	They	proposed	that	the	increased	investments	into	startups	from	the	wider	ecosystem	as	well	as	into	graduates	of	the	accelerator,	indicated	that	the	presence	of	the	accelerator	positively	affected	investment	across	the	region	and	not	just	within	the	accelerator.	However,	the	benefit	is	specific	to	the	sector	that	is	the	focus	of	the	accelerator,	rather	than	more	widely	across	other	sectors	too.			The	type	of	program	being	evaluated	also	impacts	the	level	of	benefit.	Hathaway	(2016)	identified	a	clear	distinction	in	outcomes	between	startups	that	enter	the	top	programs,	and	startups	that	enter	lesser	programs.	The	top	programs	noticeably	accelerated	the	startups’	ability	to	raise	money,	exit,	and	gain	customers,	whereas	he	found	that	lesser	
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accelerators	do	not	have	any	impact,	or	even	impede	the	startups.		He	also	found	that	startups	that	receive	funding	from	accelerators	are	more	likely	to	raise	further	funding,	be	acquired,	or	fail,	sooner	than	startups	that	raised	money	from	leading	angel	investor	groups.		He	argued	that	this	distinction	is	important,	and	the	emphasis	is	on	outcomes	happening	‘sooner’	rather	than	what	the	outcome	is,	confirming	that	helping	a	bad	startup	fail	quickly	is	also	a	positive	outcome.	The	implication	is	that	startups	that	are	backed	by	angel	investors	lack	the	subjective	feedback	and	advice	of	those	in	accelerators	and	may	therefore	be	kept	alive	longer	than	is	beneficial.		Hathaway	(2016)	concluded	that	the	learning	in	accelerators	is	of	genuine	value	to	the	startups,	which	suggests	that	the	benefit	to	the	startups	on	a	program	is	not	restricted	to	credential	signalling	to	future	investors,	or	selection	bias.	Echoing	this	finding,	in	examining	how	these	other	outcomes	are	supported,	Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	proposed	three	preconditions	for	a	successful	accelerator.	First,	access	to	deep	and	tacit	knowledge	sources.	Second,	the	ability	to	transfer	that	knowledge	effectively.	For	this	to	work,	they	argue	that	the	accelerator	has	to	know	how	to	transfer	the	knowledge	effectively,	but	also	startups	have	to	have	the	desire	for	knowledge,	and	the	humility	to	accept	advice	from	the	mentors,	acknowledging	that	they	do	not	already	have	all	the	knowledge	and	experience	they	require.			Thirdly,	they	suggested	that	the	ownership	of	the	accelerator	is	important	in	defining	whether	it	can	succeed.	Their	observation	was	that	if	the	owner	is	subject	to	rules,	restrictions,	bureaucracy	or	internal	organisational	culture	from	a	supporting	corporate	
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 144 
this	could	inhibit	the	owner’s	ability	to	execute	in	the	style	and	speed	expected	of	an	accelerator.			Beyond	the	impact	of	an	accelerator	on	its	startups,	and	the	investors	associated	with	it,	an	accelerator	can	also	be	judged	by	the	impact	it	has	on	the	wider	ecosystem	around	it.	Hochberg	(2015)		argued	that	accelerators	may	have	a	positive	effect	on	outcomes	for	all	startups	in	an	ecosystem,	including	those	not	on	the	accelerator	program.		Fehder	and	Hochberg	(2014)	found	that	an	accelerator	can	lead	to	an	increase	in	startups	being	developed	in	a	region,	and	they	can	act	as	network	aggregators	across	an	ecosystem	by	organising	open	events	like	demo	day	s,	networking	events,	and	involving	mentors.		Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	added	that	accelerators	facilitate	their	startups	to	connect	other	stakeholders	in	the	ecosystem,	so	overall	having	the	effect	of	creating	multiple	new	network	connections	across	the	ecosystem,	and	in	particular	cross-sector	connections	that	may	not	otherwise	traverse	typical	hierarchies	and	sectoral	divisions.		However,	Hochberg	(2015)	observed	that	it	can	be	hard	to	know	whether	an	accelerator	attracted	investment	to	a	region,	and	then	developed	the	entrepreneurial	ecosystem,	or	whether	the	underlying	policy	preferences	that	led	to	the	accelerator	also	led	to	the	attraction	of	investment	and	improved	ecosystem.			Given	the	suggestion	that	accelerators	help	develop	the	ecosystem,	and	in	particular	entrepreneurship,	venture	creation,	and	angel	investment,	the	question	of	whether	accelerators	could	be	used	as	economic	development	tools	in	regions	not	already	strong	in	tech	entrepreneurship	was	explored	by	Miller	&	Bound	(2011).	They	suggested	that	
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examples	like	The	Difference	Engine,	in	North	East	England,	indicate	that	accelerators	may	be	an	efficient	way	to	create	new	businesses	and	jobs,	but	in	these	lower	density	ecosystems	would	need	to	be	supported	with	public	money	to	make	up	for	the	lack	of	private	sector	funding	in	the	earlier	stage	ecosystem.			They	suggested	that	finding	the	right	balance	for	public	sector	support	is	a	challenge.	If	accelerators	are	fully	paid	for,	or	even	run	by	public	sector	organisations,	there	is	a	risk	that	they	become	disconnected	from	the	investment	community	and	the	most	innovative	ventures.	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	concluded	that	any	public-sector	investment	should	be	matched	with	private	sector	money,	whether	that	be	investment	or	corporate	sponsorship,	in	order	to	ensure	strong	ties	to	the	private	sector.	Despite	this	potential	for	public	sector	involvement	in	accelerators,	and	their	role	in	regional	economic	development,	there	is	still	very	little	data	or	research	into	this	topic.						
2.4	DEFINITION	OF	AN	ACCELERATOR		In	proceeding	to	discuss	accelerators	in	the	context	of	Social	Network	Theory	it	is	necessary	to	develop	a	working	definition	of	an	accelerator	as	the	foundation	of	this	research.	The	literature	has	produced	several	definitions,	and	a	number	of	other	factors	that	define	accelerators.	The	main	definitions	identified	as	part	of	the	literature	review	are:		
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1.	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	(see	2.3.2.4)	
• Open	and	competitive	application	process	
• Pre-seed	investment,	usually	for	equity		
• Focus	on	small	teams,	not	individual	founders	
• A	defined	time	frame	of	education	and	intensive	mentoring	
• Cohorts	of	startups	rather	than	individual	companies		2.	Frimodig	and	Torkkeli	(2013)	(see	2.3.2.4)	concluded	that	a	range	of	programs	can	be	classified	as	accelerators,	including:	
• Pre-seed	accelerators	
• Seed	accelerators	(startup	accelerators)	
• Business	accelerators	
• Corporate	accelerators		3.	Bone	et	al.	(2017)	(see	2.3.2.4)	
• A	program	with	a	fixed	duration	of	3-12	months	
• Taking	equity	rather	than	fees	
• Most	likely	provides	seed	funding	
• Offers	services	as	a	primary	resource,	rather	than	physical	space	
• Accepts	startups	in	cohorts	
• Offers	mentorship	and	training	
• Focusses	on	teams	rather	than	single	founders	
• Highly	selective	program	from	an	open	application	process	
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2.4.1	Definition	of	an	accelerator	as	a	business	support	program		The	three	definitions	outlined	above	can	be	combined	to	bring	together	their	common	themes	and	define	the	core	characteristics	of	an	accelerator	as	follows:	
• A	fixed	term	program,	usually	3	months,	and	up	to	12	months	
• Can	be	for	pre-seed,	seed,	or	more	developed	businesses	
• These	form	a	cohort,	made	up	of	what	for	convenience	can	be	referred	to	as	‘startups’	
• Startups	apply	through	a	selective	application	process		
• May	make	a	small	investment	for	equity	
• Does	not	charge	fees	from	the	participants	
• Provides	office	space	for	free,	as	part	of	a	wider	value	offering	
• Offers	training	and	mentoring				
2.5	SUMMARY:	ACCELERATORS		This	second	part	of	the	literature	review	explored	the	literature	relating	to	accelerators.	It	showed	how	accelerators	have	evolved	from	Y	Combinator,	founded	in	2005,	to	a	wide	array	of	programs.		A	continuing	theme	of	the	literature	was	both	the	lack	of	research	into	accelerators,	and	the	lack	of	large	data	sets	accumulated	over	long	periods	of	time.	This	latter	being	a	
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reason	for	the	former,	and	itself	caused	partly	due	to	a	lack	incentive	or	resources	for	accelerators	to	gather	and	publish	detailed	data	about	their	programs.			However,	several	definitions	of	accelerators	have	been	agreed	upon	by	those	researching	the	topic,	including	those	by	Christiansen	(2009,	Miller	&	Bound	(2011),	and	Bone	et	al.	(2017).	These	concur	that	an	accelerator	is	a	program	to	support	startups,	which	has	a	fixed	term	and	delivers	value	to	a	cohort	of	startups	at	one	time.	Mentors	are	the	main	way	in	which	knowledge	is	transferred,	and	accelerators	neither	pay	mentors	nor	charge	the	startups,	finding	their	revenue	in	other	avenues	such	as	investment	returns,	sponsorship,	or	other	funding.		A	selection	process	is	important	because	it	creates	a	best	in	class	cohort	of	startups.	The	selection	and	validation	process	carried	out	by	the	accelerator	is	an	incentive	for	mentors,	investors,	and	corporates	to	gather	around	the	program	and	support	it.	It	was	perceived	that	accelerators	are	more	efficient	at	sourcing	and	filtering	startups,	validating	their	cohort	in	a	way	that	is	more	efficient	for	the	other	stakeholders	than	trying	to	do	this	themselves.			Efficiency	was	identified	as	a	key	feature	of	accelerators,	with	parallels	drawn	between	them	and	universities	in	the	way	they	deliver	an	education	to	a	class	of	startups	rather	than	individually.	Efficiencies	are	also	created	by	convening	all	the	stakeholders	in	one	place	for	a	short	period	of	activity,	allowing	individual	investors	or	mentors	to	meet	a	validated	cohort	of	startups.	Equally,	they	create	efficiency	for	startups	in	their	cohort	
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by	building	a	network	of	investors,	mentors,	and	corporates	that	they	can	meet	rapidly	in	a	short	period	of	time.			Whilst	the	first	accelerators	were	primarily	what	is	termed	deal-flow	makers,	investing	in	batches	of	startups	to	create	a	portfolio	of	early	stage	investments,	later	accelerators	have	used	the	same	structure	to	promote	economic	development,	to	build	ecosystems	of	innovators	around	corporates,	and	to	achieve	other	outcomes.		The	literature	review	also	identified	that	the	investment	model	on	which	accelerators	were	founded	may	not	work	for	accelerators	that	are	not	established	in	dynamic	ecosystems	with	a	large	community	of	investors	and	innovators.		The	importance	of	ecosystems	was	further	discussed	in	relation	to	how	accelerators	can	act	as	a	junction	between	different	stakeholders	in	an	ecosystem,	and	thus	connect	them	together.	As	such,	accelerators	are	seen	to	need	ecosystems	from	which	to	source	their	startups	and	mentors,	but	also	can	help	to	build	and	sustain	ecosystems	through	their	open	events,	networking,	and	by	attracting	new	investors	and	startups	to	that	ecosystem.			The	literature	suggested	that	as	accelerators	proliferated,	they	would	find	it	harder	to	compete	with	each	other	due	to	a	limited	source	of	good	quality	startups.	New	accelerators,	without	the	reputation	and	network	of	the	incumbents,	would	struggle	to	attract	talent.	Therefore,	it	was	suggested	accelerators	would	need	to	become	more	
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focussed	on	specific	topics,	sectors,	or	technologies	to	be	able	to	offer	value	in	that	particular	space.			The	difficulty	in	evaluating	the	outcomes	of	accelerators	was	discussed	in	the	literature,	with	some	arguing	that	they	should	primarily	be	judged	on	investment	outcomes	or	return	on	investment	for	the	accelerator.	Others	suggested	that	a	broader	range	of	outcomes	should	be	evaluated.		Finally,	the	review	brought	together	the	definitions	of	an	accelerator	to	create	a	working	definition	of	an	accelerator	that	will	be	used	in	the	next	part	of	this	research.		 							
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				CHAPTER	3.	INTERPRETATION	OF	FINDINGS	FROM	THE	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
	
	
Having	reviewed	the	literature	to	build	a	framework	within	which	to	examine	accelerators	
as	social	networks,	this	chapter	brings	together	the	theory	and	concepts	from	both	parts	of	
that	review	to	form	findings	about	accelerators	based	on	Social	Network	Theory.											
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3.1	INTRODUCTION		The	hypothesis	being	proposed	in	this	thesis	is	that	accelerators	should	be	understood	and	examined	as	social	networks.	If	a	social	network	is	a	series	of	nodes	linked	by	ties,	and	an	accelerator	is	a	group	of	people	connected	by	social	links,	then	an	accelerator	is	a	social	network.	If	an	accelerator	is	a	social	network,	then	it	can	be	described	according	to	Social	Network	Theory.		The	literature	review	identified	core	theories	from	Social	Network	Theory	that	explain	the	structure	of	and	dynamics	within	networks.	It	also	identified	the	aspects	of	incubation	and	innovation	programming	that	are	specific	to	startup	accelerators.	In	this	chapter,	these	are	brought	together	to	examine	in	more	depth	how	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	can	explain	the	characteristics	of	accelerators,	and	how	this	provides	a	greater	insight	into	why	accelerators	typically	have	a	specific	network	structure	and	characteristics	of	social	engagements	between	their	stakeholders.			This	thesis	proposes	that	describing	an	accelerator	as	a	social	network	offers	greater	insight	into	how	it	creates	value	for	the	various	stakeholders,	how	it	rewards	people	for	supporting	it,	and	how	it	sanctions	those	who	do	not	comply	with	its	socially	communicated	rules.	This	framework	also	explains	the	need	for	the	various	participants	to	interact	with	people	different	to	them	in	background,	expertise,	and	status,	supporting	the	need	for	the	accelerator	network	to	be	highly	diverse.				
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3.2	FINDINGS		3.2.1	Accelerators	are	social	networks			In	developing	a	theoretical	framework	from	the	literature	with	which	to	examine	accelerators,	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	encompassing	ideal	network	structures,	behaviours,	and	innovation	support	systems	was	set	out	(see	2.4.1).			In	2.2.1.4,	it	was	argued	that	the	most	creative	and	productive	network	structure	is	one	that	has	strong	ties	with	a	high	level	of	closure	at	the	core,	surrounded	by	a	large	number	of	weak	bridging	ties,	which	creates	an	efficient	and	powerful	ability	to	find	and	qualify	information,	and	the	internal	trust	and	effectiveness	to	translate	that	into	outcomes	(Adler	&	Kwon	2002).		Rost	(2010)	observed	that	people	with	strong	ties	who	are	embedded	in	weak	network	architecture	are	most	likely	to	have	both	innovative	ideas	and	to	be	able	to	realise	them.		Davidsson	&	Benson	(2003)	observed	that	Social	Capital	and	weak	tie	networks	can	expose	nascent	founders	to	new	perspectives	and	contexts	for	their	ideas,	helping	develop	a	solution	to	fit	a	more	complete	market	view	(see	2.2.2.1).		This	demonstrates	the	advantage	of	groups	that	have	high	levels	of	internal	bonding	ties	combined	with	high	levels	of	external	bridging	ties,	because	they	can	both	access	and	benefit	from	non-redundant	information.	This	implies	that	networks	with	high	internal	links	and	low	external	ties,	or	high	external	with	low	internal	ties	are	not	well	positioned	to	succeed	in	relation	to	innovation	(see	2.2.2.5).	This	observation	should	
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inform	the	precise	design	of	an	accelerator	to	ensure	it	builds	the	type	of	network	structure	that	supports	both	accessing	new	ideas,	and	being	able	to	translate	them	into	outcomes.			A	comparison	of	the	description	of	an	accelerator	taken	from	the	literature	review	(see	2.4.1),	and	this	description	of	the	type	of	network	that	encourages	innovation,	suggests	that	an	accelerator	naturally	forms	this	type	of	network	structure.	They	have	high	levels	of	internal	bonding,	in	the	form	of	the	management	team	and	cohort,	and	high	levels	of	external	bridging	ties	in	the	shape	of	the	mentor	network.	This	creates	the	trust	to	translate	ideas,	and	the	weak	network	architecture	to	find	non-redundant	information,	in	the	shape	of	opportunities,	networks,	and	feedback	via	the	mentors,	partners,	and	sponsors.				3.2.2	Weak	and	Strong	ties	leading	to	value	in	an	accelerator		Observing	that	an	accelerator	reflects	the	description	of	a	social	network	structure	that	best	leads	to	innovative	outcomes	(see	3.2.1)	suggests	that	weak	and	bridging	ties,	as	well	as	Social	Capital	will	play	important	roles	in	accelerators.				Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	observed	that	investing	in	building	weak	ties,	or	links	to	other	networks,	increases	access	to	knowledge,	ideas,	and	influence.	Investing	in	the	development	of	strong	ties,	or	stronger	internal	relations	within	the	network,	increases	the	ability	of	the	group	to	work	together	and	realise	value	from	the	weak	ties	(see	
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2.2.2.1).	They	referred	to	these	internal	and	external	ties	as	‘bridging’	and	‘bonding’	Social	Capital	(see	2.2.2.3).			This	is	reflected	in	the	way	an	accelerator	cohort	and	management	team	are	the	strong	internal	network,	rich	in	‘bonding’	Social	Capital	whilst	the	mentors	and	wider	ecosystem	represent	the	weak	ties,	or	‘bridging’	Social	Capital.			Therefore,	a	successful	accelerator	consists	of	a	weak	network	architecture,	rich	in	both	bonding	and	bridging	Social	Capital,	the	latter	of	which	is	represented	by	bridging	ties,	which	will	be	weak	ties,	according	to	Granovetter	(2012)	who	concluded	that	that	strong	ties	are	unlikely	to	bridge,	and	most	bridges	will	be	weak	ties	(see	2.2.1.4).		The	importance	of	bridging	Social	Capital	or	weak	bridging	ties	also	reflects	Burt’s	(2004)	theory	about	Structural	Holes,	which	demonstrated	that	people	who	stand	near	and	bridge	structural	holes	in	networks	are	more	likely	to	have	good	ideas	because	they	are	exposed	to	alternative	ways	of	thinking.	As	a	result,	they	also	have	greater	influence,	so	are	more	likely	to	see	those	ideas	adopted	(See	2.2.1.4).	By	forming	networks	with	weak	network	architecture	and	multiple	weak	ties,	accelerators	bridge	structural	holes	and	bring	the	advantages	discussed	by	Burt	to	their	cohort,	and	to	the	other	stakeholders	involved.			Borgatti	&	Halgin	(2011)	went	on	to	argue	(see	2.2.1.4)	that	if	bridges	are	the	source	of	novel	information,	and	only	weak	ties	bridge,	then	weak	ties	are	the	best	route	to	novel	information,	concluding	that	someone	bridging	structural	holes	will	be	exposed	to	non-
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 156 
redundant	information	not	available	to	the	others	in	the	network	(see	2.2.1.4).	They	concluded	from	this	that	access	to	new,	non-redundant	information	positions	an	individual	to	be	more	valuable	in	the	wider	network.	This	also	explains	how	accelerators	create	a	valuable	position	within	their	wider	ecosystem,	because	they	bridge	structural	holes	and	become	a	source	of	non-redundant	information,	which	is	a	source	of	value	in	social	networks.			Accelerators	therefore	develop	a	specific	social	network	structure	that	supports	innovation,	and	creates	value	for	the	various	stakeholders	by	bridging	structural	holes	and	becoming	a	source	of	non-redundant	information.	This	is	an	outcome	of	the	specific	network	structure	of	an	accelerator,	suggesting	that	accelerator	design	needs	to	reflect	this	knowledge.			3.2.3	Social	Capital	in	accelerator	networks		If	the	engagement	between	the	ties	in	the	social	network	of	an	accelerator	is	of	such	importance,	it	is	inevitable	that	Social	Capital	will	play	a	role	in	how	these	engagements	are	rewarded	and	policed.	This	is	supported	by	Orlowski	&	Wicker	(2015),	who	wrote	that	Social	Capital	“refers	to	features	of	social	organization,	such	as	trust,	norms,	and	networks	that	can	improve	the	efficiency	of	society	by	facilitating	coordinated	actions”	(see	2.2.2.1).	Coleman	(1988)	identified	three	forms	of	Social	Capital	(see	2.2.2.1),	which	reflect	the	value	in	an	accelerator.	These	are	summarised	as:		
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1. the	expectations	of	return	based	on	trustworthiness	within	the	network;		2. the	ability	of	the	social	network	to	facilitate	the	flow	of	information;		3. and	the	role	of	norms	and	the	ability	to	police	those	norms.		These	three	aspects	of	Social	Capital	explain	the	dynamics	of	an	accelerator,	whereby	people	co-operate	with	a	view	to	some	form	of	return,	which	might	be	social	validation	or	access	to	non-redundant	information,	rather	than	just	an	economic	return,	like	being	paid.	This	co-operation	and	internal	trust	encourages	the	flow	of	information,	in	particular	the	ability	to	source	non-redundant	information	and	validate	it,	which	equates	to	a	form	of	value	to	others.	This	particular	structure	of	the	network	around	an	accelerator	also	consequently	supports	the	establishment	and	communication	of	norms,	and	the	ability	to	police	these	with	link	reciprocity	(see	2.3.3.2).			This	is	supported	by	Coleman’s	(1988,	1990)	conclusion	(see	2.2.2.2)	that	Social	Capital	is	strengthened	in	closed	networks	because	norms	are	understood,	and	they	have	the	social	mechanisms	for	reward	and	sanction.	This	leads	to	greater	trust,	suggesting	that	in	this	context	Social	Capital	can	widely	be	interpreted	as	trust.	This	explains	the	high	levels	of	trust	observed	in	accelerators,	for	example	by	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	(see	2.3.1),	as	residing	in	the	closed	core	of	the	accelerator,	which	is	rich	in	bonding	Social	Capital.	This	core	is	the	cohort	and	management	team,	and	whoever	else	is	closely	involved	with	the	establishment	and	running	of	the	program.		The	way	in	which	trust	and	value	becomes	useful	to	the	specific	outcomes	of	an	accelerator	lie	in	the	observation	(see	2.2.2.4)	of	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	who	stated	that	a	
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factor	of	Social	Capital	in	a	network	is	that	a	reward	for	generating	and	validating	valuable	information	is,	in	effect,	a	favour	owed	to	those	with	whom	that	value	is	shared.	These	‘favours’	can	be	used	to	benefit	themselves	or	someone	else	that	an	actor	chooses	to	support.			This	forms	the	basis	of	the	proposition	in	this	thesis	that	an	accelerator	accumulates	Social	Capital	and	then	confers	it	on	its	cohort.	By	building	a	network	which	is	high	in	trust	and	facilitates	the	flow	of	non-redundant,	validated	information,	the	accelerator	accumulates	Social	Capital	that	it	can	use	to	reward	co-operation	from	other	high-value	actors.	It	can	then	decide	what	to	ask	for	in	return	for	sharing	that	value,	which	in	this	case	is	the	support	of	the	startups	in	its	cohort.			This	is	important	because	this	thesis	proposes	that	the	startups	themselves	lack	the	Social	Capital	required	to	engage	with	high-level	actors	who	are	rich	in	tacit	knowledge	and	ties.	Accelerators	accumulate	a	much	higher	level	of	Social	Capital,	which	they	can	then	use	to	reward	stakeholders	for	supporting	their	startups.		This	takes	many	forms,	but	is	primarily	the	role	the	accelerator	plays	in	creating	efficiencies	and	value.	For	example,	by	creating	a	small,	validated	cohort	from	a	large	number	of	startups	offers	a	more	efficient	mechanism	for	a	high-value	actor	to	meet	the	startups.	Furthermore,	the	accelerator	can	reward	co-operation	socially,	for	example	through	endorsement	of	social	credentials	to	mentors,	and	by	making	high	level	connections	between	the	mentors	and	with	the	sponsors	and	investors.			
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This	was	summarised	in	the	literature	review	by	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002),	who	observed	that	“these	forms	of	power	can	benefit	groups	that	distil	them	collectively,	allowing	them	to	‘get	things	done’	more	effectively,	thus	creating	value	for	the	group”	(See	2.2.2.4).			3.2.4	Accelerators	cluster	co-operators	to	create	economic	outcomes		Accelerators	are	therefore	clearly	building	networks	that	reward	co-operation	in	order	to	create	value	for	the	stakeholders	involved.	The	way	an	accelerator	encourages	co-operation	is	reflected	in	the	observation	made	by	Harrison	et	al	(2011)	(see	2.2.3.2)	that	cooperating	with	an	actor	who	is	highly	connected	in	a	network	increases	the	chance	of	reward,	or	of	sanction	for	not	cooperating,	because	that	actor	is	able	to	spread	reputation	more	effectively.	They	went	on	to	conclude	that	this	goes	some	way	to	explain	why	cooperative	people	tend	to	cluster	in	networks.	As	an	accelerator	is	highly	connected	within	its	wider	ecosystem	and	sits	at	the	heart	of	its	own	network,	it	is	in	a	stronger	position	to	reward	those	who	co-operate	with	it,	which	contrasts	with	an	individual	startup.			This	is	supported	by	Granovetter	(2005),	who	explained	how	this	ability	to	cluster	co-operative	actors	leads	to	economic	outcomes	(see	2.2.2.3).	He	observed	that	social	networks	create	economic	outcomes	by	encouraging	the	flow	of	information,	over	bridging	ties,	and	using	the	trust	that	resides	in	the	network,	in	the	form	of	the	Social	
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Capital	and	strong	ties,	to	validate	or	qualify	that	information.	They	support	this	function	by	being	able	to	reward	or	sanction	behaviour	using	link	reciprocity	(see	2.2.3.4).			Combined,	these	features	lead	to	the	actors	within	the	accelerator	behaving	in	a	way	that	may	reward	the	network,	or	other	actors,	rather	than	themselves.	This	is	due	to	the	expectation	that	‘trust’	creates	reciprocity,	or	a	return	on	investment	later	in	time,	as	Social	Capital	can	retain	value	over	time	and	be	expended	later	(see	2.2.2.1).			This	apparently	non-rational	form	of	behaviour,	whereby	an	actor	may	expend	effort	to	benefit	others	rather	than	himself,	is	a	consequence	of	embeddedness	within	a	network,	reflecting	an	expectation	of	social	outcomes	like	status	and	approval,	or	a	risk	of	sanction	(see	2.2.3.3).	This	further	explains	the	economically	irrational	behaviour	in	accelerators	whereby	actors,	such	as	mentors,	give	their	time,	knowledge,	and	contacts	for	free	to	assist	the	startups.	It	also	supports	the	argument	in	this	thesis	that	accelerators	should	be	viewed	primarily	as	social	networks,	rather	than	being	analysed	just	as	business	support	programs.	The	main	mechanism	whereby	mentors	are	incentivised	and	rewarded	is	Social	Capital,	an	outcome	of	the	accelerator	being	a	social	network.			3.2.5	Value	can	be	used	to	reward	or	sanction			Equipped	with	this	explanation	of	how	the	specific	type	of	social	network	that	makes	up	an	accelerator	facilitates	outcomes	and	how	value	resides	within	the	accelerator	social	
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network	in	the	form	of	Social	Capital	provides	further	insight	into	how	they	create	value.				It	has	been	shown	how	an	accelerator	is	of	value	to	actors	because	it	facilitates	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information,	and	is	rich	in	weak	ties	and	therefore	offers	novel	ties	as	another	form	of	value.	It	has	also	been	shown	that	an	accelerator	is	a	dynamic	social	network	embedded	in	a	weak	network	architecture,	meaning	it	can	communicate	reputation	effectively	across	a	large	ecosystem	Therefore,	its	value	can	be	used	to	reward	co-operators,	and	conversely	withholding	or	withdrawing	it	can	be	used	as	a	threat	of	sanction.	This	link	reciprocity	was	shown	to	be	a	means	of	policing	dynamic	networks	(see	2.2.3.4).			This	suggests	that	a	well-structured	network,	rich	in	bridging	and	bonding	Social	Capital,	embedded	within	a	weak	network	architecture,	is	well	placed	to	use	link	reciprocity	to	reward	co-operation	and	police	its	norms.				3.2.6	Protecting	startups,	and	link	reciprocity			The	description	of	link	reciprocity,	and	the	way	in	which	an	accelerator	can	confer	its	Social	Capital	on	its	cohort,	(see	3.2.3)	explains	the	observation	by	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	that	accelerators	can	protect	their	startups.	(see	2.3.3.5)	They	described	this	as	being	a	function	of	the	strong	ecosystem	around	the	accelerator	making	it	easier	for	the	startup	to	threaten	reputational	damage	to	bad	actors,	and	this	is	explained	in	depth	by	
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Social	Network	Theory.	The	structure	of	the	accelerator’s	social	network,	combined	with	the	value	residing	within	its	Social	Capital,	allows	it	to	reward	and	sanction	actors	using	link	reciprocity,	and	therefore	offer	value	to	its	startups	in	the	form	of	protection.		This	observation	informs	accelerator	design	by	demonstrating	that	an	accelerator	should	protect	its	startups	via	construction	of	a	specific	network	structures	using	Social	Capital	and	link	reciprocity.				3.2.7	Building	Cohorts	to	create	efficiencies				Another	key	feature	of	accelerators	described	in	the	literature	is	that	they	form	cohorts,	and	this	creates	efficiencies	in	how	they	deliver	value	to	stakeholders.	Cohorts	create	efficiency	of	scale	(see	2.3.2.4),	allowing	the	accelerator	to	deliver	training	and	education,	as	well	as	to	organise	mentoring	efficiently,	reflecting	how	universities	teach	to	classes	rather	than	individuals.	Furthermore,	Bliemel	et.al	(2014)	observed	that	accelerators	employ	very	few	people	(see	2.3.2.4)	and	therefore	deliver	their	value	in	a	way	that	is	cost-effective	compared	to	other	approaches.			The	other	aspect	of	the	efficiency	created	by	an	accelerator	was	explained	by	Hathaway	(2016)	in	how	it	transfers	tacit	knowledge	from	mentors	to	startups	and	in	doing	so	condenses	years’	worth	of	their	knowledge	gained	through	experience	onto	a	focussed	group	of	people	in	a	single	place,	and	in	a	short	period	of	time	(see	2.3.2.4).		Cohen	(2013)	explained	how	the	accelerator	absorbs	this	“learning-coordination”	cost	
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by	arranging	for	the	group	of	mentors	to	engage	with	the	cohort.	This	is	more	efficient	than	each	startup	engaging	directly	with	each	mentor.		She	found	that	when	accelerators	facilitated	mentoring,	the	startups	had	more	mentoring	sessions	(see	2.3.3.2),	but	the	coordination	effort	undertaken	by	an	accelerator	also	benefits	the	mentors,	sponsors,	investors	and	corporates	because	they	gain	the	value	of	meeting	a	validated	cohort	of	startups.				3.2.8	Creating	value	through	a	startup	selection	process		A	key	aspect	of	the	efficiency	and	value	of	creating	a	cohort	lies	in	the	selection	process,	which	provides	an	efficiency	to	other	stakeholders	by	finding	and	convening	a	best	in	class	of	startups.	Accelerators	are	expected	to	carry	out	a	rigorous	selection	process	to	create	a	cohort	that	is	demonstrably	the	best	in	class	(see	2.3.3.6).	This	refers	back	to	the	explanation	of	how	an	accelerator	creates	value,	and	consequently	accrues	Social	Capital	through	the	facilitation	of	early	access	to	novel	and	non-redundant	information	(see	3.2.3).	The	search	and	selection	process	takes	time	and	resources,	the	end	product	of	which	is	therefore	of	greater	value	to	stakeholders	than	undertaking	this	effort	themselves.			The	importance	of	the	selection	process	is	not	only	explained	in	practical	terms	of	sourcing	investments	or	new	innovation,	it	actually	underpins	the	way	in	which	an	accelerator	builds	Social	Capital,	and	is	therefore	able	to	reward	and	sanction	actors	using	link	reciprocity.	In	return	for	co-operating,	mentors	gain	access	to	this	valuable	
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resource.	Corporates	and	investors	may	pay,	in	the	form	of	sponsorship,	to	access	the	cohort.	Being	a	gatekeeper	to	this	source	of	high-value,	novel	information,	positions	the	accelerator	to	be	able	to	ask	favours	of	the	ecosystem,	and	to	threaten	sanction	by	withdrawing	or	withholding	access	to	that	resource.				3.2.9	Using	Social	Capital	to	build	a	mentor	network				Having	demonstrated	how	the	accelerator	accumulates	Social	Capital,	and	can	use	it	to	reward	co-operation,	explains	the	resource	used	by	accelerators	to	recruit	and	incentivise	mentors.	As	identified	previously,	mentors	are	a	defining	aspect	of	accelerators,	and	create	value	for	the	startups,	and	efficiencies	in	how	tacit	knowledge	is	transferred	(see	2.3.3.1).				Paul	Graham	(2011)	stated	that	startups	need	a	very	diverse	group	of	mentors	to	address	their	knowledge	and	network	gaps	(see	2.3.3.1).	Frimodig	&	Torkkeli	(2013)	observed	that	mentors	generally	work	for	free	(see	2.3.3.1).	The	description	here	about	how	accelerators	create	value	suggests	that	mentors	are	paid	with	Social	Capital,	which	takes	the	shape	of	access	to	non-redundant	information,	new	ties,	and	social	validation.			This	is	supported	by	Bjørnskov	&	Sønderskov	(2012),	who	argued	that	Social	Capital	has	potential	value	because	it	gives	access	to	information	and	resources	in	a	social	network.	Adler	&	Kwon	(2002)	also	suggested	that	Social	Capital	could	be	developed	with	an	expectation	of	future	benefit	and	therefore	holds	value	that	can	be	expended	
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later.	Audretsch	et	al.	(2011)	recognised	that	Social	Capital	could	be	used	in	place	of	other	forms	of	capital.	In	this	way	it	becomes	an	asset	that	can	be	used,	in	this	instance,	to	pay	mentors.	(see	2.2.2.1).		Mentors	not	only	work	for	free,	but	typically	without	signing	NDAs	(Miller	&	Bound	2001;	see	2.3.1)	This	ties	the	conclusion	that	they	are	primarily	rewarded	with	Social	Capital	into	the	suggestion	that	they	are	policed	using	link	reciprocity.	If	they	are	incentivised	and	rewarded	with	information	and	ties,	and	through	social	validation,	then	the	threat	of	cutting	these	off,	and	of	damaging	their	reputation,	is	an	effective	threat	of	sanction	against	them	behaving	as	bad	actors,	and	replaces	the	need	for	NDAs.			Understanding	how	mentors	are	rewarded	and	policed	in	this	way	should	inform	the	design	of	accelerators	to	ensure	that	the	network	structure	and	program	design	most	effectively	supports	the	use	of	Social	Capital	to	reward	co-operation	by	mentors,	and	is	able	to	use	link	reciprocity	to	sanction	them.				Therefore,	if	an	accelerator	does	not	sit	within	a	weak	network	architecture,	and	is	not	rich	in	bridging	and	bonding	Social	Capital,	it	will	struggle	to	reward	mentors.	The	risk	will	be	that	mentors	either	lose	interest	and	do	not	offer	enough	value	to	the	cohort,	or	that	the	mentors	may	harm	the	startups	because	they	do	not	fear	any	sanction.	Trying	to	counter	this	by	paying	mentors	and	asking	them	to	sign	contracts	will	confuse	experienced	mentors,	who	are	used	to	engaging	in	a	way	familiar	with	accelerators.	It	will	change	the	dynamic	from	a	complex	social	interaction	that	is	mutually	beneficial,	
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and	embedded	within	social	relations,	to	a	less	complex	transactional	engagement	in	which	they	are	paid	consultants	under	sanction	from	contracts.			3.2.10	The	role	of	accelerators	as	ecosystem	builders		This	chapter	has	so	far	shown	how	accelerators	form	a	particular	social	network	structure,	and	are	rich	in	both	bridging	and	bonding	Social	Capital.	This	makes	them	powerful	connectors	within	an	ecosystem,	because	they	accumulate	value	that	encourages	actors	to	co-operate	with	them,	and	can	therefore	reward	co-operation.	By	facilitating	the	flow	of	non-redundant,	validated	information,	for	example	through	the	selection	process,	but	also	the	weak	tie	network	they	build	around	them,	they	are	valuable	to	multiple	different	stakeholders,	and	consequently	can	catalyse	connectivity	within	an	ecosystem.			This	leads	to	the	suggestion	that	accelerators	both	need	ecosystems	and	can	build	them.	They	need	them	in	order	to	source	resources	such	as	startups,	mentors,	investors,	and	partners.	Also,	in	order	to	be	useful	to	the	startups,	these	networks	need	to	be	large	and	varied	(see	2.3.3.1).	The	wider	ecosystem	also	represents	the	weak	network	architecture	within	which	they	are	able	to	exercise	link	reciprocity	in	order	to	police	their	norms.			Accelerators	can	build	ecosystems	because	they	become	repositories	of	Social	Capital,	making	them	attractive	to	different	stakeholders	to	engage	with	them.	The	interplay	
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between	startups,	mentors,	corporates,	and	investors	is	intrinsically	cross-sectoral,	positioning	the	accelerator	as	a	bridge	between	actors	from	different	areas	and	of	different	status	in	the	ecosystem.					3.2.11	EyeFocus	building	an	ecosystem	in	eye-care			The	role	accelerators	can	play	in	convening	ecosystems	informed	how	EyeFocus	sought	to	build	an	‘eye-care	innovation’	ecosystem.	In	doing	so	it	set	about	connecting	a	wide	array	of	stakeholders	involved	in	eye-care	innovation.	To	describe	this	activity	this	thesis	develops	the	accelerator	typology	introduced	by	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	of	an	“ecosystem	builder,”	(see	2.3.3.4)	which	was	defined	as	an	accelerator	building	ecosystems	of	innovators	around	Corporates.	This	definition	is	considered	alongside	that	of	Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	who	used	“welfare	stimulator”	(see	2.3.3.5)	to	describe	an	accelerator	with	public	funding	focussed	on	supporting	the	development	of	entrepreneurship	and	innovation	networks.			Practically	speaking,	both	are	building	ecosystems	of	innovators,	one	at	a	local	or	regional	level,	the	other	around	a	corporate	or	sector.	EyeFocus	Accelerator	is	considered	by	this	author,	as	an	ecosystem	builder	because	it	built	what	is	here	described	as	the	‘eyecare	innovation	ecosystem.’	This	was	built	around	several	corporates,	reflecting	the	definition	by	Pauwels	et.al	(2015),	but	also	for	the	wider	good	of	the	sector,	in	a	way	that	reflects	the	welfare	stimulator	model	of	Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley.		
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EyeFocus	also	partially	reflected	Lehmann’s	(2013)	definition	of	a	‘corporate	accelerator’	(see	2.3.3.5)	in	that	it	was	funded	by	and	closely	associated	with	a	corporate.	However,	the	example	given	by	Lehmann	was	of	accelerators	being	established	by	and	for	corporates,	whereas	EyeFocus	was	an	independent	business	that	approached	the	corporates	after	being	established.		Describing	EyeFocus	as	an	ecosystem	builder	is	further	supported	by	Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	who	argued	that	an	ecosystem	builder	accelerator	can	have	a	role	in	a	sector	or	region	of	convening	stakeholders	who	might	otherwise	not	meet.	Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	also	argued	that	an	accelerator	can	act	as	a	network	aggregator	across	an	ecosystem,	especially	as	a	result	of	the	open	events	they	run,	such	as	demo	day	s,	networking,	and	mentoring	meetings	(see	2.3.3.5).		EyeFocus	connected	stakeholders	who	might	otherwise	not	meet,	and	created	value	for	the	wider	ecosystem,	as	well	as	building	an	ecosystem	around	a	corporate.	It	is	therefore	proposed	here	to	call	it	an	ecosystem	builder,	with	that	definition	being	a	compilation	of	those	outlined	above,	and	a	development	of	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015).		Being	an	ecosystem	builder	influences	the	aims	and	outcomes	of	the	accelerator,	as	they	therefore	extend	beyond	those	of	a	deal-flow	maker,	and	incorporate	a	broader	set	of	criteria,	as	will	be	examined	further	below.			Consequently,	this	thesis	understands	that	the	concept	of	an	‘ecosystem’	applies	to	the	wider	context	in	which	accelerators	exist.	It	is	something	that	the	accelerator	can	
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contribute	towards	building,	and	within	which	the	accelerator	can	act	as	a	central	focus	and	connector.	Furthermore,	for	more	advanced	accelerators,	and	especially	deal-flow	accelerators,	an	ecosystem	is	required	from	which	to	source	mentors	and	investors,	so	the	two	are	intrinsically	interdependent.			Whilst	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	referred	to	an	accelerator	building	an	ecosystem	around	a	corporate	when	they	coined	the	phrase	“ecosystem	builder,”	for	the	purpose	of	this	research,	and	as	will	be	demonstrated	from	it,	the	concept	is	here	taken	to	mean	an	accelerator	that	consciously	sets	out	to	build	an	ecosystem	in	a	sector	which	is	disjointed	and	poorly	connected.			The	accelerator	consequently	acts	as	convenor,	bridging	between	stakeholders	in	the	ecosystem	that	might	otherwise	struggle	to	communicate	and	cooperate,	such	as	startups	and	corporations,	Non	Governmental	Organisations	(NGOs),	and	universities.	Therefore,	the	accelerator	aims	to	leave	the	ecosystem	better	connected	and	more	efficient	as	a	result	of	its	activities,	spreading	benefit	well	beyond	the	traditional	key	stakeholders	of	startup,	investor,	and	accelerator	founder.			3.2.12	Sharing	Social	Capital	as	an	ecosystem	builder		This	interpretation	of	the	role	an	accelerator	plays	in	the	wider	ecosystem	is	supported	in	Social	Network	Theory	by	the	suggestion	that	those	who	generate	Social	Capital	rarely	reap	all	of	its	benefits,	because	it	resides	in	the	ties	between	nodes,	not	within	a	
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single	node	(see	2.2.2.1).	By	building	and	supporting	ecosystems,	accelerators	generate	Social	Capital	that	benefits	the	whole	accelerator	network	and	wider	ecosystem,	not	just	the	cohort,	manager,	or	financial	supporter	of	the	program	(see	3.2.12).		This	leads	accelerators	to	have	an	inevitable	role	as	ecosystem	builders,	because	they	build	value	that	lies	in	the	ties	between	the	nodes	of	its	network,	and	which	uses	Social	Capital	to	reward	actors.	Therefore,	it	necessarily	has	to	build	an	ecosystem	within	which	its	own	Social	Capital	resides,	as	that	Social	Capital	cannot	just	reside	within	the	accelerator	but	is	a	function	of	the	accelerator’s	relationship	with	other	actors	in	the	ecosystem.			An	example	of	this	dynamic	is	the	observation	by	Fehder	&	Hochberg	(2014)	that	accelerators	encourage	the	emergence	of	local	angel	and	VC	communities,	and	stimulate	their	wider	investment	activity	(see	2.3.4.2)	beyond	just	the	accelerator’s	cohort.	Therefore,	a	consequence	of	an	accelerator	attracting	investors	to	the	cohort	is	that	those	investors	become	more	active	across	the	ecosystem	and	invest	in	other	startups	too,	which	becomes	an	inevitable	biproduct	of	the	value	the	accelerator	is	creating	for	its	own	benefit,	reflecting	the	sharing	of	Social	Capital	outlined	above	(see	3.2.12).			Consequently,	accelerator	design	should	assume	that	much	of	the	value	it	creates	will	not	directly	benefit	the	accelerator,	or	its	backers.	This	should	be	explained	to	the	other	stakeholders	in	terms	of	its	place	in	an	ecosystem,	and	the	function	of	Social	Capital	that	value	created	for	others	will	increase	the	ability	of	the	accelerator	to	generate	value	over	time	for	itself	and	the	stakeholders	it	benefits	directly.		
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3.2.13	Managing	redundancy	and	decay			As	was	examined	in	2.2.1.4,	non-redundancy	decays	over	time	as	information	flows	between	weak	ties,	and	as	a	result	they	become	stronger,	or	dissolve.	Decay	here	describes	the	tendency	of	relationships	to	weaken	over	time	(see	2.2.3.3).	Consequently,	two	things	are	predicted	to	happen	to	weak	ties.	Either	they	weaken	and	dissolve,	and	the	newly	introduced	people	do	not	pursue	their	relationship,	or	they	become	strong	ties	and	cease	to	be	a	bridge	over	which	non-redundant	information	can	flow.	Within	the	context	of	an	accelerator,	it	is	desirable	for	the	cohort	to	form	close	relationships	so	they	can	support	each	other,	during	the	program	and	in	the	future.	However,	it	is	not	desirable	for	the	mentor	network	to	become	a	strong	tie	network	in	relation	to	the	cohort	otherwise	the	non-redundancy	of	its	information	and	ties	will	decay	(see	2.2.2.3).			Therefore,	theory	suggests	that	as	an	accelerator	program	runs,	the	large	amount	of	non-redundancy	built	into	the	newly	introduced	weak	tie	network	of	mentors	and	cohort	will	decay	as	information	flows	over	it,	and	eventually	the	information	will	cease	to	be	non-redundant.			Addressing	the	desire	to	form	a	highly	embedded	and	close	cohort	(see	2.2.3.3),	Burt	(1999)	showed	how	a	high	level	of	embeddedness	in	which	actors	are	connected	indirectly	through	many	third	parties	can	slow	the	way	in	which	relationships	weaken,	or	decay,	naturally	over	time	(see	2.2.2.3).	He	suggested	that	building	this	attachment	with	the	actors	should	happen	as	early	as	possible,	and	be	embedded	in	other	types	of	
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social	relations	because	a	higher	level	of	embeddedness	will	lead	to	a	slower	rate	of	decay.		Referring	in	this	case	to	an	incubator,	(see	2.3.3.4)	Eveleens	et	al.	(2016)	also	explained	that	this	is	achieved	by	putting	participants	in	close	proximity	to	each	other.	The	shared	space	and	events	form	a	dense	internal	network	with	strong	closure	between	the	cohort	and	managers.	This	will	support	the	ability	of	the	incubator	or	accelerator	network	to	develop	and	communicate	norms,	and	to	‘get	things	done’	(see	3.2.3).		The	design	of	accelerator	programs	should	therefore	encourage	network	closure	within	the	cohort	and	management	team	early	in	the	program,	both	through	group	activities	like	training	and	informal	activities	such	as	meals	and	visits,	and	by	inviting	the	friends	and	family	of	the	cohort	to	extra-curricular	events,	as	proposed	by	Burt	(Burt	1999;	see	2.2.3.3).		However,	while	it	is	positive	to	encourage	the	cohort	to	become	strong	ties	quickly,	the	tendency	of	the	value	of	weak	ties	to	decline	over	time	as	non-redundancy	decays	poses	a	problem	to	an	accelerator	when	related	to	the	mentors.	If	an	accelerator	network	is	not	dynamic,	then	it	is	inevitable	that	over	time	all	the	actors	will	meet,	will	exchange	their	novel	information,	and	will	gradually	see	an	increase	in	the	redundancy	of	information	and	ties	being	exchanged	within	the	network,	or	the	decay	of	non-redundancy	(see	2.2.14).	Triadic	closure	will	increase	as	actors	meet	each	other	and	make	multiple	connections.	The	startups	in	the	cohort	will	gradually	cease	to	receive	
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information	or	ties	that	are	non-redundant	and	will	therefore	see	the	value	of	the	accelerator	reduce	accordingly.				Therefore,	it	is	not	only	important	to	build	a	weak	tie	network	around	an	accelerator,	but	to	plan	to	refresh	this	network	constantly	in	order	to	maintain	its	ability	to	deliver	non-redundant	information,	and	therefore	value.	Equally,	this	dynamic	aspect	of	the	network	supports	link	reciprocity,	which	would	also	diminish	if	ties	are	not	being	constantly	formed	or	dissolved.			3.2.14	The	impact	of	non-redundancy	decay	on	program	length		Apart	from	reflecting	how	an	accelerator	needs	to	design	and	manage	its	network,	the	question	of		non-redundancy	decay	also	influences	the	question	of	how	long	a	program	should	last,	and	supports	the	argument	that	it	needs	to	be	time-limited.			To	keep	a	network	constantly	refreshing	over	time	is	challenging	over	time,	because	new	weak	ties	will	gradually	evolve	into	strong	ties,	or	dissolve.	To	do	this	indefinitely	poses	a	challenge	most	likely	beyond	the	capacity	of	an	accelerator,	especially	one	with	limited	resources.	Furthermore,	any	ecosystem	will	eventually	reduce	in	its	ability	constantly	to	provide	new	actors	to	a	dynamic	network.		This	thesis	proposes	that	even	the	most	perfectly	structured	accelerator	will,	over	time,	see	non-redundancy	decay	and	embeddedness	increase	as	the	actors	in	the	accelerator	social	network	increase	the	
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number	of	mutual	ties	they	have	and	the	amount	of	information	flowing	through	the	network.				At	this	point	the	nature	of	the	network	changes,	and	it	ceases	to	be	what	this	thesis	proposes	is	the	social	network	specific	to	an	accelerator	(see	3.2.1).	Friedkin	(1980)	supports	this	assumption,	observing	that	bridges	between	networks	are	between	weak	ties	because	strong	ties	tend	to	form	triadic	closure,	whereby	people	who	are	closely	connected	are	likely	to	know	each	other’s	contacts	as	well	as	each	other	so	have	already	eliminated	structural	holes	within	their	more	embedded	network.			An	accelerator	network,	primarily	being	the	mentors	and	cohort,	will	develop	triadic	closure	over	time	as	the	weak	ties	share	their	ties	repeatedly	with	different	actors.	This	then	suggests	that	accelerators	need	to	ensure	there	is	a	high	degree	of	non-redundancy	in	the	network	they	build	from	the	outset.	If	a	group	of	mentors	are	all	recruited	from	the	same	source,	for	example	an	organisation	or	corporation,	the	speed	at	which	redundancy	will	develop	for	the	cohort	will	be	much	faster,	because	there	will	be	high	levels	of	triadic	closure	already	between	those	mentors	as	they	are	colleagues,	sharing	multiple	ties	and	knowledge	from	within	their	organisation.			Therefore,	accelerators	need	to	build	mentor	networks	that	not	only	represent	weak	ties	to	the	cohort,	but	also	to	each	other.	This	will	delay	the	decay	of	non-redundancy	within	the	whole	network,	as	the	likelihood	of	any	given	mentor	providing	the	same	information	or	new	ties	as	another	mentor	is	reduced.	This	also	creates	greater	Social	
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Capital	for	the	mentors,	as	meeting	each	other,	not	just	the	cohort,	will	generate	more	value	for	them.			This	understanding	of	decay	in	networks	also	informs	the	discussion	about	the	length	of	accelerator	programs.	The	literature	demonstrated	that	programs	are	typically	3	months	long,	though	can	last	up	to	12	months	(see	2.3.2.4).	There	are	many	practical	reasons	for	programs	being	12	weeks.	One	is	simply	that	accelerators	are	copying	Y	Combinator,	which	was	structured	to	run	over	a	university	summer	holiday	(Christiansen	2009).	Other	factors	include	cost,	and	the	ability	of	an	accelerator	management	team	and	cohort	to	sustain	a	bootcamp	style	of	programming,	with	aspects	like	mentor	overload	(see	2.3.3.2),	for	any	longer	than	12	weeks.			However,	Social	Network	Theory	adds	another	aspect	to	this	discussion,	suggesting	that	around	12	weeks	may	be	an	optimum	timeframe	before	which	the	decay	of	non-redundant	information	begins	to	set	in,	which	would	diminish	the	value	of	the	program	to	all	of	its	stakeholders.	It	is	possible,	therefore,	that	the	3	month	program	is	the	natural	length	of	time	for	an	accelerator	network	before	embeddedness	diminishes	its	ability	to	facilitate	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information	over	an	ever	decaying	pool	of	weak	ties.							
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3.2.15	Pitch	training	and	developing	role-sets		Connected	with	the	way	in	which	accelerators	sit	within	ecosystems	and	build	weak	tie	networks	with	low	redundancy	is	their	role	in	developing	role-sets,	which	is	a	product	of	the	startups	engaging	with	this	diverse	network.			The	literature	examined	the	work	of	Rose	Coser	(see	2.2.1.5)	to	explain	how	accelerators	add	value	to	their	cohort	by	developing	their	ability	to	engage	with	a	wide	variety	of	people,	and	why	accelerators	typically	focus	so	much	time	on	pitch	training.	Learning	to	pitch	is	the	skill	of	explaining	a	startup	to	an	individual	or	audience	quickly	and	succinctly.	Startups	typically	pitch	at	Demo	day	s,	usually	in	2-5	minutes	and	with	a	limited	number	of	slides.			Coser	referred	to	‘cognitive	flexibility’	(see	2.2.1.5)	to	describe	the	skill	of	seeing	the	world	from	the	perspective	of	many	different	people.	This	is	understood	here	to	describe	the	skill	developed	both	through	mentoring	and	pitch	training.	Coser	(1975)	wrote:	“When	others	are	understood	to	be	different	from	oneself,	a	thought	must	be	more	clearly	articulated	into	speech.	And	when	the	others	are	known	to	differ	among	themselves,	the	speech,	to	be	understood	by	all,	must	be	even	more	carefully	elaborated.”			This	describes	why	a	diverse	mentor	network	is	important,	why	pitch	training	is	a	core	activity,	and	why	accelerators	focus	on	developing	the	role	and	status	sets	of	their	
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cohort.	Startups	have	to	find	a	way	to	communicate	their	product	or	business	to	a	very	broad	audience,	ranging	from	investors	to	customers.	These	represent	different	role	and	status	sets,	and	the	term	‘cognitive	flexibility,’	describes	well	the	skill	developed	by	startups	during	the	multiple	engagements	with	mentors	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	accelerator.			This	insight	should	inform	the	design	of	accelerators	by	emphasising	that	they	have	a	role	in	developing	the	participant’s	role	sets,	and	in	understanding	the	value	of	cognitive	flexibility.	The	importance	of	complex	role-sets	identified	in	the	literature	suggests	this	should	be	a	core	focus	of	accelerator	programs,	rather	than	an	incidental	biproduct.	Understanding	the	theory	underlying	pitch	training	suggests	that	it	is	far	more	than	an	exercise	in	communication	and	presentation,	and	is	in	fact	a	core	part	of	their	intellectual	and	social	development	as	a	result	of	the	accelerator	program.					3.2.16	The	pros	and	cons	of	investing	in	the	cohort		The	discussion	in	the	literature	review	about	how	accelerators	are	evaluated	focussed	heavily	on	investment	returns	and	outcomes	(see	2.3.4.2).	Christiansen	(2009)	provided	calculations	to	show	how	a	deal-flow	maker	can	generate	a	return	through	investment,	and	Bliemel	et	al.	(2014)	argued	that	the	only	measure	of	an	accelerator’s	success	should	be	investment	returns	(see	2.3.4.4).		
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Further	into	the	chronology	of	the	literature,	as	the	accelerator	concept	evolved,	and	developed	into	different	typologies	(see	2.3.3.5),	investment	became	increasingly	less	important	both	to	the	definition	and	the	activity	of	an	accelerator.	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015)	suggested	that	the	investment	model,	or	deal-flow	maker,	is	unlikely	to	work	outside	of	a	few	very	large	ecosystems	(see	2.3.4.2).		It	is	evident	that	as	accelerators	have	developed	into	programs	with	multiple	and	varying	aims	and	objectives,	investing	has	become	less	important	as	a	primary	factor	in	cohort	selection,	and	in	the	evaluation	of	accelerator	outcomes.	If	a	program	is	primarily	aiming	to	stimulate	innovation,	develop	an	ecosystem,	or	address	a	technical	problem	for	a	corporate,	then	investing	into	the	startups	may	result	in	accepting	the	wrong	startups	for	those	purposes,	or	rejecting	startups	that	might	suit	the	aims	of	the	accelerator.			This	thesis	will	argue	that	investment	creates	a	number	of	filters	in	the	selection	of	a	cohort	that	either	may	impose	artificial	limitations	on	which	startups	are	accepted,	or	may	preclude	other	outcomes	(see	7.2.5).		Furthermore,	as	Golomb	(2015)	proposed,	accelerators	based	primarily	around	investment	outcomes	may	struggle	financially	if	those	returns	are	not	successful	(see	2.3.4.2).	As	accelerator	funding	has	developed	to	incorporate	sponsorship,	grants,	and	other	sources,	investing	has	become	less	important.			
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However,	it	remains	the	case	that	for	a	residential	program	of	several	months,	the	startups	may	need	funding	to	pay	for	their	costs,	so	some	form	of	funding	would	be	required	and	must	be	considered	if	investment	is	not	part	of	a	program.				3.2.17	Definition	of	an	accelerator	as	a	social	network			The	literature	has	described	the	best	network	structure	to	support	innovation	(see	3.2.1)	and	in	doing	so	begins	to	describe	an	accelerator	in	terms	from	Social	Network	Theory.	It	suggests	that	the	most	creative	and	productive	network	structure	is	one	that	has	strong	ties	with	a	high	level	of	closure	at	the	core,	surrounded	by	a	large	number	of	weak	bridging	ties,	which	creates	an	efficient	and	powerful	ability	to	find	and	qualify	information,	and	the	internal	trust	and	effectiveness	to	translate	that	into	outcomes	(Adler	&	Kwon	2002,	Rost	2010;	see	3.2.1).	Rost	(2010)	further	explained	this	by	concluding	that	people	with	strong	ties	who	are	embedded	in	weak	network	architecture	are	most	likely	both	to	have	innovative	ideas	and	be	able	to	realise	them.	Social	Capital	and	weak	tie	networks	can	expose	nascent	founders	to	new	perspectives	and	contexts	for	their	ideas,	helping	develop	a	solution	to	fit	a	more	complete	market	view	(Davidsson	&	Benson	2003;	see	2.2.1.4).	This	also	reflects	Coleman’s	(1988)	three	forms	of	Social	Capital:	“Obligations	and	expectations	depend	on	trustworthiness	within	the	social	network;	the	ability	of	the	social	network	to	facilitate	information-flow;	and	the	presence	of	both	norms	and	sanctions	for	breaching	those	norms.”	(see	2.2.2.2)		
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The	accelerator	network	can	be	policed	using	link	reciprocity	by	virtue	of	being	a	dynamic	network	with	high	degrees	of	density	across	a	large	weak	network	architecture,	and	being	rich	in	social	capital	(see	3.2.6).		In	this	way,	it	can	communicate	reputation	both	as	a	reward	or	sanction,	and	because	it	bridges	structural	holes	and	facilitates	the	flow	of	novel	information,	it	rewards	actors	with	early	access	to	novel	information,	social	credentials,	and	new	ties.		The	skill	used	to	operate	in	this	network	involves	having	complex	role	and	status	sets.	The	selection	process	to	create	a	best	in	class	cohort	produces	the	internal	value	that	enables	link	reciprocity.	The	network	needs	to	start	out	very	rich	in	weak	ties	and	non-redundancy	because	these	will	inevitably	decay	as	the	accelerator	connects	these	ties	over	time	(see	3.2.14).			
	
3.3	SUMMARY		This	chapter	examined	how	accelerators	create	value	by	bridging	structural	holes	in	social	networks.	They	accumulate	Social	Capital	by	building	a	social	network	rich	in	bridging	and	bonding	Social	Capital,	which	allows	them	to	become	a	resource	for	valuable	information,	and	to	be	trusted	to	reward	people	who	co-operate	with	them.			They	reward	people	with	non-redundant	information,	novel	ties,	and	social	validation.	Being	highly	connected	within	their	network,	and	the	wider	ecosystem,	enables	the	accelerator	both	to	reward	and	sanction	people	in	this	way,	but	also	leaves	people	
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confident	they	will	be	so	rewarded	or	sanctioned	because	both	parties	are	able	to	spread	reputation	effectively.			Creating	a	dense	network	core,	consisting	of	the	cohort	and	managers,	within	a	weak	network	architecture,	being	the	wider	ecosystem,	and	being	a	dynamic	network	that	brings	in	and	pushes	out	people	rapidly,	allows	it	to	use	link	reciprocity	to	police	its	norms.	Those	norms	are	developed	and	communicated	by	the	dense	core.				This	suggests	that	the	selection	process,	which	creates	a	validated	group	of	startups	is	actually	a	source	of	the	Social	Capital	the	accelerator	then	uses	to	support	and	protect	those	startups.		Social	Capital	was	recognised	as	a	replacement	for	economic	capital	as	a	reward,	and	can	be	understood	to	have	a	future	benefit	to	the	holder	-	it	can	be	accrued	and	deployed	to	achieve	outcomes.	This	suggests	accelerators	accrue	Social	Capital	and	then	expend	it	later	on	behalf	of	their	startups.	In	this	way	they	confer	their	status	and	Social	Capital	on	the	startups,	enabling	them	to	ask	high-status	actors	for	advice	and	support.			The	value	in	an	accelerator	that	results	from	its	social	network	therefore	relies	on	weak	ties	and	non-redundancy,	but	these	were	shown	to	decay	over	time	as	triadic	closure	and	embeddedness	increase	once	people	meet	frequently	and	share	their	knowledge	and	contacts.	This	decay	function	risks	undermining	the	value	an	accelerator	can	offer,	and	also	therefore	its	ability	to	police	norms	with	link	reciprocity.		
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It	was	suggested	that	this	may	explain	why	programs	are	generally	3	months	long,	though	such	a	proposition	would	require	extensive	further	research.		However,	it	is	clear	that	the	decay	function	means	any	accelerator	network	will	gradually	tend	towards	strong	ties	and	redundancy,	at	which	point	it	would	naturally	cease	to	be	an	accelerator	in	nature.			Consequently,	accelerators	should	be	designed	with	this	decay	function	in	mind,	ensuring	that	the	mentor	network	and	cohort	start	off	with	a	high	level	of	weak	ties,	in	order	to	postpone	the	inevitable	transition	into	strong	ties	and	redundancy.			Social	Network	Theory,	in	particular	role-sets	and	cognitive	flexibility	were	also	shown	to	play	a	fundamental	part	in	accelerators,	represented	by	the	skill	the	startups	gain	by	engaging	with	a	diverse	mentor	group,	and	in	developing	their	pitches.			Finally,	investment	was	examined,	concluding	that	not	all	accelerators	should	invest	in	startups	in	the	way	a	deal-flow	maker	situated	in	an	advanced	ecosystem	might	do.	Investing	forces	the	selection	process	to	focus	primarily	on	whether	the	startups	can	achieve	investment	returns,	which	may	obscure	other	outcomes	that	would	be	more	relevant	to	other	types	of	accelerator.			 		
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				CHAPTER	4.	CASE	STUDY	-	APPLYING	THESE	FINDINGS	TO	ACCELERATOR	DESIGN			
The	findings	from	the	previous	chapter	led	to	theory	about	how	accelerators	work	as	
social	networks.	This	chapter	takes	this	theory	and	creates	practical	suggestions	about	
how	this	theory	should	inform	the	design	of	accelerators,	and	applies	the	theory	to	
EyeFocus	Accelerator,	which	provides	a	case	study	for	this	thesis.		
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4.1	INTRODUCTION		This	chapter	translates	the	insights	from	the	previous	chapter	into	theory	that	informs	the	design	of	accelerators,	and	in	particular	to	EyeFocus	Accelerator.	Where	findings	from	the	literature	have	led	to	observations	about	the	behaviour	of	accelerators,	and	how	they	can	be	influenced	by	these	findings	this	is	now	turned	into	practical	recommendations	for	accelerator	design.	Then	in	the	following	chapter,	having	used	some	of	these	findings	to	inform	the	design	of	EyeFocus,	this	case	study	will	inform	insights	into	how	they	translated	from	theory	into	practice.					4.2	ACCELERATORS	AS	SOCIAL	NETWORKS		This	thesis	argues	that	an	accelerator	is	a	social	network,	and	that	the	benefits	of	accelerators,	such	as	business	support	or	identifying	innovation,	are	an	outcome	of	their	being	a	social	network,	rather	than	the	social	network	element	being	an	outcome	of	the	business	support	program.			Once	an	accelerator	is	understood	to	be	primarily	a	social	network	then	the	role	of	Social	Capital,	weak	ties,	and	link	reciprocity	can	be	recognised	as	fundamental	rather	than	incidental,	as	outlined	in	the	Social	Network	Theory	definition	of	an	accelerator	reached	in	3.2.17.			
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Consequently,	in	designing	an	accelerator,	these	foundations	are	the	best	place	to	start.	The	different	sets	of	actors	should	be	defined	and	understood	from	the	outset;	who	they	are,	and	where	they	come	from	in	the	ecosystem.	How	do	they	interact	with	each	other?	What	do	they	each	have	to	offer,	and	want	in	return?	How	will	they	be	found,	and	incentivised	to	join	the	program?				4.2.1	Weak	and	strong	ties;	cohort	and	mentors		The	importance	of	bridging	and	bonding	Social	Capital,	and	weak	and	strong	ties	was	discussed	in	3.2.2,	concluding	that	the	cohort	and	management	team	form	the	strong	internal	ties,	rich	in	bonding	Social	Capital,	whilst	the	mentors	are	the	primary	source	of	weak	ties	and	bridging	Social	Capital.			The	theory	thereby	emphasises	the	importance	of	the	mentors	for	an	accelerator.	They	are	not	just	performing	a	function	of	knowledge	transfer,	but	are	the	primary	means	to	structure	the	weak	network	architecture	and	bridging	ties.	This	means	they	play	a	role	in	creating	the	type	of	network	that	can	be	policed	using	link	reciprocity,	and	alongside	the	cohort	create	the	value	embedded	in	the	network	in	the	form	of	non-redundant	information	and	bridging	Social	Capital.	This	observation	provides	a	greater	insight	into	the	way	a	mentor	network	should	be	structured,	and	recruited.	The	examination	of	Social	Capital	as	a	resource	(see	3.2.3)	also	explains	how	mentors	should	be	rewarded	for	their	involvement,	and	explained	why	they	are	rarely	paid,	or	sign	NDAs	(see	3.2.9	and	2.3.3.1).	
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This	will	inform	how	an	accelerator	should	structure	the	mentor	network	(see	below,	4.3),	and	how	mentors	should	be	rewarded	(see	below	4.5.2).	It	also	points	to	the	importance	of	developing	strong	closure	and	bonding	Social	Capital	within	the	Cohort	(see	3.2.12),	and	with	the	accelerator	management	team	early	in	the	program,	as	discussed	in	more	depth	below	in	4.4.				4.2.2	Weak	network	architecture	and	bridging	ties;	diversity	of	mentors		The	theory	points	to	the	need	for	mentor	group	to	be	diverse.	If	the	mentors	are	all	strong	ties,	they	will	bring	novel	information	to	the	startups	initially,	but	the	non-redundancy	will	decay	very	quickly	(see	3.2.13)	due	to	the	triadic	closure	within	the	mentor	group,	in	that	they	all	know	each	other	and	share	common	knowledge.	This	will	soon	become	apparent	to	the	startups	who	would	begin	to	receive	the	same	knowledge	and	contacts	repeatedly	from	the	mentors.			The	weak	network	architecture	created	by	a	diverse	group	of	mentors	gives	the	accelerator	a	higher	chance	of	sourcing	novel,	non-redundant	information	and	ties.	The	theory	of	Six	Degrees	(see	2.2.1.2)	points	to	the	way	a	large,	diverse	group	of	mentors	will	bring	other	potential	contacts	much	closer	to	the	startups	than	a	small,	dense	network	of	mentors	with	fewer	bridging	ties.			
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The	impact	of	this	understanding	on	accelerator	design,	and	on	the	formation	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator	is	discussed	further	below	in	4.3.3,	where	this	theory	explains	why	the	mentor	network	needs	to	be	sourced	through	weak	and	bridging	ties,	not	just	from	the	immediate	network	of	the	accelerator	founders	and	sponsors.				4.2.3	Facilitating	link	reciprocity			This	diversity	also	supports	link	reciprocity,	and	therefore	the	ability	of	the	accelerator	to	police	norms	and	enforce	rules.	Incorporating	actors	from	across	an	ecosystem	facilitates	the	communication	of	reputation	widely,	and	a	diverse	and	dynamic	network,	and	in	which	value	is	embedded	through	bridging	Social	Capital,	all	support	link	reciprocity.	Therefore,	it	is	important	that	the	mentor	network,	being	the	main	source	of	weak	ties,	is	diverse	not	just	to	satisfy	the	need	of	the	startups	for	a	wide	range	of	expertise	(see	2.3.3.1),	but	also	to	support	the	way	in	which	the	accelerator	polices	its	norms	(see	3.2.6).		This	has	a	clear	impact	on	the	design	of	an	accelerator,	supporting	the	wider	argument	that	the	mentor	network	needs	to	be	diverse,	but	also	that	the	whole	network	around	the	accelerator	needs	diversity	and	weak	ties.	This	is	particularly	relevant	when	an	accelerator	is	supported	by	one	or	more	sponsors,	as	discussed	further	below	in	4.3.3.		Without	the	specific	network	structure	that	supports	link	reciprocity,	the	accelerator	will	be	less	able	to	enforce	norms,	and	therefore	to	protect	its	startups	(see	3.2.6).		
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4.2.4	Value	creation	through	non-redundant	information	in	the	cohort	and	mentors		The	previous	chapter	referred	to	the	way	in	which	an	accelerator	creates	value	by	facilitating	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information	(see	3.2.5).	Corresponding	with	this,	a	primary	source	of	novel	information	in	an	accelerator	consists	of	the	cohort	of	startups.	As	was	explored	in	2.2.1.4,	having	early	access	to	novel	information	is	a	source	of	value	in	a	social	network,	therefore	mentors	gain	value	by	being	the	first	to	meet	the	startups,	and	by	exploring	their	companies	in	depth	through	mentoring	prior	to	them	pitching	to	investors	or	clients.	This	privileged	access	to	the	startups	is	a	direct	means	by	which	the	mentors	are	rewarded	for	co-operating	with	the	accelerator,	and	represents	Social	Capital	that	can	be	translated	into	economic	capital	(business	opportunities)	and	human	capital	(becoming	better	informed,	and	therefore	educated).			As	well	as	the	flow	of	information	benefitting	and	rewarding	the	mentors,	the	flow	of	tacit	knowledge	from	the	mentors	to	the	startups	is	the	primary	value	proposition	to	the	cohort	from	the	accelerator	(see	2.3.2.4,	and	3.2.7),	so	this	needs	to	be	considered	when	structuring	a	mentor	group	to	ensure	they	have	a	wide	range	of	tacit	knowledge	as	a	resource	for	the	accelerator	to	offer	the	cohort.		Combined,	these	sources	of	knowledge	and	ties	also	form	the	main	value	for	the	investors,	corporates	or	other	supporters	of	the	accelerator.	The	cohort	and	the	mentors	are	repositories	of	novel	information	and	ties,	and	the	way	the	mentors	increase	the	value	of	the	cohort	also	creates	value	for	the	investors	and	accelerator	manager,	and	backer	of	the	accelerator.		
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Therefore,	in	designing	an	accelerator,	it	should	be	understood	that	the	main	form	of	value	it	creates	is	early	access	to	novel,	non-redundant	information.	This	value	moves	in	all	directions,	with	the	value	residing	in	all	the	different	stakeholder	groups	in	relation	to	each	other,	not	just	in	the	cohort.	Designing	an	accelerator	needs	to	test	where	the	value	resides	and	ensure	each	stakeholder	group	is	both	providing	and	receiving	this	value	(see	3.2.5,	and	3.2.8).			The	theory	therefore	informs	the	design	of	accelerators	by	demonstrating	where	the	value	resides,	and	how	it	is	used	to	reward	each	stakeholder	group,	as	discussed	further	below	in	4.5.3.				
4.3	MENTORING		In	particular,	this	understanding	of	the	way	in	which	value	resides	in	the	different	stakeholder	groups	should	inform	how	mentors	are	recruited	and	managed.	The	theory	has	indicated	that	mentors	are	rewarded	with	early	access	to	novel	information,	but	also	that	they	are	a	repository	of	tacit	knowledge	and	ties,	which	are	also	forms	of	value	for	the	cohort	and	to	the	other	mentors	and	stakeholders.			The	mentor	group	therefore	needs	to	be	formed	and	managed	in	such	a	way	that	it	reflects	this	theory.					
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4.3.1	Mentor	recruitment	for	EyeFocus	Accelerator		
Translating	this	theory	into	practice,	understanding	the	best	structure	of	a	mentor	group	informed	how	EyeFocus	set	about	recruiting	mentors.	It	was	clear	that	the	program	would	require	a	mentor	group	that	is	large,	diverse,	and	balanced	between	general	tech	and	eye-care,	and	was	global.			As	identified	by	Christiansen	(2009),	good	mentors	attract	good	startups,	and	good	startups	attract	good	mentors	(see	2.3.3.2).	For	a	new	accelerator	this	creates	a	problem,	as	it	has	neither.	Christiansen	(2009)	observed	that	the	network	around	an	accelerator	starts	out	reflecting	the	‘quality	and	quantity’	of	the	personal	network	of	the	accelerator	founder,	but	over	time	grows	to	reflect	the	quality	of	the	startups	that	have	come	out	of	the	program	(see	2.3.3.4).	With	no	prior	cohort	to	attract	the	mentors,	the	accelerator	founders	inevitably	start	with	their	own	strong	ties,	building	out	the	mentor	network	in	layers,	with	each	layer	acting	as	validation	to	the	next	less	socially	close	layer.	In	this	respect,	they	are	using	their	Social	Capital	to	begin	the	process,	which	in	turn	builds	Social	Capital	into	the	program	so	the	search	can	extend	beyond	their	own	immediate	networks	(See	3.2.9).		The	strategy	adopted	by	EyeFocus	therefore	involved	approaching	very	close	contacts,	who	were	strong	ties,	to	form	the	initial	core	of	mentors.	The	sponsors	would	also	be	asked	to	contribute	mentors,	and	gradually	the	program	would	build	a	reasonable	number	of	mentors.	With	this	validation,	in	the	form	of	the	first	mentors	associated	with	the	program,	it	would	become	possible	to	reach	out	further	to	weaker	ties,	and	over	
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bridging	ties,	and	ultimately	to	strangers	with	no	ties	to	the	network.		The	partners	and	mentors	were	also	asked	to	propose	other	mentors	from	their	networks,	who	were	also	weak	ties	or	strangers,	thus	using	the	weak	network	structure	evolving	around	the	accelerator.			This	approach	not	only	reflects	the	need	to	build	up	Social	Capital	in	order	to	attract	mentors,	but	also	consciously	builds	a	weak	network	architecture	around	the	accelerator	that	is	rich	in	bridging	capital	because	the	mentors	are	not	all	directly	known	to	the	founders,	or	to	the	other	mentors.			This	network	structure	of	a	dense,	strong	tie	core,	with	weak	ties,	and	bridging	ties	also	supports	the	use	of	link	reciprocity	to	police	norms,	as	it	can	communicate	reputation	effectively.				4.3.2	Mentor	Selection		The	literature	and	following	discussion	clearly	emphasises	that	mentor	selection	is	an	important	factor	for	an	accelerator	in	that	mentors	need	to	be	diverse,	co-operators,	and	people	who	will	understand	and	respect	the	norms	of	the	accelerator	(see	2.3.3.1).		This	informed	EyeFocus	from	the	outset.	As	the	method	to	recruit	mentors	began	with	strong	ties	and	worked	out	to	the	edges	of	the	accelerator’s	immediate	social	network,	it	was	easier	to	assume	that	the	early	mentors	would	fit	the	purpose	as	they	were	
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personally	known	to	the	managers.	However,	once	mentors	were	being	recruited	via	bridging	ties,	and	even	direct	approaches	from	strangers	to	the	accelerator,	more	care	needed	to	be	taken	to	ensure	mentors	would	fit	the	norms	and	culture	of	the	program.			When	approaching	mentors	from	the	startup	sector	it	was	assumed	most	of	them	had	mentored	before	and	would	understand	what	was	expected	of	them.	However,	because	EyeFocus	was	also	working	with	its	corporate	sponsors,	and	with	the	eye-care	sector,	selecting	mentors	had	to	take	into	account	that	a	number	of	them	might	not	know	what	they	were	being	asked	to	do,	and	may	not	be	suitable	for	this	very	specific	form	of	interaction.		EyeFocus	designed	mentoring	to	be	consistent	with	the	norms	and	practices	of	the	wider	startup	sector.	Therefore,	mentoring	was	anticipated	mainly	to	involve	short	20-30	minute	sessions,	and	would	expect	a	degree	of	trust	and	openness	between	startups	and	mentors.	It	was	assumed	that	this	may	be	quite	an	unfamiliar	format	to	corporate	or	medical	professionals	who	had	not	engaged	in	this	way	before.	It	was	anticipated	that	some	would	interpret	mentoring	as	involving	ongoing,	long	periods	of	engagement,	or	requiring	NDAs	to	be	in	place	prior	to	discussions.	As	such,	the	approach	to	mentoring	reflected	the	theory	discussed	above,	both	in	relation	to	the	norms	of	‘mentor	overload’	(Cohen	2013;	see	2.3.3.2),	and	relying	on	trust	over	contracts	(Miller	&	Bound	2011).	This	had	to	be	communicated	to	mentors,	and	also	informed	the	selection	of	mentors.				
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Selection	of	mentors	was	therefore	based	on	the	following	considerations:	1. Had	they	mentored	startups	before,	and	therefore	did	they	understand	what	mentoring	in	this	context	means?	2. They	were	excluded	if	they	asked	for	payment,	as	this	suggested	they	did	not	understand	the	norms	around	cooperation	and	creating	Social	Capital	that	benefits	the	wider	ecosystem.	3. They	needed	to	have	either	very	strong	networks,	or	some	relevant	knowledge	to	transfer	to	the	startups,	or	both.	But	if	they	had	neither	they	were	unlikely	to	offer	enough	value	to	justify	the	time	they	would	take	from	the	startups	for	a	mentoring	session.		4. They	needed	to	be	comfortable	with	the	fast	nature	of	mentoring,	generally	20-30	minute	initial	mentoring	sessions.	Those	who	felt	they	required	hours,	or	multiple	meetings,	may	be	excluded	because	this	was	not	in	keeping	with	the	style	of	an	accelerator	like	EyeFocus.		5. 		4.3.3	Retaining	diversity	in	a	niche	or	corporate	accelerator		Structuring	an	accelerator	in	a	very	niche	vertical,	like	eye-care,	and	with	large	corporate	sponsors	or	partners,	created	a	risk	of	building	a	network	of	mentors	that	consisted	only	of	people	from	the	eye-care	sector,	or	only	provided	by	the	sponsors,	which	would,	as	suggested	above	(see	3.2.13),	lead	to	more	rapid	decay	function	due	to	the	duplication	of	knowledge	and	triadic	closure	between	the	mentors.				
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If	this	happened,	then	early	in	the	program,	the	startups	would	find	themselves	receiving	similar	knowledge	and	advice,	and	similar	introductions	due	to	the	homogenous	nature	of	the	corporate’s	dense	internal	network,	and	the	nature	of	shared	knowledge	residing	within	the	corporate.		In	this	instance,	the	accelerator	would	fail	to	provide	the	full	breadth	of	access	to	education,	networks,	and	information	that	is	needed	by	startups,	and	is	expected	of	an	accelerator	competing	in	the	wider	marketplace	(see	2.3.3.1).	This	lack	of	diversity	would	also	undermine	the	ability	to	use	link	reciprocity	to	enforce	norms,	as	outlined	in	4.2.3.		Based	on	this	detailed	understanding	of	mentoring,	it	was	clear	that	EyeFocus	needed	to	have	a	large	group	of	mentors	which	was	divided	between	eye-care	industry	specialists	and	tech	sector	generalists,	and	consisted	of	mentors	from	the	sponsor	companies,	and	also	a	diverse	group	of	individuals	from	the	wider	ecosystem.	This	would	address	the	assumption	that	all	startups	require	some	generic	business	support,	regardless	of	their	sector	specialism,	but	that	a	focussed	accelerator	like	EyeFocus	also	needed	to	offer	unique	access	to	eye-care	specialists	as	well.			EyeFocus	was	therefore	designed	so	that	a	balance	was	constantly	sought	between	encouraging	sponsors	to	provide	mentors,	and	having	too	much	representation	from	either	one	company	or	one	sector.	It	was	decided	to	limit	the	number	of	mentors	from	each	sponsor	to	the	main	experts,	or	key	executives,	agreeing	that	any	other	individuals	needed	by	the	startups	would	be	approached	on	a	case	by	case	basis	during	the	
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program.	This	ensured	that	the	cohort	had	access	to	a	very	broad	range	of	experts	from	the	sponsor	companies,	but	that	the	list	of	mentors	promoted	by	EyeFocus	was	not	dominated	by	a	sector	or	company,	and	expressed	the	diverse	mentor	network	EyeFocus	had	built.			As	the	sponsors	provided	senior	executives,	EyeFocus	also	sought	out	startup	founders,	and	others	who	were	at	very	different	stages	of	their	careers	to	balance	the	mentor	group.	There	is	a	different	set	of	benefits	in	a	mentor	at	the	peak	of	their	career	compared	to	one	maybe	1-2	years	ahead	of	the	startup.	Both	have	valuable	lessons	and	contacts,	so	it	was	recognised	as	important	that	the	mentor	network	did	not	only	consist	of	high	status	actors.	This	also	helps	develop	a	wider	range	of	role	and	status	sets	within	the	engagements	arranged	by	the	accelerator	(see	2.2.15).			4.3.4	Managing	mentors		In	keeping	with	the	findings	of	the	literature	review,	it	was	evident	that	mentoring	would	involve	a	large	number	of	rapid	interactions	between	mentors	and	startups,	reflecting	the	principle	of	mentor	overload	(Cohen	2013)	so	one	member	of	the	EyeFocus	team	was	allocated	the	task	of	managing	mentoring	in	the	lead	up	to	and	for	the	duration	of	the	accelerator.			Prior	to	the	program	launch,	this	work	mainly	involved	approaching	new	mentors,	and	upon	agreeing	to	be	involved,	chasing	them	for	a	biography	and	photo	to	put	on	the	
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website.	This	was	important	because	the	mentor	biographies	demonstrated	visually	the	network	being	assembled	by	EyeFocus,	and	validated	the	program	through	association	with	the	mentors.	Having	also	understood	that	mentors	are	rewarded	with	Social	Capital	(see	4.5.2),	presenting	them	on	the	EyeFocus	website	was	part	of	this,	giving	them	credentials	by	association	with	EyeFocus,	the	other	mentors,	and	the	sponsors.			During	the	program,	a	system	was	developed	to	manage	who	mentored	which	startups.	It	was	important	to	ensure	that	all	the	mentors	were	asked	to	do	at	least	one	mentoring	interaction,	that	none	were	asked	for	too	much	time,	and	that	all	the	startups	received	the	appropriate	mentoring.			As	well	as	managing	the	mentoring	sessions,	the	EyeFocus	team	member	was	tasked	with	managing	mentor	relations.	This	involved	processing	feedback	from	mentors,	following	up	offers	to	make	introductions,	and	managing	visits	to	EyeFocus	by	mentors,	in	some	cases	planning	their	travel,	accommodation,	and	entertainment	as	guests	of	the	program.	It	was	decided	that	to	protect	the	mentors,	the	cohorts	were	asked	not	to	approach	them	directly	without	prior	agreement,	and	generally	to	manage	interactions	either	via	EyeFocus,	or	with	them	involved.	This	avoided	mentors	being	contacted	by	multiple	startups	at	once,	or	being	asked	to	contribute	more	time	than	they	were	comfortable	with,	reflecting	the	way	Cohen	(2013)	observed	how	an	accelerator	reduces	the	“learning	coordination”	for	the	cohort	(see	3.2.7),	but	extending	that	conclusion	to	creating	the	same	benefit	for	the	mentors.			
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Mentoring	was	scheduled	in	detail	for	the	first	3-4	weeks	of	the	program.	The	remainder	of	the	program	was	left	unplanned	in	order	to	allow	mentoring	to	be	organised	as	it	was	needed	by	the	startups,	and	as	mentors	were	available.				4.3.5	Mentor	methodology		The	concept	of	“mentor	overload”	(Cohen	2013)	suggested	that	the	main	approach	to	mentoring	would	involve	‘speed	mentoring’	sessions,	whereby	mentors	or	startups	would	sit	at	tables,	and	every	20-30	minutes	would	be	rotated	for	the	next	session.			However,	as	EyeFocus	was	a	program	built	around	a	topic	rather	than	a	geography,	the	mentors	were	not	necessarily	in	Berlin.	Therefore,	further	work	was	required	to	coordinate	how	to	engage	with	mentors	abroad,	who	either	flew	in	for	a	short	period,	joined	the	group	on	visits	elsewhere,	or	mentored	online	using	a	variety	of	tools,	primarily	Skype	and	Google	Hangout.		It	was	understood	that	mentoring	is	not	business	consultancy	and	should	be	focussed	more	on	providing	a	wide	range	of	knowledge	and	contacts	to	the	startups	over	a	short	period	of	time.	This	involved	avoiding	a	program	in	which	the	startups	meet	a	small	number	of	mentors	regularly	over	a	longer	period,	in	favour	of	the	startups	meeting	as	many	mentors	as	possible	briefly,	to	make	a	first	contact	which	could	follow	up	after	the	program.				
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This	ensures	the	startups	rapidly	accumulate	a	new	social	network,	and	receive	intensive	and	conflicting	feedback,	as	outlined	by	Cohen	(2013)	during	the	short	program,	which	they	can	build	on	after	the	program	in	more	depth.				4.3.6	Mentor	time	commitment			In	order	to	build	a	suitably	diverse	mentor	network	for	EyeFocus	it	was	decided	that	the	basic	ask	of	mentors	would	be	kept	as	minimal	as	possible	in	order	to	avoid	them	saying	no	when	invited	to	join	the	program.	In	particular,	it	was	found	that	people	who	had	not	previously	mentored	at	accelerators	were	concerned	about	the	time	commitment.			To	address	this,	mentors	were	asked	to	commit	a	minimum	of	one	hour	at	some	point	in	the	program,	whilst	also	stressing	that	there	was	no	upper	limit	to	the	time	they	could	offer.	It	was	hoped	that	this	would	make	it	possible	to	recruit	some	very	senior	people	as	mentors.		It	would	then	fall	to	the	managers	and	startups	to	decide	how	best	to	use	that	hour.			This	approach	reflected	an	understanding	that	mentors	are	valuable	as	bridging	ties	as	well	as	for	their	tacit	knowledge.	Whilst	some	might	spend	time	with	a	startup	sharing	tacit	knowledge,	another	might	simply	make	a	valuable	introduction.	Therefore,	the	amount	of	time	committed	was	less	important	than	having	well	connected	people	agree	to	join	the	core	of	the	program	as	mentors.			
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4.3.7	Training	for	mentoring		In	order	to	manage	expectations,	and	express	norms	to	those	not	already	familiar	with	accelerator	culture,	guides	for	mentors	and	startups	were	produced	and	circulated.	Training	for	startups	was	also	scheduled	at	the	beginning	of	the	program	to	educate	them	on	how	to	conduct	themselves	in	mentoring	sessions.			These	guides	were	intended	to	ensure	some	degree	of	consistency	in	how	mentoring	was	conducted,	and	to	protect	the	reputation	of	the	accelerator.	The	guides	communicated	the	norms	of	the	program,	especially	relating	to	mentoring	(see	8.4).			
	
	
	
4.4	THE	ROLE	OF	COHORTS		A	defining	feature	of	an	accelerator	is	the	formation	of	a	cohort	of	startups	(see	2.4.1),	rather	than	accepting	participants	on	an	ad	hoc	basis	(Fehder	&	Hochberg	2014).	The	cohort	creates	an	efficiency	of	scale,	in	which	information	and	knowledge	need	only	be	shared	once	with	the	whole	group,	rather	than	multiple	times	with	each	startup.	The	cohort	also	creates	a	peer-support	network	for	the	startups	(Bliemel	et.al	2014).	Belonging	to	a	cohort	that	is	the	outcome	of	a	selection	process	confers	a	status	on	the	startups	in	an	accelerator	(see	4.5.1),	something	not	generally	the	case	with	tenants	in	an	incubator,	or	for	startups	on	their	own.			
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The	cohort	enables	two	sources	of	value	in	an	accelerator.	The	first	is	this	efficiency	in	being	able	to	deliver	education	and	mentoring	more	effectively	(see	3.2.7),	which	is	of	value	to	the	startups,	and	the	second	is	by	searching	and	filtering	applicants	to	create	a	best	in	class,	which	translates	in	Social	Network	Theory	terms	to	providing	early	access	to	novel	non-redundant	information	(see	3.2.8),	which	benefits	the	mentors,	sponsors,	investors,	and	other	stakeholders.		This	thesis	has	also	shown	that	a	cohort	is	inevitable	in	order	to	run	a	fixed	term	program	(see	2.3.3),	so	that	all	the	participants	join	and	leave	at	the	same	time	as	each	other.	Without	a	fixed	term	program,	it	would	be	hard	to	create	a	cohort,	and	without	a	cohort	it	would	be	hard	to	run	a	fixed	term	program,	so	the	two	are	intrinsically	linked,	and	together	form	a	defining	feature	of	accelerators,	being	a	cohort	of	startups	coming	together	for	a	fixed	term	program.			At	a	practical	level,	another	efficiency	created	by	a	cohort	joining	a	deal-flow	maker	program	is	the	ability	to	carry	out	due	diligence	and	invest	in	a	group	of	startups	with	roughly	the	same	documentation,	terms,	and	investment	closing	date.	Further	into	the	program,	it	is	also	efficient	to	present	a	cohort	of	pre-selected	investment	opportunities	to	investors,	or	a	portfolio	of	products	to	corporates	(Bliemel	et	al.	2014).						
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4.4.1	Peer	support		It	is	proposed	here	that	startups	in	a	cohort	reflect	the	evolutionary	behaviour	which	features	behavioural	imitation	and	cooperation	in	order	to	strengthen	the	survival	of	the	group	rather	than	just	of	the	individual.	In	this	way,	they	all	work	together	to	increase	the	chance	of	a	single	startup	surviving.		This	thesis	proposes	that	this	behaviour	is	reflected	in	an	accelerator	because	when	one	startup	succeeds,	the	reputation	of	the	cohort	increases,	which	attracts	beneficial	stakeholders,	like	investors,	to	the	accelerator	as	a	whole	(see	2.2.3.2).		This	approach	means	that	cohorts	gain	a	reputation	that	is	the	result	of	their	combined	successes,	so	the	cohort	creates	a	healthy	pressure	for	everyone	to	cooperate	and	assist	each	other	(Cohen	2013).			4.4.2	Practical	considerations	for	building	cohorts		This	theory	should	inform	the	formation	of	cohorts	in	a	number	of	ways.		Accelerators	should	plan	not	only	to	form	a	cohort,	but	also	to	organise	activities	that	encourage	embeddedness	and	the	development	of	Social	Capital	within	the	cohort.	This	should	result	in	a	program	that	consciously	brings	the	cohort	together	for	more	than	just	work	events,	and	understands	the	longer-term	value	in	the	friendships	and	social	interactions	which	run	alongside	the	core	programming,	and	which	can	delay	decay	function.	Formation	of	friendships	within	a	cohort	should	not	be	seen	as	an	incidental	outcome	of	
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the	accelerator,	but	a	core	aim,	and	the	theory	relating	back	to	Burt	(2009)	gives	clear	guidance	on	how	to	achieve	that	(see	3.2.13).			4.4.3	Building	the	EyeFocus	cohort		Having	understood	the	importance	of	the	cohort,	it	is	clear	that	a	focus	for	any	accelerator	should	be	to	attract	a	strong	cohort.	This	requires	a	branding	and	marketing	exercise,	and	use	of	weak	ties,	to	get	the	message	out	very	widely	so	that	startups	not	already	known	to	the	immediate	network	find	out	about	the	accelerator	and	apply.	The	brand	and	messaging	will	affect	which	companies	apply.			The	selection	process	also	impacts	on	the	formation	of	the	cohort.	The	literature	suggests	that	a	cohort	should	be	the	result	of	a	small	number	of	startups	being	selected	from	a	large	group	of	applicants	after	a	rigorous	selection	process	(see	2.3.3.6).	Consequently,	the	accelerator	will	have	provided	the	valuable	filtering	process	that	creates	value	for	the	other	stakeholders,	and	credentials	for	the	startups.			Understanding	both	the	value	of	the	cohort,	and	the	need	for	it	to	consist	of	novel	startups	found	through	multiple	bridging	and	weak	tie	links	should	inform	the	branding	of	the	program,	and	recruitment	strategy,	both	of	which	combined	are	necessary	to	find	and	form	the	cohort.					
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4.4.4	Scouting	for	and	finding	startups		The	theory	indicated	that	EyeFocus	needed	to	find	a	large	number	of	eye-care	startups	and	filter	them	into	a	smaller	cohort	through	a	selection	process.	Given	that	EyeFocus	was	operating	in	a	sector	that	had	not	already	been	formed	into	a	coherent	ecosystem,	this	scouting	process	would	have	the	added	benefit	of	creating	a	wider	survey	of	innovation	in	eye-care,	which	would	be	an	asset	for	the	various	sponsors	and	partners.			It	was	estimated	that	a	reasonable	period	of	time	was	needed	to	scout	for	startups,	followed	by	a	selection	process	involving	the	sponsors,	and	then	the	announcement	of	which	startups	were	accepted	onto	the	program.	A	number	of	approaches	were	planned	to	find	startups	directly	and	to	attract	them	to	approach	EyeFocus.	From	the	perspective	of	Social	Network	Theory,	it	was	useful	to	understand	the	role	of	strong	ties,	weak	ties,	and	bridging	ties	in	finding	startups	not	already	known	to	EyeFocus.			
• Strong	ties	The	first	route	to	find	startups	was	to	contact	people	the	team	knew	well,	and	to	approach	the	sponsors	and	partners.	This	would	allow	EyeFocus	to	find	and	approach	directly	any	startups	they	already	knew.		Any	startups	they	recommended	were	more	likely	to	respond	to	the	approach,	due	to	being	introduced	by	a	trusted	contact.		
• Weak	ties	The	second	route	looked	at	weak	ties,	which	might	be	mentors,	or	other	people	in	the	ecosystems	in	which	EyeFocus	was	embedded,	but	not	close	contacts.	
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These	could	be	approached	directly	or	via	the	strong	ties,	but	were	likely	still	to	be	1-2	degrees	removed	from	the	founders.	This	increased	the	reach	of	the	network,	but	still	within	relatively	close	proximity	to	the	EyeFocus	team.		
• Bridging	ties	In	order	to	ensure	that	the	cohort	is	truly	diverse	and	consists	of	non-redundant	information	that	is	valuable	to	the	sponsors,	mentors,	and	partners,	it	is	particularly	necessary	to	recruit	startups	via	bridging	ties,	across	structural	holes,	which	therefore	means	targeting	networks	not	connected	to	the	EyeFocus	ecosystem	at	all.		To	achieve	this,	weak	ties	were	targeted,	because	bridging	ties	are	usually	weak	ties	(see	2.2.1.4).	This	required	directly	encouraging	weak	ties	in	the	EyeFocus	network	to	share	information	about	EyeFocus	with	their	weak	ties,	not	just	their	strong	ties,	as	might	be	instinctive.	This	approach	was	adopted	because	it	would	encourage	the	information	to	bridge	out	of	the	EyeFocus	extended	network	into	entirely	new	networks,	be	they	in	different	geographies	or	sectors.			At	this	point	the	brand	and	message	of	EyeFocus	becomes	important,	because	the	information	that	reaches	people	in	no	way	connected	to	the	EyeFocus	network	would	carry	little	or	no	Social	Capital	and	therefore	be	judged	more	superficially.		As	part	of	this	last	strategy,	EyeFocus	employed	the	industry	standard	approach	of	using	online	accelerator	and	startup	database	websites,	including	F6S.com,	Crunchbase.com,	and	Angelist.co.		On	these	websites,	EyeFocus	created	profiles	so	that	startups	could	find	them	in	searches	for	accelerators.	EyeFocus	also	successfully	sought	
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coverage	about	the	program	from	Ophthalmology	Today,	and	TechCrunch.	The	first	being	a	publication	for	the	eye-care	sector,	the	second	being	the	main	publication	of	the	startup	sector.			4.4.5	Managing	the	application	process		In	order	to	form	the	final	cohort,	an	application	process	is	required.	As	discussed,	this	process	validates	the	startups	selected	to	join	the	cohort,	creating	perceived	value	in	the	accelerator.	Typically,	the	sponsors	of	a	program	would	want	to	be	involved	in	this	process,	both	to	gain	the	benefit	of	seeing	all	the	startups	that	apply,	and	in	order	to	select	companies	of	interest	to	them.			The	F6S.com	website	was	used	by	a	number	of	accelerators	to	run	their	application	process.	It	also	serves	as	a	database	of	accelerators	that	startups	can	search.	It	was	decided	to	use	F6S.com	in	order	to	standardise	the	application	process,	and	to	create	a	central	database	of	applicants	that	would	be	easier	to	review.	F6S.com	also	offered	a	collaboration	feature,	so	that	the	sponsors	on	the	selection	committee	would	be	able	to	log	in	directly	and	review	the	applications.		The	intention	was	that	all	the	applications	would	be	received	by	a	deadline,	and	then	reviewed	by	the	sponsors	and	accelerator	team,	again	by	a	deadline,	reducing	down	to	a	shortlist	that	would	be	offered	a	place	on	the	program.			
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This	whole	process	needed	to	be	complete	in	time	for	those	startups	which	had	been	offered	places	on	the	program	to	make	the	necessary	arrangements	to	be	in	Berlin	by	the	launch.	This	might	include	obtaining	visas,	finding	accommodation,	and	securing	funding	from	the	accelerator	and	other	sources.			Links	to	the	F6S.com	profile	were	included	in	all	outgoing	media	and	communications,	and	on	the	EyeFocus	website	and	any	startups	found	in	a	search	were	asked	to	apply	there.		The	intention	was	both	to	create	a	manageable	process,	and	to	be	following	industry	standard	practice	in	order	to	position	EyeFocus	as	a	mainstream	startup	accelerator.				4.4.6	Aspects	of	the	fixed	term	program			The	formation	of	a	cohort	goes	hand	in	hand	with	having	a	fixed	term	program,	as	each	is	necessary	for	the	other.			The	fixed	term	has	been	shown	to	have	two	functions.	Firstly,	it	is	a	practical	aspect	of	an	accelerator,	facilitating	the	formation	of	a	cohort	and	delivery	of	education	in	an	efficient	manner,	secondly,	as	proposed	in	the	previous	chapter	(see	3.2.14),	it	addresses	the	observation	that	over	time	non-redundancy	will	decay	and	embeddedness	increase	as	the	actors	in	the	accelerator	social	network	increase	the	number	of	mutual	ties	they	have	(see	3.2.3).		
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 207 
From	this	first,	practical	aspect,	a	fixed	term	program’s	launch	date	is	a	useful	deadline	with	which	to	encourage	sponsors	to	sign	contracts,	mentors	to	provide	biographies,	and	startups	both	to	apply	and	be	in	situ	for	the	start	of	the	program.			It	may	be	argued	that	the	decay	function,	and	consequent	development	of	a	smaller	group	of	strong	ties	with	high	embeddedness,	is	a	long-term	value	outcome	of	an	accelerator.	This	is	represented	by	the	close	friends,	advisors,	and	new	team	members	a	startup	may	acquire	during	a	program.	However,	this	changes	the	dynamic	of	the	benefit	from	that	of	an	accelerator	into	something	else.	As	such,	it	is	proposed	that	an	accelerator	program	needs	to	end	before	this	decay	function	sets	in	for	it	to	maintain	a	consistent	value-offering	to	its	stakeholders	(see	3.2.13).		Consequently,	a	program	needs	to	be	of	a	fixed	term,	and	that	term	needs	to	end	before	too	much	decay	function	and	embeddedness	have	developed.	The	literature	does	not	suggest	what	such	a	term	is,	but	does	give	some	insight	into	the	experience	of	previous	accelerators.				The	original	three-month	program	introduced	by	Y	Combinator	was	this	length	because	it	ran	during	the	summer	holiday,	and	was	for	people	building	a	web	application,	which	can	be	done	relatively	quickly	(Christiansen	2009).	As	the	concept	developed	into	Europe,	and	away	from	Y	Combinator,	that	emphasis	on	3	months	was	retained,	possibly	more	out	of	habit	than	choice.	At	the	time	of	designing	EyeFocus	most	accelerators	were	3	months,	so	adopting	this	convention	met	the	desire	of	EyeFocus	to	appear	to	be	a	conventional,	mainstream	accelerator.			
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	Three	months	was	also	supported	by	empirical	observation,	and	feedback	from	other	accelerator	managers	and	startups	that	had	completed	programs,	that	both	found	12	weeks	of	intense	bootcamp	programming	the	maximum	they	could	sustain.	This	reflects	Cohen’s	“mentor	overload”	(see	2.3.3.2),	suggesting	that	the	program	needs	to	run	long	enough	to	achieve	an	overload	of	feedback	but	not	so	long	that	it	becomes	detrimental.			A	further	practical	reason	for	EyeFocus	being	3	months	was	that	the	funding	from	the	corporate	sponsors	was	anticipated	to	stretch	for	about	3	months,	with	some	time	after	to	wind	up	the	program.	It	was	estimated	that	a	3	month	program	requires	9-12	months	to	plan,	deliver,	and	wind	up.	It	became	apparent	in	the	planning	stages	of	EyeFocus	that	accelerators	are	expensive	to	run.			The	base	costs	such	as	rent	and	staff	combined	with	the	cost	of	hosting	events,	catering,	and	other	overheads	result	in	a	considerable	financial	cost	for	the	accelerator	company.	Additionally,	the	participants	in	the	program	need	to	cover	their	cost	of	travel,	accommodation,	and	other	living	costs	for	the	duration	of	the	program.	It	is	intended	that	the	investment	into	some	of	the	startups	contributes	towards,	or	totally	covers	these	costs	for	those	who	receive	it,	so	it	too	is	time-limited.			The	decision	to	run	for	three	months	was	therefore	a	result	of	a	number	of	factors.	However,	this	reflected	a	norm	with	accelerators	of	running	12	week	programs,	which	may	reflect	an	intrinsic	understanding	that	after	12	weeks	of	mentoring	and	networking	
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the	nature	of	the	underlying	social	network	changes,	and	the	value	of	that	specific	form	of	interaction	diminishes.				4.4.7	Program	branding	to	attract	startups	and	mentors		The	theory	discussed	so	far	in	determining	the	design	of	a	program	points	to	the	need	to	brand	an	accelerator	carefully	to	reflect	a	number	of	desired	outcomes.	If	an	accelerator	seeks	to	build	an	ecosystem,	bridge	between	different	sectors,	and	appeal	to	previously	unknown	actors,	then	the	branding	needs	to	communicate	the	right	message	to	these	different	stakeholders.		The	brand	will	signal	both	to	startups	and	mentors	what	to	expect	from	the	accelerator.	The	brand	also	goes	some	way	to	communicate	the	norms	and	culture	of	the	program.	Reflecting	this,	for	EyeFocus	a	brand	was	developed	that	was	consciously	informal	and	was	designed	to	appeal	both	to	tech	startups	and	the	eye-care	sector.	There	was	a	risk	of	being	branded	too	strongly	for	either	of	these,	and	thus	excluding	half	of	the	ecosystem	the	program	wanted	to	attract.	A	very	startup	focussed	brand	would	be	off-putting	to	hospitals,	corporations,	and	charities,	whilst	a	typical	ophthalmology	sector	brand	risked	not	attracting	startups.		The	branding	therefore	tried	to	emphasise	both	the	eye-care	aspect	of	the	program	and	the	informality	and	open	nature	of	a	startup	accelerator.	To	achieve	that,	the	design	and	marketing	material	included	a	fun	photo	of	a	woman	as	an	anchor	photo,	alongside	a	
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logo	that	incorporated	these	aspects	of	the	brand.	These	were	used	on	the	website	and	in	marketing	materials.		
																																			 	Figure	1.	Branding	elements	from	EyeFocus	Accelerator		Locating	EyeFocus	in	Rainmaking	Loft,	and	in	Berlin	were	also	branding	decisions,	communicating	that	EyeFocus	was	part	of	the	startup	sector	but	working	in	eye-care,	rather	than	being	part	of	the	medical	establishment	or	pharmaceutical	industry	trying	to	reach	out	into	the	startup	sector.			The	startup	sector	themed	branding	combined	with	that	of	the	sponsors	signalled	that	whilst	based	in	the	startup	ecosystem,	EyeFocus	bridged	strongly	into	the	eye-care	industry.		The	brand	was	therefore	informed	by	Social	Network	Theory	because	it	reflected	the	understanding	of	the	type	of	diverse	ecosystem	EyeFocus	wanted	to	build,	and	the	role	an	accelerator	has	in	bridging	between	sectors,	rather	than	being	aligned	too	strongly	with	just	one.		Another	part	of	the	branding	was	to	present	the	eye-care	ecosystem	EyeFocus	was	building	visually,	using	partner	and	sponsor	logos.	This	demonstrated	easily	that	EyeFocus	was	highly	connected	within	an	ecosystem	that	it	had	built	around	the	
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accelerator.		The	logos	were	used	in	marketing	materials	as	a	visual	expression	of	the	EyeFocus	network,	which	painted	a	picture	to	potential	startups	and	mentors	of	the	value	they	could	derive	from	the	network.		
	Figure	2.	Infographic	of	eye-focus	partners	and	sponsors			Consequently,	the	branding	and	positioning	of	EyeFocus	reflected	both	an	understanding	of	how	accelerators	sit	within	ecosystems,	and	the	role	they	have	in	building	and	connecting	them.	The	brand	expressed	that	startups	applying	to	the	program	would	be	in	a	familiar	startup	and	tech	environment,	and	that	the	program	would	offer	unique	value	in	connecting	them	to	key	stakeholders	in	the	eye-care	sector.			The	visual	branding	also	communicated	to	mentors	and	partners	that	their	involvement	would	bring	valuable	ties	within	a	number	of	networks,	as	well	as	the	access	to	novel	information	afforded	by	the	startups	in	the	cohort.			
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4.5	SOCIAL	CAPITAL	IN	ACCELERATOR	DESIGN		4.5.1	Practical	applications	of	Social	Capital			The	previous	chapter	observed	that	if	an	accelerator	is	a	social	network,	then	Social	Capital	will	play	an	important	part	in	defining	and	policing	its	trust,	norms,	and	value	(see	3.2.3).	The	trust	facilitated	by	Social	Capital	supports	the	flow	and	validation	of	information,	in	which	lies	much	of	the	value	embedded	within	an	accelerator,	and	enables	policing	of	norms	Social	Capital	is	stronger	in	closed	networks	because	norms	are	understood,	and	social	mechanisms	exist	to	reward	and	sanction.	Weak	network	architecture	allows	the	easy	spread	of	reputation	to	police	those	norms.	(see	3.2.3).		Accelerators	reflect	this	structure,	having	the	core	of	the	cohort	and	management	team	to	create	and	support	norms,	and	then	the	dynamic	weak	network	architecture	provided	by	the	mentors	through	which	to	police	them	with	link	reciprocity.		The	previous	chapter	concluded	that	an	accelerator	accumulates	Social	Capital,	in	the	sense	of	value	embedded	in	a	social	network,	by	building	a	specific	type	of	network	that	encourages	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information,	high	levels	of	trust,	and	an	ability	to	police	norms	so	that	co-operation	is	rewarded,	and	bad	actors	threatened	with	meaningful	sanction.	It	then	confers	that	Social	Capital	on	its	cohort,	in	effect	rewarding	others	to	support	the	startups	in	a	way	that	the	startups	themselves	could	not	do	because	alone	they	would	lack	adequate	Social	Capital	(see	3.2.3).			
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Therefore,	given	the	importance	of	Social	Capital	to	accelerators,	the	design	of	an	accelerator	program,	should	constantly	look	at	how	it	is	building	Social	Capital,	and	how	it	is	using	Social	Capital	to	reward	people	who	support	it.	This	is	important	because	when	an	accelerator	is	viewed	only	as	a	business	support	program,	without	this	understanding	of	Social	Capital,	there	is	a	risk	that	it	does	not	deliver	the	social	rewards	that	are	motivating	the	actors	it	wants	to	engage	with.	If	mentors	do	not	receive	payment,	but	also	do	not	receive	social	validation,	ties,	and	novel	information,	it	is	assumed	that	they	will	either	not	engage,	or	will	soon	lose	interest	in	the	program.			Equally,	without	this	understanding	of	Social	Capital	as	a	reward,	threatening	to	withhold	or	withdraw	that	source	of	value	cannot	be	used	as	sanction	against	bad	actors	through	link	reciprocity.					4.5.2	Social	Capital	to	reward	mentors		Social	Capital	has	been	shown	to	be	the	main	form	of	reward	for	mentors	(see	3.2.9).	Ensuring	that	the	mentors	are	rewarded	in	this	way	should	inform	the	design	of	the	program,	in	particular	taking	into	account	the	following	forms	of	reward:			
• Reputation	and	social	validation	Mentors	often	list	where	they	mentor	on	work	profiles,	such	as	Linkedin.com	and	are	listed	as	mentors	on	accelerator	websites.	This	demonstrates	the	value	they	perceive	in	being	associated	with	the	program.	It	is	therefore	important	that	
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accelerators	showcase	their	mentors	properly	to	afford	them	this	social	validation	and	credential.	This	includes	presenting	them	on	the	accelerator	website,	but	also	at	events,	and	in	other	publicity	materials.		
• Tie	Formation	Mentors	benefit	from	tie	formation	because	they	meet	the	startup	founders,	but	also	through	meeting	the	other	mentors,	and	actors	that	form	the	ecosystem	around	an	accelerator.	Therefore,	mentoring	is	a	way	of	increasing	the	mentor’s	exposure	to	weak	ties	and	this	tie	formation	is	their	reward	for	cooperative	behaviour.	Therefore,	accelerators	need	to	provide	opportunities	for	mentors	to	meet	more	stakeholders	than	just	the	startups,	and	in	particular	to	allow	them	to	engage	with	the	high-value	actors	involved	with	the	program.				
• Access	to	opportunities	Early	access	to	novel	and	non-redundant	information	is	a	defined	form	of	value	stemming	from	a	network	rich	in	Social	Capital	(see	3.2.3).	Mentors	are	some	of	the	first	people	to	engage	with	startups	in	an	accelerator,	and	therefore	have	early	access	to	the	new	opportunities	they	may	offer,	be	it	investment	or	employment,	or	just	insights	about	new	products	and	technologies.		
• Social	credentials	and	influence	Lin	(1999)	explained	how	embedded	resources	in	a	social	network	produce	value.	Accelerators	are	part	of	an	imperfect	market,	in	that	information	about	very	new	technologies	and	businesses	is	not	readily	available	to	all	actors.	
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Therefore,	because	mentors	gain	access	to	information	not	available	to	others,	their	position	in	the	social	network	affords	them	some	degree	of	influence	because	they	can	bridge	between	startups	and	other	actors	who	add	value	or	who	would	derive	value	from	such	an	introduction.	Therefore,	they	are	bridging	structural	holes	and	their	position	affords	them	social	credentials	and	influence	(see	2.2.2.4).			Overall,	it	is	important	that	the	design	of	the	accelerator	is	one	in	which	actors	such	as	mentors	can	be	confident	that	favours	will	be	returned	at	some	point	in	the	future,	reflecting	Coleman’s	(1988)	three	forms	of	Social	Capital	(see	2.2.2.1	and	3.2.3).		Providing	this	value	in	the	form	of	Social	Capital	enables	an	accelerator	to	threaten	to	withdraw	it	as	a	form	of	sanction	for	not	observing	its	norms.	If	there	is	no	value,	then	tie	dissolution,	as	part	of	link	reciprocity,	will	not	be	an	effective	threat.	In	effect,	the	more	value	the	accelerator	creates	for	its	mentors	and	other	stakeholders,	the	safer	it	will	become	for	its	startups	(see	3.2.6).			4.5.3	Social	value	through	knowledge	transfer		A	form	in	which	the	value	embedded	in	the	mentor	network	is	realised,	and	by	which	value	is	created	for	the	cohort	by	the	accelerator	structuring	a	program,	is	through	the	transfer	of	knowledge	through	training	and	mentoring.	This	reflects	‘flow	theory’	in	Social	Network	Theory	(see	2.2.1.4).			
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Accelerators	provide	an	education	in	entrepreneurship,	offering	both	acquired	knowledge,	which	is	taught	in	classes,	and	tacit	knowledge	which	is	provided	by	mentors.	The	tacit	knowledge	in	particular	is	designed	to	accelerate	their	progress	by	sharing	lessons	others	have	learned	over	time,	so	the	cohort	do	not	have	to	learn	everything	through	their	own	experience	(Frimodig	&	Torkkeli,	2013,	and	see	3.2.7	and,	2.3.2.4).		Accelerators	are	designed	to	be	very	efficient	in	this	transfer	of	knowledge,	both	by	gathering	and	exploiting	the	expertise	of	a	large	mentor	base,	and	by	providing	a	unique	education	to	a	cohort	of	startups.	This	is	more	efficient	than	the	alternative	of	each	startup	finding	and	employing	experts	and	consultants	on	a	case	by	case	basis,	or	an	education	being	provided	just	to	one	startup	(Bliemel	et.al	2014).	Therefore,	the	education	and	training	component	of	the	program	is	in	fact	an	output	of	the	Social	Capital	accrued	by	the	accelerator	in	that	it	is	delivered	by	the	mentors,	or	paid	trainers,	using	capital	raised	by	the	accelerator	based	on	the	value	it	has	embedded	within	its	network.			The	importance	of	the	education	component	informs	the	design	of	a	program	requiring	that	it	should	consist	of	structured	education	and	mentoring	in	order	for	this	value	to	be	realised.			This	informed	the	design	of	EyeFocus	so	that	part	of	the	timetable	was	reserved	for	taught	courses,	and	that	it	was	understood	that	these	would	be	provided	by	paid	educators	rather	than	mentors.	This	identified	the	difference	between	acquired	and	
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tacit	knowledge,	and	the	different	role	trainers	and	mentors	have	in	transferring	this	to	the	startups.	This	balance	should	not	be	confused	so	that	mentors	are	asked	to	provide	structured	training,	or	paid	educators	asked	to	mentor	for	free,	as	this	would	stray	outside	the	bounds	of	the	in-built	reward	system	of	the	accelerator.			4.5.4	Syllabus	design		The	program	design	reflected	the	assumption	by	the	management	team	that	the	cohort	would	require	two	elements	of	education	curriculum.	The	first	was	seen	as	a	core	curriculum,	consisting	of	information	all	the	cohort	would	need,	then	the	second	phase	might	need	to	be	tailored	to	the	needs	of	specific	startups.	This	particularly	took	into	account	the	assumption	that	EyeFocus	would	most	likely	build	a	cohort	where	the	common	feature	was	eye-care,	rather	than	the	stage	of	the	startup.			A	syllabus	of	core	skills	was	developed,	with	input	from	a	variety	of	advisors.	It	was	decided	that	core	skills	everyone	needed	before	embarking	on	the	program	would	be	taught	during	an	intensive	first	week	of	structured	programming.	This	acquired	knowledge	would	be	taught	by	paid	experts	in	a	series	of	classes.			Pitch	training	was	also	introduced	alongside	the	training	curriculum	in	the	first	week,	as	it	was	considered	essential	that	the	startups	could	pitch	their	startup	concisely	and	clearly	from	the	outset.	As	well	as	understanding	the	importance	of	the	taught	component,	the	pitch	training	sessions	reflected	the	understanding	of	‘cognitive	
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flexibility’	(see	2.2.1.5),	combined	with	an	awareness	of	steps	needed	to	prevent	decay	function	in	the	core	of	the	network	(see	3.2.13).	This	manifested	in	the	accelerator	running	multiple	informal	events	in	the	early	week,	with	meals	shared,	and	the	cohort	encouraged	to	invite	partners,	spouses,	and	friends,	but	also	that	the	early	pitch	training	workshops	were	run	with	the	whole	cohort	together,	rather	than	individually,	to	encourage	peer	support.			After	this	intense	first	week	of	classes	the	program	was	designed	to	scale	back	rapidly	the	educational	activities	so	that	the	startups	had	more	time	to	work	on	their	product	and	business,	and	to	allow	mentoring,	visits	to	partners,	and	specific	support	customised	to	the	needs	of	each	participant.															
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Consequently,	the	first	week	of	the	program	took	the	following	form:	
Week	 Day	 Date	 Core	Activities		 Attendees	
Week	1						Lean	Startup	
Week	1	
16	Feb	15	
First	day:			09:00	-	10:00:	Startups	arrive		10:00	-	11:00:	Welcome	speech	and	Accelerator	Orientation						11:00	-	12:00:	Quick	Pitch	Exchange					12:00	-	13:00:	Lunch	13:00	-	13:30:	Co-working	space	tour	and	house	rules																																																																																												18:00-20:00:	Partner	visit	 All	Startups	+	Associates	
Tuesday	 17	Feb	15	
Pitch	Training	Workshop		13:00	Lunch	Break	Design	Thinking	Workshop		5:00-8:00	Bayer	Launch	Event	 All	Startups	
Wednesday	
18	Feb	15	 Lean	Day	1:	Define	Starting	Point	9:00-13:00:	1st	block	13:00-13:30:	Lunch	break	13:30:	2nd	block	 All	Startups	+	Associates	
Thursday	
19	Feb	15	
Lean	Day	2:	Customer	
Development	9:00-13:00:	1st	block	13:00-13:30:	Lunch	break	13:30:	2nd	block	 All	Startups	+	Associates	
Friday	
20	Feb	15	
Lean	Day	3:	Experiment	
Framework	9:00-13:00:	1st	block	13:00-13:30:	Lunch	break	13:30-16:00:	2nd	block	16:00	-	19:00:	One-on-One	coaching														20:00	-	Official	Launch	Party	 All	Startups	+	Associates	Saturday	 21	Feb	15	 		 		Sunday	 22	Feb	15	 		 			Figure	3.	Timetable	for	first	week	of	EyeFocus				
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4.5.5	Developing	role	sets		As	outlined	in	the	previous	chapter	(see	3.2.16)	accelerators	should	be	aware	of	the	part	they	play	in	the	developing	the	role	sets	of	their	cohort.	This	is	an	outcome	of	the	startups	meeting	a	diverse	group	of	mentors	and	other	stakeholders,	but	can	become	a	focus	of	the	accelerator	activity	once	it	is	understood	that	this	is	happening,	and	is	of	value.			Consequently,	the	education	and	mentoring,	and	the	networking	related	activities	are	opportunities	for	the	startups	to	learn	how	to	interact	with	a	wide	variety	of	people	of	different	backgrounds	and	relative	status.	This	challenges	them	intellectually	(see	3.2.16)	and	can	develop	their	confidence	and	social	skills	in	a	way	that	will	serve	them	later	into	life.			This	author	proposes	that	this	benefit	is	also	not	just	about	addressing	the	needs	of	young	founders.	Senior	executives	or	professors	for	example,	may	not	have	experience	of	engaging	with	people	outside	their	network,	so	may	also	have	role	sets	limited	to	the	path	of	their	career.	Learning	how	to	engage	with	startup	founders,	engineers,	and	venture	capital	investors	is	as	much	a	useful	education	to	a	corporate	executive	as	it	is	to	a	startup	founder.	The	startup	teams	and	other	actors	in	the	accelerator	all	mix	with	a	far	wider	range	of	people,	by	age,	status,	ability,	nationality,	and	background	as	a	result	of	the	unique	convening	aspect	of	an	accelerator,	and	the	diversity	encouraged	by	a	weak	network	architecture,	so	all	are	developing	these	skills	through	their	involvement.		
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Complex	role	sets	become	a	key	social	skill	needed	for	the	startups	to	take	advantage	of	the	Social	Capital	that	the	accelerator	has	conferred	upon	them,	and	is	therefore	an	important	part	of	an	accelerator	program.	If	understood	by	those	designing	programs,	the	importance	of	developing	the	role	sets	of	the	cohort	should	inform	the	program	design,	with	more	effort	dedicated	to	explaining	this,	and	to	training	them	about	how	to	respond	to	the	different	social	situations	they	will	encounter	with	their	startup.			To	assist	this,	the	EyeFocus	programming	allocated	time	for	workshops	on	how	to	engage	with	different	stakeholders,	and	on	how	they	operate.	This	would	include	asking	the	sponsors	to	explain	how	their	companies	work,	and	how	to	engage	with	them,	and	include	some	training	prior	to	certain	interactions	to	brief	the	startups	on	how	to	behave,	and	even	how	to	dress	if	necessary	for	a	specific	engagement.			Instructing	the	cohort	in	how	to	behave	and	how	to	address	people	also	protects	the	reputation	of	the	accelerator,	and	imposes	a	degree	of	consistency	on	the	presentation	of	the	accelerator	and	cohort	to	other	stakeholders.	The	management	team	regularly	briefed	the	cohort	as	a	group,	or	individually,	to	ensure	they	were	prepared	for	meetings	that	ranged	broadly,	from	physicians	to	investors,	executives	to	other	startup	founders,	and	culturally	from	Californians	to	Germans.			Whilst	much	of	this	happens	intrinsically	within	an	accelerator,	understanding	the	importance	of	role	and	status	sets	allows	it	to	be	factored	into	the	program’s	activity	with	more	focus	and	purpose,	which	in	turn	should	create	longer	term	value	for	the	participants.		
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 222 
4.5.6	Pitch	training		As	identified	in	3.2.15,	pitch	training	is	an	extension	of	the	development	of	role	sets.	A	founder	or	startup	needs	to	communicate	aspects	of	a	business	to	a	very	broad	audience,	from	investors	to	customers,	mentors	to	journalists,	and	this	requires	cognitive	flexibility	(see	2.2.15).		Pitch	training	teaches	the	startups	both	how	to	explain	their	startup	very	succinctly	in	a	slide	deck	and	in	person,	and	then	learn	how	to	do	this	in	front	of	an	audience.	However,	pitch	training	also	involves	learning	how	to	communicate	ideas,	learning	how	to	present	to	an	audience,	and	most	of	all	requires	startups	to	have	a	very	clear	understanding	of	their	own	business	and	product	in	order	to	present	it	succinctly.			Conventional	mentoring	to	a	large	number	of	mentors	over	a	short	time,	also	means	that	the	startups	have	to	explain	their	startup	repeatedly,	gaining	feedback,	and	learning	quickly	what	does	and	does	not	work	in	terms	of	presentation.	Pitching	therefore	helps	develop	an	understanding	of	the	business	and	necessary	communication	skills	(see	2.3.3.2).		Whilst	pitch	training	is	common	practice,	as	a	means	to	present	to	investors,	this	thesis	has	used	Social	Network	Theory	to	explain	it	as	representing	a	training	in	cognitive	flexibility,	and	consequently	an	extension	of	developing	complex	role	sets	(see	3.2.15).		
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In	designing	EyeFocus,	the	role	of	pitching	and	pitch	training	was	already	understood	from	observing	other	accelerators.	However,	the	concepts	outlined	in	this	thesis	suggest	it	is	of	far	greater	importance	than	previously	understood.	Consequently,	EyeFocus	structured	pitch	training	into	the	beginning	of	the	program,	with	at	least	one	session	before	the	startups	met	any	of	the	mentors,	partners,	or	sponsors.			Pitching	was	used	throughout	the	program	at	the	beginning	of	any	engagements	in	order	to	communicate	what	the	cohort	was	doing	to	a	new	audience.	Before	key	events,	such	as	the	investor	pitch	at	Bloomberg	(see	8.1),	intensive	practice	sessions	were	used	to	ensure	the	pitches	were	fluent	and	fresh.				4.5.7	Network	density,	norms,	and	trust			In	discussing	Social	Capital	in	accelerators	(see	3.2.3),	another	aspect	of	Social	Network	Theory	relevant	to	the	design	of	accelerators	is	network	density.	Granovetter	(2005)	argued	that	larger	social	networks	have	lower	density,	or	multiple	connections	between	nodes,	because	people	have	natural	limitations	on	how	many	social	ties	they	can	maintain	(see	2.2.1.3).	However,	it	appears	likely	that	a	function	of	an	accelerator	is	to	enable	higher	density,	or	more	active	ties	between	nodes,	in	a	larger	network	than	any	individual	startup	founder	could	maintain	individually.			Granovetter	(2005)	explained	that	norms	can	be	enforced	more	effectively	in	a	dense	network,	where	there	are	multiple	connections	between	nodes	so	reputational	
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information	can	travel	quickly	and	widely	(see	2.2.3.1).	This	theory	suggests	that	if	a	startup	is	connected	to	a	bad	actor,	but	not	to	any	other	startups	who	already	know	the	bad	actor,	it	is	vulnerable	both	because	it	cannot	validate	its	reputation,	and	cannot	threaten	sanction	by	reputational	damage	because	it	lacks	multiple	ties	within	the	wider	ecosystem.	A	startup	on	their	own	would	not	be	able	to	maintain	such	a	large	and	dense	network,	and	is	therefore	vulnerable	to	people	who	might	take	advantage	of	it	without	the	fear	of	reputational	risk.	Therefore,	it	is	important	to	understand	the	role	of	an	accelerator	is	to	create	a	network,	that	is	much	larger,	and	with	greater	density,	than	a	startup	could	do	alone.		Within	this	large	network	that	still	has	high	density	the	accelerator	is	able	to	develop	and	communicate	norms,	which	encourage	the	protection	and	support	of	the	cohort.	Therefore,	it	is	also	important	to	be	conscious	that	the	accelerator	managers	need	to	factor	this	function	into	the	design	of	the	accelerator.	The	theory	suggests	that	developing	the	embeddedness	of	the	cohort	and	management	team	would	lead	to	stronger	density	at	the	core,	which	would	encourage	the	establishment	of	norms,	and	would	facilitate	the	ability	to	build	a	larger	network	around	that	core.	This	then	allows	link	reciprocity	to	be	used	to	police	those	norms,	so	the	accelerator	can	protect	the	startups.				This	also	reflects	back	to	Burt’s	(1999)	theories	about	embeddedness	and	decay,	in	which	he	proposed	that	early	social	engagements	including	friends	and	family	will	create	a	higher	level	of	embeddedness	and	lead	to	a	slower	rate	of	decay		(	see	2.2.3.3).	Specifically	relating	to	EyeFocus	this	informed	the	design	of	the	program	by	
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emphasising	the	importance	both	of	informal	social	activities	in	the	first	week,	and	of	inviting	the	cohort’s	friends	and	family	to	these	events.		In	terms	of	communicating	norms,	this	thesis	proposes	that	accelerators	teach	startups	how	to	be	startups	by	creating	a	consistency	through	the	program	that	structures	uniform	engagements,	for	example	in	pitching,	but	also	in	how	startups	engage	with	mentors,	investors,	and	other	startups.	These	ways	of	engaging	form	the	wider	norms	of	behaviour,	along	with	norms	of	culture,	like	trust,	and	co-operation	(see	3.2.3).		This	took	the	form	in	EyeFocus	of	guidelines	for	mentors	and	startups	around	how	mentoring	should	be	conducted	(see	8.4)	,	and	influenced	the	design	and	execution	of	the	program	so	that	the	startups	were	informed	of	the	norms	they	were	expected	to	adopt	whilst	part	of	the	EyeFocus	cohort.			Accelerators	can	exclude	and	expel	startups	and	founders	who	are	disruptive	or	not	engaging	in	the	communal	nature	of	the	program,	and	the	ecosystem	effectively	rewards	those	who	do	by	supporting	them.	This	is	link	reciprocity	in	action,	and	reflects	the	specific	nature	of	the	accelerator	network,	as	described	by	Granovetter	(2005)	who	explained	that	in	a	dense	network,	ideas	about	behavioural	norms	are	encountered	often,	and	discussed,	moderated,	and	accepted.	Also,	that	deviance	from	accepted	norms	is	harder	to	hide,	and	communicated	more	widely	through	the	network,	and	therefore	more	likely	to	be	punished	(see	2.2.3.1).		Accelerators	are	therefore	in	a	strong	position	to	develop	norms,	having	a	dense	network	at	their	core,	and	are	able	to	communicate	them	through	their	weak	network	
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architecture,	and	large	dense	network.	This	puts	them	in	a	strong	position	in	the	wider	ecosystem	to	establish	and	propagate	norms	more	generally,	thereby	encouraging	the	development	of	angel	investing,	entrepreneurship,	trust,	and	co-operation,	for	example,	as	was	observed	in	the	literature	review	(see	2.3.4.1).			In	practice,	EyeFocus	involved	the	startups	in	preparing	for	and	running	public	facing	events,	so	they	shared	the	norms	of	the	management	team,	and	understood	the	brand	they	were	part	of.				4.5.9	Protecting	Startups		This	interplay	of	norms,	a	weak	network	architecture	with	a	high	degree	of	density,	and	the	dynamic	nature	of	the	accelerator	network	has	been	shown	to	enable	accelerators	to	protect	their	startups,	primarily	using	link	reciprocity	(see	3.2.6).	Startups	benefit	from	being	able	to	threaten	a	much	higher	risk	of	sanction	by	their	association	with	the	accelerator,	which	itself	may	be	backed	by	higher	status	actors	in	the	wider	ecosystem.	Therefore,	the	accelerator	is	both	creating	a	network	that	can	effectively	police	norms,	and	also	conferring	its	social	capital	on	the	startups	(see	3.2.6).	This	should	inform	the	design	of	an	accelerator	by	ensuring	that	it	builds	this	network	structure,	and	realises	it	has	a	role	in	protecting	startups	in	this	way.			This	complex	set	of	ideas	that	explain	why	accelerators	work	in	terms	of	trust	and	cooperation	can	inform	how	they	are	designed.	They	suggest	that	the	norms	of	the	
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accelerator	should	be	expressed	clearly	to	all	stakeholders,	and	an	accelerator	needs	to	be	designed	to	have	a	dynamic	network	with	weak	network	architecture	and	multiple	weak	ties	in	order	to	be	able	to	use	reputation	to	police	those	norms	through	link	reciprocity.			Whilst	not	all	of	this	needs	to	be	explained	to	the	participants,	it	should	be	useful	for	the	accelerator	team	to	understand	why	people	are	cooperating,	and	how	reputation	can	be	used	to	encourage	this	and	to	sanction	bad	actors.	It	is	also	useful	to	be	able	to	explain	to	other	stakeholders,	such	as	corporates	and	universities,	precisely	why	the	accelerator	will	not	be	employing	NDAs	and	contracts,	or	be	paying	mentors.			EyeFocus	integrated	this	understanding	into	the	design	of	the	program,	in	particular	by	building	a	large,	weak	tie	network,	but	also	in	resisting	calls	from	corporate	lawyers,	and	university	tech	transfer	offices	to	sign	or	issue	NDAs.	Mentors	were	not	paid,	but	the	program	was	designed	in	such	a	way	as	to	share	as	much	value	as	possible	with	them.	This	involved	inviting	them	to	most	events,	offering	them	desk	space	when	they	were	visiting	Berlin,	and	offering	to	make	direct	introductions	for	them	to	other	actors	in	the	EyeFocus	network.			It	was	also	incorporated	into	the	design	of	EyeFocus	that	it	would	have	multiple	sponsors,	and	a	network	of	partners,	so	that	it	was	able	to	validate	people	through	their	reputations,	and	had	the	ability	to	communicate	reputation	back	out	to	the	ecosystem	as	a	threat	of	sanction,	supporting	link	reciprocity.			
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4.6	ACCELERATORS	AND	ECOSYSTEMS		The	previous	chapter	explored	how	the	literature	explained	the	interplay	between	accelerators	and	ecosystems	(see	3.2.10).	It	was	suggested	that	accelerators	need	ecosystems	from	which	to	source	mentors,	startups,	and	other	assets,	but	also	that	accelerators	can	build	and	maintain	ecosystems	(see	2.3.3.5).	By	running	events	and	being	open	to	new	people,	accelerators	were	shown	to	act	as	network	aggregators	across	an	ecosystem	(see	2.3.4.5).			This	research	suggests	that	the	way	in	which	accelerators	build	value	and	accrue	Social	Capital	makes	them	attractive	to	different	stakeholders.	The	accelerator	is	a	necessary	and	useful	entity	for	investors,	for	corporate	executives,	and	for	startups,	as	it	enjoys	a	relationship	with	them	all	that	they	may	not	have	directly	with	each	other.			Therefore,	just	as	an	accelerator	needs	to	be	embedded	within	an	ecosystem	to	find	the	various	stakeholders	it	needs	in	order	to	function	well,	it	can	help	build	or	develop	an	ecosystem.	It	can	leave	the	ecosystem	better	connected,	having	run	an	intensive	period	of	events	and	interactions	that	involve	connecting	multiple	actors.	The	literature	supported	this	observation	by	demonstrating	how	Social	Capital	ends	up	being	shared	widely	by	those	who	generate	it	(see	3.2.12).			As	a	result,	the	author	of	this	thesis	proposes	that	an	accelerator	can	create	a	large	number	of	social	interactions	in	a	short	period	of	time,	often	bringing	together	people	and	entities	that	would	not	otherwise	meet.	In	this	way,	the	accelerator	can	convene	
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and	develop	an	ecosystem.	In	doing	so	it	then	strengthens	its	own	position	by	being	embedded	in	a	more	dynamic	ecosystem,	which	can	become	a	self-perpetuating	cycle.	This	led	to	the	suggestion	that	EyeFocus	was	an	ecosystem	builder,	developing	that	definition	from	the	typologies	of	Pauwels	et	al.	(2015),	and	Hoffman	&	Radojevich-Kelley	(2012)	(see	3.2.11).			4.6.1	Becoming	an	ecosystem	builder			To	be	an	ecosystem	builder,	as	defined	in	this	thesis,	informs	a	number	of	factors	relating	to	the	design	of	the	accelerator.	First,	it	must	be	ascertained	whether	the	accelerator	is	launching	within	an	already	strong	ecosystem,	or	whether	it	first	needs	to	build	an	ecosystem	within	which	to	launch.	In	particular,	this	should	influence	decision	making	by	large	corporations	or	government	agencies	when	looking	to	establish	an	accelerator.	Such	programs	will	not	flourish	if	they	are	launched	without	an	ecosystem	around	them,	or	if	they	remain	contained	within	a	closed	network	and	are	not	open	to	a	broad	range	of	stakeholders	from	a	wider	ecosystem.			In	designing	EyeFocus,	this	theory	influenced	two	aspects	of	the	program.	The	first	was	the	choice	of	where	the	accelerator	would	be	located.	This	defines	how	much	other	related	activity	is	already	happening	around	the	accelerator.	Being	based	in	a	location	that	has	other	startups,	activities,	and	an	entrepreneurial	culture	provides	an	existing	ecosystem	within	which	to	establish	the	accelerator.	The	second	aspect	related	not	to	
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the	location,	but	to	the	sectoral	ecosystem,	in	this	case	eye-care,	raising	the	question	of	how	to	build	an	ecosystem	around	a	topic,	rather	than	just	in	a	location.			To	be	a	local	or	regional	ecosystem	builder	influences	where	to	run	the	program,	but	to	build	an	ecosystem	around	a	sector	requires	the	program	somehow	to	address	a	global	network	as	well	as	exist	within	a	local	ecosystem.		It	was	therefore	clear	that	EyeFocus	would	need	to	be	a	global	program,	because	the	best	companies	working	in	eye-care	were	not	also	all	in	one	location,	but	it	would	be	helpful	already	to	be	located	within	a	dynamic	startup	ecosystem,	otherwise	the	program	would	have	had	to	build	both	ecosystems.	This	strategy	was	developed	as	follows.				4.6.2	Choice	of	Location	for	EyeFocus:	Berlin		The	location	of	EyeFocus	refers	both	to	the	choice	of	city	and	to	the	location	within	that	city.	It	was	preferable	for	EyeFocus	to	be	in	a	city	near	relevant	stakeholders,	and	where	there	was	a	startup	ecosystem.	In	the	case	of	EyeFocus,	the	lead	sponsor,	Bayer,	was	located	in	Berlin,	and	Berlin	also	had	a	flourishing	startup	ecosystem.			Berlin	also	had	the	distinct	advantage	of	being	possibly	the	cheapest	major	city	in	Europe	with	a	substantial	existing	startup	ecosystem.	Feedback	from	startups,	especially	those	from	emerging	economies,	was	that	even	with	the	funding	provided	by	accelerators,	it	was	sometimes	not	enough	to	cover	the	cost	of	relocating	to	expensive	cities	like	London	for	an	accelerator	program.		
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	Berlin	therefore	created	advantages	for	EyeFocus	that	would	make	it	easier	to	attract	good	startups	and	to	work	with	its	lead	sponsor,	and	that	it	allowed	both	the	accelerator	and	startups	to	achieve	more	for	the	finance	available.			Having	an	existing	startup	ecosystem	meant	EyeFocus	could	co-host	events,	share	resources,	and	invite	that	wider	ecosystem	to	its	own	events.	In	this	respect	it	would	allow	the	cohort	startups	to	mix	with	other	startups,	and	have	access	to	resources	beyond	the	core	program.	Being	within	a	larger	existing	startup	ecosystem	also	meant	that	EyeFocus	could	adopt	the	norms	of	that	ecosystem,	making	it	easier	to	communicate	and	police	its	norms	within	the	accelerator	network	itself.				4.6.3	Choice	of	Location:	Rainmaking	Loft			Reflecting	the	discussion	in	this	chapter	about	the	need	to	bridge,	and	maintain	diversity,	EyeFocus	chose	a	well-known	startup	space	as	its	base	in	Berlin,	rather	than	a	space	heavily	associated	with	eye-care.	EyeFocus	already	had	a	strong	relationship	with	Bayer	and	other	eye-care	companies,	the	challenge	would	be	to	attract	startups	to	the	program,	so	the	brand	and	location	should	be	attractive	to	them.		Rainmaking	Loft	was	at	the	time	one	of	the	leading	startup	co-working	spaces	in	Berlin,	and	home	to	Startup	Bootcamp	Berlin,	one	of	Europe’s	leading	startup	accelerators.	Rainmaking	Loft	was	expanding	as	a	venue,	and	had	a	room	in	between	the	main	accelerator	space	and	the	event	room	which	was	the	right	size	for	EyeFocus.		
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The	perceived	advantages	of	Rainmaking	Loft	were	that	it	was	centrally	located,	already	a	startup	hub	with	other	activities	taking	place	in	the	building,	and	combined	brands	already	recognised	in	the	startup	community.	This	assisted	EyeFocus	in	further	establishing	that	it	was	part	of	the	mainstream	startup	ecosystem	as	well	as	being	part	of	the	Berlin	startup	sector	and	the	eye-care	sector.			Rainmaking	Loft	fitted	the	aims	of	EyeFocus	well	because	it	was	already	designed	as	a	startup	co-working	space	and	accelerator	location.	Consequently,	it	was	open-plan,	with	very	few	doors	or	walls.	EyeFocus	occupied	a	room	in	the	middle	of	the	building,	in	between	the	main	co-working	space	and	an	event	space.	This	meant	people	using	the	building	constantly	walked	through	the	EyeFocus	space,	which	corresponded	with	the	desire	to	develop	weak	tie	contacts	beyond	the	immediate	social	network	of	EyeFocus	because	it	opened	up	the	opportunity	for	random	new	contacts	to	be	made	by	the	startups.	The	theory	that	supported	this	choice	was	useful	in	explaining	to	corporate	stakeholders	a	decision	they	found	counter-intuitive,	coming	from	a	sector	that	would	expect	a	dedicated	space	with	closed	doors	so	that	only	EyeFocus	participants	would	have	access.			Rainmaking	Loft	also	opened	an	adjoining	café	and	bar	which	allowed	EyeFocus	and	the	cohort	easily	to	invite	people	for	informal	meetings	over	coffee	or	cocktails.	This	again	tied	into	the	desire	to	keep	interactions	informal,	and	to	have	porous	boundaries	between	the	cohort,	the	accelerator	network,	and	the	wider	ecosystem.	The	café	bar	area	became	a	convening	space	for	people	from	across	the	startup	ecosystem	in	Berlin.			
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All	of	this	made	it	easier	to	create	a	vibrant	ecosystem	around	EyeFocus.	A	launch	party	in	the	bar	area	party	was	planned	to	be	open	to	people	invited	by	EyeFocus,	to	the	other	residents	of	Rainmaking	Loft,	to	Startup	Bootcamp,	and	also	to	keep	the	bar	open	to	whoever	was	there.	This	again	created	porous	and	undefined	boundaries	between	EyeFocus	and	the	wider	tech	ecosystem,	increasing	the	likelihood	of	serendipitous	weak	tie	connections.				4.6.4	Program	design	for	building	an	ecosystem			Understanding	the	role	EyeFocus	would	play	as	an	ecosystem	builder	made	a	significant	impact	on	the	design	and	launch	of	the	program.	It	became	clear	that	if	EyeFocus	could	help	convene	and	organise	the	eye-care	sector	into	a	more	defined	ecosystem	it	would	benefit	the	whole	ecosystem,	not	just	EyeFocus	and	its	participants.	With	the	understanding	that	accelerators	need	dynamic	ecosystems	in	order	to	succeed,	and	that	accelerators	can	be	ecosystem	builders,	it	was	assumed	that	if	EyeFocus	helped	build	an	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem	it	would	in	turn	benefit	itself.	This	again	reflects	the	observation	(see	3.2.12)	that	those	who	generate	Social	Capital	do	not	reap	all	of	its	benefits	directly.			Therefore,	the	program	was	designed	with	an	understanding	that	some	of	its	activities	may	not	directly	benefit	EyeFocus,	its	sponsors,	or	its	cohort,	but	that	the	Social	Capital	it	would	generate	through	a	more	altruistic	approach	to	developing	the	ecosystem	would	benefit	them	in	the	longer	term.		
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EyeFocus	was	the	only	startup	accelerator	in	the	eye-care	sector,	so	there	was	the	opportunity	for	it	to	play	a	unique	role,	in	particular	as	a	convenor	and	as	a	disruptor.	As	a	neutral	network	aggregator,	EyeFocus	was	able	to	partner	with	almost	any	entity	due	to	being	independent,	and	not	directly	competing	with	anyone	else.	It	was	therefore	able	to	extend	its	network	into	the	charitable	sector,	academia,	healthcare,	and	industry,	as	well	as	building	a	strong	network	in	tech	and	startups.	This	gave	it	a	unique	ability	to	bridge	between	sectors	and	stakeholders,	and	therefore	build	a	new	ecosystem	to	the	wider	benefit	of	the	eye-care	sector.			Having	helped	convene	this	ecosystem,	EyeFocus	was	in	a	stronger	position	to	run	its	own	program,	and	to	offer	more	value	to	its	stakeholders,	including	its	sponsors,	so	this	altruism	with	Social	Capital	in	the	form	of	being	an	ecosystem	builder	could	be	converted	into	economic	capital	in	the	longer	term.				4.6.5	The	role	of	partners	in	building	an	ecosystem			Whilst	EyeFocus	had	several	leading	corporates	as	sponsors,	and	this	provided	a	wealth	of	knowledge	and	networks	to	the	cohort,	it	became	clear	that	EyeFocus	needed	other	stakeholders	in	the	ecosystem	to	be	part	of	the	program	to	build	a	comprehensive	ecosystem	that	was	valuable	to	the	cohort,	mentors,	and	sponsors.	However,	it	transpired		that	a	number	of	valuable	entities	could	not	become	sponsors	e.g.	universities,	charities,	and	other	non-corporate	entities	who	would	not	typically	sponsor	a	commercial	activity	like	an	accelerator.		A	method	was	needed	to	engage	with	
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them	without	asking	them	to	sponsor	the	program.	It	was	decided	to	approach	them	and	ask	them	to	become	partners.			The	concept	of	‘partner’	was	left	open	to	interpretation,	purposefully	not	being	too	defined,	so	it	could	be	adapted	to	whomever	EyeFocus	wanted	to	engage	with.		Partners	were	asked	to	share	their	logo	in	order	to	add	validation	to	the	program	and	help	visualise	the	ecosystem	EyeFocus	had	built.	They	were	asked	to	propose	a	mentor,	and	to	agree	to	some	form	of	engagement	during	the	program.	That	may	be	hosting	an	event,	dialling	into	an	online	session	with	the	cohort,	promoting	activities,	or	sharing	their	knowledge	and	resources.	As	the	partners	varied	so	much,	from	small	local	charities	to	major	hospitals,	there	was	no	benefit	in	prescribing	or	standardising	how	the	engagement	might	take	shape.			As	the	partner	network	developed,	the	design	of	the	program	was	planned	to	include	‘partner	events,’	where	the	cohort	would	visit,	or	be	visited	by	these	partners.	When	visits	were	not	possible,	the	engagements	were	carried	out	over	Skype	or	Google	Hangouts,	so	that	geography	did	not	obstruct	engaging	with	these	networks.	These	visits	were	intended	to	connect	people	so	they	could	meet	again	in	more	depth,	rather	than	trying	to	achieve	too	much	from	the	first	interaction.		Typically,	a	large	part	of	the	cohort	would	meet	one	or	more	people	from	the	partner	organisation,	so	it	was	unrealistic	to	try	to	factor	multiple	bilateral	interactions	into	such	a	visit.			
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The	intention	was	primarily	that	the	startups	would	come	away	with	the	business	cards	of	key	people	across	the	ecosystem,	some	of	whom	they	may	not	actually	need	to	meet	again	until	later	into	the	development	of	their	business.	This	would	be	explained	to	both	sides,	so	that	the	meetings	were	not	judged	on	immediate	outcomes.		Consequently,	the	partner	network	extended	the	reach	into	the	ecosystem	beyond	the	sponsors,	and	created	a	very	diverse	and	global	weak	tie	network.	The	partner	network	created	value	for	the	sponsors	and	mentors	by	widening	the	network	EyeFocus	connected	and	catalysed	for	the	benefit	of	everyone	involved.			This	network	was	an	essential	part	of	building	out	the	social	network	of	EyeFocus,	giving	the	startups	direct	access	to	key	people	in	the	wider	ecosystem.	It	also	formed	a	component	of	the	weak	tie	network	EyeFocus	used	to	find	startups	and	mentors	beyond	its	own	network.		Partnering	very	loosely	with	other	entities	that	cannot	provide	sponsorship	may	be	perceived	as	giving	away	value	to	those	entities	for	free,	but	in	fact	benefits	the	accelerator	because	it	embeds	it	within	a	stronger	ecosystem,	and	earns	it	Social	Capital	as	a	result	of	sharing	the	value	it	creates	with	so	many	other	stakeholders.	This	creates	value	that	returns	to	the	accelerator	and	cohort	over	time.		
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4.7	SUMMARY			This	chapter	began	with	the	premise	that	an	accelerator	is	a	social	network,	as	demonstrated	in	the	previous	two	chapters.	This	led	to	an	examination	of	how	this	understanding	can	inform	the	design	of	an	accelerator,	and	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator	in	particular.			Understanding	that	an	accelerator	is	a	social	network	led	to	a	focus	on	the	role	weak	ties	have	in	creating	the	weak	network	architecture	described	in	3.3	as	important	to	the	accelerator.	This	proliferation	of	weak	and	bridging	ties,	along	with	a	high	degree	of	Social	Capital	enables	the	accelerator	to	use	link	reciprocity	to	police	its	norms.		In	particular,	this	allows	it	to	protect	the	startups	in	its	cohort	and	create	value	for	the	various	stakeholders	it	attracts.	That	value	was	understood	to	lie	within	its	ability	to	offer	early	access	to	novel	information	and	non-redundant	information	and	ties.	These	forms	of	value	reside	within	networks	and	are	therefore	Social	Capital.			This	Social	Capital,	and	the	structure	of	the	accelerator	network	was	demonstrated	to	assist	in	both	building	a	mentor	network,	and	rewarding	those	mentors.	The	chapter	discussed	how	mentors	were	managed,	including	proposing	that	it	was	better	to	ask	for	a	minimum	of	1	hour	per	mentor	over	the	whole	program,	than	to	overload	them	with	time	commitments.	This	reflected	understanding	that	their	benefit	lies	not	just	in	the	knowledge	they	transfer	through	time	spent	mentoring,	but	also	in	the	network	bridges	they	bring	to	the	accelerator.	Therefore,	a	minimal	commitment	encourages	more	
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valuable	mentors	to	agree	to	join	the	network,	without	fear	of	being	asked	for	too	much	time.		Cohorts,	being	the	other	key	element	of	an	accelerator,	were	discussed	in	detail,	examining	how	the	cohort	is	recruited,	and	how	it	should	be	pulled	together	into	a	tight	group	at	the	outset	of	the	program	in	order	to	reduce	decay	over	time,	ensuring	better	peer-support	between	the	startups	and	a	more	effective	establishment	of	norms.			The	need	for	a	fixed	term	relates	to	having	a	cohort,	as	the	participants	cannot	all	begin	the	program	at	the	same	time	if	it	does	not	have	a	fixed	start	date.	It	was	suggested	that	the	need	for	a	fixed	term,	which	is	commonly	three	months,	may	relate	to	the	speed	of	decay	relating	to	non-redundant	information.	This	supposes	that	there	are	a	finite	number	of	interactions	the	cohort	and	mentors	can	have	before	these	weak	tie	connections	develop	into	strong	ties,	reducing	non-redundancy	of	the	information	available	to	both	from	each	other.			Branding	of	EyeFocus	was	examined	in	relation	to	building	a	cohort	and	attracting	mentors,	suggesting	that	the	program	needed	to	be	branded	to	appeal	to	them,	not	to	the	corporates	funding	it.	Demonstrating	visually	the	network	that	the	accelerator	has	built,	through	mentor	biographies	and	partner	logos	on	the	website	was	observed	to	be	an	important	factor	in	communicating	to	potential	startups	and	mentors	the	social	network	of	the	accelerator.			
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Role-sets	were	identified	as	playing	an	important	role	in	understanding	the	value	accelerators	create.	Exposing	the	startups	to	a	very	wide	range	of	role	and	status	sets	was	perceived	as	an	important	part	of	their	education	in	the	program.	Related	to	this,	pitch	training	was	explained	in	terms	of	developing	cognitive	flexibility.			The	role	EyeFocus	could	play	in	developing	an	ecosystem,	and	thereby	becoming	an	‘ecosystem	builder,’	was	discussed	in	terms	of	the	program	design,	the	choice	of	location,	and	the	way	in	which	partner	organisations	were	used	to	help	build	out	and	connect	that	ecosystem.			Consequently,	the	analysis	of	accelerators	using	Social	Network	Theory	contributed	to	the	design	of	EyeFocus,	and	gave	the	founders	a	stronger	understanding	of	the	role	the	accelerator	would	play	in	developing	an	ecosystem	and	supporting	the	cohort.	In	the	next	chapter	observations	are	made	about	how	this	theory	translated	in	practice,	and	what	lessons	can	be	taken	from	that.			 				
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					CHAPTER	5.	OBSERVATIONS	FROM	RUNNING	EYEFOCUS			
After	having	run	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	this	chapter	makes	observations	about	how	the	
theory	proposed	in	Chapter	4	translated	into	practice	during	of	the	program.										
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5.1	INTRODUCTION				In	this	research	the	subject	of	the	case	study	was	being	both	run	by	and	studied	by	the	same	person	concurrently.	This	allowed	the	research	to	have	greater	access	to	the	data,	information,	and	workings	of	the	business	than	if	it	had	been	studied	either	retrospectively,	or	by	a	third	party.				This	situation	also	allowed	the	researcher	the	unique	opportunity	to	test	ideas	within	the	context	of	a	live	business,	and	to	adopt	emergent	strategies	both	in	the	business	and	the	research.			Whilst	this	has	many	benefits,	one	disadvantage	was	that	the	demands	of	the	business	had	to	take	precedent	over	the	needs	of	the	research,	rather	than	the	research	driving	how	the	business	was	run.	This	was	a	commercial	reality;	a	fast	moving,	early	stage	business	had	to	do	whatever	was	necessary	to	succeed	commercially,	and	therefore	could	not	be	dictated	by	the	needs	of	research.			However,	EyeFocus	provided	a	unique	opportunity	to	run	a	research	project	immersed	within	a	business,	with	each	informing	the	other	on	an	ongoing	and	emergent	basis.			Whilst	EyeFocus	provided	an	opportunity	to	examine	the	theories	discussed	in	this	thesis	within	an	active	accelerator,	there	was	not	a	perfect	correspondence	between	the	topics	covered	in	the	research	and	those	examined	in	the	business.	The	research	and	the	business	are	two	separate	endeavours,	with	different	aims,	objectives	and	outcomes.	
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However,	the	business	did	allow	for	some	of	the	theories	explored	in	the	previous	chapter	to	be	tested	and	examined	more	closely	in	a	live	business.		A	description	of	each	week’s	activities	in	EyeFocus	Accelerator	program	is	included	in	the	Appendix	(see	8.1)	to	add	context	to	the	discussion	below.				
5.2	ACCELERATORS	AS	SOCIAL	NETWORKS		The	description	of	an	accelerator	as	a	social	network	was	examined	earlier	(see	3.2.1),	and	argued	that	the	design	of	an	accelerator	should	reflect	this,	in	particular	understanding	the	role	of	weak	and	strong	ties,	bridging	ties,	link	reciprocity,	and	Social	Capital.				Having	used	this	theory,	where	appropriate,	to	inform	the	design	of	EyeFocus,	it	was	possible	to	examine	both	how	the	Social	Network	Theory	manifested	itself	in	the	accelerator,	and	how	some	of	the	theory	translated	into	practice.			In	particular,	this	chapter	will	explore	the	theory	supporting	the	need	for	weak	ties,	mainly	in	the	form	of	mentors,	and	how	mentors	are	rewarded	with	Social	Capital.	It	will	also	look	at	how	Social	Network	Theory	provided	insights	into	where	value	is	created	in	an	accelerator,	and	how	that	value	can	be	used	in	conjunction	with	a	specific	network	structure	to	police	norms	using	link	reciprocity.			
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 243 
5.3	THE	USE	OF	SOCIAL	CAPITAL				This	thesis	has	explored	the	proposal	that	Social	Capital	is	the	main	currency	of	accelerators,	being	used	to	reward	those	who	co-operate	with	it,	in	particular	the	mentors,	and	to	police	the	norms	of	the	accelerator	(see	3.2.3).	Social	Capital	is	also	the	main	value	created	by	the	social	interactions	facilitated	by	an	accelerator,	as	it	resides	between	the	actors,	and	therefore	is	embedded	within	the	network	(see	2.2.2.4).	This	manifested	itself	in	the	design	of	EyeFocus	in	a	number	of	ways,	and	can	be	examined	in	observations	of	the	program.				5.3.1	Maintaining	a	dynamic	network		A	dynamic	network	is	needed	for	effective	link	reciprocity,	and	therefore	to	protect	the	startups.	To	ensure	this,	the	program	continued	to	add	new	weak	ties	and	contacts	to	its	network	throughout	the	program,	rather	than	seeing	that	as	a	process	that	ended	once	the	mentor	group	was	built	and	the	program	launched	(see	3.2.6).		It	was	also	observed	that	over	time	network	ties	and	non-redundancy	decay,	hence	a	fixed	term	program	would	aim	to	end	before		that	decay	negated	the	value	the	program	creates	in	terms	of	non-redundancy	(see	3.2.14).		This	informed	the	design	of	the	accelerator	by	indicating	that	the	network	it	builds	should	be	open	to	newcomers	during	the	program,	so	it	remains	dynamic.	It	also	
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suggested	that	a	weak	network	architecture	strong	in	bridging	Social	Capital	is	required	to	enable	the	communication	of	reputation,	and	a	dense	core	with	strong	bonding	Social	Capital,	in	the	form	of	the	cohort	and	managers,	is	required	to	establish	norms	(see	3.2.1).			In	response	to	this,	EyeFocus	was	designed	so	that	most	of	the	events	it	organised	were	open,	encouraging	new	people	to	attend	in	order	to	keep	the	network	dynamic.	Mentors	were	encouraged	to	bring	other	people	to	the	accelerator	activities.	When	new	people	were	evidently	relevant	to	the	program,	they	were	invited	to	become	mentors	or	Associates,	so	the	network	was	never	static.	In	this	respect,	both	the	cohort	and	mentor	group	remained	fluid	for	the	duration	of	the	program,	and	were	dynamic	networks.	People	who	did	not	engage	became	less	involved,	whilst	new	people	were	incorporated	into	the	network,	and	those	who	were	most	co-operative	were	pulled	closer	into	the	network,	all	of	which	reflected	link	reciprocity	in	the	management	of	the	EyeFocus	social	network.			This	enabled	EyeFocus	to	introduce	new	sources	of	novel	information	and	new	weak	ties	later	in	the	program	when	decay	was	visibly	setting	in.	Furthermore,	the	creation	of	Associate	status	was	a	response	to	this	dynamic,	as	it	allowed	EyeFocus	to	bring	startups	into	the	program	at	any	point,	even	in	the	last	weeks	thus	constantly	introducing	new	non-redundant	information	sources	for	the	benefit	of	the	mentors	and	sponsors.				
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5.4	DEVELOPING	ASSOCIATE	STATUS		The	introduction	of	a	new	category	within	the	cohort	was	a	major	innovation	of	the	program.	It	represented	an	emergent	strategy,	being	a	response	to	a	variety	of	challenges	that	was	fine-tuned	as	the	program	developed.			The	majority	of	traditional	accelerators	examined	in	the	literature	had	an	application	process	that	resulted	in	startups	either	being	accepted	or	rejected.	Those	startups	accepted	commonly	received	investment,	and	then	attended	the	program	(see	2.3.3.6).	This	was	the	original	intention	with	EyeFocus,	and	is	explained	further	in	the	discussion	of	the	application	process	(see	4.4.5).	However,	this	binary	approach,	in	which	the	majority	of	applicants	are	rejected,	quickly	emerged	as	unsuitable	for	a	program	that	aimed	to	be	an	ecosystem	builder,	as	defined	in	3.2.11.			For	an	accelerator	aiming	to	build	a	new	ecosystem,	attracting	a	large	number	of	startups	into	that	network	it	is	building	is	a	necessary	outcome.	Therefore,	rejecting	most	of	the	startups	that	apply	to	be	part	of	the	accelerator	appears	to	contradict	that	ambition.			Associate	status	first	emerged	as	a	response	to	an	early	application	from	a	British	Professor	of	Ophthalmology.	He	approached	EyeFocus	to	discuss	how	he	might	become	involved	in	the	program	to	develop	some	technologies	he	had	built.	He	was	a	professor	of	ophthalmology,	a	practicing	consultant	ophthalmologist,	and	was	building	iPad	apps	to	help	him	work	with	his	patients.	He	was	a	perfect	candidate	for	the	program,	but	he	
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said	he	could	not	attend	a	three-month	program	in	Berlin	due	to	his	professional	obligations,	and	due	to	having	a	family.	In	this	respect	he	was	not	a	typical	of	a	startup	founder	in	an	accelerator,	who	would	expect	to	move	to	a	city	for	three	months	for	an	accelerator	program.			This	raised	a	number	of	issues	for	the	EyeFocus	team.	Firstly,	the	applicants	were	clearly	not	all	conventional	startups,	reflecting	the	unique	nature	of	such	a	focussed	program.	Secondly,	the	traditional	program	design	did	not	allow	for	these	non-conventional	applicants	to	become	part	of	the	ecosystem	EyeFocus	was	building.			Soon	after	this,	other	companies	which	were	not	conventional	accelerator	startups,	approached	EyeFocus	wanting	to	access	the	eye-care	innovation	network	which	EyeFocus	had	built.	One	was	raising	1m	Euros	of	investment,	another	considerably	more,	so	both	had	no	need	for	the	small	investment	offered,	and	the	equity	EyeFocus	was	asking	for	of	around	8%	did	not	fit	their	valuation.	The	EyeFocus	application	process	also	attracted	some	applicants	that	were	not	yet	fully	formed	companies,	either	being	founders	with	an	idea,	or	in	the	case	of	a	team	in	Kenya,	a	startup	that	did	not	have	the	revenues	to	pay	to	come	to	Berlin	and	was	not	a	viable	investment	for	EyeFocus	to	fund	them	to	attend	the	program.			All	of	these	scenarios	raised	the	question	of	how	to	interact	with	companies	that	were	not	going	to	be	one	of	the	core	investments	in	the	EyeFocus	cohort.	Typically,	an	accelerator	would	not	accept	companies	that	it	could	not	invest	in	or	that	would	not	attend	the	program.	However,	it	became	increasingly	clear	that	only	a	small	proportion	
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of	applicants	would	fit	that	criterion,	whilst	the	others	were	still	of	interest	to	the	sponsors	and	partners	and	were	potentially	valuable	members	of	the	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem	EyeFocus	was	building.			Understanding	that	the	value	in	EyeFocus	lay	in	its	ability	to	aggregate	sources	of	novel	information,	it	became	clear	that	these	non-conventional	applicants	should	be	incorporated	into	the	EyeFocus	cohort	in	some	way	(see	2.2.2.4).				For	an	accelerator	to	be	an	effective	network	aggregator	it	needs	a	variety	of	modes	of	engagement.	In	this	context,	the	idea	of	accepting	startups	as	‘Associates’	emerged	as	a	solution	to	the	problem.		Associate	status	was	a	simple	invention	that	created	a	new	category	of	participant,	along	with	startup,	mentor,	and	partner.		This	enabled	EyeFocus	to	accept	these	applicants	in	a	way	that	they	could	join	the	network	and	ecosystem	in	a	formal	capacity,	benefit	from	the	program,	but	not	consume	the	program’s	financial	resources,	or	even	space	in	the	building	(which	was	as	limited	as	the	funding).				Associate	status	evolved	to	become	defined	as:	• Being	part	of	the	network	and	accepted	into	the	cohort.	This	allowed	companies	to	say	they	had	been	accepted	onto	EyeFocus,	which	in	itself	was	a	form	of	validation	they	valued.	• Having	full	access	to	the	activities	of	the	program	at	their	own	expense.	This	allowed	them	to	attend	events,	dial	into	online	talks	and	mentoring,	to	request	mentoring	sessions,	and	to	visit	the	accelerator,	but	did	not	put	pressure	on	the	core	funding	of	the	program.	
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 248 
• They	did	not	receive	any	funding	or	investment.	• They	did	not	have	to	pay	to	be	involved	in	the	program.	Consequently,	EyeFocus	was	not	directly	gaining	any	economic	benefit	from	their	involvement,	but	the	decision	was	supported	by	the	theory	outlining	how	Social	Capital	needs	to	be	shared	more	widely	with	the	ecosystem	(see	3.2.12)	and	how	a	stronger	ecosystem	would	in	turn	benefit	EyeFocus.				5.4.1	Benefits	of	Associate	Status		As	a	result	of	the	Associate	status,	EyeFocus	was	able	to	accept	a	total	of	16	companies	onto	the	program,	rather	than	just	the	8	startups	that	received	funding	and	a	place	in	the	accelerator	venue.	This	latter	figure	was	defined	by	the	limit	on	funding	and	space	for	full	attendees,	rather	than	any	other	limitations.	In	that	respect,	the	figure	of	8	startups	did	not	reflect	what	was	best	for	the	program	or	the	ecosystem,	only	what	was	possible	financially,	which	is	effectively	an	artificial	limit	in	relation	to	the	value	being	created	by	the	program.			Associate	status	also	meant	it	was	possible	to	accept	into	the	program	more	developed	companies,	very	early	stage	founders,	and	social	enterprises.	This	created	a	richer	mix	of	companies	on	the	program,	and	a	more	varied	group	of	people	from	which	synergies	might	develop,	and	who	could	support	each	other	as	a	cohort.			
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Based	on	the	theory	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	(see	4.2.4)	having	more	diversity	within	the	cohort,	and	more	sources	of	novel	information	makes	the	program	more	valuable	to	sponsors,	partners,	and	mentors.	The	theory	also	suggested	that	by	creating	a	cohort	of	greater	value	to	the	other	stakeholders,	EyeFocus	was	also	able	to	create	greater	value	for	that	cohort	because	it	attracted	more	interest	and	engagement	from	mentors	and	partners.			Ultimately	it	became	clear	that	having	an	application	process	that	resulted	in	rejecting	most	of	the	applicants	did	not	fit	with	the	ambition	of	being	an	ecosystem	builder.	By	creating	a	category	that	did	not	receive	investment,	the	single	deciding	factor	in	an	application	process	that	previously	focussed	on	investment	alone	could	give	way	to	a	more	varied	approach,	accepting	some	startups	that	were	suitable	investments,	whilst	also	accepting	others	that	were	not	but	which	had	other	reasons	to	be	of	value	to	the	ecosystem	EyeFocus	was	building.			
5.5	MENTORING		The	previous	chapter	described	how	an	understanding	of	weak	and	bridging	ties	and	Social	Capital	informed	the	mentor	recruitment	process.	This	aspect	of	the	program	saw	the	practice	match	the	theory	well	within	the	EyeFocus	program.					
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5.5.1	Finding	Mentors		The	previous	chapter	detailed	how	mentors	would	be	recruited	using	strong	ties,	then	weak	ties,	and	bridging	ties	to	reach	further	out	into	the	ecosystem	to	find	the	best	mentors	(see	4.3.1).	The	practice	matched	the	theory,	with	the	first	mentors	approached	being	strong	tie	contacts	of	the	accelerator	team	or	sponsors.	The	first	mentors	agreed	to	join	the	program	based	primarily	on	their	closeness	to	the	founders	or	sponsors,	and	therefore	a	high	degree	of	existing	Social	Capital.			With	this	core	of	mentors	in	place,	the	program	had	a	degree	of	social	validation,	so	it	was	possible	to	approach	weaker	ties,	and	ultimately	strangers,	by	which	time	the	existing	mentors	gave	these	new	people	enough	confidence	to	agree	to	become	a	mentor	as	well.	Once	strangers	were	being	approached,	they	were	agreeing	to	mentor	based	on	the	Social	Capital	embedded	within	the	network	built	by	EyeFocus	rather	than	any	direct	Social	Capital	between	them	and	the	founders.		This	process	was	assisted	by	requesting	that	the	sponsors	and	partners	provided	mentors	as	part	of	their	involvement.	This	added	high	level	industry	figures,	from	leading	companies.		Having	mentors	from	the	sponsors	was	a	crucial	element	of	the	program,	because	startups	would	in	some	cases	apply	specifically	to	develop	a	relationship	with	the	sponsoring	companies.			With	a	list	of	respected	figures	from	the	ophthalmology	industry,	the	eye-care	sector,	and	the	startup	sector,	it	became	easier	to	recruit	other	mentors,	and	eventually	reached	a	point	that	strangers	were	approaching	EyeFocus	requesting	to	become	a	
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mentor.	In	some	cases,	people	who	applied	were	rejected,	if	it	was	felt	that	they	did	not	bring	suitable	skills,	or	did	not	understand	the	ethos	of	mentoring.		Throughout	this	process,	a	balance	was	maintained	between	eye-care	and	startup	sector	mentors,	reflecting	the	understanding	that	the	cohort	not	only	needed	support	in	eye-care,	but	also	may	require	generic	business	and	tech	support.	This	reflected	the	practical	needs	of	the	cohort,	but	also	Social	Network	Theory	relating	to	decay	of	ties	and	non-redundancy.	If	all	the	mentors	were	from	interrelated	organisations	just	within	one	part	of	the	ecosystem	EyeFocus	was	building,	there	would	have	been	far	greater	closure	within	the	mentor	group.	This	would	have	led	to	more	rapid	decay	of	non-redundancy	and	diminishing	of	value	for	the	cohort.			The	mentor	network	(see	8.2)	was	displayed	on	the	website,	and	this	was	understood	to	be	a	visualisation	of	the	social	network	developed	by	EyeFocus,	demonstrating	the	people,	organisations,	and	skills	the	accelerator	would	offer	to	startups	as	part	of	the	program.	It	was	also	the	means	by	which	EyeFocus	gave	social	credentials	to	the	mentors	through	their	involvement	in	the	program,	representing	the	Social	Capital	with	which	they	are	rewarded.								
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5.5.2	Rewarding	mentors		The	previous	chapters	identified	that	mentors	are	rewarded	with	Social	Capital,	which	is	the	main	currency	of	an	accelerator	(see	4.5.2).	This	informed	the	design	of	EyeFocus	by	recommending	that	accelerator	programs	remain	conscious	of	how	they	are	rewarding	the	mentors,	and	ensuring	they	access	adequate	value	to	remain	engaged.			Social	Network	Theory	explained	that	this	reward	takes	the	form	of	social	validation,	early	access	to	novel	information	and	non-redundant	ties	(see	4.5.2).	Understanding	that	mentors	are	rewarded	for	their	support	with	Social	Capital	influenced	how	the	accelerator	interacted	with	its	mentors.	To	support	these	outcomes,	the	mentors	were	consciously	included	in	networking	events,	and	rewarded	with	tie	formation	by	helping	them	make	useful	new	network	contacts	via	the	accelerator.	It	was	important	to	communicate	to	them	that	the	accelerator	was	willing	to	introduce	them	to	the	other	mentors,	sponsors,	or	partners	as	that	was	not	a	given.		To	support	the	credentialing	and	social	validation	the	accelerator	needed	to	provide	to	the	mentors,	they	were	interviewed	for	blog	posts,	featured	in	social	media	posts,	and	generally	promoted	in	a	way	that	was	intended	to	develop	their	Social	Capital.		This	was	a	conscious	strategy	to	ensure	that	mentors	received	value	wherever	possible	in	order	to	keep	EyeFocus	relevant	to	them,	and	to	reflect	the	understanding	that	their	co-operation	was	being	reciprocated.			
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In	discussion	with	mentors	at	the	beginning	and	end	of	the	program,	many	had	initially	said	they	were	mentoring	to	‘give	back,’	but	at	the	end	listed	new	network	contacts	and	opportunities	as	an	outcome	of	mentoring.	This	suggests	EyeFocus	responded	to	the	theory	that	mentors	are	rewarded	with	Social	Capital,	and	ensured	they	received	social	benefits	from	their	engagement	with	the	program,	even	when	they	may	not	have	anticipated	it.				5.5.3	Organising	Mentors		The	literature	suggested	that	when	startups	are	left	to	arrange	their	own	mentoring	they	have	less	mentoring,	and	it	is	therefore	the	role	of	the	accelerator	to	facilitate	mentoring	(Cohen	2013;	see	2.3.3.2).		It	was	therefore	important	for	EyeFocus	to	take	an	active	role	in	managing	mentoring	interactions.	Despite	planning	in	advance,	the	process	of	managing	mentors	needed	to	adapt	to	the	program	as	lessons	were	learned.		The	challenges	involved:	1.	 Ensuring	that	all	mentors	had	some	mentoring	sessions.	2.	 Ensuring	that	all	startups	met	all	the	mentors	they	wanted	to	talk	to.	3.	 Mapping	which	mentors	could	best	support	which	startups.	
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4.	 Managing	the	fact	that	some	mentors	were	visiting	EyeFocus,	some	had	to	call	in	on	Skype	or	Google	Hangout,	and	others	were	available	to	meet	when	EyeFocus	visited	London	or	their	organisation.	5.	Managing	the	reality	that	the	mentors,	and	some	associates	in	the	cohort	were	in	multiple	time	zones,	ranging	from	San	Francisco	and	Nairobi	to	Berlin	and	Estonia.	(For	example,	a	partner	abroad	proposed	an	online	mentoring	session	at	4am	Berlin	time).		6.	Confronting	the	problem	that	every	startup	wanted	to	talk	to	the	high-profile	mentors,	who	themselves	had	least	time	for	mentoring	and	were	often	less	interested	in	speaking	to	all	of	the	startups.		To	manage	this	process	a	database	was	developed	to	track	how	many	sessions	each	startup	and	mentor	had	done,	and	with	whom,	and	to	track	easily	who	had	talked	to	whom.	This	gave	a	basic	ability	to	ensure	that	all	the	mentors,	and	all	the	startups	had	mentoring	sessions.			In	total,	EyeFocus	had	57	active	mentors,	and	arranged	161	mentoring	sessions	during	the	12	week	program.				5.5.4	Mentoring	methodology		EyeFocus	was	unusual	because	the	specific	focus	on	eye-care	meant	it	could	not	also	have	a	geographic	focus.	Other	accelerators	typically	build	a	mentor	group	from	the	
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people	in	the	local	ecosystem,	or	who	visit	it.	EyeFocus	built	its	mentor	group	from	the	most	suitable	people	for	the	topics,	regardless	of	where	they	were	located.	Consequently,	the	program	had	to	be	adapted	to	involve	more	online	mentoring,	and	a	wider	variety	of	approaches	to	in	person	interactions.		The	team	experimented	with	and	developed	different	ways	to	organise	mentoring.	These	are	presented	here	in	order	to	share	the	lessons	learned	in	this	process.	The	various	mentoring	methods	included:	
Variations	of	in-person	mentoring	1.	 Traditional	speed	mentoring,	where	a	mentor	sits	at	a	table,	and	startups	are	rotated	every	20	minutes	to	speak	to	them.	This	worked	well	when	either	one	mentor	was	present	at	the	accelerator,	or	when	multiple	mentors	visited.		2.	 A	mentor	addressing	a	group	of	startups	at	once.	This	typically	involved	each	startup	giving	a	very	quick	pitch,	then	the	mentor	talking	about	their	specialist	topic,	answering	questions,	and	offering	advice	to	startups	based	on	their	pitches	or	questions.	This	was	effective	particularly	when	a	mentor	did	not	have	time	to	meet	each	startup.		3.	 Mentors	only	having	meetings	with	selected	startups	based	on	specific	interests	of	the	mentor,	or	needs	of	the	startup.	This	suited	specialists,	or	mentors	who	either	did	not	have	time,	or	did	not	have	the	interest	to	meet	every	startup.		
	
Variations	of	online	mentoring	Online	mentoring	is	less	attractive	than	sitting	at	the	same	table	as	a	mentor,	and	is	more	complicated	to	organise.	However,	given	the	global	nature	of	EyeFocus,	both	in	
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 256 
terms	of	startups	and	mentors,	online	mentoring	was	necessary	to	engage	with	the	whole	ecosystem.	A	mentoring	session	online	with	someone	in	a	different	continent	should	create	more	possibilities	of	bridging	ties	into	entirely	new	networks	and	ecosystems.			Without	creating	multiple	options	for	mentoring,	and	by	allowing	both	startups	and	mentors	to	join	the	program	from	abroad	and	engage	online,	EyeFocus	was	able	to	create	more	overall	engagements,	and	build	bridging	ties	into	remote	networks.	Even	if	a	mentor	engaged	only	once	with	only	one	startup,	that	engagement	represents	novel	information,	and	a	tie	into	a	network,	both	of	which	could	in	theory	be	shared	by	the	whole	cohort,	or	could	be	accessed	again	after	the	program.	Therefore,	having	mentors	abroad,	and	mentoring	online	created	a	higher	probability	of	multiple	bridging	ties,	which	is	good	for	the	program.			EyeFocus	primarily	used	the	online	VOIP	services,	Skype	and	Google	Hangouts	for	online	mentoring	sessions.	In	one	case,	speaking	to	India,	the	mentor’s	organisation	introduced	a	unique	piece	of	software	used	just	for	that	session.		Online	mentoring	represented	an	emergent	strategy.	The	team	did	not	set	out	expecting	or	intending	to	run	much	of	the	mentoring	online.	Two	things	changed	this:	the	establishment	of	Associates,	which	meant	that	not	all	of	the	cohort	were	present	in	the	accelerator	venue;	and	the	way	the	mentor	network	was	developed	using	bridging	ties	and	weak	ties,	rather	than	looking	to	find	mentors	just	in	Berlin,	hence	EyeFocus	became	global.		
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Lessons	were	learned	as	online	mentoring	was	developed	during	the	program,	and	these	provide	useful	insights	for	other	accelerators.		Online	mentoring	developed	a	number	of	variables	to	choose	from,	namely:	
• Skype	or	Google	Hangout	
• One	to	one	calls	between	a	startup	and	mentor	
• Mentors	addressing	a	group	present	in	one	location	
• Mentors	addressing	individuals	and	groups	calling	in	from	multiple	locations	
• Each	individual	using	their	own	computer	to	connect	into	a	call	
• A	group	of	startups	using	one	camera	and	screen	to	speak	to	a	mentor	
• A	variety	of	technology	options,	including	built	in	or	external	cameras	and	microphones		Over	time,	various	problems	were	encountered,	and	best	practice	emerged	from	the	experience:	1. If	the	mentor	and	startup	were	given	a	time	and	left	to	call	each	other	multiple	things	could	go	wrong,	including	technology	not	working	(no	sound,	no	video),	or	confusion	over	time	zone	differences,	or	just	one	party	forgetting	about	the	call.				From	this	it	became	clear	that	each	call	had	to	be	set	up	by	an	EyeFocus	team	member,	who	would	typically	call	the	startup	first,	check	they	were	online	and	available,	and	check	their	sound	and	video	before	bringing	the	mentor	into	the	call.	This	became	very	time	consuming	and	a	full-time	job	for	the	appointed	team	member.	2. When	numerous	people	called	in	from	different	computers,	Google	Hangout	would	bring	to	the	front	the	video	of	any	caller	making	a	noise.	Therefore,	it	was	
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necessary	to	train	the	startups	in	advance	of	such	calls	to	ensure	their	microphones	were	muted	except	when	they	were	talking.	Background	noise	was	a	constant	problem.	3. When	calling	to	countries	with	poor	internet,	poor	sound	and	video	quality	became	a	problem.	Pre-empting	this	and	ensuring	that	the	call	used	the	best	technology,	and	potentially	did	not	include	video	helped	avoid	wasting	the	mentor’s	time	fine-tuning	the	call	once	it	had	started.		4. The	internal	camera	and	microphone	in	many	laptops	was	not	sufficient	for	these	calls,	in	particular	when	a	group	of	startups	gathered	around	one	computer	to	call	a	mentor.	Consequently,	a	professional	microphone	was	purchased	and	used	for	group	sessions.			At	the	beginning,	it	was	surprising	how	many	startups	called	in	from	noisy	cafes	or	offices,	or	in	one	instance	made	a	video	call	whilst	driving	a	car.	Another	startup	dialled	into	a	video	call	from	her	kitchen,	wearing	pyjamas.	Therefore,	it	was	clear	that	training	was	necessary	to	get	all	the	startups	to	a	consistent	standard	when	making	calls.	This	included	aspects	like	camera	angle,	lighting,	use	of	microphones,	and	choice	of	location,	all	of	which	became	part	of	the	education	offered	by	EyeFocus.			These	various	issues	and	challenges	were	addressed	through	experimentation.	New	equipment	was	purchased,	and	the	techniques	were	improved.	Through	experience,	best	practice	was	established	to	enable	online	mentoring	to	become	an	important	part	of	the	program.			
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Based	on	experience,	it	was	concluded	that	the	best	approach	for	online	mentoring	was	to	have	a	mentor	call	a	group	who	were	sitting	at	EyeFocus	in	Berlin.	After	some	early	failures,	such	calls	were	organised	with	the	cohort	sitting	in	a	quiet	room,	using	a	large	screen	and	professional	microphone.	The	manager	would	then	add	other	participants	in	different	locations	to	the	call.	Once	the	cohort	were	online,	and	their	microphones	had	been	tested,	everyone	would	mute	their	microphone,	and	the	EyeFocus	manager	would	bring	in	the	mentor.	The	manager	would	coordinate	the	call,	bringing	startups	in	one	at	a	time.				5.5.5	Mentoring	outcomes		As	discussed	in	the	previous	chapters	(see	2.3.4.4),	mapping	outcomes	of	an	accelerator,	and	in	particular	from	mentoring,	has	a	number	of	challenges.		1. Outcomes	may	not	be	attributed	to	the	accelerator,	especially	when	they	are	the	result	of	multiple	weak	tie	contacts	that	originated	with	an	introduction	by	the	accelerator.	People	do	not	always	map	their	route	through	a	network	to	be	aware	of	where	a	contact	originated.		2. Accelerators	often	do	not	have	the	internal	resources	to	track	every	outcome.	If	these	outcomes	do	not	lead	to	financial	returns,	they	may	not	deploy	resources	to	track	them.	If	their	funding	does	not	require	it,	they	also	may	not	have	the	incentive	to	track	all	outcomes.		
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 260 
3. Also	discussed	previously,	many	accelerators	cease	to	operate	once	the	program	finishes.	This	means	that	even	if	there	is	a	desire	to	track	outcomes,	there	is	no	infrastructure	to	do	this.			In	this	case	practice	matched	this	theory.	EyeFocus	made	an	effort	to	track	mentoring	outcomes	during	the	program.	This	was	easier	with	the	startups	present	in	the	accelerator,	and	more	difficult	with	the	Associates.	It	was	understood	that	many	mentoring	outcomes	would	not	be	reported	to	EyeFocus,	or	would	materialise	after	the	program	had	finished.	The	accelerator	team	were	too	busy	running	the	program	to	pay	too	much	attention	to	mapping	outcomes,	so	this	was	not	considered	a	priority	compared	to	the	immediate	demands	of	the	daily	activities	of	the	accelerator.					5.5.6	Summary:	Mentoring		In	practice,	EyeFocus	established	that	it	is	important	that	a	very	focussed	accelerator	still	must	have	a	very	broad	and	varied	network	of	mentors.	In	particular,	that	an	accelerator	close	to	a	large	corporate	does	not	create	a	mentor	group	only	from	that	corporate.	In	order	to	provide	bridging	ties,	and	non-redundant	information,	the	mentors	need	to	be	a	weak	tie	network	in	relation	to	each	other,	not	just	to	the	startups	in	order	to	prevent	or	delay	decay.		
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EyeFocus	established	that	a	very	focussed	accelerator	is	unlikely	to	create	a	group	of	mentors	in	one	location.	The	common	feature	between	EyeFocus	mentors	was	around	topics:	eye-care	or	tech,	not	location:	Berlin,	or	Europe.			Therefore,	traditional	speed	mentoring	in	the	venue	was	supplemented	with	a	variety	of	other	approaches,	including	a	complex	set	of	online	options	ranging	from	individual	calls	to	group	calls.	This	enabled	EyeFocus	to	introduce	their	cohort	to	the	best	people	around	the	world,	who	could	be	both	informative,	bridging	ties	into	entirely	new	networks,	or	just	inspirational	to	the	startups.	Online	mentoring	was	developed	as	an	emergent	strategy	during	the	program,	learning	from	early	mistakes	and	mishaps.	It	also	supported	the	involvement	of	Associates,	who	were	not	present	in	the	accelerator	venue.			This	experience	led	to	the	observation	that	mentors	should	be	understood	as	network	ties	not	just	repositories	of	knowledge.	Therefore,	a	single,	short	engagement	with	a	mentor	may	not	bring	much	tacit	knowledge	or	direct	support	to	a	startup,	but	counts	as	a	new	tie	into	that	mentor’s	network,	and	brings	value	to	the	cohort	as	a	novel	tie	rather	than	novel	information.				
5.6	PITCH	TRAINING	AND	ROLE	SETS			Rose	Coser	(1975)	argued	that	people	who	do	not	mix	with	others	who	are	different	to	themselves	do	not	develop	the	social	skills	needed	to	operate	within	complex	role	and	
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status	sets.	She	further	suggested	that	developing	complex	role	sets	is	challenging	intellectually,	requiring	people	to	think	about	a	situation	from	the	perspective	of	someone	else	using	their	cognitive	flexibility	(see	2.2.15).		Related	to	this,	she	argued	that	it	required	a	similar	development	of	skills	and	thought	to	communicate	with	a	person	different	to	oneself,	and	more	so	when	communicating	to	multiple	actors	that	are	different	to	each	other	as	well.			Development	of	cognitive	flexibility	as	described	by	Coser	was	observed	to	correspond	with	the	benefit	of	mentoring,	and	of	pitch	training	(see	3.2.15).	The	discussion	above	suggested	that	the	accelerator	should	see	this	as	a	core	task,	rather	than	an		incidental	outcome,	and	be	aware	that	the	interactions	between	the	cohort	and	other	stakeholders	represents	a	component	of	the	education	aspect,	teaching	the	startup	founders	how	to	engage	with	people	from	different	cultures,	commercial	backgrounds,	and	status.	It	was	suggested	that	developing	the	cohort’s	role	sets	becomes	part	of	the	accelerator	program.			In	practical	terms,	pitch	training	was	recognised	to	have	a	more	complex	role	than	previously	recognised.	Not	only	is	it	training	the	startups	to	express	their	company	clearly,	and	thereby	also	understand	it	more	clearly,	but	it	also	reflects	Coser’s	(1975)	argument	about	the	complex	challenge	of	communicating	an	idea	to	people	different	to	oneself,	and	more	so	to	a	group	of	people	also	different	to	each	other,	and	by	extension	is	a	development	of	cognitive	flexibility	and	complex	role	sets.			
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In	EyeFocus,	this	activity	was	clearly	understood.	Being	so	global	in	nature,	with	startups	and	mentors	from	around	the	world,	attention	was	paid	to	how	the	cohort	should	engage	with	the	different	people	they	met.	The	cohort	had	direct	interactions	with	a	very	broad	range	of	people,	from	other	startup	founders	and	accelerator	managers,	through	to	some	of	the	most	senior	people	in	the	tech	and	eye	care	sector,	including	investors,	professors,	and	executives.			It	became	clear	that	the	role	the	accelerator	can	play	in	developing	role	sets	by	convening	ties	from	a	weak	network	architecture	of	founders	who	are	very	different	from	each	other	also	applied	to	other	actors	in	the	network,	including	people	in	senior	positions	within	organisations	that	consist	of	closed,	strong	tie	networks.	These	individuals	also	had	very	little	experience,	for	example,	engaging	with	very	young	startup	founders.			This	resulted	in	greater	attention	being	paid	to	informing	the	different	stakeholder	groups	about	what	to	expect	from	each	other.	For	example,	the	accelerator	team	developed	a	manual	for	the	mentors,	and	carried	out	pre-program	engagements	with	sponsors	to	explain	how	startups	operated.	This	benefits	the	accelerator,	ensuring	a	smoother	set	of	engagements	during	the	program,	but	should	also	be	understood	as	a	tangible	outcome,	leaving	the	ecosystem	built	around	the	accelerator	better	informed	about	each	other,	and	therefore	equipped	with	more	complex	role	and	status	sets.			This	approach	involved	the	accelerator	team	spending	time	with	the	startups	preparing	them	for	different	engagements,	often	briefing	them	on	who	they	were	going	to	meet,	
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and	also	how	to	behave	and	dress.	This	led	to	considerable	changes	in	the	way	the	cohort	interacted	with	other	stakeholders,	suggesting	that	their	role	sets	were	being	developed	as	a	result.				
5.7	ECOSYSTEMS			The	previous	chapters	explored	how	accelerator	design	should	reflect	the	importance	of	ecosystems.	It	was	consequently	suggested	(see	4.6.1)	that	EyeFocus	would	need	an	ecosystem	from	which	to	source	the	various	actors	required	for	the	type	of	social	network	that	supports	an	accelerator,	and	in	return	would	be	able	to	convene	and	catalyse	the	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem.				As	became	clear	when	building	out	the	partner	and	mentor	network,	a	broad	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem	did	not	already	exist.	Smaller	ecosystems	existed,	for	example	around	clusters	of	activity,	like	the	Institut	de	la	Vision	in	Paris,	and	RNIB	and	Moorfields	Hospital	in	London.	A	large,	global,	connected	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem	did	not	exist.		EyeFocus	therefore	set	about	connecting	with	these	ecosystems,	and	between	them.	It	also	bridged	between	them	and	the	tech	ecosystem	to	include	the	startup	culture	that	supports	innovation.			As	such,	EyeFocus	evolved	from	a	deal-flow	maker,	or	corporate	accelerator,	into	what	is	referred	to	in	thesis	as	an	ecosystem	builder	(see	4.6.1).	This	was	both	out	of	necessity,	being	the	ecosystem	in	which	EyeFocus	needed	to	be	embedded	to	achieve	its	
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own	goals,	and	an	outcome,	being	the	benefit	it	shared	back	with	the	ecosystem	that	supported	it.			It	became	evident	that	being	a	new,	independent	entity	that	was	not	competing	with	any	other	entity,	and	which	was	transient	so	would	not	permanently	occupy	any	of	their	space	or	compete	for	their	funding,	meant	EyeFocus	did	not	threaten	other	organisations	positions,	funding,	or	reputation.	This	enabled	EyeFocus	to	become	a	junction	between	networks,	ecosystems,	and	stakeholders.	The	logos	infographic	showing	the	program	partners	(see	4.4.8)	is	a	visual	example	of	the	extent	to	which	EyeFocus	was	able	to	connect	global	stakeholders	in	eye-care	innovation	in	a	relatively	short	time.				
5.8	FIXED	LENGTH,	THREE	MONTH	PROGRAM		5.8.1	Choice	of	three	months		This	thesis	has	examined	how	a	three-month	program	was	chosen	for	EyeFocus	because	it	was	the	industry	standard	for	accelerators,	and	would	therefore	signal	to	startups	that	EyeFocus	was	part	of	the	startup	ecosystem.	This	choice	was	also	informed	by	a	number	of	other	factors,	including	funding,	and	advice	from	other	accelerators	and	startups	that	three	months	is	the	most	people	can	cope	with	on	an	intensive	bootcamp	style	program.					
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Social	Network	Theory	also	suggested	that	a	program	of	around	three	months	would	be	intense	enough	both	to	remain	a	dynamic	network,	and	to	offer	mentor	overload,	but	not	so	long	that	the	network	would	start	to	see	decay	in	the	non-redundant	information	and	ties	(see	3.2.14).		This	theory	translated	well	into	practice.	Towards	the	end	of	the	three-month	program	both	the	management	team	and	startups	were	getting	tired,	as	had	been	predicted.	It	became	difficult	to	retain	the	pace	of	mentoring,	partner	visits,	online	sessions,	networking,	and	social	activities	to	maintain	the	cohesion	of	the	cohort.	Increasingly	the	cohort	became	less	enthusiastic	about	attending	events	organised	by	the	accelerator.	Both	the	energy	of	the	team,	and	the	motivation	of	the	cohort	waned	towards	the	end	of	the	program,	indicating	that	three	months	had	been	the	correct	length	in	terms	of	what	is	sustainable.				Furthermore,	it	took	2-3	weeks	to	create	closure	at	the	core	of	the	accelerator,	so	that	the	cohort	and	management	team	were	close	enough	to	develop	a	shared	culture	and	support	each	other.	This	was	achieved	well,	and	resulted	in	spontaneous	evenings	where	the	cohort	cooked	together	at	Rainmaking	Loft,	and	saw	partners	and	friends	of	the	cohort	visit	the	program	from	abroad,	bringing	people	closer	together	socially,	reflecting	the	proposals	by	Burt	(2001)	on	how	to	encourage	embeddedness	in	order	to	prevent	decay	(see	2.2.3.3).		EyeFocus	managed	to	deliver	non-redundant	ties	and	information	intensively	during	the	first	half	of	the	program,	and	then	less	so	as	the	activities	slowed	down.	However,	
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three	months	proved	to	be	an	appropriate	period	during	which	most	ties	and	information	remained	fresh	and	non-redundant.	Most	mentors	and	startups	met	once,	which	represents	a	non-redundant,	or	new	contact,	with	new	information.	Had	the	program	lasted	longer,	the	list	of	mentors	and	startups	who	had	not	met	would	have	come	to	a	natural	end,	suggesting	repeat	meetings	would	have	been	necessary	to	continue	a	structured	program.	This	would	have	introduced	redundancy	into	the	ties	and	knowledge	being	offered	to	the	startups,	which	would	have	represented	diminished	value	over	time.			5.8.2	Being	a	fixed	length	program		This	thesis	argued	for	a	fixed	length	program	for	a	number	of	reasons	(see	4.4.6).	It	is	seen	as	a	complement	to	a	cohort,	and	something	that	differentiates	an	accelerator	from	an	incubator.		The	fixed	length	had	the	added	benefit	of	creating	deadlines	for	the	various	stakeholders	involved.	The	small	EyeFocus	team	was	faced	with	cajoling	a	large	number	of	individuals	and	organisations	into	an	intensive	program	of	activity,	which	is	challenging.			Having	a	defined	start	date,	and	12	week	window	in	which	to	be	involved,	helped	the	small	team	at	EyeFocus	to	encourage	the	sponsors	to	sign	agreements	and	provide	mentors,	for	the	startups	to	finalise	their	application	and	move	to	Berlin,	and	for	the	mentors	to	commit	their	time.	It	was	observed	from	engaging	with	some	more	institutional	partners	that	without	a	finite	three-month	window,	they	were	inclined	to	
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suggest	dates	for	engagement	many	months	into	the	future,	or	even	in	the	following	year.			The	fixed	length	of	the	program	therefore	created	a	useful	sense	of	urgency,	without	which	it	would	have	been	very	difficult	to	encourage	so	many	actors	to	carry	out	their	defined	engagement	in	such	a	way	that	it	created	the	intense	bootcamp	experience	for	the	cohort.	Without	the	fixed	length	it	would	have	been	impossible	to	assemble	a	cohort	in	Berlin	and	without	which	it	would	not	have	been	possible	to	deliver	the	structured	program,	realise	efficiencies,	or	create	value.	
	
5.9	COHORTS		In	this	thesis	it	has	been	proposed	that	cohorts	are	a	fundamental	part	of	an	accelerator,	complementing	the	fixed	term	program,	and	creating	the	ability	to	offer	efficiencies	to	those	involved.	They	also	create	the	core	of	the	network	from	which	norms	are	agreed	and	communicated,	and	which	creates	Social	Capital	for	the	accelerator	in	the	form	of	novel	information,	which	can	then	be	conferred	back	on	the	startups	in	the	cohort	(see	3.2.6).		In	practice,	this	was	proved	correct.	The	cohort	in	EyeFocus	reflected	the	theory	that	by	gathering	together	a	group	of	startups	that	is	the	best	in	class	it	attracts	the	attention	of	partners,	mentors,	and	sponsors.	This	can	be	seen	in	the	partners	who	gathered	around	EyeFocus	(see	4.4.8),	and	from	the	mentor	list	(see	8.2).				
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 269 
The	approach	to	forming	the	cohort	took	in	two	areas	of	theory.	Firstly,	the	way	the	program	was	branded	and	marketed,	and	how	the	application	and	selection	process	was	managed,	and	secondly	in	the	way	Burt	(2001)	discusses	how	to	form	close	teams	and	avoid	bridge	decay	(see	2.2.3.3).		Reflecting	this	last	point,	during	the	opening	weeks	of	the	program	EyeFocus	organised	informal	and	social	events	for	the	cohort,	having	a	team	dinner,	and	encouraging	the	startups	to	work	with	the	accelerator	team	to	put	on	events	together.	This	brought	the	cohort	together	and	friendships	were	formed	quickly.			The	cohort	also	creates	efficiencies	for	high	status	stakeholders	because	they	can	meet	multiple	startups	in	one	meeting,	and	can	deploy	their	value	to	that	group	in	one	session,	rather	than	multiple	times.	This	became	clear	in	practice,	as	EyeFocus	was	able	to	arrange	meetings	or	mentoring	sessions	with	very	senior	individuals	and	organisations	based	on	offering	the	opportunity	to	meet	the	cohort	in	one	short	session.	It	is	considered	evident	that	these	high	value	contacts	found	time	to	meet	the	EyeFocus	cohort	precisely	because	EyeFocus	had	already	invested	the	time	and	resource	to	find,	filter,	and	organise	the	startups	into	a	cohort.			This	further	supports	the	theory	(see	4.2.4)	that	the	accelerator	creates	value	as	a	resource	of	novel,	non-redundant	information	(see	3.2.5).	The	value	of	the	cohort,	representing	Social	Capital	accumulated	by	EyeFocus,	made	it	possible	to	meet	high-status	and	high-value	actors	in	the	ecosystem.		
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 270 
5.9.1	Cohort	recruitment		
	Having	shown	that	the	cohort	was	important,	and	that	selecting	a	best	in	class	cohort	is	part	of	the	value	the	accelerator	creates,	this	section	describes	how	EyeFocus	recruited	its	cohort.	Recruitment	was	based	on	the	concepts	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter	(see	4.4.3).	This	section	explains	what	happened	in	practice,	and	how	the	process	had	to	be	adapted	where	the	theory	did	not	translate	into	practice	as	smoothly	as	anticipated.			As	described	above	(see	4.4.4)	the	selection	process	was	managed	on	the	website	F6S.com,	and	with	a	formal	process	to	involve	the	sponsors	as	a	selection	committee.	The	ambition	was	to	have	all	applications	received,	filtered	down	to	a	shortlist,	and	then	with	the	selection	committee	to	make	offers	to	the	best	of	these,	all	within	a	pre-defined	timetable	leading	up	to	the	launch	of	the	program.			This	theory	did	not	translate	well	in	practice,	encountering	a	number	of	unforeseen	problems	which	resulted	in	emergent	strategies	to	adapt	the	process.				5.9.2	Selection	process:	lessons		Before	the	formal	application	process	opened,	EyeFocus	offered	places	to	two	startups	already	found	through	mentoring	in	other	accelerators,	via	the	strong	tie	network	of	the	
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EyeFocus	founders.	These	two	startups1	both	had	charismatic	founders,	interesting	products,	and	were	graduates	of	StartupBootcamp	accelerator	in	Copenhagen,	and	Buildit	hardware	accelerator	in	Estonia.			By	offering	them	a	place,	it	was	possible	to	set	a	precedent	of	the	sort	of	startup	the	program	was	seeking,	and	also	validated	the	program	by	showing	that	graduates	of	established	accelerators	wanted	to	join	EyeFocus.			EyeFocus	then	used	the	weak	tie	mentor	network	to	promote	the	accelerator	widely	across	the	startup,	healthcare,	and	eye-care	sector.	Pre-prepared	text	for	emails	and	social	media	posts	was	sent	to	the	mentors	asking	them	to	share	it	across	their	networks.	This	reflected	a	clear	understanding	that	the	mentors	represented	bridging	ties	able	to	bridge	into	other	networks.			By	carefully	identifying	individuals	and	organisations	that	had	a	broad	reach	into	networks	beyond	EyeFocus’s	immediate	network,	and	because	EyeFocus	was	not	competing	with	other	entities,	it	was	possible	to	create	a	brand	and	propagate	that	brand	globally	in	multiple	sectors,	quickly,	and	inexpensively.			This	approach	succeeded	in	finding	tens	of	companies	to	approach,	and	in	attracting	companies	that	approached	EyeFocus.	However,	this	was	not	adequate	to	create	a	large	
                                               
1 Mr Patch, and Blindsense (see 8.3) 
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enough	number	of	applicants	from	which	to	argue	that	those	selected	were	the	best	in	class.		Therefore,	one	member	of	the	EyeFocus	team	was	focussed	on	searching	for,	approaching,	and	processing	applications	from	startups.	This	involved	searching	the	main	startup	databases,	Crunchbase	and	Angelist,	as	well	as	looking	for	media	stories	about	eye-care	startups,	and	directly	approaching	other	possible	clusters	of	eye-care	activity,	such	as	the	Institut	de	la	Vision	in	Paris,	and	RNIB	in	the	UK.			This	created	a	momentum	that	increased	exponentially	until	EyeFocus	had	found	or	been	approached	by	more	than	one	hundred	startups.	However,	the	exponential	effect	of	information	spreading	through	a	network	takes	time,	and	this	only	reached	scale	as	the	start	date	of	the	program	approached.				5.9.3	Problems	with	the	application	process		The	theory	discussed	above	lead	to	forming	a	structured	application	process,	using	F6S.com	to	manage	the	application	process.	Described	by	TechCrunch	(Butcher	2017)	as	“a	kind	of	social	network	for	founders	and	startups	to	keep	track	of	these	programs,”	F6S	was	used	by	leading	accelerators,	and	at	the	time	had	790	accelerators	listed	on	the	site.		
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F6S.com	was	intended	to	create	a	consistent	data-set	of	applicants	that	would	enable	easier	comparisons	between	them	by	the	selection	committee	and	would	provide	a	convenient	way	to	share	this	information	with	that	committee.	F6S.com	allows	members	of	a	selection	committee	to	review	startups	online,	listing	each	person’s	feedback	and	scoring	for	the	other	selectors	to	see.	However,	F6S.com	is	also	relatively	hard	to	use,	and	requires	an	involved	registration	process	for	each	user.	It	also	encouraged	the	use	of	questionnaires	with	a	large	number	of	fields	for	applicants	to	complete.		Not	all	startups	made	their	first	contact	with	EyeFocus	via	the	F6S.com	application	portal.	Those	which	were	introduced	to	the	program	or	found	by	the	team	directly	generally	began	their	engagement	with	emails	or	a	call.	Some	startups	were	being	asked	to	send	some	basic	information	and	a	pitch	deck	by	email,	then	to	fill	out	a	profile	at	F6S.com,	others	filled	an	F6S.com	profile	and	were	then	asked	to	send	a	deck	separately.			Some	startups	were	beginning	the	F6S.com	application	process	and	leaving	it	unfinished.	Because	they	had	not	entered	their	contact	details	it	was	not	possible	to	bypass	the	system	and	contact	them	directly.	Others	were	starting	the	process	and	not	finishing	it,	but	enough	that	they	were	contacted	directly	and	then	circumvented	the	system	by	sending	the	required	information	directly.				It	was	concluded	that	the	F6S.com	process	was	too	cumbersome,	requiring	both	too	much	information,	and	it	was	a	further	obstacle	that	the	startups	had	to	join	the	platform	before	they	could	apply.	Many	of	the	companies	that	contacted	EyeFocus	
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directly	already	had	a	pitch	deck	prepared,	and	by	the	time	they	had	met	the	EyeFocus	team	on	Skype	or	in	person,	asking	them	to	fill	out	so	much	information	again	on	F6S.com	seemed	pedantic	and	inefficient	for	both	parties.	Equally,	as	EyeFocus	was	reaching	out	of	the	startup	sector	to	more	established	medtech	companies,	to	academics,	and	clinicians,	F6S.com	was	clearly	too	unfamiliar	for	them	to	use.			F6S.com	was	also	hard	to	work	with	for	the	selection	committee.	It	either	produced	a	very	long	PDF	form	with	data	about	the	startup,	or	required	those	evaluating	the	data	to	register	and	learn	how	to	use	a	new	platform	before	they	could	review	the	applications.	Given	that	the	selection	committee	were	not	from	a	tech	background,	and	not	already	familiar	with	F6S.com,	this	made	it	difficult	to	manage	what	needed	to	be	a	fast	selection	process.			Ultimately	the	use	of	F6S.com	was	abandoned	during	the	application	period	as	it	was	bringing	no	perceived	value,	and	was	clearly	putting	some	companies	off	completing	their	application.			In	its	place	applicants	were	asked	to	fill	out	basic	information	in	an	online	form	via	the	company	Survey	Monkey,	and	to	email	a	pitch	deck.	Those	of	interest	were	interviewed	over	Skype	by	the	manager	in	the	team	responsible	for	recruitment,	and	then	they	were	filtered	into	a	shortlist,	those	companies	were	interviewed	by	one	of	the	accelerator	founders.			This	process	was	quicker	and	easier,	and	produced	a	shortlist	that	was	sent	to	the	sponsors.			
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 275 
5.9.4	Problems	with	having	a	Selection	committee		A	requirement	of	the	funding	from	the	sponsors	was	that	they	would	form	a	selection	committee	and	be	part	of	the	selection	process.	This	was	welcomed	by	EyeFocus,	as	it	would	ensure	that	the	accelerator	selected	companies	that	were	interesting	and	useful	for	them,	and	also	allowed	them	to	veto	any	companies	they	felt	might	be	considered	to	be	competing	with	them	or	in	some	way	unsuitable.	They	would	also	provide	valuable	industry	insight	when	evaluating	the	applicant	companies.			However,	this	created	some	unforeseen	problems.	Firstly,	the	original	process	using	F6S.com	either	required	the	sponsors	to	register	in	order	to	access	the	applications,	or	for	EyeFocus	to	print	the	very	long	forms	F6S	created,	and	potentially	combine	them	with	pitch	decks	and	other	information.	This	became	hard	to	manage.	It	was	clear	the	sponsors	on	the	selection	committee	just	wanted	a	short	summary	they	could	read	quickly,	in	one	case	requesting	a	single	spreadsheet	in	place	of	all	the	forms	and	pitch	decks.			Secondly,	as	the	funding	had	taken	a	long	time	to	secure,	this	left	a	very	short	period	to	find	and	review	the	startups	before	the	program	started.	Being	busy	senior	executives	in	large	corporations,	the	selection	committee	struggled	to	process	the	long	and	short	list	of	startups	quickly	enough	to	meet	the	deadline	by	which	EyeFocus	needed	the	startups	to	be	accepted	on	to	the	program,	prior	to	its	launch.	A	contributing	factor	was	the	confusion	that	had	emerged	in	how	the	applications	were	handled,	and	the	switch	away	from	F6S.com.	
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Further	to	this,	it	was	also	found	that	the	corporate	members	of	the	selection	committee	often	had	little	understanding	of	the	startups	in	question,	so	were	not	able	to	make	informed	decisions.	This	was	partly	due	the	fact	that	the	information	they	received,	in	order	to	be	on	a	manageable	scale,	did	not	offer	enough	detail,	but	also	due	to	the	very	factor	that	inspired	the	program,	which	was	their	limited	exposure	to	startups	thus	far	and	desire	to	learn	more	about	them.			These	problems	were	exacerbated	by	the	reality	that	startups	were	applying	and	being	accepted	on	an	ad	hoc	basis,	rather	than	according	to	the	planned	submission	deadlines.			The	theory	outlined	above	had	suggested	a	final	application	date,	a	period	to	consider	applicants,	and	then	a	date	at	which	the	successful	applicants	were	informed.	However,	in	reality	the	two	first	startups	had	been	accepted	very	early	on.	Their	founders	were	from	Paraguay	and	Palestine,	so	both	needed	considerable	time	to	secure	visas,	travel,	and	accommodation	in	Berlin	prior	to	the	launch	of	the	program.			By	contrast,	other	startups	were	applying	the	week	before	launch,	and	even	into	the	early	weeks	of	the	program.			As	EyeFocus	grew	as	a	network,	incorporating	more	mentors,	sponsors,	partners,	and	those	startups	already	accepted,	its	weak	tie	network	grew.	With	each	additional	node,	information	about	the	program	spread	exponentially	over	these	new	bridging	ties	into	new	networks.			
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Consequently,	awareness	of	the	program	increased	exponentially	in	the	lead	up	to	and	after	the	launch.	As	discussed	throughout	this	thesis,	a	network	that	is	rich	in	weak	ties	and	Social	Capital,	and	is	positioned	near	to	structural	holes,	is	in	a	strong	position	to	communicate	novel	information	(see	3.2).	The	newly	developed	social	network	built	by	EyeFocus	became	such	a	network,	and	consequently	the	novel	information	flowing	over	the	newly	acquired	bridging	ties	and	propelled	by	the	increasing	levels	of	Social	Capital	embedded	in	that	network,	meant	that	more	and	more	startups	were	hearing	about	EyeFocus	and	applying	to	join	the	program.	It	was	also	noticeable	that	the	quality	of	these	startups	was	increasing	and	applications	did	not	stop	even	after	the	application	process	had	formally	closed	or	when	the	program	was	starting,			Eventually,	during	the	first	weeks	of	the	program,	EyeFocus	was	receiving	emails	from	startups	based	at	world	class	universities	like	Stanford,	MIT,	and	Oxford,	and	other	leading	hubs	of	research	or	innovation.	At	this	point	the	accelerator	had	already	deployed	its	investment,	and	officially	ended	the	selection	process	that	involved	the	sponsors’	committee.			The	solution	to	this	last	problem	was	the	adoption	of	Associate	status	(see	5.4)	which	could	be	deployed	immediately	in	order	to	bring	these	startups	into	the	cohort,	so	they	became	part	of	the	ecosystem.			It	was	felt	by	everyone	involved	that	the	selection	process	had	been	chaotic	and	the	theory	on	which	it	was	based	had	not	translated	into	practice	at	all	well.	The	
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requirements	of	the	process	changed	as	it	developed	and	emergent	strategies	were	required	to	be	developed	rapidly	to	adapt	the	process	accordingly.			Ultimately,	a	simpler	and	faster	process	was	developed.	Also,	the	creation	of	Associate	status	rendered	much	of	the	application	process	redundant,	making	it	easier	to	develop	the	cohort	and	increase	the	Social	Capital	of	the	program.				5.9.5	Companies	rejected	through	the	selection	process		It	is	worth	mentioning	here	the	companies	that	were	not	accepted	onto	the	program,	as	they	are	also	relevant	to	a	discussion	of	both	the	selection	process	and	formation	of	the	cohort.		In	total,	thirty-seven	companies	were	either	considered	and	rejected	by	EyeFocus,	or	were	given	offers	that	they	turned	down.	It	is	not	possible	to	list	the	companies	here,	but	the	reasons	for	them	not	joining	the	program	can	be	discussed.			A	variety	of	reasons	why	companies	did	not	engage	with	the	program	were	identified.	These	included:	• Lack	of	interest;	not	able	to	see	how	it	would	help	them.	Presumably	this	was	either	a	correct	assumption,	or	a	failure	to	understand	what	an	accelerator	could	offer.	These	were	mainly	companies	which	had	no	previous	experience	of	accelerators	or	the	startup	sector,	and	raises	questions	of	how	better	to	communicate	the	benefits	of	an	accelerator,	and	quite	how	far	from	the	startup	world	they	can	remain	attractive.		
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• Being	blocked	by	their	university	from	engaging	with	an	accelerator.	This	was	mainly	down	to	misconceptions	by	some	university	tech	transfer	offices	about	protecting	IP,	but	also	in	some	cases	an	incorrect	sense	that	EyeFocus	was	competing	with	the	university’s	tech	transfer	office.	Some	universities	simply	required	too	long	to	consider	contracts,	or	in	one	case	required	EyeFocus	to	sign	an	NDA	that	would	have	made	it	impossible	for	the	startup	to	attend	the	accelerator	or	meet	mentors.			• A	strange	observation	about	different	cultural	approaches	was	that	French	companies	insisted	on	NDAs	before	discussing	anything	with	anyone,	rendering	it	impossible	for	them	to	have	a	meaningful	engagement	with	the	accelerator	or	mentors.	This	appeared	to	be	a	pattern	specific	to	French	companies,	and	reflected	a	very	different	approach	to	confidentiality	and	trust.	• Other	companies	were	simply	too	far	away	to	engage	with	the	program,	such	as	one	in	Australia.	The	cost	of	coming	to	Berlin	was	too	high	and	the	time	zone	made	it	hard	to	meet	online.		The	fact	that	37	companies	did	not	join	the	cohort	suggests	that	the	selection	process	was	effective	in	filtering	applicants,	and	ensuring	the	cohort	consisted	of	a	best	in	class	that	would	be	of	value	to	the	mentors,	sponsors,	and	partners.								
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5.9.6	Observations:	Ecosystems	and	Cohorts		In	the	previous	chapter,	theory	was	used	to	inform	how	the	startups	would	be	found	and	selected	onto	the	program.	When	tested	in	practice,	this	theory	around	how	an	application	process	should	be	designed	fell	short	of	the	reality.	In	effect,	EyeFocus	was	a	startup,	and	therefore	things	happened	very	quickly,	unpredictably,	and	required	emergent	strategies	to	cope	with	this.	The	very	rigid	planned	application	process	was	abandoned	in	favour	of	something	that	could	function	more	quickly	and	fluidly.			The	new	application	process	reflected	the	realisation	that	EyeFocus	did	not	need	to	gather	so	much	information	from	startups	to	decide	whether	to	accept	or	reject	them,	apart	from	those	it	was	investing	in.	Even	then,	because	the	investment	was	being	made	by	EyeFocus	and	not	on	behalf	of	third	party	investors,	there	was	no	requirement	for	reporting	or	due	diligence	beyond	that	deemed	necessary	by	the	founders,	who	were	making	the	investment.			The	recruitment	process	reflected	well	the	understanding	of	weak,	bridging	ties,	and	of	Social	Capital.	It	also	reflected	the	way	in	which	social	networks	are	known	to	spread	information	in	an	exponential	manner,	which	reflected	‘small	world’	theory	(see	2.2.1.2).	This	led	to	the	escalation	of	applications,	and	increase	in	quality	of	applications,	towards	and	through	the	launch	date	of	the	program.	In	future	it	would	be	helpful	to	anticipate	this	and	plan	it	into	the	lead	up	to	the	program.			
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The	resulting	emergent	application	process	was	simpler,	with	just	an	online	form,	applicants	emailing	relevant	information,	and	a	Skype	call.			The	introduction	of	Associates	also	changed	the	requirements	of	the	application	process.	If	a	program	assumes	that	most	good	applicants	will	be	accepted	as	Associates,	and	only	special	cases	will	receive	investment	it	would	allow	for	a	system	in	which	all	the	good	applicants	could	be	accepted	into	the	cohort	quickly.	Then	on	a	case	by	case	basis	some	startups	could	be	offered	investment.	Those	startups	would	be	subject	to	a	more	rigorous	selection	process,	but	this	could	take	place	during	the	program.			Associate	status	still	needs	to	be	the	result	of	a	selection	process	in	order	to	create	the	value	discussed	in	3.2.8,	however	it	allows	for	all	good	applicants	to	be	incorporated	into	the	cohort,	rather	than	an	artificial	limit	being	imposed	by	available	funding.				
5.10	RUNNING	A	FOCUSSED	PROGRAM			The	benefit	of	a	focussed	program	was	observed	when	it	became	clear	that	as	there	were	no	other	global,	independent	accelerators	addressing	eye-care,	startups	that	were	far	more	developed,	well-funded,	or	already	in	accelerators	saw	value	in	becoming	part	of	the	unique	network	EyeFocus	was	building	through	its	accelerator.			It	had	also	been	predicted	that	the	tight	focus	of	the	program	meant	EyeFocus	was	not	directly	competing	with	other	accelerators,	so	in	fact	could	cooperate	with	them.	This	
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was	proved	to	be	the	case	by	the	first	two	startups	joining	the	cohort,	both	of	whom	had	been	recommended	by	the	accelerators	that	had	already	invested	in	them.			It	was	also	predicted	as	part	of	this	thesis	that	an	accelerator	would	need	to	retain	a	broad	network,	even	when	very	focussed	on	a	sector.	During	the	program	it	became	clear	that	the	eye-care	startups	in	the	EyeFocus	cohort	needed	the	same	range	of	support	and	advice	as	other	general	startups,	as	well	as	additional	specific	eye-care	related	support.	If	the	mentors	and	ecosystem	had	only	focussed	on	eye-care	then	EyeFocus	would	have	lacked	the	business,	tech,	and	general	startup	support	that	is	generic	across	sectors.	The	network	would	also	have	risked	losing	its	characteristics	of	having	a	weak	network	architecture	and	many	bridging	ties,	which	was	described	as	a	defining	characteristic	of	an	accelerator	(see	3.2.1).	As	outlined	above	(see	4.3.3),	a	conscious	effort	was	made	to	ensure	the	mentors	were	balanced	between	eye-care	and	tech	in	general,	and	the	branding	was	intended	to	convey	this	balance	between	the	tech	and	ophthalmology	sector.			The	cohort	and	mentor	network	which	EyeFocus	built	suggests	that	the	choice	to	focus	was	successful.	The	program	achieved	more	than	might	have	been	expected	of	a	first-time	generalist	accelerator,	finding	16	strong	startups	to	join	the	program,	and	a	broad	and	high-quality	set	of	mentors	(see	8.3	and	8.2).					
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5.11	LINK	RECIPROCITY			In	4.5.7	and	4.5.9,	link	reciprocity	was	shown	to	be	an	outcome	of	the	weak	network	architecture	of	an	accelerator	social	network	(see	3.3),	and	the	Social	Capital	accrued	by	the	accelerator.		It	is	used	to	police	norms,	and	therefore	to	protect	the	startups	(see	4.5.9).		It	was	argued	that	accelerators	need	to	maintain	the	right	network	structure,	and	share	Social	Capital	in	order	to	be	able	to	withhold	it	as	a	means	of	sanction.	This	was	reflected	in	the	design	of	the	EyeFocus	network,	and	in	the	way	actors	such	as	mentors	were	rewarded	with	novel	information	and	ties	(see	4.5.2).				During	the	running	of	the	EyeFocus	program	there	were	no	observed	breaches	of	norms,	despite	there	also	being	minimal	use	of	contracts	and	NDAs.	This	suggests	that	the	theory	is	correct	in	arguing	that	link	reciprocity	is	an	effective	method	of	policing	actors	in	a	network	like	that	of	an	accelerator,	and	that	social	sanction	has	more	weight	than	legal	sanction	in	deterring	bad	actors.				
5.12	SUMMARY			The	design	of	EyeFocus	took	into	account	insights	from	Social	Network	Theory	which	influenced	both	the	way	the	EyeFocus	network	was	structured,	and	the	way	the	program	was	designed	and	delivered.	In	particular,	understanding	the	role	of	Social	Capital	as	a	currency,	and	its	connected	role	to	link	reciprocity	informed	how	the	stakeholders	were	rewarded	for	cooperating,	and	a	focus	on	the	network	architecture.	
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It	was	understood	that	the	network	needed	to	remain	dynamic,	and	retain	a	weak	network	architecture	in	order	for	norms	and	link	reciprocity	to	be	able	to	take	the	place	of	more	traditional	legal	contracts	and	rules.	This	also	helped	delay	the	decay	of	ties	and	non-redundant	information.			This	understanding	was	reflected	in	the	way	the	cohort	was	formed,	with	a	focus	on	informal	events	at	the	beginning	of	the	program	to	preclude	bridge	decay,	and	in	the	way	mentors	were	invited	to	most	events,	so	the	program	actively	sought	to	reward	them	with	new	ties	and	knowledge.			Social	Network	Theory	also	informed	the	choice	of	location	and	duration	of	the	program.	Positioning	the	accelerator	in	an	existing	tech	ecosystem,	and	ensuring	the	program	was	long	enough	to	allow	the	cohort	to	gain	new	ties	and	knowledge,	yet	not	so	long	that	these	became	redundant.		The	focus	of	the	program	fitted	the	predictions	of	Christiansen	(2009),	leading	to	a	higher	uptake	in	interest	from	both	mentors	and	startups	than	industry	experts	had	predicted	a	new	program	would	achieve.			During	the	program	it	became	clear	that	value	lay	in	building	an	ecosystem,	as	a	network	aggregator.	This	altered	many	aspects	of	the	program,	most	notably	in	the	adoption	of	the	Associate	status	for	applicants,	and	in	the	way	EyeFocus	organised	activities	where	other	stakeholders	benefitted	more	than	EyeFocus	itself,	thus	
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developing	the	Social	Capital	of	EyeFocus	within	its	ecosystem,	and	further	supporting	its	ability	to	confer	that	Social	Capital	on	the	cohort	to	support	and	protect	them.																								
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	 				CHAPTER	6.	INTERPRETATIONS	AND	FINDINGS			
The	previous	chapter	made	observations	about	how	the	theory	examined	in	Chapter	4	
translated	into	practice	during	the	running	of	EyeFocus	Accelerator.	This	chapter	explores	
those	observations	and	reaches	findings	about	how	the	theory	should	be	interpreted	and	
applied.									
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6.1	INTRODUCTION			To	date,	whilst	some	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	have	been	involved	in	discussions	of	accelerators,	they	have	primarily	been	researched	as	business	support	activities	(e.g.	Bone	et	al.	2017;	see	2.4.1).		In	this	thesis	accelerators	have	been	examined	as	social	networks.			This	has	led	to	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	that	focusses	on	the	social	network	structure	and	dynamics,	rather	than	describing	the	business	support	activities	(see	3.2.17).		This	understanding	of	the	accelerator	as	a	social	network	points	to	a	number	of	specific	findings	about	how	and	why	certain	things	happen	in	accelerators	in	particular,	related	to	the	specific	network	dynamics	of	an	accelerator.	These	were	explored	in	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	and	led	to	findings	discussed	here.				
6.2	FINDINGS	RELATING	TO	ACCELERATOR	
BEHAVIOUR	AND	DESIGN		6.2.1	Social	Capital	explains	why	mentors	mentor		The	existing	literature	and	practice	explain	why	people	offer	to	mentor	for	accelerators	using	empirical	evidence.	This	suggests	that	people	mentor	because	they	want	to	‘give	
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something	back,’	that	they	enjoy	supporting	new	entrepreneurs.	They	also	mentor	to	learn	what	is	new	in	a	sector	of	innovation,	and	to	benefit	from	the	networking	opportunities	around	accelerators	(see	2.3.3.1).			In	this	thesis	Social	Network	Theory	has	been	used	to	examine	mentoring	in	more	detail.	This	offers	an	explanation	based	on	the	underlying	aspects	of	the	social	interaction,	described	mainly	in	terms	of	Social	Capital.	Mentors	gain	a	number	of	social	outcomes	that	equate	to	the	value	(see	3.2.5	and	4.5.2)	inherent	in	Social	Capital:	1. Tie	formation,	namely	new	network	contacts	which	equate	to	value	by	offering	bridging	ties	to	novel	and	non-redundant	information	(see	3.2.3)	2. Validation	and	social	credentials	through	being	selected	by	and	associated	with	the	accelerator,	which	is	thus	sharing	its	Social	Capital	and	status	3. Early	access	to	novel	information	in	the	form	of	innovations	being	created	by	the	cohort				6.2.3	Link	reciprocity	explains	why	accelerators	do	not	use	NDAs		The	use	of	link	reciprocity	does	not	just	apply	to	mentors	but	also	explains	overall	the	way	in	which	the	norms	of	accelerator	networks	are	policed.		Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	observed	that	accelerators	do	not	favour	the	use	of	NDAs,	explaining	this	as	a	function	of	the	accelerator’s	position	within	a	wider	ecosystem	(see	2.3.1).			
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Understanding	link	reciprocity	in	accelerator	social	networks	(see	4.2.3	and	5.11)	gives	a	clearer	explanation	of	why	NDAs	are	not	used,	and	why	trust	is	a	powerful	force	in	accelerator	networks.	It	is	more	than	just	a	cultural	norm,	in	fact	being	a	specific	function	of	the	type	of	social	network	that	forms	an	accelerator.	A	well-structured	accelerator,	as	described	in	this	thesis	(see	4.2),	is	able	to	communicate	reputation	quickly	and	effectively	across	an	ecosystem.			In	the	specific	context	of	an	accelerator,	this	means	that	if	a	bad	actor	damages	a	startup,	all	the	mentors,	all	the	other	startups,	the	partners,	sponsors,	investors,	and	other	stakeholders	clustered	around	an	accelerator	will	find	out.	This	creates	a	higher	risk	of	social	sanction	than	could	be	threatened	by	a	single	startup	in	isolation.	Accelerators	can	influence	extensive	tie	dissolution	(see	2.2.3.4)	due	to	their	position	in	an	ecosystem,	and	can	therefore	deliver	its	function	of	protecting	the	startups	in	its	cohort	(see	3.2.6).			6.2.4	The	importance	of	weak	ties	to	accelerators		An	underlying	theme	of	this	thesis	has	been	the	importance	of	weak	ties,	influenced	by	Granovetter’s	‘The	Strength	of	Weak	Ties’	(see	2.2.1.3).	Accelerators	have	been	shown	to	use	a	weak	network	architecture	rich	in	weak	ties,	some	of	which	will	be	bridging	ties,	in	order	to	bring	non-redundant,	novel	information	to	the	startups	it	is	supporting	(see	3.2.1).	Such	high-value	novel	information	and	contacts	are	accessed	over	bridging	
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ties,	and	bridging	ties	are	usually	weak	ties,	hence	the	accelerator	is	rich	in	bridging	Social	Capital	(see	3.2.1).			This	should	inform	accelerator	design,	which	need	to	be	consciously	building	weak	tie	networks,	especially	concerning	their	mentors	which	are	the	main	potential	source	of	weak	and	bridging	ties.	An	accelerator	without	weak	ties	will	lack	value	because	it	cannot	access	information	that	flows	over	bridging	ties,	and	it	will	be	limited	in	its	ability	to	police	norms	with	link	reciprocity.				6.2.5	The	importance	of	ecosystems		In	the	context	of	accelerators,	the	difference	between	an	ecosystem	and	a	network	is	that	a	network	consists	of	nodes	(people)	and	ties,	while	an	ecosystem	goes	beyond	people	and	entities,	and	includes	such	things	as	policy,	culture,	groups	of	knowledge	such	as	universities,	and	infrastructure,	for	example	flight	connections	(see	2.3.3.5).	All	of	these	things	combined	create	the	wider	environment	in	which	different	social	networks	operate.	Accelerators	are	particular	social	networks	that	sit	within	these	ecosystems,	connected	to	other	social	networks,	and	can	be	powerful	catalysts	in	forming	or	maintaining	ecosystems	because	of	their	unique	nature	and	network	structure	(see	3.2.10).		
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Accelerators	can	act	as	network	aggregators,	convening	stakeholders	in	an	ecosystem,	and	creating	value	across	the	ecosystem	by	improving	the	flow	of	information,	communicating	norms,	and	encouraging	innovation.				6.2.6	Investment	versus	ecosystem	building		The	literature	review	suggests	that	investing	in	cohorts	via	an	accelerator	as	a	deal-flow	maker	is	not	likely	to	be	a	good	way	to	make	money	unless	the	accelerator	is	established	in	a	very	mature	ecosystem	with	a	strong	investment	community,	and	experienced	groups	of	mentors	(see	3.2.16).		The	thesis	further	identified	the	value	and	necessity	of	accelerators	building	and	supporting	ecosystems	(see	3.2.10).	A	conclusion	from	the	experience	running	EyeFocus	is	that	when	an	accelerator	invests	in	the	cohort,	the	criteria	of	the	selection	process	inevitably	focusses	primarily	on	whether	the	applicants	would	be	successful	investments.	This	single	criteria	then	obstructs	other	possible	criteria	for	selection	around	what	might	benefit	the	ecosystem,	or	create	other	outcomes	for	the	accelerator	and	its	supporters.		The	risk	is	that	this	single	investment	criteria	prevents	an	accelerator	that	is	not	purely	a	deal-flow	maker	from	accepting	startups	that	may	form	a	valuable	cohort	capable	of	realising	other	outcomes	(see	2.3.4.5).					
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6.2.7	How	accelerators	protect	startups	using	Social	Capital	and	link	reciprocity			Startups	are	in	general	inherently	vulnerable	and	it	is	a	role	of	an	accelerator	to	protect	them	(see	3.2.6).	They	lack	experience,	may	not	have	the	resources	to	protect	themselves	with	contracts	and	litigation,	and	may	lack	the	large	social	network	through	which	to	validate	people,	and	through	which	to	threaten	reputational	damage	to	people	who	harm	them.			Miller	&	Bound	(2011)	observed	in	the	literature	that	accelerators	protect	vulnerable	startups.	This	thesis	used	Social	Network	Theory	to	explain	this	by	observing	that	accelerators	accrue	Social	Capital	and	status,	and	then	confer	both	on	the	startups	in	their	cohorts	(see	3.2.6).	Additionally,	the	precise	social	network	mechanism	by	which	that	protection	is	enforced	is	link	reciprocity	(see	2.2.3.4).			It	was	also	observed	that	an	accelerator	allows	a	startup	to	maintain	higher	density	in	a	much	larger	network	than	it	could	manage	on	its	own,	hence	the	collective	nature	of	the	cohort,	and	its	position	alongside	the	accelerator	allows	the	startups	to	operate	in	a	larger	network	whilst	maintaining	the	safety	and	trust	of	a	densely	connected	network,	(see	2.2.3.3).		This	gives	a	much	clearer	explanation	of	the	mechanism	by	which	accelerators	support	startups.	Once	understood	theoretically	like	this,	accelerators	should	be	more	aware	that	they	are	expected	to	develop	a	high	level	of	Social	Capital	within	their	ecosystem,	
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and	then	confer	it	on	their	startups.	If	they	are	not	able	to	do	both,	they	will	fail	to	offer	the	full	level	of	support	the	startups	need.			Equally,	if	the	accelerator	is	not	actively	rewarding	the	mentors	with	its	Social	Capital,	the	mentors	are	more	likely	to	lose	interest	before	the	program	is	complete,	and	lack	the	threat	of	sanction,	through	link	reciprocity,	should	they	become	bad	actors	in	relation	to	the	startups.					6.2.8	Associates			The	discussion	in	6.2.7	about	the	disadvantages	of	investing	via	accelerators	led	to	a	conclusion	that	accelerators	not	solely	focussed	on	investment	outcomes	may	benefit	from	admitting	a	wider	variety	of	startups	into	the	cohort	and	thereby	realise	a	wider	range	of	outcomes.	EyeFocus	addressed	this	by	creating	a	second	status	for	applicants,	who	were	able	to	join	the	cohort	as	Associates	(see	5.4).	This	was	an	emergent	strategy	that	took	shape	during	the	program,	and	allowed	EyeFocus	to	build	a	larger	cohort,	and	to	include	companies	that	were	not	suitable	to	receive	investment	for	a	variety	of	reasons.			This	supported	the	aim	of	being	an	ecosystem	builder	rather	than	a	deal-flow	maker,	and	increased	the	value	EyeFocus	was	able	to	offer	to	the	stakeholders	around	it	in	terms	of	novel	information,	based	within	a	more	varied	cohort.			
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6.2.9	Mentoring	online			It	is	acknowledged	that	the	best	opportunity	for	mentoring	is	to	have	a	mentor	and	startup	sitting	together	in	the	same	location.	However,	online	mentoring	created	opportunities	to	speak	to	world	leaders	in	eye-care	and	tech,	which	simply	would	not	have	been	possible	without	online	mentoring.	However,	some	of	this	was	very	hard	to	coordinate.	Technically	this	approach	required	everyone	to	have	a	fast	internet	connection,	good	camera	and	microphone,	and	previous	experience	using	Skype,	or	similar	services	such	as	Google	Hangouts	(see	6.2.9).		Despite	the	technical	and	logistical	problems,	which	were	significant	at	times,	online	mentoring	was	deemed	a	success.	It	allowed	EyeFocus	to	run	a	truly	global	program	and	build	a	global	ecosystem.	It	was	very	cost	effective,	as	it	eliminated	many	travel	costs.	Online	mentoring	allowed,	for	example,	a	team	in	Kenya	to	join	mentoring	sessions	in	Berlin,	and	enabled	participants	from	around	the	world	to	meet	and	talk	with	influential	and	inspiring	people.			A	highpoint	of	the	program,	and	good	example	of	the	benefit	of	this	approach,	was	a	call	with	Dr	Thulasiraj	Ravilla	from	Aravind	Eye	Hospital	in	India.	Aravind	is	a	world	famous	eye	hospital,	and	Dr	Ravilla	an	internationally	acclaimed	thought	leader	in	eyecare.	The	cohort	called	in	from	multiple	locations,	and	from	EyeFocus	in	Berlin	and	were	able	to	spend	over	an	hour	talking	to	Dr	Ravilla,	calling	from	his	office	in	Madurai,	India.			
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	Figure	4.	Online	mentoring	session	with	Dr	Thulasiraj	Ravilla,	Executive	Director	of	Aravind	Eye	Hospital	in	India,	connecting	startups	sitting	in	Estonia,	London,	Berlin,	and	Armenia.	A	demonstration	of	how	complex	online	mentoring	enabled	startups	to	meet	globally	recognised	thought	leaders.			This	has	clear	benefit	to	the	startups	and	participants,	but	also	benefited	EyeFocus	as	it	established	the	profile	of	the	Accelerator	far	beyond	its	own	geographic	base.	For	the	startup	teams,	many	of	whom	were	not	located	in	mainstream	tech	or	eye-care	ecosystems,	being	able	to	meet	global	thought	leaders	was	inspiring,	and	formed	part	of	the	development	of	their	role	sets.			Mentoring	online	created	opportunities	for	startups	to	speak	to	mentors	regardless	of	their	location.	This	allowed	the	accelerator	to	introduce	specific	knowledge,	or	bridge	into	specific	locations	in	a	way	that	would	not	be	possible	if	it	had	relied	entirely	on	a	geographically	limited	group	of	mentors	residing	in	the	local	ecosystem.			
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It	was	complicated,	and	required	traditional	mentoring	techniques	to	be	adapted,	and	new	methods	to	be	developed	as	the	program	was	running.	Whilst	mentoring	online	posed	challenges,	and	had	drawbacks,	overall	it	developed	EyeFocus’s	ability	to	build	a	global	ecosystem,	and	to	promote	innovation	in	eye-care	across	the	sector.				6.2.10	Fixed	Term	programs	and	the	decay	of	non-redundancy		The	literature	review	identified	that	accelerator	programs	typically	range	from	3-12	months	(see	2.3.2.4).		It	also	discussed	decay,	whereby	new	weak	tie	relationships	either	weaken	over	time	or	become	strong	ties,	and	therefore	the	ability	to	generate	a	flow	of	non-redundant	information	also	decays	(see	2.2.3.3).	It	was	observed	in	running	EyeFocus	that	3	months	was	the	longest	the	cohort	or	management	team	could	have	maintained	the	schedule	which	marked	EyeFocus	out	as	an	accelerator	(see	5.8.1).		This	corresponds	with	the	suggestion	that	after	3	months	both	the	management	team	and	cohort	become	tired	after	an	intensive	bootcamp	program,	but	also	supports	the	suggestion	that	decay	of	ties	and	non-redundancy	sets	in	after	3	months.			Reflected	in	EyeFocus	this	took	the	form	of	it	becoming	increasingly	difficult	for	the	management	team	to	find	sources	of	novel	information	and	ties	for	the	cohort,	and	correspondingly	the	cohort	becoming	increasingly	less	interested	in	engaging	with	scheduled	programming	over	working	on	their	startups.			
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This	all	suggests	that	accelerator	terms	are	around	3	months	for	reasons	connected	to	the	speed	at	which	the	non-redundancy	in	their	weak	tie	network	decays.	As	most	mainstream	accelerators	have	roughly	similar	cohort	sizes	(e.g.	7-15),	and	equally	similar	numbers	of	mentors	(e.g.	50-100)	then	it	is	possible	that	decay	happens	at	roughly	the	same	speed,	leaving	them	short	of	non-redundant	information	after	around	3	months.			It	is	possible	that	there	is	a	limit	to	the	number	of	mentors	a	program	can	recruit	and	reasonably	engage	with	in	a	given	period	of	time.	There	are	also	a	finite	number	of	engagements	that	can	be	created	between	a	fixed	cohort	and	fixed	number	of	mentors	up	to	a	point	that	each	startup	has	met	each	mentor	at	least	once.	Those	first	meetings	will	be	a	weak	tie	engagement,	but	further	meetings	will	gradually	diminish	the	value	the	mentors	can	bring	in	terms	of	non-redundant	information,	and	decay	will	set	in.	Other	value	will	develop,	but	this	is	transitioning	into	the	support	and	trust-based	benefit	of	a	strong	tie,	rather	than	the	novelty	of	an	accelerator	output	(Rost	2010;	and	see	2.2.1.4).			The	statistical	analysis	of	such	a	theory	in	any	detail	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	research,	and	is	recommended	as	a	topic	of	future	study	(see	7.3.5),	however	it	is	an	interpretation	of	the	research	that	decay	in	the	network	might	be	a	reason	why	so	many	accelerators	last	3	months.		There	may	also	be	a	natural	limit	of	the	extent	to	which	an	accelerator	can	keep	its	network	dynamic	over	a	period	of	time.	If	it	builds	a	mentor	network	prior	to	launching,	then	facilitates	mentoring	sessions	during	the	program,	it	would	reach	a	point	where	
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decay	increases	exponentially	due	to	triadic	closure,	and	the	extent	to	which	it	would	have	to	refresh	the	network	with	new	mentors	to	counter	this	decay	would	ultimately	translate	to	building	a	new	mentor	network	and	launching	a	new	program.			This	is	a	speculative	assumption	interpreting	the	research	in	this	thesis.	It	would	need	to	be	supported	by	further	research	(see	7.3.5),	but	does	suggest	that	an	instinctive	reflection	of	decay	in	social	networks	may	have	influenced	the	fixed	term,	and	relatively	short	length	of	that	term,	in	the	development	of	accelerators.				6.2.11	Value	resides	in	cohorts	and	non-redundant	information		The	literature	review	identified	that	cohorts	are	a	core	part	of	accelerators	(see	2.3.3.3).	Social	Network	Theory	identified	that	the	value	in	an	accelerator	lies	in	its	ability	to	provide	early	access	to	novel,	non-redundant	information	(see	3.2.3).	Therefore,	a	great	deal	of	the	value	in	an	accelerator	resides	in	the	cohort.	This	is	increased	by	a	vigorous	selection	process	to	form	the	cohort	(see	3.2.8).			However,	as	this	form	of	value	resides	in	the	novel	information	and	ties	embedded	in	the	accelerator	network,	it	must	also	reside	in	the	mentor	network,	in	the	partners	and	sponsors,	and	in	the	wider	ecosystem	an	accelerator	can	convene.	In	EyeFocus	it	was	observed	that	mentors	requested	meetings	with	other	mentors,	and	with	the	sponsors,	and	obtained	value	from	these	introductions,	supporting	the	argument	that	accelerator	managers	should	understand	that	the	value	of	novel	information	does	not	only	lie	in	the	
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cohort,	but	in	the	whole	network.	That	value	can	move	in	all	directions,	and	benefit	all	the	stakeholders,	and	understanding	this	can	be	exploited	to	increase	the	Social	Capital	of	the	program.			A	better	understanding	of	where	value	lies	within	the	accelerator	when	it	is	viewed	as	a	social	network	should	enable	more	of	that	value	to	be	realised	and	shared	across	the	network	built	by	the	accelerator,	further	increasing	its	own	Social	Capital.				6.2.12	Focussed	programs		EyeFocus	was	a	consequence	of	the	dynamic	predicted	by	Christiansen	(2009),	and	observed	by	Bone	et	al.	(2017),	that	accelerators	would	need	to	become	more	focussed	in	order	to	deliver	value	to	their	stakeholders,	and	to	be	able	to	compete	in	an	ever	more	crowded	market.	It	was	established	in	order	to	explore	the	value	of	a	highly	focussed	program,	both	to	the	cohort	and	to	the	ecosystem.	It	was	also	very	focussed	in	order	to	avoid	competing	with	other	more	established	programs	(see	2.3.3.7).			EyeFocus	attracted	a	mentor	network	and	cohort	of	startups	that	were	equivalent	in	number	to	other	mainstream	accelerators,	and	feedback	suggested	they	were	both	of	a	similar	or	higher	quality.	It	also	entered	the	mainstream	in	terms	of	being	written	about,	and	being	listed	as	amongst	the	startup	accelerators	in	Berlin,	and	in	Europe	(Bone	et	al.	2017).		
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This	suggests	the	approach	of	addressing	a	very	narrow	sector	was	effective,	and	brought	value	to	the	wider	tech	and	eye-care	ecosystems.				6.2.13	Startup	facing	brand		It	was	proposed	(see	4.4.7)	that	the	accelerator	brand	needs	to	have	outward	appeal	to	startups,	rather	than	inwards	to	the	corporate	sponsor.	If	the	primary	aim	of	an	accelerator	is	to	identify	novel	innovation	and	build	a	large	weak	tie	network,	it	should	be	designed	primarily	to	be	attractive	to	those	weak	ties,	not	to	the	organisation	that	founded	or	is	funding	it.	It	should	be	a	given	that	the	founding	or	funding	organisations	are	interested	in	the	accelerator,	so	the	public	face	should	appeal	not	to	them	but	to	actors	who	are	different	to	them,	otherwise	it	will	fail	to	attract	new	and	valuable	actors	and	to	develop	weak	ties.			Again,	this	may	run	counter	to	the	instinct	of	a	program	that	is	heavily	dependent	on	a	corporation	which	funds	it	so	this	needs	to	be	explained	and	understood.	The	theory	outlined	in	this	thesis	describes	the	social	dynamics	that	underpin	accelerators	and	make	them	work,	and	this	should	be	used	to	explain	why	an	accelerator	should	be	designed	to	appeal	to	the	startups	and	mentors	who	will	bring	the	novel	information	and	ties	to	the	organisations	supporting	it.			To	achieve	this,	corporates	or	other	large	entities	funding	accelerators	need	to	understand	that	the	accelerator	should	explicitly	be	freed	from	any	requirements	that	
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lead	to	it	being	designed	to	please	the	parent	entity.	However,	it	is	important	that	the	accelerator	is	properly	socialised	within	organisations	supporting	it	so	there	is	suitable	engagement	with	them,	but	this	should	be	part	of	the	initial	planning	rather	than	a	primary	requirement	of	the	program	design	and	branding.				6.2.14	The	need	to	remain	agile		It	was	clear	that	EyeFocus	adopted	a	number	of	emergent	strategies	to	address	problems	and	capitalise	on	opportunities.	It	is	clearly	necessary	for	accelerators	to	remain	agile	and	flexible.	This	is	an	important	consideration	when	more	accelerators	are	being	established	or	funded	by	large	corporates	and	government	agencies.	These	both	may	want	to	see	a	finalised	plan	for	the	whole	program	prior	to	launch,	but	this	would	undermine	the	need	and	ability	of	accelerators	to	adapt	and	change,	remain	dynamic,	and	to	support	rapidly	evolving	early	stage	companies.		
6.3	SUMMARY			These	findings	and	interpretations	demonstrate	how	the	way	an	accelerator	is	designed	can	be	adapted	once	it	is	examined	primarily	as	a	social	network.	This	impacts	on	how	people	and	companies	are	engaged	with	the	program,	and	how	value	is	understood	to	be	created	and	shared.	The	need	to	retain	a	dynamic	network	rich	in	bridging	and	bonding	ties	translated	back	into	practical	outcomes	through	the	development	of	the	Associate	status,	and	increased	use	of	online	mentoring.	
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 302 
	Other	areas	in	which	the	practical	execution	of	the	accelerator	was	influenced	by	theoretical	insights	include	the	greater	focus	on	developing	role-sets	and	cognitive	flexibility,	and	the	understanding	of	how	Social	Capital	was	being	used	to	reward	co-operation,	and	link	reciprocity	to	threaten	sanction	against	bad	actors.			The	network	structure	was	shown	to	be	important	in	creating	the	right	type	of	social	network	to	achieve	the	desired	outcomes	of	the	accelerator,	in	terms	of	facilitating	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information	and	protecting	startups.					 							
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				CHAPTER	7.	CONCLUSIONS	AND	FUTURE	RESEARCH			
This	final	chapter	brings	together	the	findings	and	interpretations	from	the	previous	
chapters	into	a	series	of	conclusions	about	accelerators	based	on	having	analysed	them	as	
social	networks.	These	conclusions	explain	aspects	of	behaviour	in	accelerators	and	
propose	how	this	theory	can	be	used	to	inform	the	design	of	accelerators	in	the	future.	The	
chapter	also	proposes	future	topics	for	research	that	were	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis.											
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7.1	INTRODUCTION		Returning	to	the	aims	and	objectives	stated	in	the	introduction	of	this	thesis,	the	first	3	aims	were	completed	within	the	body	of	the	thesis:	1. To	use	a	literature	review	to	identify	the	aspects	of	Social	Network	Theory	that	can	be	used	to	describe	a	startup	accelerator.	2. To	provide	a	summary	of	the	main	academic	literature	about	accelerators.	3. To	apply	this	theory	to	the	design	of	EyeFocus	accelerator	in	order	to	examine	it	in	situ.	The	last	two	aims	are	now	addressed	in	this	concluding	chapter:	4. To	use	this	exercise	to	reach	conclusions	on	how	accelerators	should	be	run	in	the	future.		5. To	create	a	definition	of	an	accelerator	based	on	Social	Network	Theory	which	can	inform	the	design	and	execution	of	future	accelerators.			7.2	CONCLUSIONS		According	to	the	approach	taken	by	this	thesis,	an	accelerator	has	been	described	as	a	specific	form	of	social	network	(see	3.2.17).		This	enabled	a	discussion	about	accelerators	that	focusses	on	the	underlying	social	network	dynamics,	rather	than	the	elements	of	the	business	support	program	(see	2.4.1).	This	Social	Network	Theory	approach	to	understanding	an	accelerator	introduced	the	concepts	from	Social	Network	
AN EXAMINATION OF STARTUP ACCELERATORS USING SOCIAL NETWORK THEORY 
 
 
 
 305 
Theory	that	have	been	used	in	this	thesis	to	describe	accelerators,	and	to	inform	the	design	of	EyeFocus.	These	are	now	used	to	reach	conclusions	in	this	final	chapter.					7.2.1	Social	Capital	as	payment	for	mentors		The	thesis	explored	the	role	that	Social	Capital	plays	in	rewarding	mentors	(see	4.5.2),	identifying	that	they	primarily	give	their	support	to	accelerators	in	return	for	value	deriving	from	Social	Capital.		Therefore,	this	understanding	of	mentoring	should	allow	accelerators	to	be	designed	with	a	far	more	precise	understanding	of	why	people	mentor,	and	therefore	with	more	focus	on	supporting	this,	so	mentors	engage	and	stay	engaged.	The	design	of	accelerators	needs	to	reflect	this	understanding	that	they	reward	mentors	with	social	validation,	tie	formation,	and	early	access	to	novel	information	(see	4.5.3).	As	examined	in	the	case	study,	to	do	this	it	is	necessary	to	invite	mentors	to	peripheral	events,	not	just	to	mentoring	sessions,	and	to	ensure	that	the	accelerator	shares	its	contacts	with	them	as	well	as	with	the	cohort.	This	theory	also	explains	why	an	accelerator	should	list	their	mentors	on	their	website,	and	otherwise	promote	the	mentors	in	a	way	that	helps	give	them	social	credentials.			Reflecting	this	understanding	of	the	motivation	for	mentors	in	the	design	and	execution	of	programs	should	result	both	in	more	people	wanting	to	mentor,	and	more	mentors	remaining	interested	throughout	the	duration	of	the	program.	Understanding	the	role	of	
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Social	Capital	in	rewarding	mentoring	also	supports	the	explanation	of	how	link	reciprocity	polices	accelerator	networks,	replacing	the	need	for	NDAs.	If	tie	formation,	social	validation,	and	novel	information	are	the	incentive	for	mentors	to	cooperate	with	an	accelerator,	then	retracting	these	is	a	sanction.					7.2.2	The	importance	of	link	reciprocity	to	accelerators		Following	on	from	this	observation	about	sanction,	the	definition	of	an	accelerator	(see	3.3)	explains	how	link	reciprocity	is	used	to	police	norms	(see	4.2.3).	The	argument	being	made	in	this	thesis	is	that	reputational	sanction	carries	more	weight	than	the	threat	of	being	sued,	or	other	forms	of	non-reputational	sanction.	This	is	a	product	of,	and	is	dependent	on,	an	accelerator	having	a	weak	network	architecture	and	strong	bonding	Social	Capital.	It	also	relies	on	accelerators	understanding	if	they	are	not	generous	with	the	value	they	create	then	they	have	nothing	to	threaten	to	withdraw,	and	they	lose	their	ability	to	police	norms.		Whilst	the	point	is	made	in	relation	to	NDAs,	it	has	more	implications.	The	context	relating	to	NDAs	is	used	to	demonstrate	the	validity	of	link	reciprocity,	but	it	relates	much	more	widely	to	how	norms	can	take	the	place	of	rules,	and	social	sanction	can	be	used	to	police	the	complex	and	varied	interactions	that	take	places	within	an	accelerator.	This	is	intrinsically	linked	to	how	accelerators	achieve	an	environment	with	high	levels	of	trust,	which	are	essential	for	mentoring	and	peer	support.				
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Therefore,	understanding	link	reciprocity	should	enable	accelerator	managers	to	ensure	their	network	architecture	is	able	to	communicate	reputation	in	this	way.	It	also	emphasises	why	it	is	necessary	to	share	the	value	of	an	accelerator	widely	and	reward	co-operators,	because	this	develops	the	Social	Capital	that	is	used	to	police	its	norms	in	the	form	of	the	accelerator’s	ability	to	grant	or	restrict	access	to	that	value.			It	is	also	important	in	the	design	of	accelerators	because	mentors	who	naturally	understand	this	will	be	put	off	if	they	are	asked	to	sign	contracts,	and	those	contracts	will	in	most	cases	be	very	hard	to	enforce.	Once	trust,	link	reciprocity,	and	Social	Capital	are	replaced	by	contracts,	the	whole	nature	of	the	social	network	underlying	the	accelerator	is	changed.	It	no	longer	uses	Social	Capital	as	its	primary	currency,	and	no	longer	champions	trust	within	the	network.	This	would	undermine	most	of	the	other	aspects	of	the	accelerator,	and	rapidly	such	a	program	would	rapidly	cease	to	look,	feel,	or	operate	like	a	conventional	accelerator.					7.2.3	Weak	ties	are	important	to	accelerators			This	thesis	has	focussed	throughout	on	the	role	of	weak	ties	and	bridging	ties	to	support	innovation	(see	2.2.1.3),	and	in	the	structure	and	design	of	accelerators	in	particular	(see	3.2.2).		Bridging	ties	are	a	source	of	novel	information	and	it	is	mainly	weak	ties	that	can	be	bridging	ties	(see	2.2.1.4).		Understanding	the	role	of	weak	ties	informed	how	EyeFocus	went	about	finding	startups	and	mentors,	consciously	using	increasingly	
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the	use	of	weak	ties	to	bridge	out	of	its	own	network	to	find	new	people	not	previously	known	to	the	managers	(see	5.5.1).		Therefore,	accelerator	design	should	reflect	the	need	to	build	a	network	rich	in	weak	ties.	This	particularly	relates	to	the	mentors	and	to	the	cohort,	but	also	to	decisions	shaping	who	the	sponsors	and	partners	of	a	program	are.		Understanding	weak	ties	is	of	particular	relevance	for	programs	started	by	corporations	or	government	agencies,	which	risk	building	mentor	networks	only	from	their	immediate,	strong	tie	network	with	the	majority	of	mentors	sourced	from	their	corporation,	or	only	from	within	other	government	networks.	This	can	be	a	result	of	risk	aversion,	wanting	to	retain	a	close	group	of	vetted	or	known	people	perceived	to	be	‘safe,’	or	because	the	organising	entity	itself	lacks	a	diverse	weak	tie	network.			Even	if	such	a	mentor	group	initially	appears	to	a	new	cohort	to	consist	of	weak	ties	with	novel	information,	simply	because	they	have	not	met	the	people	before,	it	will	rapidly	cease	to	offer	the	benefits	of	a	diverse	weak	tie	network	and	suffer	from	decay	more	quickly	(see	2.2.3.3).		A	strong	tie	mentor	network	will	have	a	high	level	of	redundant	information	existing	between	the	actors	because	they	share	similar	contacts	and	knowledge.	Therefore,	the	cohort	will	rapidly	find	themselves	being	offered	the	same	information	and	introductions	as	they	meet	the	different	mentors.		Being	able	to	explain	the	structure	of	a	mentor	group	in	terms	of	weak	ties,	and	to	explain	why	accelerators	need	weak	ties	should	make	it	easier	for	accelerator	managers	to	explain	to	funders	and	sponsors	why	a	mentor	group	has	to	feature	people	from	
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outside	their	core	networks,	even	if	this	means	opening	it	up	to	people	deemed	to	be	less	‘safe’	because	they	are	less	well	known,	or	even	to	be	competitors.		Ironically,	a	larger	network	featuring	more	weak	ties	may	feel	riskier	because	it	lacks	a	sense	of	being	controllable	and	managed,	but	with	more	strangers	and	higher	bridging	Social	Capital	the	network	should	become	safer	because	norms	and	link	reciprocity	will	take	over	from	rules	and	control	as	a	means	of	protection	and	sanction.		Therefore,	if	a	program	is	backed	or	established	by	a	single	corporate	or	government	agency	it	will	be	necessary	to	bring	in	other	companies	and	organisations,	either	as	co-sponsors		or	as	partners	in	order	to	create	the	weak	ties	and	weak	network	architecture	needed	for	the	cohort	to	benefit	from	the	program	as	described	in	this	thesis.				7.2.4	Ecosystems	are	important	to	accelerators				The	author	of	this	thesis	has	identified	that	accelerators	need	to	exist	within	ecosystems	and	can	support	building	and	maintaining	ecosystems	(see	3.2.10).			This	therefore	suggests	that	if	an	existing	ecosystem	does	not	exist	it	will	be	hard	to	launch	an	accelerator.	Consequently,	work	may	be	needed	to	connect	the	basic	parts	of	an	ecosystem	first,	which	can	then	be	used	to	prime	the	accelerator.	Thereafter,	the	accelerator	can	help	develop	and	sustain	that	ecosystem.			This	was	observed	in	running	EyeFocus,	which	existed	both	within	the	tech	and	the	eye-care	ecosystems,	and	connected	the	two	as	a	result	(see	4.4.8).	At	the	early	planning	
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stage,	it	was	decided	to	locate	EyeFocus	in	Berlin,	within	the	existing	tech	ecosystem.	However,	a	coherent	eye-care	innovation	ecosystem	did	not	yet	exist,	so	the	program	had	to	find	and	engage	with	a	large	number	of	partners	and	sponsors	in	order	to	create	an	ecosystem	that	could	provide	the	mentors	and	weak	ties	required	to	create	value	for	an	eye-care	specific	cohort.			Plans	for	new	accelerators	should	map	out	the	ecosystem	that	exists	around	them,	and	the	ecosystem	it	would	need	in	order	to	offer	enough	support	to	its	startups	to	justify	their	involvement	with	the	program.	If	that	ecosystem	does	not	yet	exist,	work	will	be	needed	prior	to	the	program	to	build	out	the	ecosystem.	Conversely,	helping	build	and	support	the	ecosystem	is	an	added	benefit	of	the	program	to	those	supporting	it	and	should	be	expressed	clearly	to	those	who	might	support	the	accelerator.				7.2.5	Investment	can	obstruct	ecosystem	building		This	thesis	has	explored	the	role	and	benefits	of	investing	into	startups	via	an	accelerator	(see	2.3.4),	concluding	that,	in	general,	only	deal-flow	makers	should	use	investment	as	their	primary	source	of	profit,	and	only	then	when	they	are	based	in	very	developed	ecosystems	(see	3.2.16).	Investment	was	seen	to	have	a	powerful	influence	over	the	selection	process	of	accelerators,	and	it	was	suggested	that	this	can	undermine	efforts	to	achieve	other	outcomes,	such	as	building	an	ecosystem	or	supporting	social	impact	outcomes	(see	6.2.6).		
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Reflecting	this,	the	development	of	the	Associate	status	in	EyeFocus	created	the	opportunity	to	accept	into	the	cohort	companies	that	were	interesting	and	relevant	to	the	sponsors	and	wider	ecosystem	but	were	not	necessarily	suitable	companies	for	the	very	specific	investment	being	offered	by	the	program.	This	example	demonstrated	that	there	are	other	ways	to	recruit	startups	into	a	cohort	which	avoid	investment	being	the	primary	filter.		If	an	accelerator	is	more	interested	in	building	an	ecosystem,	supporting	social	outcomes,	developing	wider	economic	or	social	outcomes,	or	identifying	interesting	innovation,	then	investment	potential	may	be	the	wrong	filter	by	which	to	select	startups.	Systematic	investing	on	similar	terms	also	puts	off	companies	not	directly	interested	in	a	small	equity	investment,	or	interested	in	giving	away	equity.			For	an	ecosystem	builder	accelerator,	as	defined	in	this	thesis,	it	may	be	preferable	to	accept	a	larger	number	and	wider	range	of	participants	into	a	cohort.	Their	relevance	to	the	ecosystem,	or	other	interests	of	the	program	may	provide	a	more	appropriate	filter	than	investment	potential.	The	selection	process	can	then	focus	on	creating	a	best	in	class	cohort,	which	attracts	the	other	stakeholders	in	the	ecosystem	more	effectively	than	letting	selection	become	dominated	simply	by	an	applicant’s	ability	to	realise	a	return	on	investment.		If	the	accelerator	is	not	primarily	a	deal-flow	maker,	then	it	is	therefore	recommended	that	investment	should	be	seen	as	optional,	and	dependent	on	the	desired	outcomes	of	the	accelerator.	It	should	be	made	on	a	case	by	case	basis,	and	not	be	a	requirement	for	participants	to	join	the	cohort.	
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7.2.6	Creating	different	categories	within	a	cohort	supports	ecosystem	building		Related	to	the	discussion	about	whether	an	accelerator	should	invest,	an	emergent	strategy	that	developed	during	EyeFocus	was	the	creation	of	Associate	status.	This	allowed	a	larger	number	and	greater	variety	of	companies	to	join	the	program,	which	increased	the	value	in	terms	of	non-redundant	information	and	ecosystem	building	(see	6.2.8).	In	particular,	it	identified	a	means	whereby	startups	could	join	the	cohort	without	receiving	investment.			Overall,	the	Associate	strategy	was	a	deemed	a	successful	innovation.	It	enabled	EyeFocus	to	avoid	having	to	reject	applicants	simply	because	it	had	limited	resources	to	invest,	and	allowed	the	program	to	form	a	more	interesting	and	varied	cohort,	as	a	result	of	the	ability	to	present	more	novel,	non-redundant	information	to	those	who	were	cooperating	with	it.	Therefore,	by	having	a	larger	and	more	diverse	cohort,	still	the	outcome	of	a	selection	process,	EyeFocus	was	able	to	offer	more	value.			Involving	Associates	to	some	extent	changed	the	nature	of	the	program	away	from	looking	like	a	traditional	deal-flow	maker	accelerator,	with	a	small	cohort	of	companies	that	had	received	investment	and	were	attending	the	program	full	time.	In	its	place,	there	were	a	mix	of	companies,	at	very	different	stages	of	development.	This	impacted	on,	for	example,	the	idea	of	a	traditional	demo	day		in	which	the	cohort	would	all	be	pitching	for	investment.	This	mixed	cohort	would	clearly	be	at	very	different	stages,	and	requiring	very	different	outcomes	from	something	like	a	demo	day	.			
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Consequently,	the	program	resulted	in	a	more	effective	scouting	exercise	which	identified	the	best	in	class	eye-care	innovators,	with	the	focus	being	on	eye-care	rather	than	on	their	stage	of	development,	financial	position,	or	location.	This	was	seen	as	beneficial	for	the	sponsors,	partners,	and	mentors,	as	well	as	for	the	cohort.	For	EyeFocus	it	also	led	to	greater	social	impact	outcomes,	in	that	it	was	creating	value	for	others	(the	Associates)	without	directly	gaining	value	in	return	because	it	had	not	invested	in	the	whole	cohort.	This	was	not	considered	a	problem	for	the	founders,	but	is	a	useful	observation	about	the	outcome	of	a	change	to	the	traditional	format	of	the	accelerator.				7.2.7	Accelerators	protect	startups	using	Social	Capital	and	link	reciprocity			This	research	identified	that	accelerators	have	a	role	in	conferring	status	and	Social	Capital	on	the	startups	in	their	cohort	(see	6.2.7),	which	along	with	the	link	reciprocity	they	develop	due	to	their	network	structure,	means	they	are	able	to	protect	the	startups.			Understanding	both	this	role,	and	how	it	is	realised	should	inform	accelerator	design	by	examining	whether	that	particular	accelerator	network	will	sit	within	a	weak	network	architecture,	and	incorporate	enough	Social	Capital	that	it	can	protect	its	startups	in	this	way.	Without	being	rich	in	Social	Capital	and	therefore	able	to	reward	co-operators,	it	will	lack	the	ability	to	police	norms	(see	7.2.2).			
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Being	able	to	communicate	this	to	startups	as	part	of	the	value	offering	may	also	help	explain	the	wider	value	of	an	accelerator,	beyond	the	tangible	aspects	like	finance	and	office	space.	Understanding	and	explaining	this	also	helps	establish	clearer	norms	within	the	accelerator’s	network.				7.2.8	Online	mentoring	supports	greater	value	creation	and	ecosystem	building		5.5.4	and	6.2.9	examined	how	EyeFocus	developed	online	mentoring	as	a	core	strategy	in	the	program.	This	allowed	the	mentor	network	and	wider	ecosystem	to	consist	of	the	best	people,	regardless	of	their	location.	This	was	observed	to	be	particularly	important	when	building	an	ecosystem	around	a	very	niche	sector,	like	eye-care.	In	this	case	there	were	specific	people	and	organisations	without	which	the	ecosystem	would	have	been	noticeably	lacking,	whereas	in	a	generalist	accelerator	there	are	multiple	actors	who	can	fill	general	roles.				Online	mentoring	was	shown	to	require	a	considerable	amount	of	experimentation	and	effort	on	the	part	of	the	accelerator	team.	However,	this	experiment	suggested	that	online	mentoring	considerably	increases	the	ability	of	the	accelerator	to	build	a	large	weak	tie	network,	supporting	the	many	findings	in	this	thesis	about	the	importance	and	value	of	existing	within	a	weak	network	architecture,	and	being	rich	in	bridging	ties	(see	3.3).		
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One	observation	is	that	online	mentoring	is	clearly	not	as	preferable	as	mentoring	sessions	in	person,	and	may	reduce	the	extent	of	involvement	by	a	mentor	or	partner.	However,	even	if	an	online	interaction	only	results	in	the	transfer	of	one	piece	of	useful	information,	or	one	network	tie	being	established,	this	is	a	good	enough	outcome	to	support	the	approach.	In	particular,	in	terms	of	building	an	ecosystem	and	establishing	weak	ties,	online	mentoring	could	be	argued	to	offer	more	value	because	the	fact	that	the	person	is	not	physically	present	implies	they	are	geographically	distant,	and	therefore	more	likely	to	be	a	weak	tie	with	potential	to	bridge	into	their	immediate	network	and	ecosystem.				7.2.9	Fixed	term	programs	relate	to	the	decay	of	non-redundancy		The	discussion	in	6.2.10	argued	that	a	reason	for	fixed	term	programs	is	to	address	the	problem	of	the	decay	of	non-redundant	information,	whereby	weak	ties	decay	or	become	strong	ties,	and	consequently	the	accelerator’s	potential	to	maintain	a	flow	of	non-redundant	information	declines.	If	this	non-redundancy	and	novelty	is	the	source	of	value	in	an	accelerator,	then	over	time	decay	diminishes	the	value	to	those	involved	in	the	accelerator.			It	was	proposed	that	decay	in	accelerator	networks	might	explain	why	they	tend	to	be	3	month	programs	(see	6.2.10).	If	the	value	created	by	an	accelerator	is	embedded	within	the	weak	tie	nature	of	its	network,	and	consequent	ability	to	facilitate	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information,	then	as	those	weak	ties	decay,	the	value	would	diminish.			
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The	other	reasons	for	a	program	lasting	3	months	were	tied	to	available	funding,	and	the	ability	of	a	cohort	and	management	team	to	sustain	a	bootcamp	style	program	for	any	longer.	Both	of	these	proved	to	be	the	case	with	EyeFocus.		EyeFocus	gave	insights	into	this	set	of	ideas.	Firstly,	the	funding	raised	corresponded	with	a	program	of	3	months.	Secondly,	it	was	the	case	that	after	about	2	months	it	became	increasingly	harder	for	the	management	team	to	generate	value	through	novel	interactions.	Towards	the	end	of	the	program,	whilst	it	was	not	the	case	that	every	mentor	had	met	every	startup,	it	did	appear	that	most	interactions	that	were	going	to	happen	had	already	happened.			In	particular	this	made	it	hard	for	the	accelerator	team	to	continue	to	create	novelty	on	a	regular	basis,	in	the	form	of	interactions	that	would	generate	new	knowledge,	contacts,	or	information.	Increasingly,	startups	became	less	interested	in	attending	activities	organised	by	the	accelerator,	suggesting	that	the	non-redundancy	in	the	network	built	by	EyeFocus	was	decaying	for	them,	in	that	it	was	delivering	less	novel	value.	This	supports	the	argument	above	that	non-redundancy	within	a	network	of	the	average	size	of	most	accelerators	has	a	time	limit	before	it	decays,	which	may	be	around	3	months.			This	question	requires	more	research	that	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	thesis,	but	raises	interesting	questions	around	decay	of	ties	and	non-redundant	information	over	time	within	a	defined	network	(see	7.3.5).		
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7.2.10	Value	resides	in	the	cohort	and	non-redundant	information		Understanding	how	value	is	created	specifically	by	providing	early	access	to	novel,	non-redundant	information	needs	to	inform	how	accelerators	are	designed.	It	forms	part	of	the	discussion	above	about	decay	and	program	length,	because	without	this	value	the	accelerator	would	gradually	cease	to	offer	the	Social	Capital	outcomes	that	attract	the	various	stakeholders.			This	also	informs	how	the	various	stakeholder	groups	of	the	accelerator	are	selected	and	structured,	arguing	that	each	should	consciously	be	a	source	of	novel	information	for	the	others.	For	this,	the	accelerator	needs	to	strive	for	diversity	wherever	possible,	and	beware	of	groups	of	strong	tie	contacts.			Therefore,	this	informs	accelerator	design	by	pointing	to	the	importance	of	creating	a	network	that	can	generate	novel	and	non-redundant	information,	both	for	the	cohort	from	the	mentors	and	partners,	and	for	those	stakeholders	from	within	the	cohort.	Without	this	function,	the	accelerator	will	not	be	valuable	to	its	stakeholders,	even	if	it	provides	a	useful	education	and	training	program.			Each	aspect	of	the	accelerator’s	network	should	therefore	be	examined	to	ensure	it	can	achieve	this	outcome,	and	this	is	informed	by	other	findings	from	this	thesis	relating	to	weak	ties,	and	the	network	structure	outlined	above	(see	3.3).				
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7.2.11	Focussed	programs		The	previous	chapter	examined	how	the	literature	had	argued	in	favour	of	more	focussed	accelerator	programs	(see	6.2.12),	and	EyeFocus	was	established	to	test	the	effectiveness	of	a	very	focussed	accelerator.		Aims	included	running	a	program	that	was	not	competing	with	more	established	accelerators,	and	testing	the	idea	that	a	very	focussed	program	could	offer	benefits	to	the	stakeholders.			EyeFocus	demonstrated	the	potential	of	a	very	focussed	accelerator	in	a	number	of	ways.	It	built	a	new	ecosystem	that	brought	together	eye-care	startups,	large	ophthalmology	organisations	and	companies,	and	the	tech	sector	(see	4.4.8).	This	suggests	that	an	accelerator	is	well	suited	to	build	ecosystems,	but	also	that	a	very	focussed	accelerator	can	be	a	catalyst	in	connecting	a	niche	industry	vertical	in	which	all	the	main	stakeholders	are	easily	identified	and	can	be	connected	together	in	this	way.			Another	indication	that	this	approach	was	successful	was	that	startups	joined	EyeFocus	Accelerator	after	having	already	completed	other	respected	accelerator	programs.	This	argues	that	the	specific	value	EyeFocus	offered	was	different	to	that	of	a	generic	accelerator,	or	a	technology	specific	accelerator.	In	particular,	this	suggests	that	startups	joined	EyeFocus	specifically	to	access	the	network	it	had	built,	having	previously	attended	accelerators	that	specialised	in,	for	example,	hardware	or	mobile	technology.	This	argues	for	different	benefits	from	technology	specific	programs,	which	can	offer	support	around	the	product,	and	vertical	programs	that	can	offer	support	
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around	market	access,	networks,	and	knowledge.	They	therefore	complement	each	other	rather	than	compete.			EyeFocus	was	referenced	in	the	tech	media	alongside	mainstream	global	and	European	accelerators	(Bone	et	al.	2017),	suggesting	it	managed	to	join	their	ranks,	rather	than	competing	at	a	disadvantage.	The	fact	that	so	many	startups	(see	8.3),	mentors	(see	8.2),	and	partners	(see	4.4.8)	were	involved	with	EyeFocus	suggests	they	found	it	valuable.					Therefore,	the	experiment	of	EyeFocus,	along	with	the	findings	of	the	literature	review,	argue	in	favour	of	establishing	very	focussed	programs	as	a	complement	to	the	more	established	general	accelerators,	but	also	that	very	focussed	programs	should	understand	that	the	value	they	bring	startups	may	be	more	about	the	network	they	build	than	with	more	general	programs.												
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7.3	DEFINITION	OF	AN	ACCELERATOR	USING	SOCIAL	NETWORK	THEORY	
	7.3.1	Detailed	Definition			The	thesis	has	so	far	developed	two	different	definitions	of	an	accelerator.	The	first	was	based	on	literature	about	accelerators	and	described	what	an	accelerator	does(see	2.4.1),	the	second	introduced	elements	of	Social	Network	Theory	to	describe	the	network	structure	and	characteristics	of	an	accelerator	(see	3.2.17).	These	are	brought	together	here	to	provide	a	final	definition	that	reflects	the	accelerator	as	both	a	business	support	program	and	a	social	network.			Key	aspects	are	outlined	below:	
• An	accelerator	is	a	fixed	term	program	consisting	of	support	provided	to	a	cohort	of	startups	primarily	by	mentors.		
• The	accelerator	should	consist	of	a	dynamic	network	that	has	strong	ties	with	a	high	level	of	closure,	or	density,	at	the	core,	set	within	a	weak	network	architecture	rich	in	weak	and	bridging	ties.		
• That	core	consists	primarily	of	the	cohort	and	management	team.	The	high	level	of	closure	allows	it	to	establish	the	accelerator’s	norms.	These	norms	are	communicated	through	the	weak	network	architecture	of	the	accelerator	network.	
• The	cohort	are	recruited	through	a	selection	process	to	create	a	best	in	class	that	is	validated	by	the	accelerator.		This	pool	of	novel	information	becomes	the	value	
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embedded	within	the	accelerator,	as	Social	Capital,	which	is	used	to	attract	and	reward	the	other	stakeholders.	
• The	cohort	allows	the	accelerator	to	create	efficiencies	in	how	support	is	delivered	to	the	startups,	and	in	how	the	startups	are	presented	to	the	other	stakeholders.		
• The	accelerator	creates	value	by	facilitating	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information,	and	bridging	structural	holes.	This	value,	being	embedded	within	a	social	network	is	Social	Capital.		
• The	accelerator	network	is	rich	in	Social	Capital,	which	translates	into	trust	because	its	actors	are	confident	of	returns	due	to	it	being	embedded	in	a	weak	network	architecture	that	communicates	reputation	effectively.		
• The	other	source	of	novel	information,	and	the	main	source	of	weak	ties,	are	the	mentors,	who	are	rewarded	primarily	with	this	Social	Capital,	in	particular	equating	to	social	credentials,	new	ties,	and	early	access	to	novel,	non-redundant		information.		
• The	accelerator	supports	and	protects	the	cohort	by	conferring	on	them	its	Social	Capital	and	status.	This	enables	startups	potentially	weak	in	Social	Capital	and	status	to	seek	support	from	high-value	actors	in	the	network,	who	are	subsequently	rewarded	with	the	Social	Capital	embedded	within	the	accelerator’s	network.		
• The	high	level	of	novel,	non-redundant	information	and	ties	embedded	within	the	accelerator’s	network	are	valuable	to	those	engaging	with	it.		Consequently,	the	norms	of	the	accelerator	can	be	policed	using	link	reciprocity,	whereby	that	
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value	can	be	withdrawn	as	a	sanction.		Tie	formation	is	the	accelerator’s	reward,	rather	than	payment;	tie	dissolution	is	its	sanction,	rather	than	contract	dispute.		
• The	accelerator	network	needs	to	start	out	rich	in	weak	ties	and	non-redundancy	because	these	will	inevitably	decay	over	time	as	the	accelerator	facilitates	the	flow	of	novel	information	over	the	structural	holes	it	bridges.		As	it	connects	people	together	and	they	share	information,	tie	decay	will	see	some	of	those	relationships	dissolve,	whilst	others	will	form	into	strong	ties,	and	non-redundancy	will	decay	along	with	the	weak	ties.		
• With	less	novel	information	to	share,	and	therefore	decreasing	Social	Capital,	the	accelerator	becomes	less	able	to	police	its	norms	effectively	using	link	reciprocity	because	the	threat	of	sanction	through	tie	dissolution	diminishes	along	with	the	reduction	of	novel	information	that	flows	over	those	ties.		It	will	also	have	less	Social	Capital	with	which	to	reward	people,	so	it	will	become	progressively	less	valuable	to	its	various	stakeholders.	This	decay	is	a	reason	why	the	program	has	a	fixed	term,	and	potentially	why	so	many	accelerators	run	for	3	months.	
• The	skill	used	to	operate	in	this	network	involves	developing	complex	role	and	status	sets	because	the	network	is	diverse,	and	founders	need	to	communicate	their	business	to	a	wide	range	of	people,	including	investors,	employees,	customers,	and	advisors.	This	is	reflected	in	a	focus	on	pitch	training,	which	develops	this	skill	and	the	founders’	cognitive	flexibility.		
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7.3.2	Shorter	Definition			An	accelerator	is	a	fixed	term	program	that	supports	a	cohort	of	startups.	It	consists	of	a	dynamic	network	that	has	strong	ties	with	a	high	level	of	closure	at	the	core,	set	within	a	weak	network	architecture	rich	in	bridging	ties.	It	creates	value	by	facilitating	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information	across	structural	holes,	using	the	weak	ties	in	its	network,	who	are	primarily	the	mentors.	These	mentors	are	rewarded	with	Social	Capital,	which	is	the	main	currency	of	an	accelerator,	its	value	being	embedded	within	its	social	network.	The	norms	and	rules	of	an	accelerator	are	policed	using	link	reciprocity,	which	relies	upon	the	social	network	being	dynamic	and	rich	in	Social	Capital.	In	this	way,	the	accelerator	supports	and	protects	its	cohort	by	conferring	upon	them	its	own	Social	Capital	and	status.	Over	time,	the	ability	of	the	accelerator	to	facilitate	the	flow	of	non-redundant	information	decays,	and	weak	ties	dissolve	or	become	strong	ties.	With	this	decay	in	non-redundancy	the	value	embedded	within	the	accelerator	declines,	as	does	its	ability	to	police	norms	through	link	reciprocity.		At	this	point	the	program	ends,	and	the	cycle	begins	again	with	the	next	cohort.										
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7.3	FUTURE	RESEARCH	RECOMMENDATIONS			7.3.1	Longitudinal	study	of	an	accelerator			This	research	studied	one	accelerator	for	a	relatively	short	period.	This	demonstrated	the	potential	of	researching	accelerators	live	and	in	situ.		It	would	clearly	be	valuable	to	research	an	accelerator	program	from	the	birth	of	the	idea	through	to	long	after	the	program	has	closed,	and	through	multiple	programs,	including	monitoring	the	longer-term	impact	of	the	startups	into	the	future.			This	would	require	more	resources	than	existed	in	EyeFocus	or	for	this	research	thesis,	potentially	requiring	a	university	to	partner	with	an	established	accelerator	company,	with	funding	for	a	researcher	to	spend	9-12	months	embedded	within	the	accelerator	company	full	time,	and	for	this	to	be	repeated	over	multiple	years.			7.3.2	Greater	overlap	between	academia	and	business		It	would	be	attractive	for	more	people	to	bridge	academia	and	business	in	the	ways	explored	in	this	thesis.	It	appears	that	very	few	of	the	people	running	accelerators	are	also	involved	in	researching	them,	and	equally	few	academics	researching	the	topic	are	also	employed	professionals	in	this	field.	This	gap	between	academia	and	business	also	runs	the	risk	that	academic	research	is	effectively	out	of	date	by	the	time	it	is	published,	
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and	therefore	does	not	influence	the	business	of	accelerators	because	the	practitioners	are	already	working	on	the	next	iteration	of	the	business.	Consequently,	it	is	likely	that	the	businesses	inform	the	research,	but	the	research	does	not	inform	the	businesses.	Ideally	the	research	could	inform	accelerator	design	more	than	it	does.			This	partly	reflects	the	point	above,	suggesting	that	academics	are	embedded	within	accelerators	for	the	duration	of	their	business	cycle,	also	that	research	is	processed	and	published	fast	enough	to	keep	up	with	the	rapid	iteration	of	the	accelerator	business	sector.				7.3.3	Larger	data	sets		The	literature,	and	this	thesis,	observed	that	there	is	very	little	data	about	accelerators.	Addressing	this	should	become	a	joint	effort	between	academia	and	business,	with	the	former	working	more	closely	with	accelerators,	and	the	latter	attempting	to	find	ways	to	share	data	more	readily.	This	cooperation	would	lead	to	a	better	understanding	of	what	does	and	does	not	work,	and	how	better	to	develop	accelerators	into	the	future.	In	particular	there	is	a	need	for	large	data	sets	developed	over	longer	periods	of	time.							
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7.3.4	Use	of	network	mapping	software		This	research	was	carried	out	by	an	entrepreneur	not	a	data	scientist.	Therefore,	it	does	not	feature	any	attempt	to	use	mapping	software	to	map	the	nodes	and	ties,	and	interactions	of	the	social	network	built	around	EyeFocus.			It	would	contribute	considerably	to	the	understanding	of	accelerator	outcomes	to	use	software	that	can	map	and	analyse	social	networks	to	track	the	interactions	of	an	accelerator	from	its	inception	through	to	as	long	after	it	closes	as	possible.	This	will	provide	valuable	insights	into	the	types	of	interactions	happening	within	the	social	network	that	is	built,	and	identify	when	and	how	value	is	created.			As	observed	in	this	thesis,	it	is	likely	that	many	outcomes	of	bridging	ties	created	by	an	accelerator	will	occur	long	after	the	program	has	finished,	and	therefore	not	be	tracked.	A	longer-term	study	also	involving	network	mapping	software	might	be	able	to	capture	more	of	these	outcomes,	and	also	capture	outcomes	resulting	from	bridging	ties	developed	over	multiple	degrees	of	separation	in	a	network.	This	means	if	the	accelerator	introduces	a	startup	to	a	mentor,	who	introduces	a	contact,	who	introduces	a	contact,	who	introduces	a	contact	that	leads	to	an	outcome	it	might	be	possible	to	map	that.	Such	outcomes	are	rarely	observed	as	originating	from	the	original	introduction,	or	reported	back	to	whoever	made	that	introduction.					
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7.3.5	Understanding	ideal	timeframes		This	thesis	has	suggested	that	there	is	a	link	between	accelerators	generally	running	for	3	months	and	the	timeframe	over	which	the	number	of	mentors	and	number	of	startups	engage	once,	and	thereafter	experience	a	decay	in	the	non-redundant	information	those	interactions	produce.			It	is	likely	that	an	accelerator	needs	to	run	for	long	enough	for	the	core	to	develop	a	high	level	of	closure.	The	program	also	has	to	last	long	enough	for	the	cohort	to	make	initial	contacts	with	the	mentors,	and	then	for	the	mentors	to	make	further	introductions.	This	leads	to	the	exponential	effect	that	dramatically	increases	the	scale	of	the	cohort’s	networks.			However,	at	some	point	all	the	actors	in	this	new	network	will	have	met,	exchanged	their	non-redundant	information,	and	decay	will	set	in,	seeing	many	of	the	connections	deteriorate,	whilst	other	weak	ties	will	evolve	into	strong	ties.	At	that	point	the	accelerator	ceases	to	offer	non-redundancy	to	its	stakeholders.	What	emerges	is	also	beneficial,	but	in	a	way	different	to	that	of	an	accelerator.	Close	friendships,	strong	ties,	and	highly	trusting	networks	are	good	for	getting	things	done	(see	2.2.2.4).	But	this	network	is	no	longer	about	novel	information	and	non-redundancy,	and	is	therefore	no	longer	creating	the	value	expected	of	an	accelerator.			It	would	also	be	valuable	to	understand	better	the	statistics	that	emerge	when	measuring	the	number	of	interactions	between	a	cohort	and	a	group	of	mentors	over	
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time.	How	long	does	it	take	for	an	optimum	number	of	interactions	to	happen,	and	at	what	point	does	value	start	to	decrease?		It	would	be	interesting	for	further	research	to	try	to	define	what	these	ideal	timeframes	are,	and	social	network	mapping	software	may	be	able	to	contribute	to	that.	An	evidence-based	investigation	into	this	question,	based	on	mapping	the	networks	that	develop,	and	seeing	how	and	when	they	transition	from	weak	to	strong	tie,	and	cease	to	introduce	non-redundant	information	would	prove	valuable	to	the	future	understanding	of	accelerators	and	other	activities	rooted	in	social	networks.			7.3.6	More	funding	is	required		Most	of	these	recommendations	primarily	require	funding	more	than	they	demand	any	novel	expertise,	so	it	would	be	interesting	for	the	more	affluent	funders	of	accelerators,	and	for	public	sector	funding	in	this	space,	to	consider	how	such	research	could	be	built	into	accelerator	budgets	so	they	can	work	more	closely	with	universities	to	shed	more	light	on	this	still	relatively	new	sector.								
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7.4	SUMMARY		This	thesis	has	examined	accelerators	as	business	support	programs,	and	then	used	Social	Network	Theory	to	understand	the	underlying	structure	and	behaviour	of	accelerators	as	social	networks.		This	research	has	identified	that	accelerators	are	in	fact	complex	social	networks	that	need	to	have	the	right	structure	and	behaviours	to	deliver	the	practical	outcomes	sought	from	accelerators.		Based	on	the	findings	of	this	research,	conclusions	were	able	to	form	recommendations	about	how	accelerators	should	be	designed,	pointing	to	the	value	in	understanding	the	underlying	social	network,	and	the	behaviours	and	dynamics	embedded	within	that	social	network.			Further	work	is	recommended	in	better	understanding	the	nature	of	accelerator	social	networks,	including	mapping	the	networks	using	software,	so	outcomes	can	be	more	accurately	tied	to	the	structure	of	the	social	network.			Having	an	understanding	of	how	Social	Network	Theory	describes	accelerators	should	enable	those	designing	them	to	do	so	more	effectively,	ensuring	that	the	accelerator	is	rich	in	weak	ties	and	Social	Capital,	can	police	its	norms	using	link	reciprocity	rather	than	contracts,	continues	to	provide	high	levels	of	non-redundancy,	and	ends	when	that	inevitably	starts	to	decay.				
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8.	APPENDIX			8.1	DESCRIPTION	OF	THE	EYEFOCUS	PROGRAM		This	section	presents	a	description	of	the	EyeFocus	accelerator	program,	along	with	evidence	and	data	produced	through	the	activity	of	developing	and	running	the	accelerator.			The	chapter	is	intended	to	offer	a	descriptive	narrative	of	the	program,	and	to	present	some	of	the	evidence	it	produced.	Not	all	of	the	evidence	and	narrative	is	necessarily	relevant	for	this	thesis	but	is	presented	here	also	for	the	future	study	of	accelerators,	as	outlined	in	the	aims	and	objectives.			Within	this	chapter,	some	analysis	is	combined	with	the	narrative	in	order	to	show	the	emergent	strategies	that	evolved	during	the	program.	Where	theory	helped	inform	how	the	program	was	designed,	emergent	strategies	adapted	that	design	when	the	theory	led	in	practice	to	unpredictable	outcomes,	as	happens	with	a	fast-moving	business.						
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	Figure	5.	EyeFocus	Accelerator	team,	mentors,	and	startups	in	Rainmaking	Loft	on	launch	day		EyeFocus	Accelerator	in	summary:	•	 Identified	over	90	startups	around	the	world	innovating	in	eye-care	•	 Engaged	with	startups	from	over	20	countries		•	 Supported	16	companies	from	13	countries	on	the	program	•	 Invested	in	or	funded	5	companies	•	 Worked	with	57	mentors	from	18	different	countries	•	 Organised	161	direct	mentoring	interactions	•	 Ran	44	partner	events					
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Weekly	Program	Activities		
This	section	describes	the	activities	of	the	accelerator	program,	outlining	both	the	curriculum	and	engagement	with	mentors,	partners,	and	sponsors.	This	adds	colour	to	the	theory	outlined	above	and	is	intended	to	give	an	insight	that	is	more	detailed	and	rich	than	a	purely	statistical	analysis.	It	is	intended	that	this	section	will	give	a	context	to	the	theory	outlined	in	this	thesis,	but	also	provide	a	resource	for	future	research.				
Week	1	-	Berlin	Launch	week	The	first	week	of	EyeFocus	saw	11	startup	teams	from	10	countries	flying	in	to	Berlin	for	an	intensive	program	of	activities.	This	gathering	of	the	cohort	mixed	startups	attending	the	full	program	and	associates,	some	of	whom	only	attended	for	this	first	week.	This	reflects	the	aim	to	create	closure	within	the	core	of	the	network,	especially	between	the	cohort	and	management	team.			EyeFocus	arranged	a	visit	to	Fraunhofer	Institute,	a	program	partner,	who	gave	a	presentation	on	intra	ocular	lenses	and	explained	how	the	Institute	could	work	with	the	startups	to	carry	out	research	and	development.		A	private	event	was	organized	just	for	the	lead	sponsor,	Bayer,	with	over	50	senior	executives	from	Bayer	Health	Care	Global,	who	flew	in	from	around	the	world,	and	hosted	by	Dr	Rafiq	Hasan,	Vice	President	and	Global	Head	of	Ophthalmology	at	Bayer,	and	Richard	Condon,	Business	Unit	Head,	Specialty	Medicine	UK,	Bayer.	The	11	startup	teams	presented	their	concepts	to	the	Bayer	group.	Bayer	also	had	a	chance	to	look	
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around	Rainmaking	Loft	and	learn	about	Berlin’s	leading	startup	co-working	space.	This	formed	part	of	a	longer	series	of	events	at	Bayer	held	in	Berlin	that	week	as	part	of	their	annual	global	meet	up.			The	week	also	included	the	core	of	the	taught	curriculum,	with	taught	workshops	on	Lean	Startup,	Design	Thinking,	pitch	training,	and	an	introduction	to	the	startups	about	the	rest	of	the	program.	The	week	also	included	some	intensive	speed	mentoring	sessions,	for	which	mentors	had	flow	into	Berlin	from	London	and	Paris.			At	the	end	of	the	week	EyeFocus	held	a	public	launch	party	at	Rainmaking	Loft.	Invitees	included	EyeFocus	mentors	and	partners,	and	people	from	the	wider	Berlin	startup	sector.	The	party	was	attended	by	sponsors	and	their	employees	along	with	around	80	guests	from	across	the	Berlin	startup	and	healthcare	sector.	This	was	an	unusual	opportunity	for	EyeFocus	sponsors	to	meet	the	wider	Berlin	digital	health	and	startup	ecosystem,	reflecting	the	value	attached	to	ecosystem	building	by	the	accelerator,	and	creating	value	as	a	junction	between	different	stakeholder	groups.			
Week		2	–	Berlin		
Partner	visit:	OptecBB,	mapping	the	optic	scene	in	Berlin	Optech	Berlin-Brandenburg	is	an	industry	group	for	companies	and	academics	in	the	eye-care	and	optics	sector	from	the	Berlin-Brandenburg	area.	The	EyeFocus	cohort	met	12	academics,	startups	and	clinicians	from	the	OptecBB	network	with	an	interest	in	eyecare.	This	session	introduced	EyeFocus	to	the	founders	of	Frame	Punk,	a	young	Berlin-based	startup	focusing	on	producing	eyewear	using	innovative	methods,	who	
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consequently	moved	into	the	accelerator	space	so	EyeFocus	could	help	them	network	into	the	startup	and	eye-care	community.	The	event	also	identified	a	new	mentor	who	joined	the	accelerator	mentor	group.			
	 				Figure	6.	An	associate	team	learning	about	Lean	Canvas	during	a	workshop		
Goodpoint	Fellows	Workshop	1:	finances	Marta	Führich.	MD	of	Goodpoint	Fellows,	and	EyeFocus	Mentor,	offered	to	organise	3	workshops	to	teach	the	cohort	how	to	manage	their	finances	effectively.	EyeFocus	also	invited	other	Rainmaking	Loft	tenants	to	attend	the	workshop,	sharing	the	value	with	the	wider	startup	community,	and	developing	the	Social	Capital	of	EyeFocus.					
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Berlin	Startup	Consultants:	accessing	public	funding	Darius	Moeini,	MD	of	Berlin	Startups,	gave	the	EyeFocus	cohort	a	private	session	on	the	German	and	EU	public	funding	landscape.	This	was	of	particular	relevance	to	Mr	Patch	and	Blindsense,	who	consequently	both	made	applications	to	sources	of	German	funding	to	help	support	their	product	development	and	keep	their	teams	in	Berlin.			
Week	3	-	Berlin	
Visit	to	Zeiss,	Berlin	EyeFocus	arranged	a	half-day	visit	to	Zeiss’s	headquarters	for	Surgical	Ophthalmology	in	Berlin.	The	event	was	joined	by	Jan	Willem	de	Cler,	Senior	Vice	President	Surgical	Ophthalmology,	to	give	an	in-depth	explanation	of	his	department’s	priorities	and	how	they	handle	innovation	in	a	large	corporate	setting.	The	startups	pitched	to	a	group	of	Zeiss	executives	from	across	R&D,	Ophthalmology,	and	other	teams,	who	gave	feedback	on	their	products	and	how	they	might	fit	within	the	innovation	agenda	at	Zeiss.	The	visit	also	included	a	tour	of	the	factory	facilities	to	learn	about	how	intra	ocular	lenses	are	produced.			
Opt	Retina:	Founders’	stories	Mark	Ruiz,	CEO	of	Opt	Retina,	visited	the	accelerator	to	talk	to	EyeFocus	startups	about	his	experiences	founding	an	eye-care	technology	startup,	including	some	of	the	issues	and	frustrations	he	encountered	along	the	way.	Mark	also	provided	individual	mentoring	to	each	of	the	startups.			
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Week	4	–	Visiting	London	The	week	in	London	was	arranged	early	in	the	program	in	order	to	allow	the	cohort	to	meet	people	and	have	enough	time	in	the	program	to	follow	up	and	engage	with	them.	The	aims	of	the	visit	were:	1. To	present	EyeFocus	to	the	London	startup	and	eye-care	sectors	2. To	arrange	visits	to	key	partners,	and	arrange	mentoring	sessions	3. To	expose	the	startups	to	an	important	startup	and	eye-care	ecosystem	4. To	build	out	the	weak	tie	networks	of	the	startups	in	a	different	geography,	so	they	were	not	restricted	just	to	contacts	in	Berlin	
	
KPMG	tax	&	startups	workshop	The	week	started	off	at	Rainmaking	Loft	London,	sister-location	to	EyeFocus’s	home	in	Berlin,	where	the	startups	met	with	tax,	medtech	and	startup	experts	from	KPMG’s	High	Growth	Tech	Group.	The	cohort	were	given	an	overview	of	the	London	tech	scene	and	how	they	can	access	support	from	KPMG.	This	was	followed	by	a	thorough	grounding	in	UK	tax	law	relevant	to	startups,	as	well	as	a	Q&A.	The	session	ended	with	one-to-one	meetings	between	KPMG	staff	and	startups,	in	which	our	companies	could	get	more	in-depth	advice	on	how	to	operate	within	the	UK.		Whilst	at	Rainmaking	Loft,	the	cohort	had	a	final	pitch	rehearsal	for	the	investor	event	at	Bloomberg	that	evening.	Startups	were	told	they	had	to	attend	this	pitch	training	event	or	they	would	not	be	allowed	to	pitch	to	the	investors	later.	This	was	to	protect	both	EyeFocus,	and	the	cohort,	by	ensuring	the	pitch	standard	was	consistently	high.		
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Bloomberg	pitching	event	Bloomberg	ran	a	small	number	of	private	startup	pitch	events	for	their	investor	network.	EyeFocus	was	the	subject	of	one	of	these	evening	events.	The	event	attracted	an	audience	of	25-30	investors,	ranging	from	Angel	to	VC	investors,	and	including	some	of	the	leading	impact	investment	funds	and	advisors.	The	pitches	received	excellent	feedback	from	attendees,	including	a	VC	partner	who	said	these	were	the	best	pitches	he	had	seen	at	a	Bloomberg	event.	The	pitching	was	followed	by	networking	drinks,	where	the	startups	had	the	opportunity	to	discuss	their	products	in	more	detail	with	guests.		The	event	was	a	valuable	opportunity	to	showcase	the	work	of	EyeFocus	startups	to	some	of	the	UK’s	investors,	as	well	as	to	network	with	the	London	tech	investment	community.	
	
Professor	Chris	Dainty	–	Moorfields	and	UCL	EyeFocus	spent	a	morning	with	mentor,	Professor	Chris	Dainty,	at	Moorfields	Eye	Hospital	and	the	Institute	of	Ophthalmology,	UCL.	Professor	Dainty	bridges	academic,	clinical,	and	commercial	work	in	eye-care,	being	both	a	professor	at	the	Institute	of	Ophthalmology,	and	working	for	Cambridge	Consultants,	one	of	the	leading	technical	R&D.			At	this	event,	the	cohort	pitched	to	give	an	overview	of	their	businesses,	and	had	in-depth	discussions	with	Professor	Dainty.	The	feedback	each	received	was	insightful	and	
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practical,	with	many	of	the	startups	getting	direct	advice	and	contacts	to	take	their	projects	forward.		Professor	Dainty	has	particular	expertise	into	mobile	phone	camera	technology,	which	was	invaluable	for	our	startups	developing	diagnostic	tools	on	mobile	devices.			
Moorfields	Eye	Hospital	&	University	College	London		EyeFocus	startups	met	with	senior	figures	from	UCL,	including	UCL	Medtech	Accelerator,	UCL	Institute	of	Biomedical	Engineering,	UCL	Business	and	UCL	Consultants.	The	event	gave	an	insight	into	some	of	the	ways	EyeFocus	startups	might	collaborate	with	the	university	on	research,	projects,	and	funding	opportunities,	and	the	different	organisations	and	sub-groups	within	UCL	who	can	help	with	this.		
Imperial	Innovations	pitching	&	panel	discussion	EyeFocus	visited	Imperial	Innovations	at	Imperial	College	London.	This	event	saw	the	startups	pitching	to	leading	figures	across	Imperial	Innovations,	with	representatives	from	the	Ventures	team,	Imperial	Create	Labs,	and	startups	within	Imperial's	accelerator.	The	event	also	provided	an	overview	of	the	different	innovation	activities	happening	throughout	Imperial	College,	and	the	various	ways	they	interact	with	startups.	The	cohort	were	able	to	meet	Imperial	Ventures,	one	of	the	world’s	leading	investors	in	healthcare	innovation,	along	with	a	major	eye-care	startup	they	had	recently	invested	in.					
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Seedrs,	Capital	Enterprise,	and	IDEA	London	EyeFocus	organised	a	workshop	with	startup	equity	crowdfunding	company,	Seedrs.	The	event	was	hosted	at	Idea	London,	with	Capital	Enterprise	and	was	open	to	all	London	startups.	Consequently,	an	added	benefit	was	meeting	new	startup	founders	and	other	people	from	London’s	startup	ecosystem.	As	a	result	of	this	open	invitation,	and	an	example	of	how	it	encourages	weak	tie	networking	opportunities,	EyeFocus	startup	Mr	Patch	met	one	of	the	few	Vision	Therapists	working	in	behavioural	optometry,	who	went	on	to	become	a	co-founder	in	her	company.				
RNIB	visit	On	the	last	day	in	London,	EyeFocus	visited	RNIB	(Royal	National	Institute	for	Blind	People)	one	of	the	world's	oldest	and	most	renowned	charities	supporting	people	with	sight	problems,	which	provides	support	and	advice	to	the	two	million	people	in	the	UK	suffering	sight	loss.			EyeFocus	teams	gave	pitches	to	and	received	feedback	from	the	leading	experts	in	sight	loss	services	at	RNIB.	The	event	included	a	tour	of	RNIB’s	building	and	shop,	providing	a	rare	example	of	an	office	building	designed	primarily	for	blind	people,	and	to	see	the	types	of	products	already	on	the	market	for	blind	and	visually	impaired	people.	This	forged	links	between	EyeFocus	startups	and	RNIB	or	future	engagement,	product	development,	and	networking.				
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Networking	drinks	party	On	the	last	evening	of	the	visit	to	London	EyeFocus	ran	a	drinks	party	at	an	art	gallery	in	the	East	End,	near	Silicon	Roundabout.	The	EyeFocus	team,	mentors,	and	cohort	invited	their	friends	and	contacts	from	the	London	tech	ecosystem.	The	event	was	designed	to	be	open,	and	was	promoted	on	various	London	tech	newsletters,	and	through	the	EyeFocus	network.	This	positioned	EyeFocus	within	the	London	tech	ecosystem,	and	created	further	weak	tie	networking	opportunities.			
Week	5	–	Berlin		
Goodpoint	Fellows	2	Marta	Führich	joined	EyeFocus	for	the	second	of	her	workshops	designed	specifically	to	support	startup	development	and	management.	In	this	session,	she	focused	on	how	to	get	investors	on	board	and	how	to	keep	them,	as	well	as	how	to	choose	the	right	people	to	support	startups.	The	workshop	furthered	the	startups’	understanding	on	how	to	manage	their	finances.			
Naked	Angels	Club	EyeFocus	were	invited	to	present	to	a	group	of	Angel	Investors.	The	session	was	organised	by	Tobias	Wittich,	Managing	Director,	Rainmaking	Loft.			
Week	6	-	Berlin	
Berlin	Partners	Workshop	Berlin	Partners	are	Berlin’s	inward	investment	agency.	Representatives	of	Berlin	Partners	covering	e-health,	medtech,	and	funding	joined	EyeFocus	for	a	session	
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highlighting	some	of	the	ways	Berlin	Partners	can	help	the	startups	relocating	to	Berlin	after	the	program.	Consequently,	DB	Glove	arranged	further	meetings	to	talk	about	grants	in	Germany;	Mr	Patch	was	introduced	to	the	Neuroscience	department	of	Berlin	Frei	University;	and	Blindsense	received	help	to	apply	for	visas.	This	is	an	example	of	EyeFocus	using	its	status	and	Social	Capital	to	support	startups.	This	meeting	was	more	efficient	for	all	involved	than	each	startup	having	to	find	out	about	Berlin	Partners.		
Buildit	Accelerator	co-hosted	event	EyeFocus	hosted	a	delegation	from	Buildit	Hardware	Accelerator	in	Estonia	for	two	days	of	workshops	and	events	in	collaboration	with	Berlin	Hardware	Accelerator.	It	is	unusual	for	accelerators	to	work	together	in	this	way,	but	because	EyeFocus	was	so	vertically	focused	it	was	not	competing	with	other	accelerators	and	could	therefore	act	as	a	neutral	junction	between	them.		The	events	with	Buildit	were	an	opportunity	for	EyeFocus	startups	to	interact	with	others	working	in	the	hardware	space.	The	event	attracted	external	mentors,	workshops,	and	networking	at	the	hardware	startup	space	Betahaus,	Rainmaking	Loft,	and	over	meals,	thus	increasing	the	weak	tie	network	around	EyeFocus.			During	the	event	EyeFocus	met	a	new	startup,	Batsuit,	which	was	working	on	an	eye	care	technology	at	Berlin	Hardware	Accelerator,	and	consequently	joined	EyeFocus	as	an	Associate.	During	the	first	meetings,	Batsuit	met	one	of	EyeFocus’s	visually	impaired	founders,	and	other	experts,	who	helped	the	founder	focus	his	product	market	fit.		
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Week	7	-	Berlin	
IoT	Accelerate	EyeFocus	supported	a	group	of	its	startups	to	enter	the	IoT	Accelerate	competition	in	Berlin,	taking	place	at	Rainmaking	Loft	Berlin.	The	competition	-	sponsored	by	Google,	Ericsson,	and	Application	Developers	Alliance	-	was	highly	competitive,	but	3	of	EyeFocus’s	teams	competed	and	DB	Glove	as	awarded	the	first	prize,	winning	20,000	Euro	and	a	fully	funded	trips	to	several	major	conferences.			
Impact	Hub	Anniversary	Event	EyeFocus	took	the	cohort	to	the	one	year	anniversary	celebration	of	Impact	Hub	Berlin,	an	innovation	centre	for	social	and	sustainable	entrepreneurs,	and	part	of	a	global	network	of	Impact	Hubs.	This	was	an	important	networking	opportunity	for	EyeFocus	startups,	as	most	of	them	are	working	on	social	causes,	so	it	was	important	for	them	to	be	plugged	in	to	the	Berlin	social	innovation	scene.		
Week	8	-	Berlin	
Startup	Confessions	A	group	of	EyeFocus	startups	were	given	complimentary	tickets	by	EyeFocus	partners	Berlin	Startup	Consulting	to	the	monthly	event	“Startup	Confessions”.	The	event	is	primarily	a	networking	opportunity,	with	guests	including	startups,	and	experts	across	fundraising,	tax	&	auditing,	strategy,	and	beyond.	The	purpose	is	to	support	startups	with	advice	and	expertise	to	overcome	any	challenges	they’re	facing,	and	is	a	key	regular	event	in	the	Berlin	entrepreneurship	calendar.		
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Founders’	Stories:	Melissa	Nicci	‘Founder’s	stories’	was	developed	in	the	EyeFocus	program,	inviting	other	founders	to	tell	their	story	so	EyeFocus	startups	could	learn	from	these	lessons.	For	this	event,	EyeFocus	was	joined	by	Melinda	Nicci,	Founder	&	CEO	of	Baby2Body.	As	an	entrepreneur	in	the	digital	health	industry,	Melinda	experienced	similar	challenges	to	those	being	faced	by	the	startups:	building	a	team,	getting	an	MVP	ready,	marketing,	and	fundraising.	Melissa	was	able	to	offer	the	teams	significant	insights	into	some	of	the	key	hurdles	faced	by	early	stage	entrepreneurs.			
IXDS	Design	Workshop	EyeFocus	was	joined	by	Berlin	design	agency	IXDS	for	an	in-depth	workshop	on	user-centred	service	design.	The	startups	were	led	through	a	series	of	exercises	focussing	on	understanding	the	needs	of	their	target	user	groups	and	analysing	all	aspects	of	service	touch	points.	Using	a	tailored	version	of	their	Academy	programme	-	normally	run	over	the	course	of	weeks	with	large	multi-national	companies	-	the	IXDS	team	equipped	the	EyeFocus	startup	with	practical	tools	to	support	the	design	process.		
Week	9	-	Berlin	
European	Health	Innovators	Networking	Lunch	EyeFocus	startups	were	invited	to	a	health	tech	networking	lunch	co-organised	by	Tehnopol,	an	Estonia-based	science	&	business	park,	home	to	over	180	companies	which	was	visiting	Berlin.	Tehnopol	was	connected	to	EyeFocus	via	their	founders	and	MDs.	The	lunch	was	a	valuable	opportunity	for	the	startups	to	meet	other	
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entrepreneurs	working	in	the	healthtech	space,	and	to	connect	to	some	of	the	most	exciting	startups	coming	out	of	Estonia.			
ConhIT	Conference	&	Startup	Showcase	EyeFocus	were	invited	to	participate	in	the	annual	Connecting	Healthcare	IT	Conference	2015,	a	leading	international	health	&	technology	conference.	An	EyeFocus	Startup	was	invited	to	pitch	in	the	Startup	Showcase	organised	by	Berlin	Partner,	a	partner	of	EyeFocus.			
Online	session	with	Dr	Thulasiraj	Ravilla	A	highpoint	of	the	program,	and	a	strong	example	of	what	an	accelerator	can	achieve,	was	a	video	call	with	Dr	Thulasiraj	Ravilla,	Executive	Director	of	Aravind	Eye	Care	System,	and	an	acknowledged	thought	leader	in	eye-care	innovation	globally.	Dr	Ravilla	had	offered	to	mentor	for	EyeFocus,	but	is	based	in	India.	After	considerable	planning,	a	time	was	booked	and	special	software	shared	in	order	for	him	to	meet	the	EyeFocus	teams	online.			Eight	EyeFocus	startups	joined	the	video	conference,	where	Dr	Ravilla	gave	an	overview	of	his	work,	as	well	as	some	of	the	key	innovations	coming	out	of	Aravind.	Teams	were	given	insights	into	the	Indian	eye-care	market	and	how	to	ensure	they	create	products	with	this	huge	market	in	mind.	Startups	also	pitched	to	Dr	Ravilla,	and	were	given	personal	feedback	on	their	products.		After	the	call,	several	of	the	startups	received	detailed	one-to-one	follow	up	support	from	Dr	Ravilla,	who	is	advising	them	on	the	Indian	market	&	the	viability	of	their	products	in	this	region.		
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Aside	from	the	knowledge	and	insights,	it	was	a	high	point	of	the	program	to	meet	a	world	leader	in	eye-care	innovation,	offering	inspiration	to	the	teams.	This	was	an	example	of	EyeFocus	using	its	high	level	of	Social	Capital	in	the	wider	eye-care	ecosystem	to	create	a	direct	link	between	startups	and	a	world	leader	in	his	field.			
Pro	Retina	EyeFocus	met	representatives	from	Pro	Retina,	the	German	patient	self-help	group	for	people	with	retinal	degeneration.	The	meeting	introduced	EyeFocus	to	some	key	contacts	in	Government	and	the	Third	Sector,	including	the	Christopher	Blind	Mission,	an	NGO	dedicated	to	the	needs	of	blind	people.		
Week	10	-	Berlin	
Bhavin	Shah,	Behavioural	Optometrist	Having	met	him	at	the	London	event	with	Seedrs,	EyeFocus	invited	Dr	Bhavin	Shah,	a	behavioural	optometrist	to	visit	EyeFocus	in	Berlin.	EyeFocus	had	kept	aside	a	budget	to	fly	in	people	of	exceptional	interest,	and	with	this	arranged	for	Dr	Shah	to	come	to	Berlin	for	a	night.	He	explained	behavioural	optometry,	carried	out	mentoring,	and	joined	the	teams	for	dinner.	Consequently,	he	became	a	co-founder	of	Mr	Patch,	where	he	used	his	expertise	and	contacts	to	help	test	and	launch	the	product	in	the	UK	market.			
Goodpoint	Fellows	3	Marta	Führich	delivered	her	final	workshop,	tailored	specifically	to	the	support	and	development	of	EyeFocus	startups.	In	this	session,	she	focused	on	how	to	make	sensible	partnership	decisions,	and	how	to	work	with	external	consultants	and	organisations.			
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Founders’	Stories	with	Max	Ostermeier,	CEO	&	co-founder	of	Implandata	Max	Ostermeier	visited	EyeFocus	to	speak	to	the	startups	about	his	experience	founding	a	successful	eye-care	startup.	Max	has	a	rich	and	varied	background	in	entrepreneurship,	and	was	able	to	offer	EyeFocus	teams	focused	advice	on	different	sources	of	finance,	managing	teams,	and	expanding	in	Germany	and	Europe.			
Week	11	-	Berlin	
Female	Founders	Networking	Brunch	EyeFocus	organised	a	women-only	event	for	the	female	EyeFocus	founders	and	other	female	founders	and	entrepreneurs	in	Berlin.	EyeFocus	had	an	unusually	high	proportion	of	women	involved	in	all	aspects	of	the	programme	-	including	37%	of	the	mentors,	6	founders,	and	more	than	half	the	management	team.	The	event	included	entrepreneurs	from	Startup	Institute,	Uberchord,	and	Carmudi.	It	was	an	interesting	opportunity	to	gain	new	contacts	and	perspectives	from	the	tech	world,	and	created	new	contacts	for	the	EyeFocus	founders.	Using	a	non-sector	theme	for	an	event	creates	new	weak	tie	links.	In	effect,	women	founders,	or	any	similar	theme,	cuts	horizontally	across	the	usual	sector	verticals	like	healthcare	or	hardware,	and	introduces	randomness	in	who	comes	to	the	event.			
EyeFocus	visits	Nocti	Vagus	The	EyeFocus	staff	and	cohort	went	for	dinner	at	Nocti	Vagus.	The	restaurant	is	staffed	entirely	by	blind	and	partially	sighted	waiters,	and	customers	eat	in	pitch	darkness.	The	evening	was	a	social	event	to	develop	the	cohesion	of	the	cohort,	but	was	also	a	
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powerful	experience	for	the	founders,	most	of	whom	are	developing	devices	to	make	life	better	for	people	with	sight	loss	but	are	not	themselves	visually	impaired.			After	discussion	with	some	of	the	waiters,	all	of	whom	are	blind,	two	of	them	visited	EyeFocus	to	test	and	review	some	of	the	startups’	prototypes.	They	spent	an	afternoon	giving	very	detailed	feedback	on	the	products.			
ATC	Services	workshop	on	startup	tax		The	startups	were	visited	by	a	team	from	ATC	Services,	a	tax	and	auditing	company	located	in	Berlin.	The	workshop	aimed	to	make	the	German	tax	system	more	understandable	within	a	startup	context.	The	teams	were	able	to	receive	advice	on	issues	directly	related	to	their	companies	and	moving	to	Germany.			
Greenlight	Guru	EyeFocus	teams	were	given	a	workshop	by	Greenlight	Guru,	a	US	company	offering	a	cloud-based	platform	and	consultancy	services	designed	to	help	startups	get	over	the	hurdles	of	compliance	and	regulatory	approval	both	in	the	US	and	Europe.	They	create	a	simple	way	of	managing	a	set	of	fairly	complex	processes.	The	startups	received	crucial	guidance	on	their	regulatory	concerns.			
Week	12	-	Berlin	
IP/IT	law	workshop,	Heussen	Law	Marcus	Hotze,	a	specialist	IP	and	IT	lawyer	from	law	firm	Heussen	delivered	a	workshop	on	many	of	the	common	IP	issues	faced	by	startup	companies	in	the	tech	
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field.	Startups	were	given	detailed	answers	and	support	on	areas	such	as	patents,	commercialisation,	and	IP	issues.			
Media	&	PR	Workshop,	Clarity	PR	EyeFocus	was	visited	by	Linsey	Fryatt,	Managing	Director	of	Clarity	PR	Germany.	Linsey	gave	an	informative	workshop	on	how	startups	should	approach	the	press	to	get	the	best	coverage	for	their	products,	and	startups	left	with	a	much	greater	understanding	about	how	to	gain	exposure.		
Visit	from	Croatian	entrepreneurs		EyeFocus	was	visited	by	a	group	of	Croatian	entrepreneurs,	as	part	of	an	EU-funded	programme	to	support	Balkan	businesses	to	learn	more	about	European	innovation	hubs.	Around	15	entrepreneurs	visited	the	space	at	Rainmaking	Loft,	and	were	given	a	detailed	introduction	on	the	Berlin	startup	scene,	what	accelerators	do,	and	what	EyeFocus	is	doing	differently.	The	event	was	sharing	some	of	the	experience	EyeFocus	had	developed,	but	also	further	extended	the	weak	tie	networks	of	the	teams.			
European	Digital	Health	Summit	EyeFocus	were	invited	to	be	part	of	the	2nd	annual	European	Digital	Health	Summit	"Molecules	versus	Bits	&	Bytes",	which	took	place	at	Rainmaking	Loft,	Berlin,	further	demonstrating	the	value	of	the	program	being	based	there.	Organised	by	TransAct	Advisory	Services,	Egon	Zehnder	and	Janssen	Pharmaceuticals,	the	day	brought	together	over	150	investors,	corporates	and	startups,	focusing	specifically	on	the	topic	of	digital	health	and	medtech.	The	day	was	focused	on	networking,	with	many	of	the	
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startups	making	useful	connections	with	people	from	across	Europe’s	medtech	scene,	including	investors.			
An	afternoon	with	Bosch	India	EyeFocus	hosted	representatives	from	Bosch	Eye	Care	Solutions,	who	visited	from	Bangalore,	India.	Bosch	sponsored	the	trip	to	London	in	March,	which	enabled	nine	EyeFocus	teams	to	visit	the	UK	for	a	week	of	events.	A	group	of	EyeFocus	startups	pitched	their	products	and	demonstrated	their	work,	and	were	given	insights	into	eye-care	in	the	growing	India	market,	and	some	of	the	innovative	work	being	carried	out	in	this	field	by	Bosch.		
Week	13	-	Berlin	
Workshop	on	VC	investment	in	digital	health,	XLHealth	XLHealth	is	a	Berlin-based	VC	investor	that	focuses	solely	on	digital	health	startups.	Min-Sung	Kim,	Partner	at	XL	Health,	gave	startups	a	thorough	understanding	of	their	investment	focus	and	data	in	the	digital	health	industry.		The	startups	had	a	rare	insight	from	a	specialist	investor	about	how	they	judge	investments,	the	criteria	they	use,	and	advice	about	how	to	improve	their	chances	for	success	when	approaching	VCs.		
M-Enabling	Conference	A	group	of	EyeFocus	startups	were	invited	to	join	a	panel	discussion	at	the	M-Enabling	conference	taking	place	in	Moscow,	dialling	in	from	Berlin.	The	discussion	centred	
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around	how	new	technologies	can	be	used	to	help	visually	impaired	people,	and	the	opportunity	helped	promote	the	cohort	and	accelerator	in	the	Russian	ecosystem.		
End	of	Programme	Event	EyeFocus	lead	sponsor,	Bayer	HealthCare,	hosted	the	end	of	programme	event	to	mark	the	closing	of	the	EyeFocus	program.	Guests	heard	extended	pitches	and	reflections	from	six	EyeFocus	startups	&	associates,	as	well	as	a	presentation	from	the	EyeFocus	team	on	how	it	set	up	and	ran	the	programme.		The	evening	included	several	mentors	and	partners	of	EyeFocus,	as	well	as	representatives	from	the	main	program	sponsors,	Carl	Zeiss	AG,	and	Peppermint	Venture	Partners.	The	event	was	an	opportunity	for	the	startups	to	network	with	the	sponsors,	but	also	for	the	sponsors	to	mentor	with	each	other.			
Week	14	-	Berlin	Despite	the	program	having	formally	ended,	the	EyeFocus	team	and	some	of	the	startups	remained	in	Rainmaking	Loft	for	several	more	weeks.	During	this	time,	EyeFocus	continued	to	organise	some	events	and	meetings.			
US	delegation	from	Cultural	Vistas	EyeFocus	was	visited	by	a	group	of	American	college	students,	as	part	of	a	programme	run	by	non-profit	organization,	Cultural	Vistas.		Twenty	students	and	professors	from	the	historically	black	colleges,	Morehouse	and	Spelman,	visited	EyeFocus	to	learn	more	about	opportunities	to	complete	internships	or	work	in	Germany	in	the	future.	They	
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came	from	a	wide	range	of	STEM	fields,	including	pre-med,	engineering,	psychology,	mathematics,	computer	science,	and	biochemistry.			The	EyeFocus	team	and	startups	gave	participants	exposure	to	companies	in	the	healthcare	industry	as	well	as	offer	insights	into	the	Berlin	startup	scene.		
Week	15	-	Berlin	
Charité	Entrepreneurship	Summit	-	Demo	day		During	the	program,	EyeFocus	explored	what	sort	of	final	event	would	be	most	beneficial	to	the	cohort,	deciding	not	to	organise	a	conventional	demo	day	.		The	main	reason	was	that	it	would	be	hard	to	fill	a	large	room	for	a	meaningful	event	when	the	EyeFocus	network	was	global,	and	the	Berlin	startup	sector	would	likely	find	a	demo	day		just	focussed	on	eye-care	too	specific.	The	value	of	demo	day	s	was	already	being	questioned	by	mainstream	accelerators,	and	EyeFocus	decided	it	would	offer	more	value	to	join	forces	with	an	existing	event,	which	already	had	an	audience	relevant	to	EyeFocus.	Consequently,	EyeFocus	decided	to	co-sponsor	the	8th	annual	Charité	Entrepreneur	Summit	"The	Future	of	Healthcare”.		EyeFocus	startups	flew	in	from	around	Europe	for	this	last	event,	reconvening	the	cohort	which	had	already	widely	disbursed	at	the	end	of	the	program.		Organised	by	Stiftung	Charité,	the	summit	brought	together	an	audience	from	the	healthcare	sector,	including	academics,	clinicians,	startups,	and	investors,	and	looked	at	topics	related	to	entrepreneurship	&	medicine,	examining	different	ways	that	the	two	sectors	
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can	intersect	more	effectively.	The	EyeFocus	cohort	did	a	final	pitch	session	to	a	room	full	of	healthcare	investors,	and	joined	in	with	a	panel	at	the	event.																								
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8.2	MENTORS		For	reference,	and	to	demonstrate	the	network	built	by	EyeFocus	Accelerator,	the	following	list	shows	most,	but	not	all,	of	the	mentors	on	the	program.	Some	joined	very	late	and	were	not	included	in	the	formal	list.	The	list	of	mentors	is	a	visual	demonstration	of	the	ecosystem	EyeFocus	built	and	was	intended	to	show	validation	of	the	program	by	a	broad	group	of	people,	but	also	to	offer	value	to	the	mentors	by	promoting	their	involvement.	It	demonstrated	to	startups	and	others	the	Social	Capital	that	these	people	invested	into	the	program.	The	mentor	list	shows	the	different	sectors	represented	by	the	mentors,	and	shows	that	the	mentors	consisted	of	people	at	all	stages	of	their	career,	and	from	different	layers	in	relevant	hierarchies,	from	senior	to	junior.		
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8.3	STARTUPS	AND	ASSOCIATES			
Below,	for	reference,	is	a	full	list	of	the	startups	and	associates	accepted	onto	the	program.		8.3.1	Accepted	into	the	cohort,	with	funding			Applicants	accepted	into	EyeFocus	as	Startups	(received	funding	and	attended	the	program)	
Mr	Patch		Developed	a	mobile	app	that	uses	eye	tracking	technology	to	screen	and	monitor	vision	problems	that	affect	reading	and	learning	in	primary	school	children.	From	Paraguay,	and	previously	completed	Startup	Bootcamp	accelerator	in	Copenhagen.	Received	investment	from	EyeFocus.		
BlindSense		BlindSense	produced	a	hand	held	digital	Braille	device	that	converted	text	on	smart	device	screens	into	Braille	that	punched	up	onto	the	users’	finger.	From	Palestine,	previously	completed	Buildit	Accelerator	in	Estonia.	Received	investment	from	EyeFocus.		
Ocutrack		Up	to	60%	of	children	may	be	misdiagnosed	with	a	learning	disorder	or	ADD,	when	they	actually	have	a	vision	problem.	Current	hardware	and	software	technologies	used	for	the	diagnosis	of	eye-tracking	problems	are	outdated,	expensive,	and	not	widely	distributed.	Ocutrack	aimed	to	leverage	existing	mobile	camera	technology	with	the	
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power	of	scalable	software	to	make	eye-tracking	available	to	more	patients	for	less	money.		
Founded	by	an	American	optometrist,	Joel	Getty,	who	attended	the	first	6	weeks	as	Optometrist	in	Residence.		
Aston	Eye	Tech	Aston	Eytech	is	a	spin-out	of	Aston	University's	world	leading	School	of	Optometry	and	Bio-Medical	Engineering	Department.	The	product	range,	based	on	5	years	R&D	work	by	the	academics,	includes	decision	support	software	for	optometrists	using	advanced	mathematics	and	artificial	intelligence	to	improve	accuracy	of	diagnosis	and	to	help	them	increase	sales	through	more	personalised	product	recommendations.	A	range	of	eye	test	instrumentation	designed	to	be	as	effective	but	much	more	portable	and	affordable	than	conventional	equipment.	Received	EyeFocus	investment	alongside	other	investors	in	a	seed	round.		
Semu	Semu	designed	devices	for	visually	impaired	and	blind	people	that	enable	them	to	use	home	automation	systems	to	make	their	homes	safer	and	more	efficient.	By	connecting	to	pre-existing	sensors,	the	central	device	gives	audio	feedback,	allowing	blind	and	visually	impaired	people	to	use	existing	technology	to	secure	their	homes.	When	leaving	the	house,	the	user	presses	a	button	on	the	wall	and	is	told	if	a	window	is	open	or	an	electrical	appliance	is	on,	and	can	turn	off	appliances	directly	from	the	device.	
The	team	from	Estonia	and	received	funding	to	attend	EyeFocus	to	see	if	they	could	develop	their	early	stage	idea	into	a	startup.		
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8.3.2	Accepted	as	Associates,	without	funding	
Ocuplus	German	company	that	developed	intelligent	software	for	desktops,	smartphones,	and	tablets,	as	well	as	augmented	reality	glasses	to	allow	visually	impaired	users	to	process	information	text	encountered	in	daily	life.			
Difrotec	Difrotec	offered	an	industrial	solution	for	testing	optics,	with	accuracy	100	times	greater	than	is	currently	available	on	the	market.	
Their	patented	technology	helps	optics	manufacturers	use	only	one	tool	for	quality	assurance,	rather	than	many.	Difrotec	had	already	achieved	sales	of	1m	Euros,	and	joined	EyeFocus	to	develop	their	market.	From	Estonia,	where	they	also	completed	Buildit	accelerator.	
Project	Ray	A	mobile	device	for	blind	and	visually	impaired	people,	from	Israel.		
Tooteko	Developed	in	Italy,	Tooteko	built	a	wristband	that	sends	alerts	through	vibrations	or	sounds.	Tooteko	also	has	a	built-in	NFC	antenna	which	allows	people	to	explore	any	3D	surface	that	has	been	tagged,	by	streaming	audio	content	directly	to	their	own	smart	device	so	they	receive	audio	content	connected	to	what	they	are	touching.			
Optica	Technology		From	Hong	Kong,	Optica	Technology	developed	algorithms	that	help	people	who	are	colour	blind	to	see	colours	properly.	They	have	developed	a	phone	app	that	changes	the	
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colours	on	the	phone,	but	more	complex	is	a	process	to	allow	a	3D	television	to	show	a	program	that	a	normally	sighted	person	can	view	alongside	someone	who	is	colour	blind.	The	colour-blind	person	would	wear	3D	glasses	that	convert	the	image,	so	they	can	see	the	colours	properly.	The	Optica	team	attended	the	first	week	of	the	program	in	Berlin,	then	continued	virtually	from	Hong	Kong.		
Sourcio		Armenian	Sourcio	developed	a	mobile	app	called	Eye	Care	Plus,	a	comprehensive	vision	testing	and	improvement	app	which	helps	prevent	eye	diseases	with	early	identification;	supports	and	improves	vision	through	trainings;	and	raises	eye	health	awareness.	It	also	features	direct	ophthalmological	consultancy	through	our	collaboration	with	vision	professionals.	
Suricog		French	company	Suricog	built	an	eye-tracking	system	within	spectacle	frames,	which	sits	very	close	to	the	eye.	This	allows	the	eye	to	interact	with	any	object	looked	at,	in	real	time.	This	has	multiple	applications	from	optometry,	through	to	controlling	devices	for	people	with	mobility	conditions.		
Intact	Healthcare		An	Italian	company	that	produced	a	variety	of	digital	health	hardware	devices,	they	focussed	on	DB	Glove,	which	helps	deaf	blind	people	interface	with	smart	phones	and	communicate	for	the	first	time	with	other	people	who	are	not	trained	to	speak	specialist	languages	like	Malosi.	The	founder	moved	to	Berlin	and	attended	the	full	EyeFocus	program	at	his	expense.	Because	the	company	was	an	early	stage	not-for-profit,	he	did	not	want	investment	funding.		
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App	4	Eyes	Based	in	Germany,	this	program	detects	and	documents	distortions	(metamorphopsias)	or	visual	field	defects	(scotomas)	and	illustrate	any	changes.	The	professional	version	also	provides	a	graphical	representation	of	changes.		
Givevision	Give	Vision	is	building	the	world's	first	real	time	video-to-audio	wearable	device,	designed	specifically	for	people	affected	by	sight	loss.	Based	in	London,	at	Wayra	accelerator,	they	became	an	associate	at	EyeFocus	after	meeting	the	team	at	an	EyeFocus	event	in	London.		
BatSuite	Developing	a	glove	with	ultrasound,	which	transmits	an	impulse	to	the	blind	person.	This	enables	the	blind	person	to	get	a	“picture	“of	the	surrounding	like	a	bat	does.	Part	of	Berlin	Hardware	Accelerator.	
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8.4	MENTORING	GUIDE	FOR	STARTUPS	
	This	guide	was	given	to	the	cohort	prior	to	mentoring	beginning	during	EyeFocus	Accelerator.		
	
Mentoring Guide - for Startups  
Mentoring is one of the core aspects of any accelerator program, and we feel it is one of the 
most valuable. Not only is it a unique opportunity to network with influential experts across 
diverse fields, it is also a great chance to learn new skills, ask questions, and seek advice 
and expertise from people who understand a topic deeply. There are very few circumstances 
where people like this will so freely and openly offer you their time on a one-to-one basis, 
and it shouldn’t be underestimated.  
We have prepared this short guide to help you get the most of these time-limited sessions.  
 
How to maximise the impact of your mentoring sessions  
1. Before the Meeting 
• Keep the EyeFocus team informed of ANY mentoring meeting you are having, however 
informal or quick. Please never contact mentors directly for a first session, this should 
always be organised by EyeFocus.  
• Always research your mentor. Google them, read their biography on the EyeFocus 
website, find out their back story and experiences. Even people who at first seem less 
relevant may appear more interesting once you understand a bit more about them.  
• Think about what you want from the session before it begins. Where possible, prepare 
some questions in advance. This doesn’t have to involve a lot of work, and could just be a 
few bullet points jotted down. This will help guide your conversation, ensure it’s heading in 
a useful direction, and hopefully get the information you want.  
• Think about how you appear. This may often seem less important in a startup setting, but 
the way you present yourself still matters. If your mentor is from a more corporate 
background, you might want to think about dressing a little more formally that day. Think 
about the image you want to project.  
• Bring your business card and remember to give it to your mentor! 
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• Have a clear pitch – you are not selling, but you need to summarise what you are doing 
and what you need very quickly to avoid wasting your session. 
• Remember to talk about what you don’t know, what you are missing, and what you need, 
rather than just saying how great your startup is. Mentors are there to help, not to be 
impressed.  
• Be polite. You are getting their time for free. Always turn off your phone and close your 
laptop. Never, never check messages, or answer the phone in a mentoring session.  
• NEVER BE LATE. In fact, be early. Lateness wastes your time, their time, and reflects 
badly on you and EyeFocus. NEVER BE LATE!  
3. After the Meeting 
• Speak to an EyeFocus team member about the mentoring session, even if it’s just a quick 
email. We need to have an idea about how each mentoring session goes and keep track 
of who met who.  
• Always follow up quickly. It’s likely that your mentor is a busy person who meets a lot of 
people, so they might not remember you for long. Capitalise on that first meeting by 
following up on any actions immediately. This will also show them that you’re reliable. 
• Do what you say you’ll do. It’s amazing how many startups say they’ll contact the mentor 
with information, or to remind them to follow up an introduction, and then forget. 
• Always take notes!! Keep all your notes in Evernote. What did they say, who do they know, 
what actions did you agree? In Evernote you can search for this easily in the future.  
• Keep track of who you met. They may not be useful now, but they could be important in 
the future. 
• Remember you are building a personal network for your future.  
 
Skype Mentoring 
Skype mentoring will be an important element of the EyeFocus program, both for Startups 
and Associates. There are a lot of benefits to mentoring over Skype: it allows us to interact 
with a much broader range of fantastic mentors (many of them not based in Berlin), it means 
our associates can be supported from anywhere in the world, and it makes it easier to fit 
mentoring around busy lives.  
The rules above should apply just as much to Skype mentoring - in fact, it’s probably 
necessary to be even more organised, since clarity is very important when speaking 
remotely.  
Here are some more tips specific to Skype mentoring: 
• Check time differences: what time zone is your mentor in - when does that mean you’re 
talking in Berlin time? 
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• Do you have their Skype address? This seems obvious, but make sure you know this 
beforehand, not 5 minutes before you’re meant to be speaking! This will save time and 
avoid confusion.  
• Are you in a quiet room, with good acoustics? Try to limit distractions. 
• Make sure before you call that your microphone and speakers are working –	do a test call 
to someone in EyeFocus to be sure.  
• Turn off anything on your laptop that uses bandwidth to ensure a clear call. 
• Once you have added a mentor on Skype, that doesn’t	mean you can write to them 
anytime afterwards. Only call or write when you fix an appointment, unless they ask you 
to.   										
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